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ARTICLES

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOKS RECEIVED

THE DOCTRINE OF FREE CHOICE IN SAINT BONAVENTURE[1]

The doctrine of free choice as developed by St. Bonaventure gives us an example of the dialectical development of scholasticism in the Middle Ages. The Saint's exposition of this point includes a survey of all the previous doctrines and an attempt to reconcile as many of them as possible. The result is a doctrine of free choice which is much more comprehensive than the doctrines of his predecessors. To understand St. Bonaventure's doctrine of free choice it will first be necessary to consider the nature of the soul and its faculties of reason and will. For the Saint maintains that free choice is a habit of reason and will.

I

Like many of the scholastic writers, St. Bonaventure nowhere gives an explicit proof for the existence of the soul. Although it is the form of the body, it is also a spiritual substance, composed of spiritual matter and form, which are necessary to explain the soul's limitation and mutability.[2] Spiritual matter, however, does not destroy the simplicity and immortality of the soul, since, unlike corporeal matter, it does not imply quantitative parts.[3] In their metaphysical content spiritual and corporeal matter are essentially the same; but in its actual physical existence matter is either spiritual or corporeal depending upon the form which determines its mode of existence.[4] The substantial unity of the soul also does not destroy the substantial unity of man, because body and soul have a mutual appetite and inclination toward each other which constitutes the bond of substantial unity.[5]

St. Bonaventure introduces his conception of faculties of the soul by stating that they are required to explain the operations of the soul. For if the soul did not have faculties through which it could operate,

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[1] The translation of *liberum arbitrium* as free choice seems preferable to free will or freedom of choice. As well as being a more accurate translation of the Latin, it does not prejudice the question as to the precise relationship of *liberum arbitrium* to the powers of reason and will.

[2] *In II Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, ad 5 (II, p. 415 b). Anima autem non tantum est forma, immo etiam est hoc aliquid.

[3] *Ibid.* (II, p. 415 a).

[4] *In II Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3 (II, p. 100 b).

[5] *Breviloquium*, p. 7, c. 5 (V, p. 286 b).

then the operation of the soul would be identified with its existence; and since the soul always exists, it would always operate — which is clearly against common experience.[6] These faculties are really distinct from the soul because they go out from the soul in their operations.[7] But at the same time they are not essentially distinct from the soul, but rather cosubstantial with the soul, because they proceed immediately from the soul and do not require an accident added to the substance of the soul. They are essential to the soul because without them the soul could never exist in its fullest perfection.[8] The spirituality of the soul explains how the faculties can proceed immediately from it without the intervention of an accident. Thus the Saint concludes that the faculties are cosubstantial with the soul, but not completely the same as the soul.[9] He seems to be straining in an effort to express an Augustinian concept in the terminology of Aristotle.

The real, though, non-essential, distinction between the soul and its faculties is the key to understanding the distinction which St. Bonaventure makes between the faculties themselves, especially between reason and will. He proves that reason and will must be distinct from the different operations of knowing and loving.[10] But the real distinction between them is only in the genus of faculties, since both faculties are cosubstantial with the soul.[11] St. Bonaventure has a hard time expressing this very close connection of the faculties with the soul, and hence with each other. Nevertheless it is an important point and contributes greatly toward an adequate understanding of free choice.

St. Bonaventure divides the faculties of the soul according to several different criteria of distinction. According to their nature the faculties are divided into vegetative, sensitive, and rational, and the rational into intellective and affective. He then shows the relation of reason to

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[6] *In I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, ad 3 (I, pp. 86b—87a).

[7] *In I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, f. 5 (I, p. 85b) ... virtus egreditur substantiam, quia operatur in objectum, quod est extra.

[8] *Ibid.*, ad 1, 2 (I, p. 86b). Quarto modo dicitur essentiale sine quo res non potest cogitari habere perfectum esse, ut sunt potentiae in anima, in quibus attenditur imago; et hoc est minimo modo substantiale sive essentiale; tamen non transit in aliud genus; ideo anima dicitur suae potentiae.

[9] *Ibid.*, (I, p. 85b). Potentiae animae sunt substantiales et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima; non sunt tamen cum ipsa omnino idem per essentiam.

[10] *In II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3 (II, p. 561b) ... quia cognoscere et amare absque dubio sunt actus differentes, potentiae, quae sunt ad hos actus, per se ipsas diversitatem habent.

[11] *Ibid.* (II, p. 560ab) ... nec tamen concedunt, eas simpliciter diversificari secundum essentiam, ita ut dicantur diversae essentiae, sed differre essentialiter in genere potentiae, ita ut dicantur diversae potentiae sive diversa instrumenta ejusdem substantiae.

the other cognitive faculties by dividing the cognitive faculties into sensitive and intellectual, and then subdividing the intellectual faculties into reason and intellect.[12] The foundation for this division is the two-fold object which man can know — the universal *rationes* abstracted from reality which are known by reason, and the separated spiritual substances which are known by the intellect.[13] Reason, therefore, is man's cognitive intellectual faculty under the aspect of its relation to its inferior object, universal natures abstracted from space and time.

St. Bonaventure defines will as the appetite of reason.[14] This rational appetite has two modes of operation — a natural operation according to synderesis and a deliberative operation according to free choice. Synderesis is a natural weight of the will toward the good-in-itself.[15] When the will acts according to synderesis, it is called "natural will." When it acts according to free choice, it is called "deliberative will."[16]

II

St. Bonaventure proves the freedom of the will from a metaphysical point of view rather than from a psychological point of view. He explicitly states that free choice is necessarily related to reason and will, which cannot exist or even be thought of without including free choice.[17] The Saint then goes on to analyze the meaning of this freedom which man enjoys. A faculty is considered to be free if it has full control *(dominium)* over its object and its act.[18] Control over its object means that the faculty is not bound down by its nature to some definite object so that it can seek no other. For example, the brutes can seek only the pleasurable and useful good; whereas man can seek any good whatsoever,

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[12] *Ibid.*, q. 3 (II, p. 566 ab).
[13] *In Hexaemeron*, 5, n. 24 (V, p. 358 a). Intellectualis potentia est duplex: aut ut considerat universales rationes abstractas, ut abstrahit a loco, tempore et dimensione; aut ut elevatur ad substantias spirituales separatas; et sic duae potentiae, scilicet, ratio et intellectus.
[14] *In III Sent.*, d. 33, a. 1, q. 3 (III, p. 717 b) ... nihil aliud quam affectus sive appetitus ratiocinatus.
[15] *In II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 (II, p. 910 a).
[16] *In II Sent.*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3 (II, p. 566 a). Alio modo potest dividi appetitus sive potentia in naturalem et deliberativam, ita tamen, quod non sit differentia in objectis, sed in modo appetendi; ut cum appellamus synderesim esse voluntatem naturalem, quae quidem naturaliter inclinat et instigat ad bonum honestum et murmurat contra malum; et voluntatem deliberativam appetitum, quo post deliberationem aliquando adhaeremus bono, aliquando malo.
[17] *In II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, a. 1, q. 5, f. 3 (II, p. 603 a).
[18] *Ibid.*, q. 1 (II, p. 593 a) ... unde illa potentia dicitur esse libera quae dominium habet plenum tam respectu objecti quam respectu actus proprii.

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whether it be useful, pleasurable, or the good-in-itself.[19] Control over its proper act means that by its own command the will can choose to love what it has formerly hated, or choose to hate what it has formerly loved. From this St. Bonaventure concludes that not every intrinsic operation means that the faculty is free, but only those operations in which the faculty moves itself.[20] The essence of freedom is the power of self-movement.

Arbitrium — which means "decision" but in this context is best translated as "choice" — does not differ from judgment except that it specifies those judgments which determine the activity of other powers which move in accord with judgment.[21] Choice is one type of judgment. Judgment alone implies an act of reason which is regulated primarily and solely by the norm of truth and is ordered to speculative contemplation; whereas choice implies an act of reason which is regulated primarily by the command of the will and determines the activity of other powers which move in accord with the choice.[22]

From this analysis of freedom and choice St. Bonaventure concludes that free choice must include reason and will because the full control of freedom requires that the faculty be able to reflect upon its own act and move itself toward the good which it wishes.[23] Self-reflection belongs only to reason; self-movement only to will. Therefore, free choice must include them both.

In an effort to explain further this final conclusion St. Bonaventure states that free choice is a potential whole *(totum potentiale)* of which reason and will are the parts. A potential whole is like an integral whole in that both reason and will are required for free choice; it is like a universal whole in that free choice can be predicated of either reason or will. The Quaracchi editors explain this potential whole by remarking that the perfection of free choice is present in each of the parts in its complete essence, but not in its complete capability, which requires

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[19] It is important to note that in the present discussion the Saint considers free choice as found in creatures in this life. Elsewhere he discusses free choice in its most general application so as to include God, the angels, and the souls in heaven. Cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 2, a. 1, q., (II, pp. 609 ff.).

[20] *Ibid.*, ad 4 (II, p. 594 a). Unde non quicumque motus ab intrinseco facit potentiam liberam, sed ille motus quo vis motiva movet se ipsam.

[21] *Ibid.*, q. 1 (II, p. 593 b). Arbitrium enim idem est quod judicium, ad cujus nutum ceterae virtutes moventur et obediunt.

[22] *Ibid.*, Dub. 1 (II, p. 607 a). Judicium importat actum rationis regulatum secundum regulas veritatis sive supernae legis; arbitrium vero importat actum rationis regulatum secundum imperium voluntatis.

[23] *Ibid.*, q. 3 (II, p. 599 a). Nisi enim posset se super actum suum reflectere, numquam posset illum refrenare, nisi posset se ipsam movere, nec posset in illum exire, quando vellet.

the concomitance of the two faculties.[24] But after all is said and done, there remains some obscurity concerning this particular point.

St. Bonaventure arrives at the real definition of free choice after an examination of the various definitions given by his predecessors. He falsely attributes to St. Augustine the definition which he chooses to adopt: "Liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis." Actually this definition first appears in the *Summa Sententiarum* from which it was taken by Peter Lombard and incorporated into his *Liber Sententiarum*.[25] William of Auxerre was the first to attribute the definition to Augustine.[26] Bonaventure takes the definition from the *Sentences* and follows the current opinion that it originated with Augustine. The definition itself — "facultas rationis et voluntatis" — can best be translated as a "capability of reason and will." It is important to note that *facultas* means a facility, fitness, or capability rather than a faculty.[27] This definition plays a very important role in Bonaventure's doctrine of free choice.

The Saint has analysed freedom and choice only to find that free choice must include both reason and will. He has also arrived at an acceptable definition of free choice. Now he is prepared to analyze the precise relation between free choice and the faculties of reason and will.

Once again St. Bonaventure finds his solution to this problem by reviewing the various opinions common in scholastic circles. The first of these opinions states that free choice is a universal whole which comprehends reason and will as a universal comprehends its subjective parts, as the term "animal" comprehends both rational and irrational. Bonaventure rejects this opinion because it would lead to two freedoms in man — one of reason, the other of will.

The second opinion explains the operation of free choice, which neither reason nor will alone can accomplish, by stating that free choice is a power or faculty, really distinct from reason and will, but constituted of the two. This opinion was held by Alexander of Hales and St. Albert the Great.[28] It is rejected by Bonaventure who clearly states that the distinction between free choice and the two faculties is only a rational distinction due to the appropriation of the mind. According to their doctrine free choice is considered as moving and commanding reason and will; whereas reason and will are looked upon as being moved and

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[24] *Ibid.*, ad 6, n. 1 (II, p. 600a).
[25] Cf. Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale*, vol. I, 25, 27—29.
[26] *Ibid.*, 64, 217.
[27] *In II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3 (II, p. 599b).
[28] Alexander, *Summa*, I—II, 390, sol.; Albert, *In II Sent.*, d. 24, a. 5.

as carrying out the command of free choice.[29] Furthermore, it is difficult for Bonaventure to understand how one power or faculty can be made up of two and how free choice, a "capability of reason and will," can directly be called reason and will.[30]

From this definition of free choice St. Bonaventure concludes to the third opinion, namely that free choice is a habit of reason and will. The argument is simple. For since free choice is a "capability of reason and will," it must be a habit of reason and will, for capability means habit.[31]

St. Bonaventure clarifies his position by distinguishing three different types of habit. The first type is verified when a faculty is capable of a given act by its very nature — for example, the mind is capable of knowing itself. His analysis of this first type indicates that Bonaventure uses the term habit in a very wide sense so as to include the capability of a faculty for its own natural operation. In this case the habit is only rationally distinct from the faculty.

The second type of habit is verified when a faculty is capable of a given act by reason of an accident which inheres in the faculty — for example, the intellect is capable of knowing geometric figures by reason of an acquired accident which lies outside the nature of the intellect in itself. This habit is really distinct from the faculty and adds a definite reality to that faculty.

The third type of habit is found in a faculty which is capable of a given act by reason of its very nature but on the condition that it is joined to another faculty for its operation. Such is the habit of free choice.[32] The faculties of reason and will are by their very nature capable of the acts of consent and choice, the only requirement being that they be joined together in these operations. Consequently this third type of habit does not add any absolute reality to the faculties of reason and will, nor does it add merely a different way of understanding the two

[29] *In II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2 (II, pp. 596 b—97 a).

[30] *Ibid.*, q. 4 (II, p. 601 b) . . . difficile est intelligere qualiter ex duabus potentiis una constituatur vel quomodo liberum arbitrium, loquendo formaliter et proprie, sit duae potentiae.

[31] *Ibid.* (II, pp. 601 b—02 a). Quoniam igitur liberum arbitrium secundum propriam suam assignationem facultas rationis et voluntatis esse dicitur, hinc est quod liberum arbitrium principaliter dicit habitum et complectitur rationem et voluntatem, non tamquam una potentia ex eis constituta, sed tamquam unus habitus, qui quidem recte dicitur facultas et dominium, qui consurgit ex conjunctione utriusque et potens est super actus utriusque potentiae, per se et in se consideratae, sicut arbitraria potestas in duabus personis regimen habet super actus utriusque in se consideratae.

[32] *Ibid.*, q. 5 (II, p. 603 b) . . . et sic potentia rationalis sine aliquo habitu superaddito ex sola conjunctione sui cum appetitu nata est in actum consentiendi et eligendi exire.

faculties. Free choice adds to the faculties of reason and will a mutual relation to each other.[33] When reason is said to be joined to the will in order to perform the acts of consent and choice, nothing new is added to the nature of reason except its relation of union with the will.

A brief review of some of the matter already seen will help to fill out St. Bonaventure's doctrine of free choice as a habit of reason and will. The Saint is very careful to stress the fact that reason and will are very deeply rooted in the essence of the soul, so much so that they are cosubstantial with, though really distinct from it. Reason and will are really distinct in the genus of faculties, but because they are cosubstantial with the soul they are not essentially distinct from each other. This essential unity with each other and with the soul explains how they are naturally capable of a united operation such as consent and choice.

Free choice considers reason and will under the aspect of their mutual relation to each other which is due to their natural ability to join in one operation. It is aptly called a habit of reason and will since it follows from the very nature of these faculties. Gilson comments on St. Bonaventure's use of the term *habit:*

This being so, the freedom of the will is to be ranked among the *habits*. It is a facility in the intellectual and voluntary activity and resembles rather a permanent disposition of the soul than a mere accident of the rational soul, as are many of its habits; it is rooted in the very essence of the soul, and this must be clearly grasped if we are to see exactly what it is.[34]

The unity of reason and will in free choice is the unity of a potential whole *(totum potentiale)* and is explained by the essential unity of the two faculties of reason and will with the spiritual soul.

St. Bonaventure's doctrine of free choice gives a very detailed and organized solution to a problem which has puzzled philosophical minds since the days of Plato's Academy. Here for the first time we find a serious attempt to combine as much of traditional thought as possible with a new insight into the problem. Many points of Bonaventure's doctrine have necessarily been taken over from his predecessors. In fact one of his chief aims seems to be to reconcile the traditional ideas of Augustine with the growing interest in Aristotle. This attempt to express Augustine's concepts in Aristotle's terminology leads to some limitations and obscurities. This is especially evident in the discussion of the distinctions between the soul and its faculties of reason and will, as well as the distinction between choice and the same two faculties.

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[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, New York, 1938, p. 408.

These real but non-essential distinctions are based on the doctrine of Augustine that reason and will proceed immediately from the soul without the intervention of any accidental perfections.

St. Bonaventure's proof that free choice is a habit of reason and will is an original contribution and the most distinctive feature of his doctrine.[35] This is his solution to the problem of the relation between free choice and the faculties of reason and will. Here he adds his penetrating insight to the findings of his predecessors, especially Anselm, Alexander of Hales, and Albert the Great. It would seem that all of these men had a very similar understanding of the fact that reason and will must somehow work together in the act of free choice. Bonaventure, however, seems to have been more successful in the struggle to express the precise nature of this combined operation.

When Bonaventure's doctrine is compared with his contemporary, St. Thomas Aquinas, the differences between the Augustinian and the Aristotelian approach to the problem of free choice become most evident. St. Bonaventure was more concerned with the metaphysics of freedom than with a psychological study of the will as such. St. Thomas, on the contrary, makes a metaphysical study of the will in itself and a profound psychological investigation of its operations. The results of this psychological study serve as the basis of Thomas' conclusions regarding free choice.

An adequate consideration of the relative merits of Bonaventure's solution would take us beyond the limits of this article. Suffice it to say that St. Bonaventure rightly deserves his high place of honor among the scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages. His doctrine of free choice is a brilliant attempt to solve a most knotty problem, a problem which in many of its aspects must remain a philosophical mystery.

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[35] Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale*, vol.I, p. 221. Saint Bonaventure, vers 1250, réagit contre tous ses prédécesseurs en faisant du libre arbitre, non point une faculté, mais simplement un habitus, une facilité.

TRUTH, THE AID,
NOT THE OBSTACLE TO VIRTUE

Some months ago I happened to read an article that was published a few years ago in the Jesuit quarterly, THEOLOGICAL STUDIES. Its author, Rev. John Connery, S. J., proposed in his article to explain the Thomistic doctrine concerning the role of prudence in the moral life of man.[1] That Father Connery consulted some of the works of Aquinas in preparing his article is incontestible to anyone who will take the trouble to read it. But that the Jesuit reproduced faithfully the thought of St. Thomas on some points essential to the proper function of prudence is very contestible. So much so, that I have set myself to the task of demonstrating that to reproduce the doctrinal thought of another, especially that of a medieval theologian, it is not at all sufficient to reproduce his words, even though it be done with a goodly number of references.

I have chosen as the title of my effort, "TRUTH, THE AID, NOT THE OBSTACLE TO VIRTUE," because, it seems to me, Father Connery's basic error stems from a misconception concerning the distinction between speculative and practical truth, an error which results in an attenuation, if not an annihilation, of the role of truth in the moral life of man. He not only distinguishes speculative truth from practical truth, a distinction for which he certainly has a warranty in many of the works of St. Thomas,[2] but he does more—and for this he has no warranty. He sets up an irreconciliable opposition between them that culminates in the assertion: "Virtue is more important than speculative truth,[3] so that, if one cannot be sure of both, virtue is to be preferred. St. Thomas was clever enough to see how passion could use a false devotion to speculative truth as a pretext to achieve its own

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[1] "Prudence and Morality," THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, Vol. XIII, No. 4, pp. 564—582.
[2] S. T. I q. 14, a. 16, corp; De Ver. q. 3, a. 3, corp; De Virt. in Comm. a. 6, corp; In VI Eth. lect. 2, nos. 1132—1135; in III De Anima, lect. 15, no. 820; in II Meta. lect. 2, no. 290; in III Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3, ad 2.
[3] The position Father Connery defends, curiously enough, is, by implication, contrary to that of all the spiritual writers of the Ignatian school, who stress the necessity of contemplation for progress in virtue. Speculative truth is the object of contemplation.

satisfaction, and he properly diagnosed such a course of action as a departure from virtue rather than an approach to truth."[4] It is a pity that Father Connery fails to cite the text of St. Thomas justifying such an opposition between virtue and truth, for by so doing he unwittingly creates in the mind of the reader the suspicion that he is employing the great prestige enjoyed by St. Thomas in the field of Catholic Theology to confirm an opinion that is peculiarly his own. As a matter of fact, St. Thomas, instead of opposing truth and virtue, couples them in an association of mutual assistance to each other. In the very first Book of his great Commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle, the Angelic Doctor takes a position diametrically contrary to the one espoused by Father Connery. For he categorically asserts that devotion to truth, far from being a guise for vice, is of the utmost necessity for the preservation of virtue, even though such a devotion involves a strain on friendship:

"For it will seem better, that is more upright, pertinent to morality, and absolutely obligatory, that a man should not fear to assail his friends in defense of the truth. Such a procedure is so necessary to morality that without it virtue cannot be preserved . . . This duty is especially incumbent upon philosophers, whose profession is wisdom, or knowledge of the truth."[5]

There is in reality, therefore, no opposition in the doctrine of St. Thomas between virtue and truth, but, as we shall see in the course of this paper, a mutually harmonious relationship grounded in the reciprocal causality of the act of the intellect on the will, and the act of the will on the intellect, in human conduct.

In his article Father Connery reduces moral conduct to an exaggerated voluntarism that dispenses with the necessity of truth as a guide to virtuous living. Since he ascribes this doctrine, erroneously in my opinion, to St. Thomas, it behooves me to demonstrate the following propositions:

I. In the authentic Thomistic doctrine practical truth involves no conflict with speculative truth. Between the two there is no ,,gap,'' as Father Connery asserts, but practical truth is simply an extension of speculative truth to action.

II. This extension of speculative truth to action necessarily involves a conformity with a well-ordered appetite, for prudence is concerned exclusively with virtuous conduct, which is executed by a free will.

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[4] THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, Vol. XIII, No. 4, p. 578.

[5] In I Et. lect. 6, no. 76. Commenting on the nature of law and obligation in St. Thomas, Gregory Stevens, O. S. B., writes: "the science of ethics aims at the acquisition of *both* truth and virtue." PROCEEDINGS OF AMER. PHIL. ASSOC., Vol. XXIX pp. 195—196.

This conformity to a well-ordered appetite does not, however, constitute a substitute in morality for conformity with reality, as Father Connery endeavors to insinuate.

III. It is the practical reason, informed by the virtue of prudence, which dictates the virtuous deed, and hence is the proximate norm of morality in human conduct.

PRACTICAL TRUTH IS SIMPLY AN EXTENSION OF SPECULATIVE TRUTH

While moral theology, as taught in the seminary, reveals little if any connection with metaphysics and psychology,[6] in the Thomistic system it is the logical development, not merely in terminology, but in conceptual content as well, of a viewpoint that is firmly grounded in the metaphysical axiom: agere sequitur esse. Since the esse of man, as revealed in Thomistic psychology, is a composite of the spiritual and the material, his activity necessarily reveals the same elements. But it is his activity that is proper to man as a spiritual being that constitutes the subject matter of moral theology. For the voluntary acts of man are the sole natural means by which he achieves the destiny that is implicit in his creation and made explicit through revelation. And the principles of human conduct are the intellect or reason and rational will.

Though the intellect and will, from the psychological viewpoint, interpenetrate each other (the failure of Father Connery to realize this is a major contributing factor in his misinterpretation of the genuine Thomistic ratio of practical truth) in functioning as principles of human activity,[7] for the sake of greater clarity, and in the interest of preciseness of expression, we shall treat the acts of the intellectual faculty in isolation from those of the appetitive faculty in the first two sections of this paper. In the third section we shall explain the mutual cooperation and reciprocal causality of both faculties in the formation of the prudential judgment that guides moral conduct.

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[6] Speaking of the contribution that psychology makes to the progress of the other sciences St. Thomas writes: "We cannot master the science of morals unless we know the powers of the soul." In I De Anima, lect. 1, no. 7. Equally apropos is the following observation by John O. Riedl: "Practical philosophy without theoretical philosophy, especially without metaphysics, would leave its possessor without the means of proving its principles." Philosophy in Christian Education, p. 94.

[7] De Virt. in Comm. a. 6, ad 5; S. T. I q. 16, a. 4, ad 1.

In man there is one and only one faculty of intellectual knowledge which is called in the works of St. Thomas, as in other medieval scholastics, intellectus or ratio.[8] The former name is used to designate the cognitive faculty as apprehensive of material essences, and in the act of uniting or separating those essences in the judgment.[9] The latter name is used exclusively to indicate the cognitive faculty in its discursive process of comparing known truths in order to arrive at a truth hitherto unknown.[10] The act of reasoning presupposes those of judgment and simple apprehension as constitutive elements, for the syllogism, speculative or practical, is constructed in an orderly series of propositions.

The speculative and practical intellect in man are essentially one and the same spiritual faculty, which differ only in their end.[11] Contemplation of the truth is the exclusive end of the speculative intellect, which thus terminates its operation within itself.[12] The end of the practical intellect is to order or adapt truth, which in other circumstances might be the object of contemplation, here and now to action,[13] for the practical intellect, unlike the speculative, has pertinency to morals precisely and solely because, together with the rational will, it is a principle of human activity:

"As it is said in THE SOUL 'practical knowledge differs from speculative knowledge in its end.' For the end of speculative knowledge is simply truth, but the end of practical knowledge, as we read in the METAPHYSICS, is action."[14]

It is not the object of knowledge, nor any difference in the manner of acquiring knowledge that justifies the distinction between the speculative and the practical.[15] The little boy sent by his mother to a self-service store to purchase five articles valued at twelve cents each employs the self-same multiplication table, learnt speculatively in school, to formulate his prudential judgment that he owes the cashier sixty cents. And because of that speculative knowledge rendered practical in those concrete circumstances he recognizes the moral obligation of paying sixty cents and not one penny less. With the clarity for which

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[8] In II De Anima, lect. 14, no. 812.
[9] De Ver. q. 15, a. 1, sed contra. In Post Analyt. Proem. no. 4 (4).
[10] S. T. I q. 79, a. 8, corp; De Ver. q. 24, a. 3, ad 1.
[11] S. T. I q. 79, a. 11, corp; De Ver. q. 3, a. 3, corp; In II Meta. lect. 2, no. 290.
[12] S. T. I II q. 3, a. 5, ad 2; De Virt. in Comm. a. 7, ad 4.
[13] De Ver. q. 2, a. 8, corp; S. T. I q. 79, a. 11 ad 2; De Ver. q. 3, a. 3, ad 4; De Virt. in Comm. q. u. a. 7, ad 1; In III Sent. d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 3.
[14] De Ver. q. 3, a. 1, corp. Cf. also S. T. II II q. 57, a. 3, corp; De Malo q. 6, a. u. corp.
[15] De Ver. q. 3, a. 3, ad 5.

he is famous Aquinas states that the basis of the distinction between the speculative and the practical reason is not to be found in the knowledge-act, for it is one and the same act, but in the application of that knowledge to action by the practical reason—an application that the speculative reason fails to make:

"For the practical understanding is the same as the operative understanding. Hence, only extension to a work makes an understanding practical . . . But to be practical, the understanding must be the PROXIMATE RULE of action."[16]

In different words and in another work he teaches the very same doctrine:

"The speculative and practical reason differ in this: the speculative is only apprehensive of things, but the practical is not only apprehensive but causative."[17]

By his speculative intellect, therefore, man simply knows the truth. By the application of that self-same truth, with the aid of his practical intellect, to a course of action, which, by reason of intent or circumstances, may or may not be in conformity with moral law, he conducts himself virtuously or viciously, and merits praise or blame. It is one and the same intellect by which man knows the truth that Christ revealed, and with which he initiates, under the activation of a will abetted by divine grace, conduct in conformity with that truth. In brief, it is the relationship to free-will, enjoyed by the practical intellect, but not by the speculative intellect[18] that constitutes the former a co-principle of the human act, and is the radical reason why it is the subject of the virtue of prudence.

Although this relationship to free-will, the basis of the distinction between the speculative and the practical intellect, runs all through the works of St. Thomas, Father Connery ignores it completely. Hence, it is not at all surprising that he, involuntarily, involves himself in a very questionable procedure. In preparation for his self-erected opposition between speculative and practical truth (and in violation of the first rule of scholarly research—objectivity), he attempts to make the Angelic Doctor teach just what he wants him to teach. Though Aquinas expressly and unequivocally ascribes the judgment, the second act of the virtue of prudence, to the SPECULATIVE INTELLECT,[19] the Jesuit

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[16] De Ver. q. 14, a. 4, corp; De Ver. q. 2, a. 8, corp.
[17] S. T. II II q. 83, a. 1, corp; De Ver. q. 3, a. 3, ad 7.
[18] De Virt. in Comm. a. 7, ad 1. Cf. also In VI Eth. lect. 2, no. 1135; in III De Anima lect. 14, nos. 813—815; S. T. I II q. 9, a. 1, ad 2.
[19] S. T. II II q. 47, a. 8, corp.

moralist tells us that this passage must be interpreted in the light of „clearer" texts.[20] The first of these "clearer" texts, with which Father Connery opposes Aquinas to himself, reads thus:

"the act of the speculative intellect, as regards its EXERCISE, in so far as it is voluntary, is subject to deliberation and choice, and is consequently governed by prudence. But as regards its SPECIFICATION which is determined by its object, necessary truth, it is subject neither to deliberation nor consequently to prudence."[21]

Had Father Connery searched the works of Aquinas for months to find a text that would more neatly nullify the position he attempts to ascribe to the Dominican theologian, I dare say he could not have found it. For from the text just cited the following is crystal clear: The act of the speculative intellect may be regarded from a twofold point of view. From the viewpoint of its specification, it bears a relation only to its object, has no relationship to moral conduct, and hence is not subject to the control of prudence. But from the viewpoint of its exercise, like any human act it plays a part in the moral life of man and consequently is subjected to the influence of prudence. But this could be so because practical truth is nothing else but the extension of speculative truth to action — the thesis we have been at pains to establish against the Jesuit moralist.

The other text is found in the Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics where Aquinas is establishing the fact that although synesis and prudence are concerned with the same matter, they are not on that account the same habit. It reads:

"He (Aristotle) therefore says in the first place that though synesis and prudence are concerned with the same matter, they are not, however, the same habit. The evidence for this fact is found in the realization that in speculative matters, IN WHICH THERE IS NO ACTION, there is only a twofold work of reason, viz., inquiry and the judgment that follows upon inquiry. AND THESE TWO ARE THE WORK OF THE PRACTICAL REASON, whose inquiry is deliberation, which pertains to ebulia, and whose judgment following upon deliberation pertains to synesis . . . THE PRACTICAL REASON, HOWEVER, DOES NOT STOP THERE, BUT FURTHER PROCEEDS TO ACTION. And so there is necessary a third work as complementary and consummative, viz., the command which precedes action. And this last, namely, the command properly belongs to prudence."[22]

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[20] Op. cit. p. 570, footnote 22.
[21] S. T. II II q. 47, a. 2, ad 2.
[22] In VI Eth. lect. 9, nos. 1238—1239. Also in III Sent. d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 3, St. Thomas teaches that psychologically speaking these acts in the practical order are identical with the same in the speculative order.

Father Connery tells us that the commentators understand this text to mean merely that the speculative intellect has acts of its own similar to the acts of counsel and judgment performed by the practical intellect. But such an interpretation does violence to the clear and unequivocal statement

". . . in speculative matters, in which there is no action, there is only a two-fold work of reason, viz., inquiry and the judgment that follows upon inquiry. AND THESE TWO ARE THE WORK OF THE PRACTICAL REASON . . ."

In one place, as we saw above[23] in an article devoted exclusively to the virtue of prudence, a virtue of the practical intellect, St. Thomas ascribes its second act, the judgment, to the SPECULATIVE INTEL-LECT. And in this last cited text he ascribes the acts of inquiry and judgment in speculative matters to the PRACTICAL REASON. The impartial reader, free from all preconceptions in the matter, can, therefore plainly see that in the teaching of St. Thomas the first two acts, inquiry and judgment, are performed by the intellect without distinction as to its speculative or practical function, but the third act, the command, is ascribed exclusively to the practical or operative in-tellect, because it immediately bears upon action or conduct. We might hesitate to oppose our interpretation to that of the eminent commen-tators,[24] were it not for the fact that St. Thomas himself, in the very same Book of the Commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle provides us with a statement that confirms our interpretation and completely quashes the forced interpretation of the commentators as reported by Father Connery. It reads as follows:

"It must therefore be affirmed that the practical intellect commences its work in an universal consideration, AND IN THIS RESPECT IT IS IDEN-TIFIED WITH THE SPECULATIVE INTELLECT. But it terminates its consideration in a particular operable."[25]

What some moral theologians, among whom, it seems to me, Father Connery is to be included, fail to appreciate is that man becomes morally what he was meant to be by the proper use of all of the faculties of his nature, but principally by his intellect and will. This moral development

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[23] Cf. p. 13 above.

[24] Concerning the responsibility of Catholic scholars in their failure to preserve authentic Catholic tradition Justus George Lawler writes: "The systematic annihilation of Scholasticism at the hands of the commentators teaches in a striking way the consequences of such petrification." THE CHRISTIAN IMAGINATION, p. 28, Westminster, Maryland, 1955.

[25] In VI Eth. lect. 2, no. 1132. Quite consistently, therefore, St. Thomas teaches that the "superior reason is speculative and practical." In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3.

he achieves, not without struggle,[26] nor as he would compose a symphony, make a garden or load a truck, but by producing within himself an harmonious equilibrium between his moral aspirations, his psychological limitations and the metaphysical exigencies of the universe of which he is a part. Too many theologians treat the "Way," the "Truth" and "Life" that Christ came to reveal as completely separated, hardly related parts of a whole. It was for the benefit of such theologians that Père Chenu, a devoted student of St. Thomas, wrote the admonition: "Theology as a science is eminently one; dogma and morality are not two parts loosely put together, one speculative and the other practical, which some exterior pressure will tie together here and there. They are two sides of one reality, where the categories of speculative and practical, far from forming a real division, only play a part, because of a constant surpassing of their technical differences."[27]

PRACTICAL TRUTH IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE IN MORALITY FOR CONFORMITY WITH REALITY. IT IS RELATIONSHIP, OF THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT TO THE WILL, THAT PRESUPPOSES, NOT DISPENSES WITH, THE NECESSITY OF FORMAL TRUTH

It is however, in his treatment of practical truth in the moral act that Father Connery exhibits not merely a voluntaristic bias, common enough among Suaresians, who generally favor a "pro ratione stat voluntas" approach to all moral problems, but a positive anti-intellectualism that is quite surprising in one who proposes to reproduce faithfully the teaching of the Angelic Doctor. Because of the possibility of error in the prudential judgment the Jesuit moral theologian provides us with one of the most self-conctradictory and unthomistic solutions

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[26] Father Connery, indubitably, is not expressing genuine Thomistic doctrine when he writes: "St. Thomas, then, does not envision the ideal moral life as a life of conflict between opposing forces, a struggle between reason and the passions. It is not the triumph of duty over the strong and sometimes violent opposition of desire." Op. Cit. p. 574. Aside from the fact that such a statement rests upon an equivocation of the word "ideal," and is, in fact, opposed to authentic Catholic theological teaching, St. Thomas clearly states: "The passions impelling to evil are completely quelled neither through acquired virtue nor through infused virtue, except miraculously; for there always remains the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit even after (the acquisition of) moral virtue." De Virt. in Comm. q. u. a. 10, ad 14.

[27] "The Plan of St. Thomas's 'Summa Theologiae,' CROSS CURRENTS, Vol. II, No. 2, Winter, 1952, p. 75. Justus Lawler expresses the same idea: ". . . theology has sometimes been compartmentalized, and each segment is often seen by itself so that the science tends to lose the unity and simplicity that characterized it among the great Scholastics and the Fathers." Op. cit. p. 15.

of an ethical problem that I have ever encountered in a theological journal. One should read it in its entirety. I shall reproduce only the minimum required for refutation. Here is his solution: "St. Thomas solves the dilemma (the failure of prudence, an intellectual virtue, to exclude error) by distinguishing practical from speculative truth. In speculative truth there must always be conformity with reality. Speculative truth must always tell you exactly that which is. But in practical truth conformity with reality is not necessary. The purpose of practical truth is not to tell you that which is but rather that which is to be done. To serve that purpose it is sufficient that there be conformity with a well-ordered appetite. The thing to be done here and now is that which a well-ordered appetite i. e. an appetite aimed at virtue, dictates. If there is this correspondence between act and appetite, the act will contain practical truth . . . St. Thomas judged this criterion for practical truth so important that he maintained it should be followed in practical judgments even though it might conflict with speculative truth . . . Making allowance, then, for the inevitable error, St. Thomas admits that the prudent man will not always do the right thing. But his act will always be linked to objective reality through the medium of a well-ordered appetite. It will always coincide with speculative truth or be the closest approximation to it possible in the circumstances . . . We can readily admit that practical truth does not have the stature of speculative truth. Conformity with a well-ordered appetite will not always be conformity with reality. But while practical truth may at times fall short of speculative truth, it is also true that only a well-ordered appetite can give any abiding guarantee of speculative truth in moral acts."[28]

To be perfectly fair to the Jesuit moralist, I cannot believe that he actually means to say what the conventional meaning of his words convey, namely, that practical truth, at one and the same time, in one and the same act, lacks conformity with reality as unnecessary, and yet, somehow, includes such conformity, or the closest possible approximation to it, not, however, through a cognitive, but through an appetitive relationship with things as they are in themselves. But let us examine the text of Aquinas on which he bases so bizarre an interpretation. Here are the words:

". . . truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. For the truth of the speculative intellect depends on the conformity of the intellect to the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters,

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[28] Op. cit. pp. 576—579.

therefore no speculative habit about contingent matters is an intellectual virtue, but only about necessary things. On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends upon conformity with a right appetite. This conformity has no place in necessary matters, which are not effected by the human will, but only in contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be matters of interior action or the products of external work."[29]

It should be quite evident from this text, it seems to me, that there can be no question of speculative truth in contingent matters, so that Father Connery's conclusion that only conformity to a well-ordered appetite can "give any abiding guarantee of speculative truth in moral acts" is completely without justification. And more than that, it is a distortion of the express wording of Aquinas who positively excludes such an interpretation when he says that "this conformity has no place in necessary matters" — the very stuff that makes for speculative truth. Nor does this text, we submit to the critical reader, attribute to conformity with a well-ordered appetite (a requisite for practical truth) such primacy as to warrant the conclusion "St. Thomas judged this criterion for practical truth so important that he maintained it should be followed in practical matters even though it might conflict with speculative truth." Here, again, Father Connery is ascribing a doctrinal position to St. Thomas without furnishing us with proof for such position. It certainly is not contained, explicitly or implicitly, in the above-cited text. As a matter of verifiable fact, St. Thomas expressly "reduces truth and falsehood in action to a common genus with truth and falsehood in speculation"[30] so that "conflict" between practical truth, or virtue, and speculative truth is, to say the very least, purely imaginative on the part of Father Connery. What the Angelic Doctor says in that text is something quite different and must be understood in the light of his authentic doctrine concerning prudence. He often says that prudence, an intellectual virtue in the PRACTICAL ORDER (the recta ratio agibilium) concerns the things that lie within the capacity of the human will, the operables or human acts with which the moralist is concerned. Because such acts are contingent there can be no such thing as a speculative intellectual virtue to aid the intellect of man in their performance, for they lie entirely within the ambit of the practical intellect. In view of Father Connery's attempt to exclude the speculative intellect from exercising causality on the second act of prudence, the

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[29] S. T. I II q. 57, a. 5, ad 3.
[30] In III De Anima, lect. 12, no. 780.

judgment, as we have shown above,[31] this attempt of his to introduce speculative truth into moral acts defies explanation.

It is fundamental to understanding the words of the above-cited text (so fundamental that I am amazed that Father Connery does not even advert to it) to remember that in the thomistic system truth like other metaphysical notions, such as goodness, morality, being, is analogical.[32] Moreover, in the same system, truth never bespeaks the relation of an appetitive faculty to its act, as the Jesuit understands practical truth, but always, without exception,[33] the relation of the cognitive faculty, human or divine, to some extra-mental reality. And since the moralist, qua moralist, unlike the logician, is concerned exclusively with conduct specifically human, it follows that the former, while not neglecting formal truth as something superfluous and unnecessary (without it the rectification of an erroneous conscience is impossible) will concern himself primarily with practical truth. And if one will take the trouble to consult the article on prudence from the above-cited text has been taken he will find that that is exactly what St. Thomas, in his reply, is doing. For him practical truth is an extension of speculative truth to conduct, an extension that essentially involves conformity to a well-ordered appetite — but in no sense is this conformity a substitute for speculative truth in morality. In other words, practical truth does not obviate the necessity of conformity with reality; rather, it presupposes it, just as moral conduct does not obviate the proper psychological function of the intellect and will, but presupposes it. As we have already shown,[34] the end of the speculative intellect is to apprehend and contemplate truth. In this act of contemplation the speculative intellect bears the relation to its object of the thing measured to its rule or measure.[35] We have likewise shown that the practical intellect is not only apprehensive of truth, also, however, causative — the proximate rule of human conduct. In so far as it is apprehensive — that is, in the order of specification, — the act of the practical intellect is also measured by the thing known and hence CONFORMED TO REALITY. In so far as it is causative, and for that very reason a co-principle of the voluntary act (the proper consideration of the moralist) it bears a relation to the

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[31] Cf. p. 13 above.

[32] De Ver. q. 1, a. 2, corp.

[33] On one occasion (S. T. II II q. 58, a. 4, ad 1) Thomas uses the word "truth" with reference to the will, but he hastens to explain that he is doing so in an extended sense "because of its proximity to the reason."

[34] Cf. p. 12, above.

[35] De Ver. q. 1, a. 2, corp.

rational will, the efficient cause of all human activity.[36] In this latter relation — in the order of exercise — the practical intellect informed by the virtue of prudence is the rule or measure, and the human act the thing measured. Since speculative truth is confined to the logical order, and practical truth a requirement of the moral order, which is not subversive but complementary to the logical order, there is no such thing as the "conflict" that Father Connery so gratuitously postulates. No one could be clearer than Aquinas on this matter when he writes:

"the good of anything consists in a mean, according to which it is conformed to a rule or measure, which it is possible to fail or to reach . . . Now intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good . . . Hence the good of an intellectual virtue consists in a mean, in so far as it is subject to a measure. Now the good of intellectual virtue is the true: in the case of speculative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely; in the case of practical virtue, it is the true in conformity with right appetite.

Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, is as something measured by things, since things are the measure of our intellect, as is stated in Metaphysics X . . .

The truth of practical intellectual virtue, however, IF WE CONSIDER IT IN RELATION TO THINGS, HAS THE NATURE OF THAT WHICH IS MEASURED. Hence, BOTH IN THE PRACTICAL AND IN THE SPECULATIVE VIRTUES, THE MEAN CONSISTS IN CONFORMITY WITH THINGS, BUT IF WE CONSIDER IT IN RELATION TO APPETITE IT HAS THE NATURE OF A RULE OR MEASURE. Consequently the rectitude of reason is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of prudence, as ruling and measuring, of moral virtue, as ruled and measured by that mean."[37]

There can be no doubt, therefore, that it is authentic thomistic doctrine to say that "the rectitude of the practical intellect involves a conformity with things as understood through the intellect acting speculatively."[38]

The "dilemma," therefore, to which Father Connery alludes is not factual in the doctrine of St. Thomas, but is a projection of a very factual dilemma, the one that confronts whomsoever accepts the Jesuit's interpretation of St. Thomas. It is the age-old dilemma, that one encounters in the proposal of the "simplist"[39] that the cultivation of the moral virtues dispenses with the necessity of the cultivation of the intellectual virtues in the Christian life. This attitude, which stems from an infra-

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[36] S. T. I II q. 20, a. 1, ad 3; In III Sent. d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, sol.; C. G. III c. 26.

[37] S. T. I II q. 64, a. 3, corp.

[38] M. M. Childress, "Efficient Causality in Human Actions," MODERN SCHOOLMAN, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, 1951, p. 196.

[39] Cf. "All is Good," CROSS CURRENTS, Vol. IV, No. 1, Fall 1953, pp. 1—5.

rational hostility to intellectualism,[40] is found even in those whose profession calls for the most selfless dedication to truth — teachers, confessors and spiritual advisers. St. Theresa of Avila solved the dilemma in her own life by professing a preference for a learned confessor rather than a pious one. Such a preference must provide no little scandal to people like Father Connery, who, as we have seen, opposes virtue to truth and expresses a preference for the former at the expense of the latter. In so doing he becomes a propagator, not of traditional Catholic morality, but of a caricature of morality, which the eminent Thomist, Josef Pieper, designates by the term "moralism" when he writes: . . . the classical doctrine of the virtue of prudence offers the only chance to overcome radically the phenomenon of 'moralism'. The substance of 'moralism', which most people regard as a thing peculiarly Christian, is that it severs what we are from what we ought to do, that it proclaims a duty without perceiving and without showing that duty is rooted in what we are. On the contrary, the nucleus as well as the proper concern of the doctrine of prudence is as follows: to prove as necessary the coherence of what we ought to do with what we are; in the act of prudence what we ought to do is decided by what we are. Moralism says: good is what should be, because it should be. The doctrine of prudence says: good is what AGREES WITH REALITY; it should be BECAUSE IT CORRESPONDS WITH REALITY."[41]

PRACTICAL REASON, INFORMED BY THE VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE, IS THE PROXIMATE NORM OF MORALITY

In his conduct man is worthy of praise or blame only in so far as his acts lie within the untrammeled power of his will,[42] in other words, only in so far as they are voluntary. For only the voluntary act has moral implications.[43] Now a voluntary act is one which proceeds from the will as from an internal principle but with knowledge of the end.[44] Since both knowledge and volition are required it follows necessarily that both intellect and will are principles of the human act.[45] It is our

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[40] Cf. "American Catholic Intellectualism" by Gustave Weigel, S. J. THE REVIEW OF POLITICS, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 275—307.

[41] "On the Christian Idea of Man," REVIEW OF POLITICS, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 7.

[42] S. T. I II q. 21, a. 3, corp.; in II Sent. d. 41, q. 3, a. 1, sol.

[43] De Malo q. 2, a. 1, corp.; In II Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 5, sol.

[44] S. T. I II q. 16, a. 1, corp.; In III Eth. lect. 1, no. 386.

[45] In I Eth. lect. 1, no. 8; De Virt. in Comm. q. u. a. 2, ad 12; De Malo q. 6, a. u. corp.

task in this final section to show the relationship of these two rational faculties to each other and to the virtue of prudence in the causality of the moral act.

It is paramount, in the first place, to a proper understanding of the doctrine of St. Thomas, to realize that the virtue of prudence, unlike its purely intellectual counterpart, the habit of art, resides as in its subject, not in the reason alone, but in the reason and will, which by their harmonious interaction constitute the operative or practical intellect as distinguished from the speculative:

"But prudence consists not only in knowledge but also in appetition. For its principal act is command, which is the application of acquired knowledge to appetition and action. [46]

Hence, to speak most precisely, prudence is situated neither in the reason alone, nor in the will alone, but in the faculty of free choice, which in Thomas as in all medieval theologians, is described by the terms liberum arbitrium.[47] Though prudence involves both cognition and appetition in its act it cannot reside equally in reason and will, according to the rule laid down by Aquinas himself:

"There cannot be one habit equally in two powers, but there can be a habit of one power in so far as it has ordination to another."[48]

As we shall show presently, prudence perfects the reason in relation to action, the voluntary act, the efficient cause of which is the will.[49] Hence prudence is primarily and principally in the practical reason as subject to the causality of the will.[50]

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten, even momentarily, that prudence though it is concerned with the same matter with which the moral virtues are concerned, the voluntary act, and hence is classified with them,[51] is essentially an intellectual virtue, distinct from the other cardinal virtues.[52] Consequently, to attempt, even partially, to give a scientific expose of the virtue of prudence in terms of the moral virtues,

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[46] S. T. II II q. 47, a. 16, corp. Father Davitt, after a comprehensive study of the matter, is convinced that there is a technical difference between "praecipere" (the word used in the text cited) and "imperare" in the psychology of St. Thomas. But he concedes that in many instances Aquinas seems to use them synonymously. Cf. THE NATURE OF LAW, p. 140 by Thomas E. Davitt, S. J.

[47] De Ver. q. 24 and De Malo q. 6, a. u.

[48] De Ver. q. 14, a. 4, ad 7.

[49] S. T. I q. 82, a. 4, corp.; S. T. I II q. 17, a. 1, corp.; De Malo q. 6, a. u. corp.; De Ver. q. 14, a. 2, ad 6.

[50] De Virt. in Comm. q. u. a. 7, corp.; S. T. I II q. 56, a. 3, corp.

[51] S. T. I II q. 58, a. 3, ad 1; in III Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, qa. 2, ad 3; De Virt. Card. q. u. a. 1, ad 3.

[52] S. T. I II q. 61, a. 4; S. T. I II q. 58, a. 2, corp.

as does Father Connery, who devotes almost half of his article to a discussion of moral virtue, is to confuse the student needlessly and hopelessly. Needlessly, I say, because prudence is never present in the soul except in company with the moral virtues;[53] and hopelessly, because an already complicated discussion is thereby over-complicated.

In every act of moral virtue, which is impossible without prudence,[54] the human reason and will interpenetrate each other,[55] and inform each other's acts reciprocally.[56] This mutual interaction and causal reciprocity constitutes the psychological basis of thomistic moral theology. A theology worthy of the name perforce employs a bona fide philosophy (ancilla theologiae) to clarify and to systematize the data of revelation. And because grace builds on nature, an ignorance of nature cannot but lead to a distortion of the function of the moral virtues as contrasted with intellectual virtue. For the virtues bear a relation to grace analogous to that which obtains between the rational faculties and the human soul. They are proximate principles of activity, the former in the supernatural order, the latter in the order of nature. The psychological interpenetration[57] of the reason and the will corresponds and complements the more fundamental interpenetration, metaphysically speaking, of truth and goodness in the being of any thing.[58] As a consequence, in the moral order, the order proper to man as a rational creature, prudence

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[53] S. T. I II q. 58, a. 5; De Virt. Card. q. u. a. 2, corp.; in VI Eth. lect. 10, no. 1274.
[54] De Virt. Card. q. u. a. 2, corp.; De Virt. in Comm. q. u. a. 6; in III Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 3, sol, and ad 3.
[55] S. T. I q. 16, a. 4, ad 1; De Virt. in Comm. q. u. a. 6, ad 5, and a. 7, corp.
[56] S. T. I II q. 13, a. 1, corp.; De Ver. q. 24, a. 6, ad 5.
[57] Father Klubertanz, S. J., that assidous thomistic scholar, very pertinently makes this observation: ". . . in St. Thomas's psychology there is no separation of any kind between intellect and will, but only a distinction based on their formal objects and their causal order. Intellect and will are not just closed, non-communicating essences; in the order of operation they interpenetrate . . . in St. Thomas's metaphysics of causality 'the action of the agent is in the patient.' When, therefore, he says that the 'power of the prior act remains in the following act' he is not using a metaphor or giving an ad hoc solution. Those who have a different metaphysics of action, or who close off and compartmentalize intellect and will, will necessarily give an explanation that differs from that of St. Thomas." THE UNITY OF HUMAN ACTIVITY, The Modern Schoolman, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, p. 91. It should be quite evident, at this stage of the investigation, that Father Connery found it possible to detect a cleavage between virtue, the object of the will, and speculative truth, the object of the speculative intellect, only because his metaphysics and psychology are not authentically thomistic.
[58] S. T. I q. 79, a. 11, ad 2.

and the moral virtues, which perfect the reason and the will respectively, have the same material, but not the same formal object:

"One and the same thing in the objective order is the object of the intellect under the aspect of truth, and the object of will under the aspect of goodness. In like manner, one and the same thing can be the object of prudence and of the other moral virtues but under different aspects. It is the object of prudence under the aspect of deliberation; it is the object of the moral virtues under the aspect of being operable."[59]

Since the individual virtues are distinguished by their formal,[60] not by their material object, a professionally theological discussion of the role of prudence in morality that represents prudence, the cause and the form of all the other moral virtues,[61] as subsidiary to, and an adjunct of, the moral virtues, is erroneous in doctrine and misleading in fact.

But a much more serious error as to the nature of prudence is to assert that for "St. Thomas prudence is both empirical and philosophical, but it is primarily philosophical."[62] Such a statement betrays a complete misconception of the relationship of St. Thomas to Aristotle, his guide and teacher in the philosophical sciences, and of the nature of the magnificent synthesis that Aquinas effected between the profane wisdom of the Stagyrite and the divine wisdom revealed in Christ.

It is bordering on the commonplace to state that the Dominican theologian was tremendously indebted to the pagan Greek for terminology and for many of the concepts he employed in constructing one of the most grandiose metaphysical-theological systems ever effected by the mind of man. For the metaphysical foundation of that imposing intellectual edifice he was supremely indebted to Aristotle. But in matters theological, though he was heavily indebted to men like Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, John Damascene, St. Ambrose, John Chrysostom and the Cappadocian Fathers,[63] who provided the material, more or less refined and prepared for the final touch of his genius, he owed nothing to Aristotle. As someone has well expressed it, "a Catholic concept is not at all the same as a Platonic or Aristotelian concept, since God's Word in human form whether flesh or Scripture) cannot be limited to a meaning we choose."[64]

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[59] In III Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 3; S. T. II II q. 47, a. 5, ad 3.
[60] S. T. II II q. 47, a. 11, corp.
[61] De Car. q. u. a. 3, ad 13; De Virt. in Comm. q. u. a. 12, ad 16; In III Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, sol.; De Ver. q. 14, a. 5, ad 11.
[62] John S. Connery, S. J. op. cit.
[63] Cf. "Patristic Schools in the 'Summa,'" by Nicholas Halligan, THE THOMIST, Vol. XII, pp. 271—322 and 505—543.
[64] Hans Urs von Balthasar, "What should theology be doing?", CROSS CURRENTS, Vol. IV, no. 4, p. 353. Quite apropos also is the statement of

For St. Thomas the prudence with which he was concerned, and which is the subject of this present investigation, is infused together with the theological virtues,[65] and like them is essentially supernatural.[66] Hence it is not at all surprising that in his treatment of prudence Aquinas expressly excludes the philosophical viewpoint.[67] For him prudence is always and exclusively the supernatural, intellectual-moral virtue which enables a man, acting within the sphere of created values, to move closer daily to his final end, which is nothing else than the God Christ came to reveal.

If the prudence the Angelic Doctor mentions so often in his works is empirical and philosophical, then to assert that on the level of true moral judgments "the simple but virtuous peasant can come closer to truth than the pagan philosopher,"[68] is to discount natural wisdom without thereby insuring the compensatory possession of supernatural wisdom. As so often occurs, Father Connery, without realizing the inconsistency necessarily involved in the use of principles only partially assimilated, has reached full circle in illogical reasoning. In the statement above quoted he implies a preference for moral virtue rather than knowledge, but it is in reality the virtue of the pagan (however virtuous), not of the Christian. Not even once in his entire article does he mention the essential role of supernatural charity in the realm of morality.

It is undoubtedly true that men progress in the virtue of prudence, as they do in the practice of all Christian virtues, but to designate such progress in the use of a supernatural virtue by the word "empirical" is dangerously misleading. And to employ the term "philosophical" to express the rational component of this virtue is completely unwarranted in a treatment professionally theological. By the same token, the supernatural infused theological virtue of faith might be termed "philosophical," for faith performs a function analogous to that of the virtue of prudence.[69]

Having explained the subject in which it resides and the essence of the virtue of prudence, we come now to the nub of the matter — the

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F. Van Steenberghen, an authority in the matter: "the Christian thinkers of the middle ages . . . always had a very clear notion of the distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge, between philosophy and the sacred science or theology." "The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century," p. 112.

[65] De Virt. Card. q. u. a. 2, ad 3.
[66] De Virt. in Comm. q. u. a. 10, corp., and ad 10; Ib. a. 5, corp.
[67] De Virt. Card. q. u. a. 4, ad 3; De Ver. q. 14, a. 6, ad 5.
[68] Op. cit., p. 579.
[69] S. T, I II q. 56, a. 3, corp.

act which specifically distinguishes it from all other virtues. In various places throughout his works Aquinas assigns three acts to prudence,[70] but of these three he expressly tells us that only one, the command, is proper to this virtue:

"There are three acts of reason in respect of anything to be done by man: the first of these is deliberation, the second, judgment, the third, command. The first two correspond to the acts of the speculative intellect which are inquiry and judgment,[71] for deliberation is a kind of inquiry; but the third is proper to the practical intellect in so far as the practical intellect is ordained to operation, for reason does not have to command in things which man cannot do. Now it is evident that in things done by man the chief act is that of command . . ."[72]

The acts of deliberation and judgment, acts of ebulia and synesis (or gnome) respectively, the potential parts of prudence,[73] are preliminary to the command, which is specifically distinctive of prudence because it is closest to the end of this virtue,[74] morally good conduct, and for this reason, as we have seen already,[75] is called its principal. Some confusion, however, results from the fact that Thomas in speaking of the most important act of the practical reason says that it is "the command OR choice which is effected by prudence."[76] In this statement he equates "praecipere" and "eligere." Strictly speaking the two acts of command and free choice are not only distinct but different acts. Both of them, however, are essential to the moral act, and each of them contributes partially to moral conduct. In the act of any moral virtue whatsoever the specifically distinctive element which makes the act moral (as distinguished from meritorious) is the free movement of the will acting under the guidance of the practical reason informed by prudence. That is why Aquinas says that the

"rectitude of choice in other virtues is due to prudence . . . and in this sense the act of prudence is emeshed in the acts of the other virtues.[77]"

For free choice is a composite act of knowledge and appetitive movement towards one means rather than another[78] conducive to the end intended by the moral agent. In the composition of the moral act prudence

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[70] S. T. I II q. 58, a. 4, corp.; In III Sent. d. 33, a. 1, sol.; De Virt. Card. q. u. a. 1, corp.

[71] Cf. p. 15 above.   [72] S. T. I II q. 57, a. 6, corp.

[73] S. T. II II q. 51, a. 1—4.

[74] S. T. II II q. 51, a. 2, ad 2; In III Sent. d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 3, ad 1.

[75] Cf. pages 15 and 21—22 above. Cf. also S. T. II II q. 47, a. 8, corp.; In II Eth. lect. 8, no. 339; In III Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 4.

[76] De Virt. in Comm. q. u. a. 12, ad 26. Cf. also S. T. II II q. 47, a. 1, ad 2.

[77] In III Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 3, resp.

[78] In III Eth. lect. 6, no. 457.

contributes the necessary knowledge, the will informed by the appropriate moral virtue contributes the necessary movement.[79] Because of the necessary involvement, therefore, of prudence in the acts of the moral virtues, command or choice may be ascribed, in the sense explained, to prudence. Concerning this intricate matter Father Davitt writes: "... the praecipere is before the election or rather part of it ... the word praecipere, then, used to denote the act of the intellect before or with the election, seems to derive from prae-accipere, which in turn St. Thomas uses as practically synonymous with prae-eligere. Hence the word praecipere, if used to denote the act of the intellect in the election, is better translated as "the judgment of election;" if it is used to denote the act of the intellect that directs execution after the election, then it is synonymous with imperare and should consequently be translated as 'command'."[80] From the explanation furnished by Father Davitt it becomes clear why in one place the Angelic Doctor says it is the command that applies knowledge to action,[81] and in another it is the act of election.[82] They both do; but they are ordered to each other in a series of acts in which election, or free-choice, is subsequent to the "judgment of election," but prior to the command.

In every human act the individual deliberately and freely chooses some finite good which is chosen for a determinate reason. To put it a little differently, moral conduct is motivated conduct. By one and the same[83] complex movement the will effects the external action under the impulse of the motive. The motive is the mentally conceived goal or objective, which may or may not precede the external action in time, but certainly precedes it causally for the motive is the reason why the will posits the action. As St. Thomas so well expresses it, "all action commences from the intention of the end."[84] Now in the order of execution the individual achieves the end intended by FIRST willing the means that are conducive to the intended end. But in the order of intention this sequence of appetitive objects is completely reversed. It is the end that is FIRST willed, and the means are subsequently willed because they are conducive to the end. As a consequence, in voluntary conduct the will assumes a priority over the reason—a priority that

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[79] In III Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1; S. T. II II q. 47, a. 1, ad 2.

[80] Op. cit. pp. 139—140.

[81] S. T. II II q. 47, a. 16, corp.

[82] In III Sent. d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 3, ad 2.

[83] S. T. I II q. 12, a. 4, corp.; in II Sent. d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, sol.

[84] De Ver. q. 14, a. 2, ad 6.

normally, psychologically speaking, it does not possess. St. Thomas thus expresses this important facet of his psychology:

"reason, as apprehending the end, PRECEDES the appetite for the end; but the appetite for the end PRECEDES the reason in so far as it deliberates about the choice of means, which is the concern of prudence."[85]

This text, and others like it,[86] are essential to a proper understanding of the notion that so vexed Father Connery — the genuine ratio of practical truth — and which, as we have seen in the second part of this paper, he attempts to explain in a manner that entails the repudiation of principles basic to thomistic metaphysics and psychology. As an intellectual virtue in the practical order of moral conduct, prudence confers upon the practical intellect "rectitude."[87] This "rectitude" is nothing other than a special and particular conformity of the cognitive faculty in man to his appetitive faculty. Such a conformity, however, is an accidental modification of the natural faculty of the practical intellect. It does not disrupt nor destroy the natural capacity of this faculty to be conformed to external reality, for "grace builds on nature," according to the axiom, it does not maim nor destroy it.

This accidental modification of the practical intellect is explained in the following manner. In the causality of the moral act, in which both practical intellect and will concur, the former is posterior in act and causally dependent upon the latter, in the sense above stated. Hence, as a requisite for harmonious interaction there must be an adaption of the cognitive faculty, the "moved-mover" to the appetitive faculty, the principal cause or "mover" in moral activity:

"For an act which proceeds from one potency in so far as it is moved by another (potency) cannot be perfect unless both potencies are well disposed to the act . . . the good disposition of the potency that is the 'moved-mover' is accomplished through a conformity to the potency that moves it . . ."[88]

This conformity of the practical intellect to the will is effected by the virtue of prudence, which presupposes (we shall see why in a moment) the "rectitude" of the will,[89] not in the sense that the will determines the object of prudence,[90] but in the sense that it is the "rectified" will

[85] S. T. I II q. 58, a. 5, ad 1. Cf. also In III De Anima, lect. 15, no. 821.
[86] S. T. I II q. 3, a. 4, ad 3; De Ver. q. 14, a. 5, ad 5; De Car. q. u. a. 3, ad 12; S. T. I II q. 8, a. 3, ad 3.
[87] S. T. I II q. 56, a. 3, corp., and in many other places.
[88] S. T. I II q. 56, a. 4, corp.
[89] S. T. I II q. 56, a. 2, ad 3; I II q. 58, a. 3, ad 2.
[90] De Virt. in Comm. q. u. a. 7, corp.; De Ver. q. 15, a. 2, corp.

that provides the practical intellect, informed by prudence, with the principle whence it commences its own proper intellectual activity — deliberation, judgment and reasoning,[91] that precedes the choice of the means conducive to man's final end. For in the practical syllogism that precedes moral conduct, it is the end, supplied to the practical intellect by the "rectified" will, that plays the part exercised by a principle in the order of speculative truth:

"... the perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters depend on the principles from which reason argues. Now in human acts ends are what principles are in speculative matters. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with regards to ends; and this depends upon the rectitude of his appetite."[92]

In thomistic theology, however, as in all catholic theologies, it is the theological virtue of charity that "rectifies" the human will with respect to its final end,[93] for it is the final end which is the principle of activity in all moral conduct.[94] Now theological charity is the form of prudence as it is of all the virtues without exception.[95] Since the human intellect can know the object of the will, the end or the good under the aspect of truth, just as the will can will the object of the intellect, truth under the aspect of good,[96] the informing presence of charity in the will, acting through the virtue of prudence, enables the practical intellect to deduce means efficaciously conducive to supernatural beatitude. The human act, in so far as it is a means to that supernatural end, that is in the order of exercise, is specified good or bad only in relation to that end.[97] Hence the conformity of the practical intellect to the will effected by theological charity consists, ultimately, in this that "the practical intellect shares with the will a common object: being under the double aspect of truth and goodness."[98] And it is the radical reason why, in

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[91] De Ver. q. 14, a. 5, ad 11; S. T. I II q. 58, a. 3, ad 2; I II q. 57, a. 4, corp.; and II II q. 47, a. 2, ad 1.

[92] S. T. I II q. 57, a. 4, corp. Cf. also S. T. I II q. 58, a. 3, corp., and ad 3; In III Sent. d. 33, a. 1, ad 1, sol. 1.

[93] In II Sent. d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, sol.; De Car. q. u. a. 6, ad 11 and a. 12, ad 12.

[94] In I Eth. lect. 12, no. 139; S. T. I II q. 1, a. 5, corp.

[95] De Ver. q. 15, a. 5, ad 11. In III Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 3; De Car. q. u. a. 3, ad 9. A. G. Sertillanges, O. P., stresses this function of charity when he writes: "Hence theologians refer to charity as the 'form' of the virtues; that is to say, at once the impulse that moves them and the superior viewpoint that guides them." RECTITUDE, New York 1953, p. 67.

[96] De Virt. in Comm. q. u. a. 6, ad 5.

[97] De Car. q. u. a. 3, corp.; S. T. I II q. 18, a. 5, ad 3.

[98] Gregory Stevens, O. S. B., op. cit., p. 196.

the admirably consistent doctrine of St. Thomas, the cardinal virtue of prudence is never found in habitual sinners.[99] And the rectitude of reasoning in moral matters, in which the supernatural end provides the principle of the practical syllogism employed by the practical reason, informed by prudence, to deduce means conducive to the same end, constitutes the essence of practical truth.

" . . . the good of intellectual virtues consists in the utterance of truth. Truth, however, consists in a certain conformity of intellect and word to thing. And since conformity is a mean between the disparity of two extremes, it is expedient that the good of intellectual virtue consist in a mean (which is observed when) that is asserted concerning a thing which actually is . . . This is the case when the intellect absolutely considers something. BUT WHEN REASONING IS INVOLVED, THE MEAN IS OBSERVED NOT ONLY IN CONFORMITY TO THE THING, BUT ALSO IN THE CONFORMITY OF CONCLUSIONS TO PRINCIPLES, OR OF MEANS TO END IN THE ORDER OF OPERATION."[100]

Quite in character with the exaggerated voluntarism that mars most of his treatment of the doctrine of prudence, Father Connery asserts that "universal moral principles reach down to individual acts through the moral virtues. It is the (moral) virtues that guide the intellect toward objective reality."[101] Such a statement may be true in a theology based on Suaresian principles — I wouldn't know. But I do know that the Jesuit moralist makes an egregious blunder when he ascribes such doctrine to St. Thomas. In thomistic psychology the will is a blind faculty whose object is the good AS APPREHENDED BY THE INTELLECT,[102] and any explanation, such as the one just cited, that ascribes a cognitive function to virtues that exclusively perfect the appetitive function in man involves a patent contradiction of basic thomistic tenets. As we have just seen, it is certainly true that the "rectitude" of the practical intellect with respect to its final end is accomplished, thanks to the virtue of prudence, through conformity to the will informed by the theological virtue of charity. But this conformity is effected on the ontological, or objective, level, so to speak of a rational

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[99] S. T. II II q. 47, a. 13, corp.

[100] In II Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 3. Cf. also S. T. I II q. 12, a. 4, corp.

[101] Op. cit. p. 579.

[102] In II Sent. d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, sol.; De Ver. q. 14, a. 2, ad 3. Concerning those whose psychology is that of Father Connery, Henri Renard S. J. writes: " . . . they would have the will — which is an appetite and therefore a non-cognoscitive faculty — operate as if it were a complete intellectual supposit." The Functions of Intellect and Will in the Act of Free Choice," MODERN SCHOOLMAN, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, p. 91.

creature's being. On the moral or subjective[103] level of his being, it is the practical reason that reasons from the principle to the particular act covered by the principle.[104] Hence it is the recta ratio that rectifies the individueal acts of the will in the choice of finite goods, the means to man's final good or end. This mutual and reciprocal causality of the will upon the intellect with respect to the final end, and of the intellect upon the will with respect to the means to that final end, is clearly enuntiated by Aquinas when he writes:

"It is therefore manifest that the rectitude of the appetite through its relation to the end is the measure of truth in the practical reason. And accordingly, the truth of the practical reason is determined by a conformity to right appetite. BUT THE VERY TRUTH OF THE PRACTICAL REASON IS THE RULE OF RECTITUDE FOR THE APPETITE CONCERNING THE MEANS TO THE END. AND IN THIS SENSE APPETITE IS SAID TO BE RIGHT WHICH ACCOMPLISHES THAT WHICH REASON DE-CLARES TO BE TRUE."[105]

In these last words is contained an implicit repudiation of the voluntarism espoused by Father Connery. It is abundantly clear, therefore, that in the order of exercise, the will is the prime cause of the virtuous act, for the will not only moves itself to act, but also moves the practical intellect by imparting to it the "rectitude" that enables it to reason in a manner truly formable to man's actual last end. But in the order of specification, the recta ratio (or the practical reason informed by prudence) is the prime principle of virtuous conduct,[106] for the free choice of the will in the moral act is formally determined by the last practical judgment which is the work of prudential reasoning.[107] That is the fundamental reason why the recta ratio is the rule or measure of the moral act.[108] Finally, it is not the will, but the reason, acting in virtue of the power of the will remaining in it, that commands the execution of the moral act.[109] This interaction of reason and will in ethical conduct has been well expressed in the following words: "Ethics is lived philosophy, the arena in WHICH TRUTH BECOMES GOODNESS. Ethics is the workroom where the will executes the plan of reason. The

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[103] Joseph de Finance emphasizes this important aspect of knowledge in his admirable article "Being and Subjectivity," CROSS CURRENTS, Vol. VI, No. 2, pp. 163—178.
[104] In II Sent. d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, sol.
[105] In VI Eth. lect. 2, no. 1131.
[106] De Malo q. 6, a. u. corp.
[107] De Ver. q. 15, a. 3, corp.
[108] S. T. I II q. 64, a. 3, corp.; I II q. 68, a. 7, ad 4; II II q. 109, a. 2. ad 3; In II Sent. d. 24, a. 3, ad 1 and ad 3; De Ver. q. 23, a. 6, corp.
[109] S. T. II II q. 47, a. 8, corp.

ethical therefore is the true and reasonable, and for that reason the practical and the best. There are no moral aims that the intellect cannot sanction for the very good reason that TRUTH AND GOODNESS ARE ONE IN THE MATRIX OF BEING. The will has no worthy actions that are unworthy of the intellect, and the intellect has no higher dignity than when it contemplates truth that will engage the will in action. The duties which it imposes, the course which it prescribes are commands issuing from the captain on the bridge, the neglect of which may cause shipwreck. THAT IS WHY MORALITY IS TRUTH AND IMMORALITY IS A SYNONYM FOR UNREASON."[110]

I cannot terminate this article at this point, even though, to my own satisfaction at least, I have refuted Father Connery. And my reason is twofold. In the first place, the basic cause of the confusion that pervades practically all of his treatment of prudence finds no mention in his article, for the very good reason, of course, that it is unbeknown to him; nor has it thus far been mentioned in mine. But in my opinion to omit mentioning it would be to fall short of the objective I had originally in answering Father Connery. And secondly, because the viewpoint that he defends in his article is so common, even in educated catholic circles, that to fail to explain, however tentatively, how it has gained currency is to contribute, at least indirectly, to the perpetuation of that viewpoint. It is based on the persuasion, in practice,[111] if not in theory, that the prudential or ultimate practical judgment that specifies every moral act that issues from the finite will is culpably vitiated by passion, but not by ignorance nor error. Father Connery, I readily admit, does not say this. But a careful reading of his article will suffice to demonstrate that it is the assumption underlying his thesis that there can, and often does exist an opposition between virtue and speculative truth. Why else would he devote pages to emphasize the deleterious effect of the passions upon prudential judgment, but not one word concerning the equally baneful effect of ignorance and error? As a matter of fact, the obstacles in the intellectual sphere to the virtuous act are more directly opposed to the virtue of prudence than are the passions, even though it be true that any grave sin is equally corruptive of the prudential judgment. For

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[110] "Primacy of Truth" by Rudolf Harvey, O. F. M., FRANCISCAN STUDIES, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 266.

[111] When all is said and done the practical is the order par excellence of prudence, notwithstanding Father Connery's indefensible statement to the contrary, viz., "Nor will the function of prudence cease with the individual act." Op. cit. p. 582.

the passions are opposed directly only to the moral virtues, and through them to prudence.

This viewpoint that for practical purposes equates passion with sin, but ignores the relation of ignorance and error to sin, certainly is not the viewpoint of St. Thomas.[112] In fact, he verbally finds fault with those who in their pretence to virtue have attempted

"to exclude totally from the virtuous man the passions of the soul. For the good of reason CONSISTS IN THE RATIONAL CONTROL OF THE PASSIONS, which are the movements of the sensitive appetite. Hence it is of the essence of virtue, NOT TO EXCLUDE THE PASSIONS TOTALLY, BUT ONLY THE INORDINATE PASSIONS . . ."[113]

In the degree that we are scandalized by these words of Aquinas, in the same degree we have been misled by that perversion of true Christian morality[114] that goes by the name of "moralism" to which we have already alluded. In the genuine thomistic doctrine sin is committed not only through inordinate passion, but also through ignorance and error.[115] For not all ignorance and error destroys the voluntariety of the human act[116] any more than does every passion. It is precisely because the human reason is liable to error and ignorance,[117] just as the will is vulnerable to the surge of passion, that prudence is necessary in the practical reason and the moral virtues in the will.

How then did such a viewpoint gain currency? For no one who has lived any length of time among men can deny that it is most common. Josef Pieper traces it back to the heretical teachings of the Manichees, the Montanists and the Catharists.[118] I have no doubt that those ancient errors have left their impress on the thinking of subsequent generations, including our own. But perhaps I shall be indulged to profer one or two causes that exhibit greater pertinency to our own milieu.

Our age has been characterized by momentous strides achieved by man in the domination of his environment. Progress in the field of the physical sciences within the last century has been truly phenomenal. As a consequence, the knowledge acquired through these sciences

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[112] The genuine thomistic teaching concerning the relation of passion to virtue and vice — a matter so poorly understood even among some educated Catholics — is excellently portrayed by Josef Pieper in his book "Fortitude and Temperance."

[113] In II Eth. lect. 3, no. 272.

[114] Cf. Dietrich von Hildebrand's book "True Morality and its Counterfeits" for a splendid treatment of the subject.

[115] In II Sent. d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, sol.

[116] In II Sent. d. 22, q. 2, a. 2, sol.

[117] In II Eth. lect. 7, no. 322.

[118] "Fortitude and Temperance" p. 73.

has assumed a prestige, even among the unlettered, that is unmatched in any other field of human knowledge at the present time. The common people have been tremendously impressed by the commercial applications that reflect the gigantic strides that have been made in the scientific world. And the educated have become inclined to envy a little the success, and its attendant emoluments, of the physical scientist. Nor has the latter foregone any opportunity to eulogize the contribution his special type of knowledge, characterized by the principle of verification, has made to the material civilization modern man has built for himself. As a consequence, the magnified importance, and the pseudo-claims to a transcendent value, of the physical sciences has become the woof of the intellectual tapestry that we so fondly admire as the supreme creation of modern man. Quite without conscious connivance this mentality has invaded even spheres of human knowledge far more important than the knowledge of nature, ethics, for instance. Hand in hand with the usurpation of the claim to preeminence, once accorded indisputably to metaphysics (and ethics) accomplished by the physical sciences, has emerged a thinly concealed disdain for the values that are the exclusive domain of the metaphysician and the ethical philosopher. In short, positivism has made itself felt even amongst our own. As a consequence there has been a steadily growing and discernible tendency, even among Catholic theologians, to over-stress the role of the passions, as positive, readily discernible factors, and to discount error and ignorance, which, of their very nature, are negative or privative factors, in the genesis of sin.

Among well educated Catholics, another, but no less potent influence has been at work contributing to the viewpoint above mentioned, but stemming from an entirely different source. It is well known among Catholic philosophers and theologians that some ancient philosophers, principally Socrates, were of the conviction that vice is universally synonymous with ignorance. It is likewise common knowledge that St. Thomas, like other scholastic theologians of his age, refuted this opinion.[119] Starting from this historical fact some, not without appeal (futile though it be) to the authority of St. Thomas as a justification for their intolerable logic, have indulged in some very devious reasoning. Since vice is not ignorance, they have persuaded themselves that knowledge, the contrary of ignorance, can contribute nothing to the acquisition of virtue, the contrary of vice. And this is exactly the position (unwittingly, I am sure) Father Connery assumes in his entire discussion of pru-

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[119] In II Sent. d. 24, q. 3, a. 3, sol.

dence. He verbally admits the necessity of knowledge for virtue,[120] but by his express and direct attack upon devotion to truth as a guise for vice he unwittingly reveals his true position. For in his mind "a false devotion to truth is a departure from virtue."[121] But a departure from virtue is nothing else than vice. And by insisting that truth in ethics need not involve conformity to reality he effectively demolishes the possibility of any recourse to an objective standard for distinguishing true from false devotion. In effect, therefore, notwithstanding his assertion to the contrary, he stands with those who stigmatize devotion (true or false) to truth as vice.

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[120] Op. cit. pp. 572—573.
[121] Op. cit. p. 578.

FRANCISCAN ELEMENTS IN THE LIFE
AND SOME ESSAYS OF FRANCIS THOMPSON

PREFACE

To arrive at an estimate of the influence bearing upon the life and work of an author, the primary necessity is to realize his particular point of view. This can be achieved by studying the author in the light of his background. Francis Thompson lived and wrote in an atmosphere of a virile Franciscan cult which permeated English life during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Because of this fact, an interpretation of the nature and significance of the spirit of St. Francis is necessary in order to arrive at an understanding of the mind of Thompson as revealed in his essays, as well as to appreciate the full impact of this spirit on his life. Hence, a brief, historical research into the nature and significance of the spirit of St. Francis will be the subject matter of Chapter One.

Conversely, the test of an understanding of Francis Thompson would consist in the ability to recognize the Franciscan elements in his life and essays. Therefore, Chapter Two will attempt to examine the nature of the Franciscan spirit that existed in England during the nineteenth century in which Thompson lived and wrote. Paradoxical as it may seem, the nineteenth, a century of revolution, phenomenal expansion, mounting wealth and material well being, loved St. Francis more perhaps than any other saint, but it loved him in its own way. Then, too, interest in the personality of St. Francis was enkindled during this century by the importance attached to the sixth centenary of his death. By a curious coincidence, on this centenary a writer belonging to the German Romantic School published a small volume entitled *Der Heilige Franziskus von Assisi, Ein Troubadour*. The novelty was contained in the sub-title *Ein Troubadour*, which implied the discovery of the knight and minstrel in the Saint of Assisi, traits which heretofore were disregarded.

Moreover, the circumstances of Francis Thompson's life, bound up as they are with a background of Francican spirituality, postulate, for a true view of the man, an investigation of this influence in his life. Consequently, Chapter Three will focus attention on the spirit of St. Francis as revealed in the facts of Thompson's life.

Since the full impact of the influence on an author would be most noticeable in his writings, the final chapter will deal with a consideration of the Franciscan elements in some of the essays of Francis Thompson. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the Franciscan influence in the life and some essays of Thompson in order to prove that his life and essays reflect and embody the spirit of St. Francis of Assisi.

The primary source for the life of St. Francis was the English version of *The Writings of St. Francis of Assisi* (1906), edited by Paschal Robinson. The official biography providing other basic facts on St. Francis was that of Brother Thomas of Celano, a contemporary of the Saint— *St. Francisci Assisiensis Vita Prima et Miracula*, edited by Eduard d'Alençon (1906). Theodore A. Zaremba's published doctoral dissertation which contained a study of the Third Order Secular as an agency of social reform, proved helpful in tracing the significance of the Franciscan spirit through the centuries.

Everard Meynell's *Life of Francis Thompson* supplied the first-hand biographical facts, and the essays themselves were included in the *Prose Works* (1913), edited by Wilfred Meynell, Thompson's friend, philosopher, and guide. Of special importance to my study was the book, *Literary Criticisms of Francis Thompson* (1948), newly discovered and collected by Terence L. Connolly, curator of the Thompson Collection at Boston College.

CHAPTER ONE

THE NATURE OF THE SPIRIT OF ST. FRANCIS

The life of a Christian has always been regarded as a military service of Christ. St. Paul who borrows many figures from military life demands of every Christian that he be "a good soldier of Christ."[1] In the sixth century St. Benedict, the father of Western monasticism, regarded his monks as soldiers who would do battle for Christ, the true King. But in the period of the Crusades, the soldier became a knight, a noble liegeman of the Lord, a champion of God. In the fully developed feudal system a knight was defined as

one raised to honourable military rank by the king or other qualified person, the distinction being usually conferred only upon one of noble birth who had served a regular apprenticeship to the profession of arms.[2]

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[1] II Tim. 2: 3.
[2] "Knight," *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, Vol. V. James Murray, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1901).

Originally, though, a knight was a miltary servant of the king or other person of rank, a feudal tenant holding land from a superior on condition of serving in the field as a mounted and well-armed man.

It took two centuries of cultural and churchly training, however, to develop those splendid figures which fully expressed the ideal of Christian knighthood. After the conquest of Jerusalem the necessity of a standing army became peremptory in order to prevent the loss of the Holy City to surrounding, hostile nations. Out of this necessity arose the military orders wherein was realized the perfect fusion of the religious and military spirit. Consequently, chivalry reached its apogee during this period. No name was considered better than that of knight. Like the monastic, the knightly vow bound with common ties warriors of every nation and condition, enrolling them in a vast brotherhood of manners, ideals, and aims.[3]

Wherever such knighthood flourished, there also were the knightly and courtly minstrels, or troubadours who sang the praises of honor and duty, unqualified fealty, and loyalty to God, king, and liege lord. The knights themselves considered it an honor to be as expert with the lyre as with the sword. An injunction given in an instruction on knighthood stated that the newly invested knight must be gay, participate in great clamor in the field, and have great joyfulness at home.[4] This gaity, in fact, held the first place among the qualities which became the knight.

Into this age of knighthood and minstrelsy, Francis of Assisi was born on September 26, 1182. His parents were Pietro, son of Bernadone Marcioni, a rich merchant, and Donna Pica of a noble Provençal family. As a youth, Thomas of Celano, his contemporary and biographer, says of Francis:

> He had a ready wit, sang merrily, and delighted in fine clothes and showy display. Handsome, gay, gallant and courteous, he soon became the prime favorite among the youth and nobles of Assisi.[5]

Clothed in the garb of a minstrel, and with a scepter in his hand, he passed as King of Youth from feast to feast in company with his friends; always he was the first in frolic, in mirth, and in song.

Goaded on by dreams of romantic adventures and restless for action, Francis in 1201 took part in the hostilities of his own city against Perugia,

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[3] Carl Wesle (ed.), *Das Rolandslied des Pfaffen Konrad* (Bonn, 1928), p. 5820.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

[5] Thomas de Celano, *St. Francisci Assisiensis Vita Prima et Miracula*, ed. Eduardus Alenconiensis, O. M. Cap., (Romae, Desclée, Lefèbre et Soc., 1906), 1.

but he was taken prisoner with many of his compatriots. After he was released he returned to Assisi. Then, as a result of a severe illness, he was impressed with the nothingness of life and began to think of eternity. Having recovered from the sickness though, he returned again to his former mode of life.

Then in a dream one night Francis saw a large hall filled with knightly armor, and each weapon was marked with a cross. It was after this that Francis first began the exchange of earthly weapons for spiritual ones, a worldly knighthood for the divine.[6] Now he began to seek solitude which formerly he had so assiduously avoided, devoting much time to prayer, until finally he became master of his pride. He began by serving the sick and the poor with such solicitude that even the service of the lepers was no longer repulsive. The real meaning of Christ's words became clearer to him, "He that will follow Me must deny himself."

One day while praying in the delapidated Church of St. Damian he heard these words from the crucifix, "Francis, do you not see that my house is falling to ruins? Go and repair it."[7] Taking the words literally, he immediately sold his horse and some cloth from his father's house in hopes of getting enough money to repair the old church. Because he begged for stones to use in the work, Francis' companions and his own father ridiculed him. At first he fled from this storm of abuse and hid himself in a cave, but Thomas of Celano assures us that his chivalric nature soon reasserted itself.[8] And summoning up courage, he returned to Assisi to make known to his father his plans to consecrate his life to God. Finally, in the presence of Bishop Guido Secondi, Francis gave his clothing and the money he still had to his father and proclaimed:

> I will return to my father even the clothes which I have received from him. Hitherto I have called Pietro Bernardone my father; henceforth, I shall say in all truth, 'Our Father Who art in Heaven. Thou art my treasure and my hope.'[9]

From now on his sole ambition was to know and fulfill his obligations as liegeman of Christ.

On the feast of St. Matthias, February 24, 1209, Francis heard the priest read the words of the Gospel:

> Going therefore, preach saying: the kingdom of heaven is at hand. Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purse; nor scrip for your journey, nor two coats nor shoes, nor staff . . .[10]

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[6] Celano, *op. cit.*, 4—5.   [7] *Ibid.*, p. 16   [8] *Ibid.*, p. 18
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 26.   [10] Matt. 10:7.

"This is what I have sought!"[11] exclaimed Francis, and throwing aside purse, staff and shoes, he exchanged his tunic for the poor garb of the Umbrian peasants and his belt for a rope. The following day he started to preach, and immediately others followed him. His first two disciples were Bernard of Quintavalle, a rich noble of Assisi, and Peter Cantaneo, a canon and Doctor of Law.[12]

A few weeks later, the three went into the Church of St. Nicholas and asked God to make known His will. Three successive times Francis opened the Bible at random and each time the essence of the message was to sell all, give to the poor, and follow Christ. In these manifestations Francis recognized the hand of God and turning to his disciples he advised them to do as they had heard, In his Testament Francis wrote:

> And when the Lord gave me some brothers, no one showed me what I ought to do, but the Most High Himself revealed to me that I should live according to the form of the Holy Gospel . . .[13]

The ideal of Francis was therefore, a life lived according to the perfection of the Gospel, and when he gave his new Community the first rule in 1209, he began in this manner:

> The rule and life of these brothers is this: namely, to live in obedience and chastity and without property and to follow the doctrines and footsteps of our Lord Jesus Christ, who says: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor . . .[14]

Thus, the rule was very simple, being only a commentary on the three texts of the Gospel.

Not being satisfied with binding only his own Brothers to the evangelical way of life, in 1212 Francis undertook the foundation of an Order for women, the Poor Clares. But even this second order was not sufficient as Francis felt that something should be done for those who lived in the world. Accordingly, the Third Order was begun in 1221 which gave lay persons an opportunity of leading a penitential life without breaking family ties.

Francis was concerned, however, not only for the members of the three Orders. He wished to share the extraordinary graces he had received also with those outside the vicinity of Assisi. So, outlining the plan for his apostolic labors, Francis drew the figure of the Cross on the

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[11] Celano, *op. cit.*, 29.

[12] *Ibid.*, 37.

[13] Paschal Robinson, *The Writings of St. Francis of Assisi*, ed., (Philadelphia: Dolphin Press, 1906), p. 81.

[14] *Ibid.*, 32.

ground with the arms pointing to the four corners of the globe. He sent
out the Brothers in these directions to preach the glad tidings of the
Gospel to all men.

But the members of Francis' Order not only preached to Christians
and heathens; they actually strove to better the conditions of the poor,
the laborer, and the miserable. He taught his brethren to expect for
their labors no other reward than their daily sustenance. In his rule he
stated:

> Let the Brothers who know how to work, labor and exercise themselves
> in that art they may understand if it be not contrary to the salvation of
> their souls . . . And for their labor they may receive all necessary things,
> except money.[15]

In this manner Francis inculcated work and labor not only as a
means of acquiring a living, but also as a means for doing good to others.
Whatever need a man was in, the Friar was to assist him in so far as he
might do so. Thus, the social ideal of Francis was the ideal of service
having for its motive the evangelical law of love.

After receiving the Sacred Stigmata in answer to his prayer for
greater love of God and His creatures, Francis suffered much from
failing health. But in all his afflictions he always retained a joyful
and childlike spirit toward his heavenly Father. Finally, when Francis
was told that death was approaching, he exclaimed, "Welcome, Sister
Death!"[16] Lying on the ground, strewn with ashes after having repeated-
ly welcomed death, Francis of Assisi died just as his Brothers were
chanting Psalm 141, "Bring my soul out of prison, that I may praise
Thy name."[17] He received "Sister Death" singing, says Thomas of
Celano.[18] It was the third day of October 1226, and the forty-fifth year
of his life.

As such, the life of Francis of Assisi was in contradiction to the
spirit of the thirteenth century world. The teachings of the Gospel had
been forgotten and poverty was considered a disgrace. Amid all this,
the heart of Francis was inflamed with love for God. Nothing expressed
this more beautifully than his own often repeated words, "Deus meus
et omnia."[19] "Deus meus et omnia." His heart glowed for Christ, especial-
ly in the mystery of His sufferings. It was this love that prompted
Francis to renounce the whole world and devote himself to his "Lady
Poverty" in all simplicity according to the Gospel.

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[15] *Ibid.*, 39—40.   [16] Celano, *op. cit.*, 2, 10.   [17] *Ibid.*, 2, 10.
[18] *Ibid.*, 2, 10.   [19] *Ibid.*, 2, 10.

Francis taught the world to see God in all nature. The very animals became his brothers and sisters. *The Mirror of Perfection* expressed this in the words:

> Entirely absorbed in the love of God, the Blessed Francis saw the goodness reflected in every creature in a perfect manner, and because of this he was devoted to created things with a special and heartfelt love.[20]

No matter how small and insignificant, the eye of Francis penetrated into the deepest meaning of all things earthly, reaching the last and Supreme Cause of all things. When at last his bodily eyes no longer could see the beauties of the external world, and mindful of the countless benefits which he had received from creatures, Francis the poet, sang out his "Canticle of the Sun." Like the sun, this song moved Francis himself to utter joy and to closest union with God in the midst of sufferings. Like the sun, it should travel throughout the wide world wherever the Franciscan Friars, the Minstrels and Jongleurs of God appeared, to infuse in men true joy. Thus, the "Canticle of the Sun" is more than the swan-song of the Saint; it is the symbol of the life and ideals of him who even in his last hour urged his Brothers and disciples of all times "We are the minstrels of God who should lift up the hearts of men and move them to divine joy."[21]

At the very first chapters of the Order the chief efforts of Francis were directed, not only toward the interior life of the individual members by inculcating the faithful observance of the rule, but also toward the extension of the Order's activity by dispatching preaching friars into different parts of the world. According to Felder, the sending of friars into foreign mission fields was formally decided on at the Chapter of Pentecost in 1219.[22] Five years later, the Franciscan friars under Brother Agnellus of Pisa, the first Provincial Minister appointed by Francis himself, were sent to England to preach penance with courage and simplicity.

Friar Thomas of Eccleston, the earliest historian of the Order in England, opens his Chronicle *De Adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam* in these significant words:

> In the year of the Lord 1224 in the time of the Lord Pope Honorius in the same year, that is, in which the Rule of the Blessed Francis was by him confirmed, and in the eighth year of the Lord King Henry, son of John, on

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[20] St. Bonaventure, *The Life of St. Francis of Assisi*, (London: Burns, Oates, 1925), p. 84.

[21] Hilarin Felder, *The Ideals of St. Francis of Assisi*, (Chicago: Benzinger Brothers, 1925), p. 428.

[22] *Ibid.*, 309.

the Tuesday after the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin, the Friars first arrived in England, landing at Dover.[23]

Thus is related the beginning of the first Franciscan English Province, composed of nine members, four clerics and five lay brothers. After an adventure at Dover where the beggarly appearance of these mendicant missionaries caused their temporary detention as vagabonds, they reached Canterbury and were received in the Priory of the Holy Trinity.

After the suspicion of their first reception was dispelled, the Franciscans were welcomed with enthusiasm wherever they went, and soon they won the hearts of the English people. Westbrook points out that

. . . the increase and dispersion of the Order was remarkable. In November 1224 two of the London friars had reached Oxford; houses were founded by 1226 in Yarmouth, Northhampton, Norwich and Lynn.[24]

So within a relatively short time Friar Eccleston records that the Order had increased in England to well over twelve hundred members, drawn from all ranks of society, living in forty-nine houses throughout the kingdom and exerting their influence in the university, in the castle and on Cheapside, in the pulpit and the confessional.[25] In a word, their influence became as elevating as it was broad. Moreover, the vow of poverty, by making the friars dependent upon those among whom they moved, brought them into intimate contact with the lives of the people. They did much to ennoble suffering and poverty in the eyes of the world, and to elevate the ideal of marriage and family life. From *Glimpses of Catholic England* we learn that "the brethren were rich in the joyousness of spirit which distinguishes the disciples of the Jongleur de Dieu."[26]

Later, when John Wyclif was perverting England by his heretical teaching in the fourteenth century, the Franciscans of Oxford were among the first to oppose him.

Learned theologians assembled at Oxford in 1381, and Friar John Tyssington, a leading doctor of the University, was foremost in condemning Wyclif's doctrines regarding the Blessed Eucharist.[27]

In regard to Wyclif's attack on the friars themselves, Hutton maintains:

His charges against them are indeed perhaps as good evidence as we could have that the core of Franciscanism was still sound in spite of the

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[23] Raphael Huber, *A Documented History of the Franciscan Order*, (Milwaukee: Nowing Publishing Co., 1944), p. 813.
[24] T. S. Westbrook, *Glimpses of Catholic England*, (London: Burns, Oates, 1930), p. 62.
[25] *Ibid.*, 64.   [26] *Ibid.*, 59.
[27] Francis B. Steck, *Franciscans and the Protestant Revolution*, (Chicago: Macmillan, 1902), p. 22.

disasters in which so much had become little more than a dream of the Golden Age.[28]

The continued achievements of the English Franciscans through the centuries are consistently noteworthy. Father Steck contends that the English have given to the Franciscan Order a greater number of eminently learned men than all the other nations taken together.[29]

During the reign of Henry VIII, however, the Franciscans were the first to feel his vengeful fury because they were the first who dared to set themselves against his lawless policy. Besides, on account of the friars' traditional loyalty to the Holy See and their acknowledged influence with the masses, they were rightly designated by those in power as the most formidable and inflexible defenders of truth and justice. Consequently, many of them were imprisoned and even put to death. The few surviving Franciscans after Queen Elizabeth's reign waited for an opportunity to rally their scattered forces. Hence, when James I ascended the throne in 1603, the friars banded together again and established the Second Province.

A revival of the Order and its social influence took place during the seventeenth century.[30] Besides the new scholars militating for the dogma of the Immaculate Conception to counteract the onslaught of the heretics on the Mother of God, the friars in particular carried on diplomatic peace missions between countries of war ravaged age. Outstanding were Joseph le Clerc of Tremblay, Bonaventure of Caltagione, St. Lawrence of Brindisi, Giacinto da Casole, and Marco da Aviano.[31]

"During the first half of the eighteenth century," Father Steck asserts, "the province prospered as perhaps never before."[32] In 1756 it counted about one hundred members, of whom in 1758, at least forty were active in England. Accordingly, many new missions could be taken over, to the great joy of the people who welcomed the friars with open arms, and by generous benefactions tried to relieve their temporal needs. In this way the Franciscans were enabled to rebuild some of their friaries, notably those at White Hill and York, and resolutely

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[28] Edward Hutton, *The Franciscans in England*, (London: Constable and Co., 1926), p. 203.

[29] Steck, *op. cit.*, 203.

[30] Theodore Zaremba, *Franciscan Social Reform*, (Pulaski: Franciscan Printery, 1947), p. 326.

[31] *Ibid.*, 326.

[32] Steck, *op. cit.*, 330.

... they set out once more on the highways of the world solely concerned with the fulfillment of their original mission: that of being heralds of the Great King.[33]

Then, too, during this eighteenth century St. Francis of Assisi became the subject of literary endeavor. A popular life of the Saint by Candile Chalippe, the first biography not written in Latin, was published and later translated into Italian and English.[34] Besides, there was the publication of the scholarly works of Nicholas Papini; the learned Bollandist, Constantius Suyskens published the October volume II of *Acta Sanctorum* in 1766 which included Thomas of Celano's *Legenda prima*, the *Legenda trium sociorum* and fragments of Julian of Speyer's *Vita St. Francisci*.[35] But of this century Zaremba says:

> If the eighteenth century had loved and understood St. Francis least of all ages, then the nineteenth was to begin atonement for that neglect. For as the Holy Father mentions ... nothing could efface nor obliterate the memory of Francis.[36]

Even as the sons of St. Francis were reeling under the heavy blows of anticlerical governments, the times were to witness the beginning of an unprecedented revival of admiration for the Poverello.

Thus, after considering the nature of the spirit of St. Francis it can be said that even a cursory perusal of his life reveals that Francis of Assisi made no attempt to bequeath posterity a systematic presentation of his spiritual ideas. Impulsive, ardent and simple, Francis would probably have recoiled from the phrase "scientific spirituality." Nevertheless, Franciscan spirituality as exemplified by the life of the Holy Founder may be summarized as follows: It arises from the pure love of God and rests in His Divine Son, Jesus Christ. With simple faith it seizes upon His Holy Gospel and extends its message of love in deed and in word to all men and creatures in God's great family. Its necessary mark is perfect poverty coupled with humility, and its modality is constituted by childlike simplicity and joyous knightly enthusiasm for all of God's creation.

Finally, in regard to the significance of the spirit of St. Francis, heroic service in behalf of the poor and oppressed was characteristic of the Franciscans from the thirteenth down to the nineteenth century. While it is true that the Third Order was the most important single achievement of St. Francis which effected the greatest social reformation,

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[33] Agostino Gemelli, *The Franciscan Message to the World*, (London: Burns, Oates, 1935), p. 197.
[34] Zaremba, *op. cit.*, 328.   [35] *Ibid.*, 328.   [36] *Ibid.*, 327.

yet other great benefits resulted from the achievements of his followers. Zaremba maintains that "there is no field of activity in which the sons of Francis have not merited well of humanity."[37] Despite the numerous misfortunes with which it was visited, the Order of St. Francis always returned with new vigor and fresh strength to the pursuit of the ideals which had been set down for it by its Holy Founder.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SPIRIT OF ST. FRANCIS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Agostino Gemelli in speaking of the Romantic movement which was in progress during the nineteenth century says:

> If this movement tended insofar as it concerned culture and literature to idealize the Middle Ages, it studied St. Francis in particular with no small measure of sympathy considering him in the light of the troubadour of God.[1]

This devotion to the Little Poor Man of Assisi can be attributed in part to the high status of the Franciscan Order in England at this time. Though a general sentiment of dislike for all Religious Orders prevailed, yet the Franciscans proved to be the happy exception for they were not suspected of meddling in politics; they exercised no influence in government circles, and they owned no great estates nor schools.[2] And again, Father Steck attributes the success of the Franciscans among the laity to the fact that,

> their life of complete detachment from earthly things was a salutary reproof to the wealthy, and a source of comfort and satisfaction to the needy and oppressed.[3]

Commenting on St. Francis and the universality of his influence Dubois remarks:

> Though the reform which Francis and the Church accomplished conjointly was above all religious, based on the Gospel and aimed at the conversion and salvation of man, it was nevertheless, all comprehensive, including the natural as well as the supernatural, the material as well as the spiritual in man. It aimed not at the destruction of existing principles and institutions, but at the repression of abuses committed by individuals and the triumph of justice and charity among men.[4]

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[37] *Ibid.*, 325.
[1] Gemelli, *op. cit.*, 199.   [2] *Ibid.*, 199.   [3] Steck, *op. cit.*, 31.
[4] Leo Du Bois, *St. Francis of Assisi, Social Reformer*, (Chicago: Benziger Brothers, 1906), p. 7.

But perhaps the best evidence of the completeness of the reform, both social and religious, which the Poverello effected according to Martin[5] is that the social ideal of St. Francis made so strong an appeal to the people as to attract large numbers of them from every walk of life, anxious to become members of the Third Order Secular, and this, at a time when the Christian world had all but lost sight of the Gospel ideals. And so "the common people when they made up their minds to go back to the Sacraments, went to Franciscan churches for they felt that the Franciscans were close, both to them and the Gospel."[6]

A great stimulus was given to this movement of sympathy with which lay persons were regarding St. Francis by two great Popes whose personalities dominated the stage of Christendom during the latter half of the nineteenth century, Pius IX and Leo XIII. His Holiness Pope Pius IX joined the Tertiaries in 1821, and cultivated the Franciscan spirit throughout his life. That he solemnly celebrated the golden anniversary of his profession as a Tertiary in 1871, and that he encouraged the Third Order and dedicated it to the Sacred Heart in 1874 provides proof of this.[7]

In 1875 Pope Pius appointed Cardinal Pecci, Archbishop of Perugia, and later Pope Leo XIII as the protector of the Third Order at Assisi, the cradle of the Franciscan movement. When he entered upon his new duties, the Cardinal delivered an address in which he declared

that he had always looked upon the Third Order as a school of Christian perfection, erected without doubt at the inspiration of the Holy Ghost . . . and exceedingly useful both to religion and to the State.[8]

In another public utterance regarding the Third Order just a month after his elevation to the Papacy, Leo XIII remarked:

As God sent St. Francis to heal the evils of his age by the Third Order, so this order, we are certain is a more suitable means than any other of calling the world back to the observance of the Gospel . . . We are perfectly certain that the Third Order is a most powerful antidote against all the evils which harass the present age so that there is no means more apt to lead the world to a true and solid keeping of the Gospel.[9]

Thus the Pope made clear the place of Franciscan spirituality and specifically of the Third Order in Catholic social action of the period. The Sovereign Pontiff placed his high hopes in this Franciscan spirit

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[5] Paul R. Martin, *The Gospel in Action*, (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1932) p. 117.
[6] Gemelli, *op. cit.*, 200. [7] *Ibid.*, 200.
[8] Martin, *op. cit.*, 130. [9] *Ibid.*, 130.

and its salutary effects also, because of the great similarity betwee
the evils of thirteenth and nineteenth century societies. In this compa
ison the Pope bases himself chiefly on two points of similarity: th
decline of divine charity and the perversion of the Christian sense
duty, outwardly manifested in the seeking of comforts and the av
striving for pleasures.[10]

Five years after the election of Leo XIII to the Papacy, occurre
the seventh centenary of the birth of St. Francis. Honoring this occasio
with the Encyclical *Auspicato concessum*, Pope Leo lauded the Thir
Order as the great gift of the Poverello to the world, and one whic
largely contributed to the preservation of Christian civilization. H
convictions are evident in the following encyclical passage:

> Domestic peace and public tranquility, integrity of life and kindlines
> the right use and management of property — the best foundations of civil
> zation and security — a spring from the Third Order of St. Francis as fro
> their root, and it is to Francis that Europe is largely indebted for the prese
> vation of these blessings.[11]

Then in 1883 realizing that the Third Order needed rejuvenation Po
Leo breathed new life and vigor into it with the Encyclical *Misericor*
Dei Filius. Keenly aware that the nineteenth century was drifting int
indifferentism and laicism, "to put God back into the life of the wor
was his one endeavor; and the best means to accomplish this was in h
mind the Third Order of St. Francis.[12] In stating the purpose and sco
of this encyclical he says that:

> ... from many quarters comes the report of a growing devotion to St. Fra
> cis of Assisi and of a general increase in the number of those seeking admi
> tance into the Third Order. Wherefore, like one giving general inducemen
> to the entrants of a race, We determine to devote Our attention to whatev
> might in any way hinder or retard this salutary course of sentiments.[13]

Not only the great Pontiffs of the latter nineteenth century, bu
other Catholic sociologists as well, in an attempt to discover if th
precepts of the Gospel had ever been utilized in the field of economic
encountered the personality of St. Francis.[14] Monsignor Wilhelm En
manuel Ketteler, the great Archbishop of Mayence, the champion
the Church against the despotism of the Kultur Kampf, Socialism, ar

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[10] Zaremba, *op. cit.*, 79—80.
[11] Pope Leo XIII, *Auspicato concessum*, (Milwaukee, Bruce, 193;
p. 224.
[12] Steck, *op. cit.*, 36.
[13] Pope Leo XIII (Encyclical: *Misericors Dei Filius*, (Milwaukee, 193;
[14] Gemelli, *op. cit.*, 215.

Freemasonry, and defender of the rights of the working class, had drawn inspiration from the example and social doctrines of St. Francis. "I feel most intensely," he said, "the attraction of the social doctrines preached by St. Francis during the Middle Ages.[15] Of the same opinion, too, were the other Catholic sociologists of that generation — Frederic Ozanam, Donoso Cortes, Kolping, Windhorst, Cardinal Manning, Mermillod, La Tour de Pin, Lorin and Toniolo.[16]

An outstanding example of the notable social work resulting from the Third Order Secular is the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, founded by the lay Tertiary, Frederic Ozanam whose whole life was imbued with that love for his fellow men which was in perfect harmony with the teaching of his Seraphic Father Francis. According to Martin,[17] this society although it has no canonical connection with the Franciscan Order, may be cited as a work which through its Tertiary founder at least, is linked with Francican influence and today occupies a place of honor among the charitable organizations of the Church.

Although it was a long time before English literature came to a conscious appreciation of Catholicism, Senft[18] claims that notwithstanding the fact that the influence came through many centers, it really came from one, namely, the Romantic Movement. Even though the nineteenth and late eighteenth centuries discovered the Middle Ages emotionally and inaccurately, it is, as G. K. Chesterton aptly observed, something more than an accident that Romances are named after Rome.[19] It was only a question of time and logic before St. Francis was recognized as one of the sign-posts not only to the medievalism the Romantics cultivated, but also to the origin of that medievalism which is Rome. Tennyson expressed the sentiments of his age when he sighed:

Sweet St. Francis, would that he were here again,
He that in his Catholic wholeness used to call the very flowers
Sisters, Brothers — and the beasts — whose pains are hardly less than ours.[20]

The Oxford Movement which followed was the religious counterpart and completement of, if not essentially one with, the Romantic Move-

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[15] *Ibid.*, 215.   [16] *Ibid.*, 215.   [17] Martin, *op. cit.*, 126.

[18] Henry Senft, "The Influence of Franciscanism in Catholic English Literature," *A Report of the Twenty-Second Annual Meeting*, Franciscan Educational Conference, (Washington, D. C.: Capuchin College, 1940), p. 243.

[19] G. K. Chesterton, *St. Francis of Assisi*, (New York: Geo. H. Dorah Company, 1924), p. 34.

[20] Alfred Tennyson, "Locksley Hall Revisited, Sixty Years After," *Poetical Works of Alfred Tennyson*, (New York: Harper Bros., 1902), 11, 100—102.

ment.[21] And it was John Henry Cardinal Newman (1801—1890) who finally conducted the movement to its authentic source of inspiration. This decision was made final in his retreat at Littlemore in 1845, after which he followed the example of St. Philip Neri, his spiritual father and clothed himself in the habit of the Third Order.[22] His immortal *Dream of Gerontius* expressed his intimate thoughts on a subject that had occupied his whole lifetime, the final meeting with Sister Death. Here, he appropriately inserted his lofty tribute to St. Francis in the words of the Angel to the Soul before its judgment:

> There was a mortal, who is now above
> In the mid glory: he, when near to die,
> Was given communion with the Crucified,
> Such, that the Master's very wounds were stamped
> Upon his flesh; and from the agony
> Which thrill'd through body and soul in that embrace,
> Learn that the flame of the Everlasting Love
> Doth burn ere' it transform . . .[23]

Actually, however, Kenelm Digby (1800—1880) who was doing literary work in the Catholic Church a full decade before Newman's conversion paid tribute to the Franciscan traditions of the Middle Ages and helped to show to his contemporaries that religion was really the soul of romance.[24] While it is true that Father Frederick W. Faber (1814—1863) as an Anglican had already come into contact with Franciscans on the Continent, Kenelm H. Digby succeeded in correcting his view of them by directing him to the sources of the Franciscan story. Father Faber's translation of Chalippe's *Life of St. Francis* antedated by three years Karl Hase's important *Franz von Assisi* (1850) which Seton is inclined to take as a starting point of the Franciscan literary movement.[25] The book's significance has not received the attention it deserves, possibly because it was overshadowed by the masterly translation by Henry Cardinal Manning of one of the best known of all sources of Franciscan history, the *Fioretti*.

English Catholicism is remarkable, however, not only for the number of its Tertiary authors, but also for the quality of their lives and creations. Among the first was Aubrey De Vere who was a convert to the Catholic Faith from the "religion" of the Romantics. He alludes to the

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[21] W. H. Hutton, "The Oxford Movement," *Cambridge History of English Literature*, ed. A. W. Ward, Vol.XII (1916), p. 281.

[22] Senft. *op. cit.*, 244.

[23] John H. Newman, *Dream of Gerontius*, ed. W. F. Stockley, (St. Louis: Herder, 1914).

[24] Senft, *op. cit.*, 245.   [25] *Ibid.*, 245.

motives for his conversion in the preface to the *May Carols*, seeing Catholicism at once as a theological truth and as a living power, reigning among the humanities and renewing the affection and imagination of men.[26] Of St. Francis' patronage by the Romantics he sang wisely; but far from regretting the saint in Francis, De Vere tried to imitate him in the Third Order. Of his strictly Franciscan literary productions, we have his rhythmic translation of the *Fioretti* and *Perfect Joy*. Coventry Patmore's religious and literary background prior to his conversion in 1862 was similar to De Vere's, but Patmore's theory of the experience of beauty is only the distant echo of the voice of the composer of *The Canticle of the Sun*. Nevertheless, his desire to be buried in the rough habit of the Franciscans in Lymynton Churchyard was more than an author's dramatic gesture.

Besides the afore-mentioned authors whose lives and works reflected the Franciscan spirit in the nineteenth century, there were others, such as Alice Meynell, Katherine Tynan Hinkson, and of course, Francis Thompson. The investigation into the Franciscan elements that influence the life and essays of Thompson will form the burden of the next two chapters.

Turning to the non-Catholic intellectuals of the age, admiration for the Poverello can be found among the most diverse types. Matthew Arnold saw in Francis the person who knew best of all how to make religion popular. "He provided the most popular body of ministers of religion that has ever existed in the Church."[27] John Ruskin admired Francis so much that he considered becoming a Catholic only in order to be able to join the Third Order. In his *Deucalion* written in 1875, he considers himself a brother of the Third Order.[28] Franz Liszt showed his appreciation of Francis and what he stood for in his mind by his melodious "Franciscan Sonata."

Just as Pope Leo XIII gave a vital impetus, particularly among the Catholic masses, so among the intellectuals and non-Catholics a comparable impulse was given by new scholarly research into the life of the Umbrian Saint. In 1855 Karl Müller published a study on the origins of the Franciscan orders which despite the author's hypercritical attitude was fruitful in results. More successful though was another German

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[26] *Ibid.*, 246.
[27] Matthew Arnold, "Pagan and Medieval Religious Sentiment," *Essays in Criticism*, (New York: A. L. Burt Company, 1865), p. 155.
[28] John Ruskin, *Deucalion*, (New York: Merill and Baker, 1875), p. 6.

Protestant, Henry Thode, who that same year depicted St. Francis as the source of Renaissance art.[29]

Toward the close of the nineteenth century Paul Sabatier (1854—1941) learned of the character and influence of Francesco Bernardone. This French critic studied the Italian mendicant, was captivated, and in 1894 wrote a *Life of Francis of Assisi*. He did not portray the facts accurately, however, and this occasioned a popular attempt to champion the cause of the Poverello.[30] Nevertheless, he spent some forty odd years in research on Franciscan subjects. Zaremba in his *Franciscan Social Reform* maintains that there is no denying the fact that nearly all who have written anything of value about the Poverello since Sabatier entered upon the scene, have been directly or indirectly influenced by him. And there has been much written since that day;[31] so much, in fact, that it defies any accurate description. John R. H. Moorman in his book *The Sources for the Life of St. Francis of Assisi*[32] gives a rather complete list of the authors who have done work on St. Francis in England since 1894. O'Brien goes so far as to make the statement:

> Since that day the presses of the world have turned out literally thousands of lives, studies, portraits, biographies, appreciations, interpretations, and what nots of the Italian draper's son.[33]

This literary significance of St. Francis is further attested by O'Mahoney when speaking of the latter half of the nineteenth century he declares that:

> . . . the figure that has focussed most attention upon himself, drawing the regards of lettered and unlettered alike, is the man called Francis of Assisi, the man acclaimed by the modern mind as its own pet discovery, the man whose cult knows no frontiers, neither the boundaries of his country nor the far flung reaches of the Catholic Church. Literally Francis is of the wide world, everybody's Saint.[34]

But all these ephemeral praises of the Saint, based on his role of a pure humanitarian, lover of nature, or inspirer of art, rebel of the Church, or first exponent of a personal interpretation of religion have comparatively little value. The important thing to realize is that the great

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[29] Raphael Huber, *A Documented History of the Franciscan Order*, (Milwaukee: Nowing Publishing Co., 1944), p. 31.

[30] Isidore O'Brien, "St. Francis in Literature Past and Present," *Thought*, I (December, 1926), 387.

[31] Zaremba, *op. cit.*, 334.

[32] John R. H. Moorman, *The Sources for the Life of St. Francis*, (Manchester: University Press, 1941), pp. 9—10.

[33] O'Brien, *op. cit.*, 388.

[34] James O'Mahoney, "Literary Significance of St. Francis of Assisi," *Thought*, IX (December, 1934), 416.

benefits which have accrued to civilization from the Franciscan spirit were the result of Francis the Saint.

During his lifetime Francis was lovably and engagingly human, and at the same time heroically selfless and supernatural. He was invariably courteous toward even the lowest and least. The secret, then, of the personal appeal of Francis the Saint, was that he had a basic reverence for every person. G. K. Chesterton very aptly says of him:

> To him a man was always a man . . . he honored all men; that is, he not only loved, but respected them all. What gave him his extraordinary personal power was this; from the Pope to the beggar, from the Sultan of Syria in his pavillion to the ragged robbers crawling out of the wood, there was never a man that Francis Bernardone was not really interested in him; in his own inner individual life from the cradle to the grave; that he himself was being valued and taken seriously . . .[35]

Furthermore, he treated all men as kings. In his intense desire to restore self respect in the hearts of those who had lost faith in God and man, no sacrifice was too much for him. This spirit of brotherly love endeared St. Francis of Assisi in the hearts of people, even those of the nineteenth century.

Thus, the spirit of St. Francis showed itself very strongly during the nineteenth century both under a religious and a social aspect. Through the favorable attitude of Pope Pius IX and Pope Leo XIII toward things Franciscan, the role of the Third Order of St. Francis was considerably enhanced and became the medium of a thorough religious and social reform.

Further, eminent sociologists of the period among whom was Frederic Ozanam, gave official sanction to the social thought of St. Francis and spread its appealing doctrines.

Moreover, besides the religious and social aspect of Franciscan Spirituality, it was the nineteenth century that recognized the qualities of "knight" and "minstrel" in Francis with the resulting emphasis on his romantiscism. This, in turn, called attention to his literary significance among Catholics and non-Catholics alike.

Finally, though the literary aspect of the appeal of St. Francis mounted to universal proportions, the mainspring of the true Franciscan Spirituality during the nineteenth century was the personal appeal of Francis the Saint.

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[35] G. K. Chesterton, *St. Francis of Assisi*, pp. 142—143.

CHAPTER THREE

FRANCISCAN ELEMENTS IN THE LIFE
OF FRANCIS THOMPSON

An author's interpretation of life depends not only on his natural temperament and mentality, but also on his training and environment; on the other hand, in order to estimate fairly any man's character it is of prime importance to understand his particular point of view. Hence, if the significance of some of Francis Thompson's essays is to be apprehended, a cursory survey of his life must be made. Cognizant of these facts, it will be necessary also, to investigate the potent influence of Franciscan spirituality upon Thompson's life because in his delineation of the character of Thompson, the biographer Allen insists that:

> One does not possess the true talisman that admits to his magnificence until one has acquired something of an insight into Franciscan ideas . . . something of that distinctively Franciscan intimacy with sacred things, that captivating audacious familiarity with the divine . . . For of the various influences which mold the character of the man, one perceives the most salutary to have been that of the Order of his seraphic namesake of which he was a devout Tertiary.[1]

Moreover, up to the present time, the important phase of Franciscan influence in the life of Thompson has been almost completely ignored.

Francis Thompson was born at Preston, Lancashire in 1859. His father was a doctor and a convert to the Catholic Church. In reminiscenting about his early childhood Thompson says of himself:

> There is a sense in which I have always been and even now remain a child. But in another sense I never was a child, never shared children's thoughts, ways, tastes, manner and life. I played, but my sport was solitary sport even when I played with my sisters . . . And from their hard practical objectivity of play I was tenfold wider apart than from girls with their partial capacity and habit of make-believe.[2]

But there was no discontent in this particular memory because with his mother and sisters his books and his own inventions he was happy. At seven years he was reading poetry and, overwhelmed by feelings of which he knew not the meaning, had found his way to the heart of Shakespeare and Coleridge.[3] In search of seclusion sometimes he would

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[1] Hugh Allen, "Poet of the Return to God," *Catholic World*, CVII (1918), 291—292.
[2] Everard Meynell, *The Life of Francis Thompson*, (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1913), p. 8.
[3] *Ibid.*, 6.

carry his book to the stairs where, away from the constraint of chairs and tables, the voices and noises of the surroundings were subdued and he could meditate and learn. Francis of Assisi, too, though not quite so early in youth, sought solitude in which to learn God's will in his regard.

Thompson's parents had destined for him the priesthood, so in 1870 he was sent to Ushaw College near Durham. Here the boy remained for seven years, but vigilant superiors recognized that the youth who shirked appointed tasks to pursue the delights of literature, who was rarely punctual, and who was a daydreamer, could scarcely become a pastor of souls. He returned home, much to the dissatisfaction of his parents, but more so to his own, for he had wanted sincerely to become a priest. On the other hand, Thompson recognized the justice of his confessor's opinion that he discontinue his studies for the priesthood and resign himself to the will of God. So it was that the A. M. D. G. inscribed in his exercise books was none the less perfect dedication. "To the Great Glory of God" was already his pen's motto.[4]

His life of suffering and renunciation in preparation for his future work was already beginning. His father's decision that he should become a doctor, he accepted in silence and with an inward feeling of frustration, he entered Owen College, Manchester, where he took up the study of medicine. The six years he spent there "were productive chiefly of the spirit of evasion rather than rebellion, and of intensive reading—but not of medical books on the poetry shelves of Manchester's public library, and of much writing—but not college theses."[5] Francis' natural abstraction toward mundane things led to his failure at every task to which he was set.

In 1879 Thompson had a serious sickness, and did not recover until after a long siege of fever. Meynell informs us that it is probably at this time that he first tasted laudanum as sedative.[6] Later, in a fit of despondency, Francis had recourse to the drug, and the habit persisted with him almost all his life. His mother, shortly previous to this, had given him as a present a copy of Thomas De Quincey's *The Confessions of an English Opium Eater* in hopes that it would help him to overcome the habit. However, the effect was just the opposite.

Soon after his failure at medical college, Francis left home after a misunderstanding between himself and his father. Not unlike the father

[4] *Ibid.*, 34.
[5] Benjamin Musser, *Franciscan Poets*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), p. 16.
[6] Meynell, *op. cit.*, 46.

of Francis Bernardone, Thompson's father had little sympathy for other-worldliness. Moreover, neither parent realized this gift in their son, but thought it a stubborn unwillingness to submit to parental authority. Nevertheless, Francis Thompson looked upon his vocation as poet as a sacred calling, a form of anointed priesthood wherein he worked for the greater honor and glory of God. The much-quoted words, found among the poet's notes seem to confirm this belief, "To be the poet of the return to Nature is somewhat; but I would be the poet of the return to God."[7] He sold his medical books then in order to obtain the necessary funds with which to reach London. Here he spent three years in the performance of menial tasks in an atmosphere completely devoid of the real solace of friendly presences.

> Without friends or courage, Francis found no better job than that of collector of books . . . Unlike his fellow collectors he would have an additional stock in his private pocket — his own library — and his interest would be in this, rather than in the bundle on his back . . .[7]

He found no work commensurate with his attainments, but though his back ached under his bundle of books, his reading of Blake and Aeschylus buoyed him up. During this period he showed, like Francis of Assisi, a sublime indifference to personal discomforts. May it not be

> . . . that Francis Thompson discerned in his life enough similarity with that of St. Francis to make him decide deliberately to pattern himself after the Seraph of Assisi?[8]

Then, when the time came when he had no lodging, the nights were an agony of prevented sleep and the days long blanks of general discomfort. In a note Francis wrote of his habit of prayer at this time:

> It was my practice from the time I left college to pray for the lady whom I was destined to love — the unknown She. It is curious that even then I did not dream of praying for her whom I was destined to marry; and yet not curious: for already I previsioned that with me it would be to love, not to be loved.[9]

Poverty and its handmaiden, Suffering, was to his dying hour to be his self-chosen Bride as in the case of the beloved Assisian. Though Thompson suffered almost past belief, "he retained even in London gutters and in the most loathsome of circumstances a singular purity of heart and inherent gentleness of thought and speech."[10] Like his Assisian

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[7] *Ibid.*, 62.
[8] Sister M. Catherine Frederic, O. S. F., "The Franciscan Spirit as Revealed in the Literary Contribution of Francis Thompson," *Franciscan Studies*, XI (March, 1951), 29.
[9] Meynell, *op. cit.*, 73.
[10] Musser, *op. cit.*, 16.

namesake, Thompson learned above all things that lack of the world's goods is small lack, and even to lose everything is no great loss. This he found could be proved by analogy to those who have gained everything and found it small gain. Although it is true that the poverty of Francis Thompson was more a matter of circumstances than of choice as was that of the Saint, it is to be noted that even when he might have changed his conditions, Thompson apparently preferred poverty to even moderate circumstances.

Having seen some numbers of *Merrie England*, a Catholic magazine, Francis Thompson in 1887 sent a copy of his essay "Paganism Old and New" and a poem entitled "The Passion of Mary" to the editor, Wilfred Meynell.[11] But the manuscripts, most uninviting in outward aspect, were pigeon-holed for six months — and finally were released, read, and estimated. Meynell decided to accept the essay and poem and to meet the author. But failing in the attempt, Meynell finally printed the poem in April 1888, without Thompson's permission, thereby hoping to get in contact with him.[12] This proved successful; a letter came on April 14, which was answered by the editor immediately. Arrangements were then made for an interview.

A few days later, Thompson reported at the office. Everard Meynell gives this account of his father's first impressions:

> . . the door opened, and a strange hand was thrust in. The door closed but Thompson had not entered. Again it opened; again it shut. At the third attempt a waif of a man came in. No such figure had been looked for; more ragged and unkempt than the average beggar, with no shirt beneath his coat and bare feet in broken shoes, he found my father at a loss for words.[13]

Recovering himself after this most unusual spectacle of dereliction, Wilfred Meynell attempted to open a conversation with his visitor by commenting on the essay he had received. There was little to be done for him, however, at this interview except to extract his promise to return. He did return again and again, but it was long before he would accept substantial hospitalities. From thenceforth, however, Thompson found in Meynell a guide, a philosopher, a friend.

Physically he was battered, and his condition led Wilfred Meynell to prevail upon him with much difficulty to be examined by a doctor. "He will not live" was the first verdict, "and you hasten his death by denying his whims and opium."[14] But the risk was taken, and Francis was sent first to a private hospital, and then to the Storrington Priory

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[11] Meynell, *op. cit.*, 85.   [12] *Ibid.*, 88.
[13] *Ibid.*, 89.   [14] *Ibid.*, 94.

in Sussex where he eventually renounced narcotics. Thus he alludes to
the change within himself:

> Please accept my warmest thanks for all your kindness and trouble on
> my behalf. I know this is a very perfunctory looking letter; but until the
> first sharp struggle is over, it is difficult for me to write in any other way.[15]

Moreover, having learned the advantage of being without narcotics for
mental exercise, Thompson assures Wilfred Meynell that he has learned
to bear his fits of depression without it, and therefore no longer fears
for himself.

"The Ode to the Setting Sun" was written at mid-summer in 1889,
and according to Wilfred Meynell, this was the first conclusive sign of
the splendour of his powers. And so it was, that the renunciation of
opium, not its indulgence, opened the doors of his intellect. Just as
Francis of Assisi emerged from the sufferings of San Damiano, a great
saint, so out of the depths of the darkest London streets Thompson
came forth a great poet.

From 1889 to 1896 Thompson not only wrote poems, but he also
contributed reviews, essays, and criticisms to some prominent magazines,
notably *Merrie England*, the *Academy*, and *The Athenaeum*. In these
years he wrote the content of his three volumes of verse, *Poems*, *Sister
Songs* and *New Poems*. In prose he published his *Life and Labours of
of St. John Baptist de la Salle, Health and Holiness: A Study of the Relation
between Brother Ass — the Body, and His Rider — the Soul*, and *the Life
of St. Ignatius of Loyola* which appeared serially in the *Athenaeum*. His
Essay on Shelley was published posthumously.

When Thompson left the monastery a tStorrington, and returned
to London, he spent much time with the Meynell's and their children.
Of this period Alice Meynell affirms of Francis that

> . . . he had natural good spirits, and was more mirthful than many a man
> of cheerful, of social, or even of humorous reputation . . . as he was one of
> the most innocent of men, he was also one of the finest tempered.[16]

Thompson's deep appreciation of the joys and sorrows of child life
emanated from the fact that at heart he was a child, and so he could
fathom the depths of childish joy.

In 1892 when Francis Thompson was thirty-three years old he went
to Pantasaph, the Franciscan Monastery in North Wales. He lodged at
the gates of the Capuchin Monastery, and spent much time within its

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[15] *Ibid.*, 94.
[16] Alice Meynell, "Some Memories of Francis Thompson," *Dublin
Review*, CXLII (1908), 162.

walls. After having been formally enrolled as a member of the Third Order of St. Francis in the monastery church, Thompson belonged in name as well as in spirit to the great family of Franciscans. There it was that Father Alphonsus, Provincial of the English Franciscans, Father Marianus, the procurator, and the sandaled friars "looked after all his wants from boots to dogma."[17] The Franciscan way of life was fascinating to Thompson, and he frequently visited the monasteries of the Order at Olton and Crawley. Allen contends:

> His fine nostalgia for spiritual things put him *en rapport* with the Franciscan mood, and time and again when almost slain by life, which is coarse and vulgar when it touches his type, the unutterable peace of Franciscan places eased the tragedy of his vicissitudes.[18]

Because of the Franciscans' delicate care of him, Francis' health was considerably improved and he became less melancholy, in fact, even lively.

Father Anselm, later Archbishop of Simla, India (now retired) who became Francis' philosophical school master and close friend was responsible for the awakening of Thompson's intellectual interests. And "this friendship was, not without its influence upon Thompson's later work."[19] Even at this early date he contributed to the *Franciscan Annals* under Father Anselm's editorship, and his work bore the stamp of Franciscan thought. The reasons for this good understanding between the Franciscan friars and Thompson are mentioned in Richard de Bary's *Franciscan Days of Vigil:*

> Francis Thompson was just then [1894] a favourite with the Order, and there were keen discussions about his mystical intuitions. In the spirit of the Franciscan *Laudes Domini*, the Breviary Offices of the Seasons, Thompson recalled them, and expounded the phases of asceticism that ran with them in his poem, 'From the Night of Foreboding' . . .
>
> The center of interest in the household was the poet, Francis Thompson, who spent the summer of that year in a neighboring cottage. Walks in the late evening did not result in much conversation; but at evening gatherings in my room the poet used often to join the party, and argued with vigour and persuasiveness on favorite topics. The Franciscans had learnt a kind of art of drawing their mystical guest into conversations.[20]

So it was that among his Franciscan companions he had the right atmosphere for new periods of composition.

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[17] Meynell, *op. cit.*, 180.
[18] Allen, *op. cit.*, 293.
[19] Meynell, *op. cit.*, 181.
[20] Richard de Bary, *Franciscan Days of Vigil*, cited by Everard Meynell, *The Life of Francis Thompson*, pp. 182—183.

Thompson's allusion to the bearded counselors of God[21] is redolent with the local color of Pantasaph. And again, when dealing with the works of St. Francis, Thompson referred to poetry as "clinging about the cowls of his Order."[22] He was happy in this companionship for "they, as he, had sacred commerce *cum Domina Paupertate*."[23] A neighbour's reminiscence is that given by Father David Bearne, S. J., in *The Irish Monthly*, November, 1908 who

recalls two occasions on which I had the privilege of chatting with the poet . . . Of each occasion I retain the happiest memories . . . As men commonly understand the word, there was no fascination about Thompson. There was something better. There was the *sancta simplicitas* of the true poet and the real child.[24]

Although Thomson spoke with great enthusiasm, it was the man himself, rather than what he said, that won the admiration of all.

The friars were instrumental in helping Thompson to acquire another companion, Coventry Patmore, who as a Third Order member went in 1894 to stay at Pantasaph. It was Patmore and the monks who introduced Francis Thompson to the transcendental ideas behind the Church's liturgy, thus supplying him with the philosophical basis of the mystical sections of some of his writings.[25] And thus it was that

Thompson's mysticism was in true lineal Franciscan descent. He knew that the way is long and that we arrive not by choosing our path, but by treading the thorns and briars of the road on which our feet have been set . . . With Francis Thompson, mysticism was morality carried to the nth power.[26]

Consequently, in all Nature Thompson was conscious of the operations of an unseen Power that is craving audience and converse with His creatures.

One of the best word pictures of Francis Thompson is supplied by Mr. Lewis Hind in a letter to Wilfred Meynell when he writes, "In memory I see him one miserable November afternoon communing with the Seraphim and frolicking with the young-eyed Cherubim in Chancery Lane."[27] The slush was ankle deep and an icy rain was falling. Yellow fog literally wrapped the pedestrians who were splashing down the lane. In the midst of it all Francis Thompson, wet and mud spattered, was seen. But apparently he was happy for

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[21] Everard Meynell, *op. cit.*, 181.
[22] *Ibid.*, 181.   [23] *Ibid.*, 181.
[24] Father David Bearne, S. J., *The Irish Monthly*, November, 1908, cited by Everard Meynell, *The Life of Thompson*, p. 185.
[25] Calvert, *op. cit.*, 166.   [26] Allen, *op. cit.*, 292.
[27] Maynell, *op. cit.*, 201.

His lips were moving, his head was raised, his eyes were humid with emotion, for above the roof of the Chancery Lane Safe Deposit Company, in the murk of the fog, he saw beatific visions. They were his reality, not the visible world.[28]

And so Thompson walked among men a pathetic figure, a paradox of peace with pain. He had a strange other-worldliness about him as if he were conscious of making only a hasty sojourn on earth.

In 1906 Thompson again visited the Franciscan monastery at Crawley, where he had been given hospitality over many years. Prior Anselm's courtesy toward Francis is evident from these excerpts:

Holy Saturday

Dear Francis, — The Alleluias have been sung, and I echo them to you, dearest friend, hoping they bring you joy and peace and blessings . . .

Dear Francis, — Could you give me and the community the great pleasure of your company on the Feast of St. Anthony, when the Bishop of Southwark will assist? I do hope you will come, as it is the last feast I shall have before the Chapter, an event that may scatter us all to the four winds of heaven . . . The Community and particularly myself would be delighted to have the pleasure of your company on October 4, the Feast of our Holy Father St. Francis and your name-day. I am looking forward to some long talks. How I long for a return of the happy days at Pantasaph, when we discussed all things in heaven and on earth and in infernis.[29]

Thus, even in the latter part of his life, Thompson was a congenial companion of the Franciscans.

Francis Thompson's health was never good and at last his frail constitution fell a prey to consumption. So on November 2, 1907, he was taken to the Hospital of St. John and St. Elizabeth in London where he died after having received the Sacraments. As Everard Meynell says of him:

He was too magnanimous to take one to his dead heart. Suffering alone, he escaped alone and left none strictly bound on his account.[30]

But Wilfred Meynell himself rings the final note of triumph on Thompson's life in the words:

But let none be named the benefactor of him who gave to all more than any could give to him.[31]

Even today Francis Thompson's admirers are reminded of his Franciscan propensities for his portrait shows him in the conventional habit of the Third Order of St. Francis and suggests grateful memories of St. Francis' devoted sons who influenced so greatly his spiritual and

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[28] *Ibid.*, 193.
[30] *Ibid.*, 350—351.
[29] Meynell, *op. cit.*, 344—345.
[31] *Ibid.*, 351.

physical development. This portrait, which is a copy produced by John Lavelle from a sketch drawn by the Honorable Nevilly Lytton a few weeks before Thompson's death, now hangs in the Thompson Room at Boston College. The eyes of Thompson in the portrait are fixed upon an image of Christ and His Mother who were the very essence of his life and the ultimate source of his inspiration.

Thus, even a cursory survey of the facts of Francis Thompson's life shows that the impact of Franciscan spirituality had its influence on him. Even Thompson's early youth displays the Franciscan spirit, notwithstanding the fact that some exterior circumstances of his life were unlike those of Saint Francis.

Whereas St. Francis' way of life was his own choice, Thompson's was more a matter of circumstance. Nevertheless, for Thompson, life in the London streets initiated him in the Franciscan ideals of Poverty, Renunciation, and Pain.

Furthermore, after Wilfred Meynell rescued Thompson from the streets, he became intensely devoted to his "priesthood of poetry." But the real awakening of Thompson's intellectual and spiritual interests was the result of his contacts with the friars at Pantasaph where his Franciscan tendencies were considerably enhanced.

Finally, his last years spent among Franciscan associates were peaceful and happy ones. He died in the habit of the Third Order of St. Francis.

CHAPTER FOUR

FRANCISCAN ELEMENTS
IN THE ESSAYS OF FRANCIS THOMPSON

The whole Christ, the whole Gospel, with whatever emphasis he found in Christ and in the Gospel, and all of it integrated into everyday living and preaching and praying—that is the spirituality of St. Francis of Assisi. Because he so completely took unto himself and endeavored to give to others the Word of God, Francis did the very same with regard to the words of God—his letters, his Testament, even his rules are full of loving reverence, a fervent enthusiasm for the Word and the words of God.

Archbishop Robinson might have been writing about Francis Thompson when he observed of St. Francis:

His writings abound not only in allegory and personification, but also in quaint concepts and naive deductions. His final argument is often a text

of Holy Scripture, which he uses with a familiarity and freedom altogether remarkable.[1]

Some parts of his writings in which the interweaving of Scriptural phrases is intricate, almost defy any attempt to indicate them by references. For example, in the longest of his six letters, the one addressed "To All the Faithful" we discover not less than forty-five Scriptural references, and in his letter "To All the Friars" we find twenty-six Biblical quotations. So, too, Francis Thompson acknowledges his debt to the influence of the Holy Scriptures when he says that the Bible as an influence from the literary standpoint had a late but important date in his life. He admits having read the Bible for its historical content as a child, and in early youth it supplied a permanent and shaping direction. But not until quite later in maturer years did the Bible as a whole become an influence. Then, however, "it came with decisive power ... its influence was mystical; it revealed to me a whole scheme of existence."[2] Thompson concludes his essay "Books That Have Influenced Me" with the contention that whoever opens the Bible, learned or simple, equally finds something appropriate for his understanding.[3]

Of the prose in the Vulgate, Thompson wrote in a review of a paper by Dr. Barry on St. Jerome's revision:

> No tongue can say so much in so little ... Nor to any unprejudiced ear can this Vulgate Latin be unmusical ... Could prose have more impassioned loveliness of melody? Compare it even with the beautiful corresponding English of the Authorized Protestant Version; the advantage in music is not to the English but to the soft and wooing fall of these delicately lapsing syllables.[4]

As a result of the fine appreciation that is evident in the passage quoted above, much of Thompson's writing, like that of St. Francis, is definitely reminiscent of the Bible. Whereas the Holy Gospel forms the very foundation of the spirit of St. Francis, Francis Thompson maintains that the Gospel is the very fountain source of his writings. And so, according to Joseph Husslein in the preface to *Francis Thompson: In His Paths*, "there is about Thompson an intensity of truth and conviction, a realism bred of experience that were bound to penetrate hearts, infuse new hope and confer fresh strength."[5] Father Anselm, now Arch-

[1] Paschal Robinson, ed., *Writings of St. Francis of Assisi*, (Philadelphia: The Dolphin Press, 1906), pp. xiv—xv.

[2] Francis Thompson, "Books That Have Influenced Me," *Literary Criticisms*, ed. Terence Connolly, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1948), 543.

[3] *Ibid.*, 543.   [4] Meynell, *op. cit.*, 171.

[5] Terence Connolly, *Francis Thompson: In His Paths*, (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1944), p. vii.

bishop Kenealy, one of the Franciscan friars who befriended Thompson at Pantasaph said, "The trouble with the world today is that it has suffered corruption. The antidote is Francis Thompson."[6] He who was always aware of what was going on around him in the world, and who was sympathetic with its troubles, followed the advice given by the Assisian Francis who wrote in his rule:

> Let us love our neighbors as ourselves, and, if any one does not wish to love them as himself, or cannot, let him at least do them no harm, but let him do good to them.[7]

And again in his admonition on compassion toward one's neighbor, Francis reports, "Blessed is the man who bears with his neighbor according to the frailty of his nature as much as he would wish to be borne with by him if he should be in a like case."[8] Visionary though he might be, Francis Thompson like the Saint who "penanced Brother Ruffino because the 'visionary' was overpowering in him the worker,"[9] and who never allowed contemplation to divert him from activity, was not blind to the needs and wants of those about him.

So it was, that Thompson also, was deeply affected by all the problems of his time, and he shows this interest poignantly in his essays. In "Moestitiae Encomium" he laments:

> Alas for the nineteenth century, with so much pleasure and so little joy; so much learning, and so little wisdom; so much effort and so little fruition; so many philosophers and so little philosophy ... so many teachers and such an infinite wild vortex of doubt.[10]

"The only thing left" he continues, "is sadness which stamps our virtues and our very life."[11] It was said of Thompson that "when he is most truly himself, he is most genuinely a son of the nineteenth century, heir to all the ages that have gone before, beneficiary of all its knowledge and songs."[12] But his philosophy, his symbolism, and his deep religious convictions were abreast with only the best thoughts of his age. According to H. E. Cory writing in the *Dial Magazine* in 1914, his whole life was a superb, pious, and immortal protest against the present formula that life is (and should be) a struggle for existence.[13] As such, Thompson's

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. viii.   [7] Robinson, *op. cit.*, viii.   [8] *Ibid.*, 15.
[9] Francis Thompson, "Darkest England," *Prose Works*, Vol. III, ed., Wilfred Meynell, (New York: Scribner's, 1913), p. 58.
[10] *Ibid.*, 111.
[11] Thompson, "Darkest England," 111.
[12] Milton Brunner, "An Appraisement," *The Independent*, LXIV (January, 1908), 98.
[13] H. E. Cory, "Francis Thompson," *The Dial*, LVI (February, 1914), 49.

life was the life of an untheatrical martyr, a perfect refutation of anything like a materialistic philosophy. Nevertheless, in his essay "Darkest England" he writes:

> This is a day which with all its admitted and most lamentable evils, most of us are most glad that we have lived to see; for it is a day wherein a bad old order is fast giving place to a new; and the new, we trust, through whatever struggle and gradual transformation, will finally prove a higher order than the old.[14]

From this it can be seen that Thompson's faith was certain; he did not despair as the Victorians were inclined to do, for the reason, as he supplies in "Form and Formalism," that the modern world profoundly and hopelessly disbelieves in the power of prayer, not in a scornful way, however, but it simply just does not comprehend.[15] Thompson then proceeds to give a glimpse of the doctrine of Individualism which was so characteristic of the Victorian period. Though he admits that the Individualistic theory had its scaffolding of excellence, he goes on to say:

> The walls of no theory can rise far above the ground without that. Our neighbors have this in common with Heaven — they only help those who are perfectly able to help themselves. In the days when the blatant beast of Individualism held the field, that was a truth.[16]

He continues, with some relief, that this old spirit is rapidly becoming a cynicism, even though it had been a diabolical doctrine, as it was the outcome of that proud teaching which declared it despicable for men to bow before their fellowmen. It implied, not that a man should be an individual, but that he should be independent. Thompson's belief, like that of his Assisian namesake, was that a man should be individual, but not independent.[17]

Thompson reveals his interest in education, also, because with the growth of democracy in England during the nineteenth century, came the spread of popular education. In "Darkest England" he points out that this movement was one of the signs of the common tendency, involving a negation of the doctrine of Individualism.[18] It meant, moreover, that the hearts of men were softening toward each other, and reviving the spirit of the Brotherhood of Man. Everard Meynell reminds us that among the notes of Thompson are many jottings of a resolve to write on the young children of London.[19] Thompson states the case for Free

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[14] Thompson, "Darkest England," p. 61.
[15] Thompson, "Form and Formalism," p. 73.
[16] Thompson, "Darkest England," p. 62.
[17] *Ibid.*, 62.   [18] *Ibid.*, 62.   [19] Meynell, *op. cit.*, 64.

Education when he asks whether the children could be gathered together and educated in the truest sense of the word so as to cut off and eliminate future recruits to the ranks of "Darkest England." If that would be done, there would be needed no astrology to cast the horoscope of the future for he claims, "in the school satchel lie the keys of tomorrow."[20] By way of climax he emphasizes:

> Think of it. If Christ stood amidst your London slums, He could not say, 'Except you become as one of these little children.' Far better your children were cast from the bridge of London than they should become one of those little ones.[21]

Thus, Thompson was always ready to come to the assistance of those who needed help, even though he himself suffered acutely the pangs of his own poverty.

So, when Francis Thompson is labelled as standing outside the age in which he lived, this is meant only in so far as he preached a creed which the Victorians rejected. G. K. Chesterton writes on this point:

> But none of these Victorians were able even to understand Francis Thompson; his skyscraping humility, his mountains of mystical detail, his occasional and unashamed weakness, his sudden and sacred blasphemies.[22]

Like him of the Assisian hills, the poet of the London streets had been laughed at, pushed aside, misunderstood and, like him, the soaring spirit could not be downed by circumstances. Both had the inward eye, the outer humility; both found delight in, and gave voice to the little things of creation; both drew away from the world to draw nearer to Christ.

For Francis of Assisi, the means of growing to a Christlike stature was voluntary poverty. By his renunciation of home, family, friends, and earthly possessions the Assisian strove to emulate the poverty of Christ's life in an uninterrupted series of self abnegation. Even in his youth, Francis Bernardone had perceived the corrupting influence of riches, and he resolved to introduce within his new Order such a devotion to poverty, renunciation, and detachment as would safeguard its members from the seductions of all earthly things. In the Second Rule of the Friars Minor, Francis writes:

> And as pilgrims and strangers in this world, serving the Lord in poverty and humility . . . because the Lord made Himself poor for us in this world.

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[20] *Ibid.*, 65.
[21] *Ibid.*, 64.
[22] G. K. Chesterton, *The Victorian Age*, (New York: George Doran Company, 1924).

This, my dearest brothers, is the height of the most sublime poverty which has made you heirs and kings in the kingdom of heaven: poor in goods, but exalted in virtue.[23]

Francis Thompson, too, would have dedicated himself to God, but disappointed by the decision that he was unfit by temperament for the serving of the altar, he determined to spend himself in the "priesthood of poetry." For this new work Thompson was cognizant of the fact that a period of preparation proportionate in rigor to the envisioned goal is essential, whether that goal be the attainment of heroic sanctity in the case of St. Francis, or the realization of a poetic ideal as it was in his own. In the essay on "Shelley" Thompson informs us:

Most poets, probably like most saints, are prepared for their mission by an initial segregation, as the seed is buried to germinate: before they can utter the oracle of poetry, they must first be divided from the body of men. It is the severed head that makes the seraph.[24]

The unusual demand of the individual who "would hitch his wagon to a star" of lofty endeavor is renunciation, and the loftier the achievement the more rigorous the abnegation. So it was that for Thompson's new work a sacrifice was demanded, one that took the form of renunciation of love, marriage, and domestic pleasures. Renunciation of conjugal love, however, was not all the poet was called on to sacrifice. Even as St. Francis sought in solitude to learn the deepest lessons of divine love, so Francis Thompson submitted to an apprenticeship of isolation "far from the madding crowd." Of the growth and activity characteristic of this period Thompson explains in "Health and Holiness":

In poet as in saint this retirement is a process of pain and struggle. For it is nothing else than a gradual conformation to artistic law. He absorbs the law into himself, or rather he is himself absorbed into the law, moulded to it until he becomes sensitively respondent to its faintest motion, as the spiritualized body to the soul.[25]

Everard Meynell in his *Life of Thompson* contrasts the types of poverty as embraced by the two Francis'. In place of rocky platforms Thompson's poverty gave him the restaurant's doubtful tablecloth, and sometimes even he ate from paper bags. The broken bread eaten on the hills of Umbria was appetizing in comparison with the heavy bread of Soho; and Thompson never drank from the clear stream. It was literally true, Meynell testifies, that Thompson cast all his life's best

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[23] Robinson, *op. cit.*, 65.
[24] Thompson, "Shelley," p. 11.
[25] Thompson, "Health and Holiness," p. 261.

treasures at the feet of his Lady Poverty; his health, spent to a degree that Wilfred Meynell penned his picture as "a moth of a man;" his wealth, for he was nearly a Franciscan and learned in the difficult arithmetic of subtraction, leaving at his death nothing more than a tin box of refuse.[26] Physical self denial, and disregard of personal luxuries, are but the manifestations of a spiritual state, of the state recommended by Christ: "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of Heaven." The Saint put his virtue to the proof; he embraced the leper, he preached to the birds. Thompson, on the other hand, also renounced personal pride, ambition and pleasures, but the leper would pass him unnoticed, and he was too shy, too little a man of the world to preach to the practical sparrows of the Edgeware Road. Visited though with pangs of this heroic abnegation often in his life, he queries in "Finis Coronat Opus," "Why was I never told that the laurel could soothe no hunger, that the laurel could staunch no pang, that the laurel could return no kiss?"[27] In his sacrifice of love, the account of which runs consistently through his writings, Thompson undoubtedly reached the apogee of renunciation.

The greater part of the essay "Sanctity and Song" (A Second Paper) is devoted to a discussion of the poverty of St. Francis and what he believed to be allied with poverty — pain. The following anecdote from the essay very aptly illustrates Francis of Assisi's idea of poverty even before his conversion:

> Pica [Francis' mother] was preparing the table for dinner, and Francis placed on it very many loaves. Pica inquired why he put so many loaves for so few guests. 'They are for the poor,' said her son. 'But where are the poor?' asked Pica. Francis answered: 'They are in my heart.'[28]

Following closely in the steps of that great Saint and social reformer of Assisi, Francis Thompson, his zealous namesake, loved the poor and lowly. Through his close contacts with the neglected multitude of the London streets he realized their sad plight, and tried to promote action to alleviate their miseries. In "Darkest England" is a veritable clarion call to the Catholic laity, the army of English Franciscan Tertiaries to remedy a terrible social condition of the London slums. Though he praised the work of the Salvation Army in a review of General Booth's book *In Darkest England*, Thompson deplores the inactivity of the Third

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[26] Meynell, *op. cit.*, 24.
[27] Thompson, *op. cit.*, "Finis Coronat Opus," p. 134.
[28] Thompson, *Literary Criticisms*, "Sanctity and Song," (A Second Paper), p. 493.

Order of St. Francis. In answer to Professor Huxley who compared the Salvation Army with the Franciscans, Thompson states:

> The very chivalrous militarism of St. Francis has been caught and vulgarized in the outward military symbolism of the Salvation Army. That joyous spirit which St. Francis so peculiarly fostered is claimed by General Booth as an integral and essential feature in his own followers.[29]

Continuing in the same strain, Thompson credits the Franciscans on giving the first impetus to street preaching in which the Salvationists were so actively engaged. He reminds the Salvation Army then, that something more than the ringing of a bell is needed to gather the multitude into the churches. Thompson extends the general invitation to go into the highways and byways like the Franciscan friars of old and preach to the crowds. "Why should the Franciscans hide behind their caricatures?" he asks. "Where is the brown frock and the cord?"[30]

Then becoming even more explicit, Thompson in this same essay refers directly to the nature of the work of the Third Order when he says that the army of the Assisian is in the midst of us, enrolled under the banner of the Stigmata; over thirteen thousand strong, this army follows the barrack routine of religious peace and prayer. "Sound to the militia of Assisi and warn them that the enemy is round about them, that they must take to the field; sound to the Third Order of St. Francis."[31]

"In Darkest England" also vividly portrays in their true light the contrasting scenes of London streets. Only one drilled in the school of suffering as Thompson was from childhood, could behold there as he says

> . . . a region whose hedgerows have set to brick, whose soil is chilled to the stone; where flowers are sold and women; where the men wither and the stars; whose streets to me on the most glittering day are black. For I unveil their secret meanings. I read their human hieroglyphs. I diagnose from a hundred occult signs the disease which perturbs their populous pulses. Misery cries out to me from the kerb stone; despair passes me by in the ways . . .[32]

Thompson assures us that we are raising from the dust a fallen standard of Christianity, not merely in phrase, but in practice, not by lips, but by lives we are reaffirming the Brotherhood of Man.[33] He reveals this same thought in "Health and Holiness" when he says:

> This is an age when everywhere the rights of the weaker against the stronger are being examined and asserted . . . Within the Church itself,

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[29] Thompson, *Prose Works*, "In Darkest England," p. 56.
[30] *Ibid.*, 56.   [31] *Ibid.*, 57.   [32] *Ibid.*, 52.   [33] *Ibid.*, 61.

which has ever fostered the claims of the oppressed against the oppressor, a mind and rational appeal has made itself heard.[34]

The crying need of the age, declares Thompson, is not only to foster the energies of the body, but to foster also the energies of the will. He asserts, moreover, that the weakest man has will enough for his appointed exigencies, if he but developed it as he would develop a feeble body. To that special end, he reminds us, are addressed the sacramental means of the Church. In this last statement Thompson boldly declares that the remedy for many of the evils of the time is more religion, not only in matters of belief, but in practice as well.[35]

Therefore, it is not merely a passive acquiescence in pain that Francis Thompson teaches, but like St. Francis, he meditates upon the suffering Christ and desires to suffer with Him. He himself wrote a commentary on St. Francis, emphasizing the dignity, beauty, and indispensability of Pain

> . . . which came to man as a penalty, remains with him as a consecration; his ignominy, by a Divine ingenuity, he is enabled to make his exaltation... How many among us after repeated lessonings of experience are never able to comprehend that there is no special love without special pain ? To such St. Francis reveals that the Supreme Love is itself full of Supreme Pain . . . So he revealed to one of his companions that the pain of his stigmata was agonizing, but was accompanied by a sweetness so intense as made it ecstatic to him.[36]

Thus it was, that Thompson found in St. Francis the best illustration for his principle that sanctity and song are expressions of the same reality. When the Canticles assigned to St. Francis are his subject, Thompson intimates the difficulty which the natural man encounters in understanding sanctity, and therefore in appreciating these canticles in which the purifying power of suffering is implicit. In the conclusion of the essay "Sanctity and Song" (A Second Paper) Thompson points out "that the spirit of song which was in St. Francis did not expire with him. Poetry clung around the cowls of his Order; and it was a Franciscan, Thomas of Celano, who gave to the Church perhaps her two greatest hymns."[37] Again in "Moestitiae Encomium" he reminds us:

> Power is the reward of sadness. It was after Christ had wept over Jerusalem that He uttered some of His most august words; it was when His soul had

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[34] Thompson, "Health and Holiness," p. 249.
[35] *Ibid.*, 268.
[36] "Sanctity and Song," (A Second Paper), 295—296.
[37] *Ibid.*, 497.

been sorrowful even unto death that His enemies fell prostrate before His voice. Who suffers, conquers.[38]

In these words we are given a positive attitude toward suffering and an answer to the age-old question. "Why must we suffer?"

Thompson then applied his theory of pain to poets in particular. Consequently, he musingly asks why it is that the poets who have written for us the most beautiful lyrics, free from the mixture of dull, earthly things — the Shelley's, the Coleridge's, and the Keats' are the very persons whose lives are among the saddest in literature? Furthermore, he asks whether sorrow, passion, and fantasy are indissolubly connected like water, fire, and cloud; that as from the sun and dew are born the vapours, so from fire and tears ascend the visions of joy; that the heart like the earth smells sweetest after rain. Finally, he decides that songlight is like sunlight and darkens the countenance of the soul. Perhaps the rays are to stars, what thorns are to flowers, he concludes, and so the poet after wandering over heaven, returns with bleeding feet. In other words it was familiarity with pain that enhanced their writings.[39]

It was inevitable, therefore, that one of Thompson's temperament, realizing as he did the value of suffering, should place emphasis on that phase of spiritual experience known as asceticism, and give his assent to the doctrine that the excellence of the moral life can be won only through control of the passions and will. Consequently, the practice of asceticism is deliberately accepted and expounded in "Health and Holiness" in full harmony with the teachings of St. Francis as a mode of living, intended to subject the lower to the higher, body to soul.[40] The sub-title "Study of the Relations between Brother Ass, the Body, and His Rider, the Soul," is almost a direct quotation from St. Francis, who, when tempted to carnal thoughts or desires chastised „Brother Ass" unmercifully. In this essay Thompson concerns himself with the clamant cry of the body's rights and the extremity of the reaction to medieval asceticism. The externals of asceticism may change with the time, he believes, but in its essence, asceticism is inevitable and inexorable.[41] He refers to the Saint of Assisi as being

a flame of active love to the end, despite his confessed ill-usage of 'Brother Ass,' despite emaciation, despite ceaseless labour, despite the daily hemorrhage from the Stigmata.[42]

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[38] Thompson, *Prose Works*, "Moestitiae Encomium." 113.
[39] Thompson, "Shelley," 35—36.
[40] Thompson, "Health and Holiness," 267.
[41] *Ibid.*, 267.   [42] *Ibid.*, 267.

Hence the holiness resulting from his asceticism energized St. Francis and wrung from his body the uttermost drop of service. Again in "The Image of God" Thompson reiterates:

> I cannot believe but that St. Francis who loved all things loved not least the hardly used Brother Ass. Rather are we intended to use this 'sweet enemy' as a child, which we love, chastise, thwart, cherish; refusing now, because our dearest wish is its future greatness.[43]

Thus, Francis Thompson emphasizes the subservience of the body which includes physical life in general, to spiritual creativeness, whether in the aspect of sanctity or of song. His plea for health as well as holiness, is an argument that holiness is better served by health than by disease; and that "Brother Ass" should be rewarded for his usefulness to make him more useful. The only value of pain is to strengthen the will when the soul passes through a process of seclusion and interior gestation.[44]

A spirit of simplicity, however, broke easily through the subdued pain of Thompson's life, like a child's laughter through its tears, and it is unmistakably reflected in his essays when he wanders through the "nurseries of heaven."[45] This was the very element that rendered St. Francis' extraordinary character so easily understood, so close and natural because he appeared never other than he was, always candid, clear, plain, and simple as a child.

Nowhere in the "Fourth Order of Humanity" does one lose sight of the naive simplicity of Thompson whose heart never grew old, though his shoulders were bent and his steps lagged. Aptly he remarks, "Men are but children of a larger growth."[46] With serious conviction, yet ever the child, "so small that the elves could whisper in his ear"[47] he confides how when small, he wrung by eloquence and fine diplomacy a beautiful doll from his sisters which he christened "the Empress of France" because of its beauty. In the opening sentences of the essay he notes the gradations in creation:

> In the beginning of things came man, sequent to him woman; on woman followed the child, and on the child, the doll. It is a climax of development; and the crown of these is the doll.[48]

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[43] Thompson, *Literary Criticisms*, "The Image of God," 493.
[44] Thompson, *Prose Works*, "Health and Holiness," 277.
[45] Thompson, *Selected Poems*, "To My Godchild," (London: Methuen Company, 1908), 42.
[46] Thompson, *Prose Works*, "Fourth Order of Humanity," p. 68.
[47] Thompson, "Shelley," p. 7.
[48] Thompson, "Fourth Order of Humanity," 66.

Thus, he elevates the doll to the order of humanity, and goes on to tell how in love he was with the bust of the Vatican Melpomene,

. . . the statue which thralled my youth in a passion such as feminine mortality was skill-less to instigate. Nor at this let any boggle; for she was a goddess.[49]

This, then, is the source of Francis Thompson's deep appreciation of the joys of child life; he was at heart a child. How fitting that Thompson himself should ask, "Know you what it is to be a child?"[50] And in the next sentence he answers:

It is to have a spirit yet streaming from the waters of baptism; it is to believe in love, to believe in belief; it is to be so little that the elves can reach to whisper in your ear; it is to turn pumpkins into coaches, and mice into horses, lowness into loftiness, and nothing into everything.[51]

Each child has its fairy godmother in its own soul, its highly imaginative faculties that can make itself, though living in a nutshell, the king of infinite space. It is

> To see a world in a grain of sand,
> And heaven in a wild flower,
> Hold infinity in the palm of your hand,
> And eternity in an hour.[52]

Percy Bysshe Shelley, because of his spontaneity, was Thompson's ideal poet, and Shelley was spontaneous because he was ever a child. Coming to his poetry, we peep over the wild mask of revolutionary metaphysics, and we see the winsome face of the child. It is not difficult to read Thompson into his own description of Shelley:

He is still at play, save only his play is such as manhood stoops to watch, and his playthings are those which the gods give their children. The universe is his box of toys. He dabbles his fingers in the dayfall. He is golddusty with tumbling amidst the stars. He makes bright mischief with the moon. The meteors nuzzle their noses in his hand. He teases into growling the kenneled thunder, and laughs at the shaking of its fiery chain. He dances in and out of the gates of heaven; its floor is littered with his broken fancies. He runs wild over the fields of ether. He chases the rolling world. He gets between the feet of the horses of the sun. He stands in the lap of patient nature and twines her loosened tresses after a hundred wilful fashions to see how she will look nicest in his song.[53]

Shelley's play, however, led him to an unsatisfactory pantheism, but Thompson's because he was a Christian, led him to the feet of Divine

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[49] *Ibid.*, 68. [50] Thompson, "Shelley," p. 8.
[51] *Ibid.*, 8. [52] *Ibid.*, 8. [53] *Ibid.*, 18.

Love as it did St. Francis who, according to Felder was simplicity's most charming blossom.

Thompson's description of Franciscan simplicity applies equally as well to himself. He explains that it consists mainly in the contentment of every man to be and appear just what he is, regardless of his birth. This unassertive taking for granted that he is just himself, combined with matter-of-fact thoughtfulness of others, creates him a natural gentleman. This genuine simplicity causes strangers to feel at home with him. "It is this lofty and unsought genuineness which makes the true poet take to the Franciscan, and the true Franciscan to the poet."[54] The reason for this is because the Franciscan embodies in himself the poet's ideal which is sensitive and candid realization, the spontaneous candor of the child, combined with adult consciousness.

Commenting then on the loss of this spontaneity among the Victorian writers who were over deliberate in expression, continually searching for the proper word for the right place, Thompson remarks:

> Theoretically, of course, one ought always to try for the best word. But practically, the habit of excessive care in word selection frequently results in loss of spontaneity. And still worse, the habit of always taking the best word, too easily becomes the habit of always taking the most ornate word, the word most removed from ordinary speech.[55]

As a result of this artificiality, the poetry of the time has become, according to Francis Thompson, a "kaleidoscope," and the mind of the reader is diverted from the content to the mechanics of the poem. Even the poets themselves have become very self-conscious. In "The Way of Imperfection" the same point is stressed:

> . . . and now [1899] . . . no thoughtful person can contemplate without alarm the hold which the renascent principle has gained over the contemporary mind. Unless some voice be raised in timely protest, we feel that English art must soon dwindle to the extinction of endurable excellence.[56]

Thus, Thompson himself was aware of the grave danger of artificiality in writing, and he tried to avoid it, in so far as possible, in order not to lose childlike spontaneity. In regard to the literary field in general, he makes the following statement:

> Over it all, is the trait of this serpent perfection. It even affects the realm of colour, where it begets cloying, ennervating harmonies, destitute

[54] Boston College, "Franciscan Simplicity," Thompson MSS, Exercise Book 117, quoted from Sister Eucharista Merrigan, *The Philosophy of St. Francis Is One of the Most Important Sources of Information in the Poetry of Francis Thompson*, M. A. Dissertation, Boston: Boston College, 1942.
[55] Thompson, *Prose Works*, "Shelley," 5.
[56] Thompson, "The Way of Imperfection," 97—98.

of those stimulating contrasts by which the greatest colourists throw into relief the general agreement of their hues.[57]

In poetry this practice tends toward the love of the miniature finish, and eventually the principle leads to aestheticism wherein art takes predominance over inspiration of body and soul. Moreover, this type of writing affects those who aim at simplicity no less than those who seek for richness, for indeed nothing is so artificial as our simplicity. In a concluding remark on this topic, Thompson emphasizes the fact that "this inherent quality in our writing results inevitably in loss of spontaneity."[58]

Thompson's own writings, although varied and rich in intellectual content, are bright with childlike vision. Using his own words, Thompson's "spontaneity and childlikeness make contact with the crystal springs of being and give a brightness to a world-dulled mind."[59] Megroz claims that Francis Thompson's writing is "nearer to sanctity than to science — they are unsophisticated."[60] It is with this exceptional, piercing intentness that Thompson gazes on Nature and realizes that

... to commune with the heart of Nature — this has been the accredited mode since the days of Wordsworth ... but you speak and you think she answers you. It is the echo of your own voice. You think you hear the throbbing of her heart, and it is the throbbing of your own.[61]

So the poor seeker after happiness finds that the sympathy of Nature is "the sympathy of a cat, sitting by the fire and blinking at you."[62] Indeed, Nature has a tranquil charm, but she is tranquil because she has no heart. Consequently, "Nature cannot give what she does not need,"[63] namely, soul's ease. Meditating on these thoughts, Thompson cries out, "Though you may be a very large thing, and my heart a very little thing, yet Titan as you are, my heart is too great for you!"[64] Then with deep conviction he expresses his ideal in "Nature's Immortality":

Absolute Nature lives not in our life, nor yet is lifeless, but lives in the life of God: and in so far, and so far merely as man himself lives in that life does he come into sympathy with Nature, and Nature with him. She is God's daughter who stretches her hand only to her Father's friends.[65]

The climax is finally reached when Thompson recalls "not Shelley, not Wordsworth himself, ever drew so close to the heart of Nature as did

[57] *Ibid.*, 98.
[58] Thompson, "Shelley," 6.
[59] *Ibid.*, 5.
[60] Rudolph Megroz, *Francis Thompson: Poet of Earth and Heaven*, (London: Faber & Gwyer, 1927), 213.
[61] Thompson, *Prose Works*, "Nature's Immortality," 80.
[62] *Ibid.*, 80.   [63] *Ibid.*, 80.   [64] *Ibid.*, 82.   [65] *Ibid.*, 82.

the Seraph of Assisi, who was close to the heart of God."[66] Thus, the
essayist reveals his simplicity and close kinship with St. Francis who
was blessed with a keenness of perception which aided him in reading
the secrets of the heart of Nature because he had first read the secrets
of the Heart of God. In the further development of his theme, Thompson
uses an analogy to arrive at the truth. He implies that God, the Supreme
Spirit and Creator, reveals His conceptions to man in the material forms
of Natur. In turn he compares God with a painter, a poet, and a musician:

> An Ideal wakes in the Omnipotent Painter; and straightway over the
> eternal dikes rush forth the flooding tides of night, the blue of heaven ripples
> into stars; Nature from Alp to Alpine flower rises lovely with the betrayal
> of the Divine thought. An ideal wakes in the Omnipotent Poet, and there
> chimes the rhythm of an ordered universe. An ideal wakes in the Omnipotent
> Musician, and creation vibrates with the harmony . . .[67]

In the conclusion of "Nature's Immortality" Thompson insists that in
proportion as a man fulfills the end for which he was created, in pro-
portion as he enters oneness with the Creator, and in so far as his life
is identified with that of God, in just that measure he will be able to read
the book of God's work of creation.[68] It was this view that made God
the Alpha and Omega of His creation which was such a prolific source of
inspiration to Thompson. By way of explanation he adds, however, that

> . . . as in the participation of human spirits some are naturally more qualified
> for interpenetration than others — in ordinary language, as one man is more
> able than his fellows to enter into another's mind, so in proportion as each
> of us by virtue has become kin to God, will he penetrate the Supreme Spirit,
> and identify himself with the Divine Ideals.[69]

Therefore, not all men are equally capable of interpreting God's book of
Nature. Only through contemplation can the close friends of God
penetrate His secrets.

Again in "Paganism Old and New" Thompson repeats this same
idea when he says:

> . . . it is a noteworthy fact that the intellect of man seems to seize the divine
> beauty of Nature, until moving beyond that outward beauty it gazes on the
> spirit of Nature; even as the mind seems unable to appreciate the beautiful
> face of a woman until it has learned to appreciate the more beautiful beauty
> of her soul.[70]

It is matter of little significance to Francis Thompson who saw beyond
the visible, down the long avenues of the unseen, whether God mani-

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[66] *Ibid.*, 82.   [67] *Ibid.*, 86—87.   [68] *Ibid.*, 87.   [69] *Ibid.*, 88.
[70] Thompson, "Paganism Old and New," 44.

fests Himself in a simple field flower, an exquisitely designed snowflake, or a flaming summer sunset. Each in a varying degree is a masterpiece; each bears the insignia of divine craftsmanship, and therefore, each is to be reverenced. In all these things Thompson felt the "operations of a conscious, unseen Power that is craving audience and converse with His creation."[71] In the following pronouncement wherein he shows the analogies between God, Nature, man, and the poet, Thompson becomes avowedly one with St. Francis:

> All creation is reproduction . . . But in the beginning, God was, and God alone was. Wherefore of Himself alone could He be cognizant. From Himself alone then, could He draw His conceptions. It follows that all His creatures must be, as they are, the Protean reproduction of His cognitions of Himself.[72]

He recognizes then the fact that all Nature is but applied Godhead, and through the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity various manifestations of the Supreme Spirit come to us. With the rare quality of insight that characterizes God's saints, Francis Thompson, like the Assisian, saw Nature for what it really was, a creature of God, and in their common creaturehood he could fraternize with all creation; by intuition he saw all creation taken up by God in the Incarnation of His Son. Thompson's mysticism, consequently, was truly Franciscan

That Francis Thompson could detect genuine from spurious mysticism is evident from a group of essays in Father Terence L. Connolly's recently edited book on *The Literary Criticisms of Francis Thompson*. In a criticism of Dean Inge's "Studies of English Mystics" Thompson states:

> The terms 'mystic' and 'mysticism' are so loosely used, indeed, that one is never sure beforehand what may be meant by them. If a man turns a table or keeps a private 'spook,' he is a mystic; if he writes poems of a more or less spiritual order (and very little will do), he is a mystic . . . We should not be surprised if acquaintance with the differential calculus were held to constitute a man a mystic; for ordinary people do not understand it — and that is 'mysticism' . . .[73]

In other words, he claims that to most people mysticism only means a kind of abstraction or even religious wilfulness and whimsicality. Whereas in this essay Thompson merely deplores Dr. Inge's vagueness in discussing the nature of mysticism, in "Some Mysticisms and a

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[71] Thompson, "Nature's Immortality," 88.
[72] Boston College, "A Prose Fragment on the Analogies between God, Nature, Man, and the Poet," Thompson MSS, 203.
[73] Thompson, Literary Criticisms, "Studies of English Mystics," 438.

Mystic" he definitely condemns the popularization of the subject which currently was being done:

> . . . popular mysticism is an evil thing . . . The mystic is not (as Mr. Thorold's use of the word would seem to countenance) a student of mysticism any more than a scientist is one who studies books on science.[74]

Continuing, Thompson himself defines mysticism as "an interior ladder at the summit of which is God," or merely, "the Science of Love"[75] and then he explains that the mystic endeavors by a rigid, practical virtue, combined with prayer, meditation, and mortification of the senses to arrive at a closer union with the Creator. Such then, in brief, is the theory of Francis Thompson's mysticism, although its principles are many and not in a few words to be expounded. It can be said, nevertheless, that his mysticism was like that of St. Francis.

Applying his own definition of mysticism to Francis Thompson himself, abundant evidences are to be found in his essays of the Science of Love. Father Cuthbert, in an article on "Thompson, the Mystic" relates:

> With him there is no effort in piercing the outward form to arrive at the inward spirit . . . He is in truth but at intervals conscious of the material lodgment in which the spirit dwells. Was it not thus that St. Francis of Assisi regarded all creation?[76]

In other words, Thompson like St. Francis, saw Christ in everything, and that is the true spirit of Christian mysticism. In "Sanctity and Song" Thompson repeats, "Earthly beauty is but heavenly beauty taking to itself flesh, and saintship is the touch of God."[77] Whereas to most, even good people, God is a belief, "to the saints He is an embrace because they have felt the wind of His locks, and His heart has beaten against their side. They do not believe in Him, for they know Him."[78] The devotion of St. Francis to the Incarnate Word was the burden of his song, too, and the imitation of Christ was the goal of his life. The first of his spiritual counsels on the religious state, preserved in his "Admonitions" commences with these words:

> The Lord Jesus said to His disciples: 'I am the Way, and the Truth and the Life. No man cometh to the Father, but by me' . . . Wherefore, all those

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[74] *Ibid.*, "Some Mysticism and a Mystic," p. 443.

[75] *Ibid.*, 443—444.

[76] Father Cuthbert, "Francis Thompson," *Catholic World*, LXXXVI (January, 1908), 482.

[77] Thompson, Prose Works, *op. cit.*, "Sanctity and Song," 89.

[78] *Ibid.*, 90.

who saw the Lord Jesus Christ according to humanity and did not see and believe according to the spirit and the Divinity, that He was the Son of God, were condemned.[79]

This is a positive statement of the absolute need for faith in Christ as the way to God; and this was what Thompson believed. It was indeed, this consciousness, not merely of the reality, but of the nearness of the unseen world, this intimate sense of love and friendship of Christ that inspired Thompson. Christ, the true Orient, was the central figure of his life. As he states in "Form and Formalism":

In Christ, therefore, centres and is solved that supreme problem of life — the marriage of the Unit with the Sum. In Him is perfectly shown forth the All for one and One for all, which is the justificatory essence of that substance we call Kingship; and from which, in so far as each particular kingship derogates, it forfeits justificatory right.[80]

Thompson explains that "no common aim in life can triumph till it is crystallized in an individual, at once its child and its ruler."[81] Man himself must become incarnate in a man before his cause can triumph. Hence, the universal Word became the individual Christ, that total God and total man being particularized in a single symbol the cause of God and man might triumph.

Thompson specifically states his aim as an author in his essay "Form and Formalism":

Theology and philosophy are the soul of truth; but they must be clothed with flesh, to create an organism which can come down and live among men. Therefore, Christ became Incarnate to create Christianity. Be it spoken with reverence, a great writer who is likewise a great thinker does for truth what Christ did for God, the Supreme Truth.[82]

Thus, Francis Thompson as an essayist carried the spirit of Truth and Beauty with him into the highways and byways of life. Moreover, the Franciscan spirit within him purified earthly things of mere earthliness, and invested them with an intense Catholic immortality.

Finally, through his essays which bear the imprint of the spirit of St. Francis, Francis Thompson preached his message of poverty, renunciation, and pain, simplicity, joy, and love. Whoever fails to understand these ideals of the man cannot hope to grasp the meaning or significance of his essays.

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[79] Robinson, *op. cit.*, 5—6.
[80] Thompson, "Form and Formalism," 77.
[81] *Ibid.*, 76.
[82] *Ibid.*, 71.

CONCLUSION

In the first chapter of this study it was my purpose to determine the nature and significance of the spirit that came directly from Francis of Assisi through the English Franciscan Province down to the nineteenth century England of Francis Thompson's day. Despite vicissitudes, the spirit of St. Francis, the evangelical spirit of poverty and simplicity, joy and pain, together with a tender love of Christ and an active love of neighbor has never departed from the Order. In conclusion it can be stated, after focussing attention on the life and apostolic labors of Francis and his followers, that the essence of the Franciscan spirit is the imitation of Christ, based on the Holy Gospel with whatever emphasis Francis found in Christ and in the Gospel. Further, Franciscan spirituality as it existed in nineteenth century England can be traced back directly to the founder himself.

Point two of this study was a presentation of the Franciscan spirit, from its religious, social, romantic and literary aspects, that permeated English life during the latter half of the nineteenth century in which Francis Thompson lived. Through these considerations it was found that Franciscan spirituality exerted a strong impact on English society; due to the favorable attitudes of the Popes and contemporary sociologists toward the Third Order of St. Francis came added interest in his literary significance. Consequently, it can be said that Francis Thompson who lived and wrote in this virile Franciscan atmosphere would be influenced by it.

Whereas it was proved in the preceding chapter that a virile Franciscan spirit existed and permeated English life during the nineteenth century, Chapter Three was an investigation of the Franciscan influence in the life of Francis Thompson. It was concluded that many parallels exist in the lives of St. Francis of Assisi and Francis Thompson, the Tertiary. Although their very early lives were, to a certain extent, somewhat contradictory as to events and outward characteristics, a decided similarity of character, temperament, and spirituality was discernable in their mature lives. Furthermore, besides the fact that he lived in a milieu of Franciscan spirituality, Francis Thompson came in direct contact with the true spirit of St. Francis during his stay at the Franciscan Monastery at Pantasaph. Consequently, Thompson's last years and death are strongly reminiscent of the Franciscan influence that so deeply affected all of his life.

The final point in this exposition was a study of the Franciscan elements in some of the essays of Francis Thompson. Thus, after concentrating attention on the content of these essays it is evident that the spirit which motivated St. Francis and which pervades his writing can be detected in the ideas, expressions, and observations of Thompson. Moreover, the similarities between St. Francis and Francis Thompson are so obvious that to neglect making any references to them would be to present an unbalanced picture of Thompson, since his essays were decidedly influenced by the Franciscan spirit. Furthermore, no small measure of Thompson's greatness derives from this spirit which pervades much of his work. In conclusion, Francis Thompson in his essays, like another St. Francis lifted his voice to beseech his contemporaries to seek Christ in all things.

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COMMENTARY

Luther and Tetzel's Preaching of Indulgences, 1516—1518

In its issue of February 16, 1958, the *Register* of Denver, Col. printed the following item: "John Tetzel in 1516 was preaching indulgences, when Luther accused him of selling indulgences. His teaching on indulgences for the living was orthodox but his views on indulgences for the dead were censured by Cardinal Cajetan and others and in popular disrepute Tetzel retired broken."

Such garbled information has been multiplied by the hundreds in the past and will be multiplied by the thousands in the future.

Up to 1895 all Catholic historians stated that Tetzel's preaching on indulgences was orthodox also in regard to indulgences for the dead, when the Catholic historian Nicholas Paulus began to state the contrary opinion.

In 1886 the Protestant theologian August Wilhelm Dieckhoff, Professor at the Protestant university of Rostock in Germany, declared publicly that historical studies had led him to the conviction that Tetzel had preached the "orthodox Catholic teaching on indulgences and Protestants have been grossly misled about this man."

This frank statement naturally roused the ill feelings of the members of the aggressive *Evangelical Alliance* (Evangelischer Bund) and the Protestant theologian Gustav Kawerau, at this time professor at the neighboring Protestant university of Kiel, likewise in Germany, came to the rescue. He admitted that the current story about Tetzel among Protestants is a myth; he stated that his teaching on indulgences for the living was correct, yet in regard to indulgences for the dead Tetzel followed an opinion which would immediate deliverance from Purgatory attribute to the alms spent in behalf of a certain soul. Kawerau further says that Tetzel did not preach, what was current among Protestants "as soon as the coin in the casket rings, the soul to Heaven springs," yet he believes that Tetzel substantially preached in that sense.

This opinion of Kawerau would not have created any sensation in Catholic circles, if it unexpectedly would not have been adopted by the Catholic historian Nicholas Paulus, who tried to uphold this opinion

in two books published in 1895 and 1899. This Kawerau-Paulus version of Tetzel's preaching found its way into Pastor's *History of the Popes* and into the *Catholic Encyclopedia* despite numerous refutations on the part of Catholic historians. And the *Catholic Encyclopedia* has been the feeder for innumerous articles like the one published by the *Register* on February 16th, 1958.

The Kawerau-Paulus story would make us believe that Luther was not ruffled in the least about the indulgence preaching in 1516; he was only roused in 1517, when Tetzel preached in the little village of Jüterbog near Wittenberg, the Duke of Saxony having not allowed him to preach in Wittenberg. It was then that Luther was roused and some time later on October 31, 1517, nailed the ninety-five theses against indulgences on the church door at Wittenberg (*Catholic Encyclopedia*, s. v. Tetzel, vol. XIV, 539).

In 1891 a chronicle was published written by John Oldecop, born in 1493, which covers the years 1500 to 1573 (edited in Stuttgart 1891 by K. Euling). This Oldecop was a student at Wittenberg in 1515 and 1516 and a great admirer of his teacher Luther; in 1527 he was ordained a priest and became an opponent of Luther.

Oldecop states that in June of 1516 he heard a stirring sermon preached by Tetzel in the parish church of Wittenberg. This contemporary statement upsets the contention of Kawerau-Paulus that Tetzel never preached in Wittenberg. Oldecop further states that in the evening of that day Luther preached against indulgences in the church of the Augustinians in Wittenberg. Since Luther does not mention these facts, Paulus says this statement of Oldecop is wrong. But Luther did not keep a diary and so he did many things in 1516 which he never mentions later. Curiously Paulus admits that Oldecop had attended Tetzel's sermon but refrains to state that this was done in Wittenberg. By the time Tetzel preached in Jüterbog, Oldecop was living in Hildesheim.

From Oldecop's book we know that Luther preached against indulgences in the monastic church of the Augustinians in Wittenberg in June of 1516. Yet it took a long time till Luther dared to preach in public against indulgences. He knew that preaching heresy was a capital offence and he was not ready to sacrifice his life. He had to abide his time till he was sure that the Duke was espousing the Reformation cause and he would not run any risks. Yet by that time Tetzel had preached at Jüterbog in April 1517 and many months were to pass till he dared to nail the theses against indulgences at the door of the church in Wittenberg, October 31, 1517.

We have first-hand information about Tetzel's preaching only from two persons. The first is the Protestant Myconius who had heard Tetzel preaching in Annaberg in 1510; he states that Tetzel preached that the poor are given the indulgence gratis without paying anything. The second is Oldecop who wrote that Tetzel did not only demand money to gain the indulgence but urgently confession; and in regard to the indulgence for the dead he preached that everything is left to *the mercy of God* whether the gift of money has an effect for the benefit of the dead person or not. Moreover, he relates that Tetzel's stirring sermon had moved him to receive the sacraments of confession and holy communion and to pay a sum of money for the building of St. Peter's in Rome. Accordingly, Tetzel's indulgence-sermons were mission sermons in the truest sense: reception of sacraments were the chief objectives and money only secondary. This first-class evidence of a young student of theology of 23 years cannot be discredited. Tetzel states in 1518 in his anti-theses nr. 56: "Whoever says that a soul cannot rise to heaven before the money rings in the box, commits an error." But Paulus and others consider this statement as a meaningless phrase.

Despite the first-hand information of Oldecop, which was surely no singular exception, the *Catholic Encyclopedia* writes that Tetzel "substantially taught that the mere gift of money without contrition on the part of the giver was sufficient to gain a plenary indulgence for the dead" and adds that this teaching was as repugnant to the Church as it violated every principle of elementary justice (*Catholic Encyclopedia*, s. v. Tetzel, vol. XIV, 540).

The historians Paulus and Pastor state the same but add that "espousing the teaching of a certain school of theology Tetzel taught that an indulgence for the dead could be *infallibly* gained for, and applied to, this or that individual soul."

The historian of the popes, Pastor, states that these opinions preached by Tetzel and others had been condemned by the Sorbonne as early as 1482 and again in 1518 and the foremost theologian at the papal court Cardinal Cajetan disapproved of such exaggerations which gave undue prominence to the financial aspect. Though Tetzel did not conduct himself as scandalously as the Papal Legate Arcimboldi, he cannot be acquitted from all guilt. "Not only was he inclined to exaggerate, but his public appearance lacked modesty and simplicity. He was bold and arrogant and performed the duties of his office always with an eye to the main chance, so that scandals could not fail to rise" (quoted from the *Catholic Fortnightly Review* edited by Arthur Preuss, August 15, 1906, 509).

After all this presentation of the matter is garbled. Justly Arthur Preuss states: "While we are not, of course, inclined to dispute Pastor's final judgment of Tetzel, based as it is on all the available documentary evidence; nor to extenuate the Dominican from the charge of arrogance and undue greed; yet we think it is but fair to him and the historic truth to emphasize one important circumstance, not sufficiently, it seems to us, appreciated by the learned historian of the popes: viz. that what he calls an altogether uncertain opinion of some theologians, was held by such eminent authorities as for instance Suarez" (*Catholic Fortnightly Review, loc. cit.* 511). This doctrine had found its way into the *Letters of Indulgence* which the Papal Legate Arcimboldi had ordered to be printed and which were sold by Tetzel. In these printed certificates everybody could read that an indulgence for the dead can be gained by paying the stipulated money and nothing more was necessary, since it is expressly stated that for gaining an indulgence for the dead no contrition nor reception of the sacrament of penance was required. Tetzel had to preach according to these printed instructions, as the historian Nicholas Paulus admits. Now Cardinal Cajetan reproving the indulgence-preachers said: "They speak in the name of the Church as long as they proclaim the teaching of Christ and the Church." Tetzel preaching according to the instructions of the indulgence letters did not preach his own exaggerations and the people buying those certificates believing the printed instructions were led to believe that by mere paying money they could gain a plenary indulgence for dead friends. If anything was wrong in this belief, the pope's personal representative the Papal Legate Angelo Arcimboldi is to be blamed.

The presentation of Pastor and Paulus and of the *Catholic Encyclopedia* is misleading, because it creates the impression that the teaching of that certain school of theologians on which all is based, was so obscure that it vanished just with the Reformation. And yet that school remained and is still alive. Suarez was one of the great theologians of that school (born two years after Luther's death; died in 1617). He, writes Arthur Preuss, defended with such strong, not to say irrefutable, arguments as this his position: "The state of grace is only demanded to remove the obstacle to the indulgence and, therefore, as such it is only a necessary disposition for a person who is to receive the effect of the indulgence. Yet in our case he who pays the money is not gaining the result of the indulgence but somebody else. Therefore, the case is different from that of one who personally gains the indulgence; the latter must be in the state of grace, because he personally receives the effect of the indulgence.

Therefore, it is not inconvenient that a sinner obtains some good for another, though he cannot gain it for himself, because he possesses an obstacle but not the other party and this the more, since the good effect procured to the other is not the merit of the gaining person . . . He who gains an indulgence for another, does not gain anything first for himself which he later gives to another. All he does is that he fulfils the condition required, so that the Pope grants the indulgence to the other. This condition is to perform the work, i. e. payment, which will induce the cause able to realize the grant of an indulgence" (Suarez, *De poenitentia*, disp. 53, sect. 4, n. 6).[1] Accordingly a Jew may gain an indulgence for his dead Catholic wife in this way. This opinion is defended by other great theologians like Cardinal Bellarmin and Billuart to mention the most outstanding. Among more recent theologians whose works are still in use in the seminaries we may mention Pesch, Merkelbach, Van Noort, Capello and many others. Pesch writes in the year 1900: "Many theologians believe that sinners may gain indulgences for the dead" quoting the reasons of Suarez. "Hence, writes Preuss *(loc. cit.)*, the opinion held and defended by Tetzel is defended even to-day by eminent theologians."

"In the other point of teaching, viz. that a plenary indulgence for the dead is *infallibly* gained by the soul to which it is applied, Tetzel was in equally respectable company, since it also was taught by Suarez and other learned theologians, for instance to mention only a few contemporaries of Tetzel: Prierias, John von Paltz, and John Eck" (Preuß, *ibid.* 512). The Dominican Sylvester Prierias was the first Italian opponent of Luther. In June 1518 he was commissioned to examine the works of Luther. He found in them Luther's thesis nr. 27 against

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[1] ". . . status gratiae solum requiritur ad tollendum obicem indulgentiae; et ideo per se solum est dispositio necessaria in eo, qui recepturus est indulgentiae effectum; in praesenti autem non est recepturus effectum ille, qui efficit opus ad indulgentiam requisitum, sed alius, cui indulgentia procuratur; ergo. Et ideo non est simile de lucrante sibi ipsi indulgentiam, nam in eo requiritur status gratiae, non formaliter, quia operans est, sed quia recipiens est indulgentiae effectum. Atque hac ratione non est inconveniens, quod existens in peccato, aliquem effectum possit obtinere alteri, et non sibi, quia ipse habet obicem, non vero alius; maxime cum hic effectus non nitatur merito operantis. Sicut sacerdos existens in peccato, potest per sacrificium obtinere alteri remissionem poenae, non vero sibi. Denique explicatur optime ex dictis: nam is qui lucratur indulgentiam alteri, nullo modo prius sibi lucratur aliquam satisfactionem, ut eam alteri praebeat, sed solum exhibet conditionem postulatam, ut Pontifex alteri concedat indulgentiam; haec autem conditio non est nisi executio talis operis quoad substantiam ejus, per quod potest sufficienter impleri causa proportionata talis indulgentiae . . ." Edit. C. Berton, 22, 1112.

Tetzel about the coin ringing the soul to heaven. John von Paltz was a teacher of Luther but died before the Reformation in 1511. John Eck was the ablest opponent Luther ever found during his lifetime. "To-day many theologians defend the same opinion as probable, yet considering the contrary opinion as better founded. The Jesuit Beringer, the best authority on indulgences, originally believed the opinion that we have *no certainty* about the effect of the indulgence for the dead, but changed later his opinion on the weight of the reasons advanced by Father Schmid in an article published in 1893 and so he finally defended as *more probable* the opinion, that indulgences for the dead can be applied to their fullest extent and *with certainty* to the souls of the faithful in Purgatory" (Preuss, *ibid.* 512). Thus Tetzel is vindicated in every detail except the one that his opinion was not a dogma as he is accused to have held. Yet after all nobody has proved that Tetzel had held that opinion. The only first hand account of Tetzel, that of Oldecop, states that he "left everything to the mercy of God" so that he did not promise any certainty in that matter.

Some modern Catholic writers create the impression as if the Church had changed her position in regard to the doctrine of indulgences. The manner of indulgence preachers has changed but not their doctrine. The matter has also changed, because with indulgence money no churches are built but other charitable works are financed. The foremost work is nowadays Mass Stipends.

Shortly after Luther's death the custom of indulgences "of privileged altars" was introduced. This indulgence differs from all others granted by the pope for the relief of the dead in that regard that it can be gained with greater certainty for the benefit of a particular soul. The reason is that in this case the *Church*, not the pope, offers God the measure of satisfaction from her treasure of spiritual goods which equals the measure of punishment of that particular soul. Then the means of application of satisfaction is more sure and efficacious. That means is the Mass to which it is attached and the expiatory effect of the Mass has the power to remove obstacles which might perhaps in papal indulgences, according to the decree of Divine Justice, hinder the application to that particular soul (Beringer, *Die Ablässe, ihr Wesen und Gebrauch*, 12th edit., Paderborn 1900, 436).

Yet we must keep in mind that indulgences can only be gained for dead who died as members of the Church. If a Catholic dies in excommunication or a Protestant in good faith that his Protestant Church is the right one, they are deprived of the participation in indulgences,

as long as the excommunication is *not* lifted by a priest who has power to do so. An act of perfect contrition insures the salvation of their soul but no indulgence can be gained for them as long as the excommunication is not lifted. So, if a priest wants to say a private Mass for his deceased Protestant friend, he better lifts first the excommunication.

Catholics cling to their myths and Protestants cling to theirs but both have clung and will cling probably to the end of the world to their *common myth* that Tetzel's preaching of indulgence has *caused* the Reformation. Luther himself has repudiated this myth. When he was told that Tetzel had become deathly sick on account of persecutions, Luther wrote a letter to Tetzel saying: Don't worry, the Reformation (the thing) was not started by you but "the child has another father." And Luther was right in this point. The Reformation was born from Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone and on this foundation it rests as firmly now as in 1514, when Luther formulated it. With this doctrine purgatory and indulgences were eliminated. Indulgences were a side-issue in Luthers's doctrine and if Tetzel never had preached, Luther would have attacked indulgences some time later. At any rate, Luther was astonished about the great disturbance caused by him in that point. If the present pope would grant an indulgence to build a second St. Peter's in Rome, he would not find the least trouble: Catholics nowadays are better instructed on that article of faith, what is a good effect of the one-time great turmoil.

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TEXTS ILLUSTRATING THE CAUSALITY
OF THE SACRAMENTS

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA

In the June-September issue 1957 of *Franciscan Studies* (Vol. 17, pp. 238—272) we published ,,Texts illustrating the causality of the sacraments from William of Melitona, *Assisi Bibl. Comm.* 182, and Brussels Bibl. Royale 1542.'' Unfortunately, by some mishap, the edition did not carry the footnotes to the texts, which footnotes showed the interdependencies of the texts, as well as the identification of the sources. In having these footnotes printed here we take the opportunity to add also corrections of other errors. The references throughout are to the page and line of the printed article.

p. 239, line 3, f. 79*r:* f. 78*v.*
p. 240, line 16, regenerativam: regenerantem
p. 240, line 37, corporale: corporalem
p. 242, line 102, comparatione.: comparatione,
p. 242, line 103, accidens,: accidens; alio modo dicitur communiter per accidens,
p. 242, line 104, quarendum: quarundam
p. 243, line 137, animae. Item, causa per se, id est: animae, sunt causa per se, id est,
p. 243, line 138, acceperunt, ad: acceperunt. Ad
p. 243, line 139, dispositiva: dispositiva,
p. 245, line 243, transfundent: transfundunt
p. 247, line 292, invenitur: inveniuntur
p. 248, line 331, similia bona animae,: naturalia bona animae;
p. 250, line 423, nobiliter: minus nobiliter
p. 253, line 89, perficientem: perficiendo
p. 257, line 243, huiusmodi: huiusmodi,
p. 258, line 277, gloriae: gloria
p. 259, line 341, *delete* non
p. 260, line 362, signent: signant
p. 262, line 451, permanebat: permaneat
p. 264, line 6, *delete* utrum
p. 268, line 163, ipsa: ipsam
p. 272, line 342, animam, quia: animam, non tamen eodem modo est illa gratia in sacramentis et in anima, quia

The following pages reproduce the footnotes to three texts.

ASSISI BIBL. COMM. 182 (Cf. *Franciscan Studies*, June-Sept. 1957, p. 239 ff.)
Lines 1 to 8, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 65 to 70.
Lines 6 to 8, cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, Lib. 1, pars XI, cap. 2, (*P. L.* 176, 343).
Lines 10 to 14, cf. *infra* Melitona lines 72 to 75.

Lines 15 to 16, cf. Lombard, *IV Sent.*, dist. 3, (*ed.* Quaracchi, II, 759 with references).

Lines 15 to 17, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 76 to 78.

Lines 19 ff., cf. Aug., *Tract. 80 super Iohannem* 15, 3 (*P. L.* 35, 1840).

Lines 19 to 20, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 79 to 82.

Lines 21 to 23, cf. *infra* Melitona lines 83 to 85.

Lines 24 ff., *non invenimus.*

Lines 32 to 33, ,,Virtus est bona qualitas," etc., cf. Lombard, *II Sent.*, dist. 27, ch. 5 (*ed.* Quaracchi I, p. 446); cf. also Aug., *De lib. arbitr.* c. 19, (*P. L.* 32, 1268), and Petrus Pictaviensis, *Sent. Lib. III*, c. 1 (*P. L.* 211, 1041). On this point cf. Lottin, *R.S.P.T.* (1929) p. 371.

Lines 32 to 34, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 92 to 95.

Line 35, cf. Aug. *Ennar. in Ps.*, Ps. 118, 73 (*P. L.* 37, 1553).

Lines 35 to 36, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 96 to 98.

Lines 37 to 38, cf. *infra Melitona*, lines 99 to 100.

Lines 39 to 40, cf. rather Isidore of Seville, *Etymol.* VI, c. XIX, 39—42 (*P. L.* 82, 255 c—256 a). On this point cf. D. Van den Eynde, O.F.M., *Les définitions des sacrements pendant la première période de la théologie scholastique*, Rome-Louvain, 1950, p. 3 and p. 175, where he speaks of the attribution of this definition to St. Gregory.

Lines 39 to 41, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 104 to 107.

Lines 44 to 45, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 108 to 109.

Lines 44 to 45, cf. Lombard, *IV Sent.*, dist. 1, ch. 5 (*ed.* Quaracchi II, p. 747).

Lines 48 to 51, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 110 to 114.

Lines 60 to 80, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 116 to 140

Lines 81 to 89, cf. *infra* Melitona lines 141 to 146, *aliquo modo.*

Lines 93 to 94, cf. Aug., *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 17, n. 33 (*P. L.* 44, 901).

Lines 90 to 100, cf. Melitona *infra*, lines 168 to 175 *aliquo modo.*

Lines 101 to 118, cf. Melitona *infra* lines 176 to 192 *aliquo modo.*

Lines 122, *James* 5, 14.

Lines 119 to 122, cf. Melitona *infra*, Lines 198 to 197.

Lines 128 to 129, cf. Melitona *infra*, lines 202 to 203.

Lines 142 to 194, cf. Kilian F. Lynch, O.F.M., *The Sacrament of Confirmation in the Early-Middle Scholastic Period*, p. LXVI ff., (*Franciscan Institute Publications*, Theology Series n. 5), St. Bonaventure, Louvain, Paderborn, 1957.

Lines 160 to 161, cf. *supra*, lines 15 to 20.

Lines 195 to 203, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 254 to 263.

Line 197 ff., cf. *Glossa Lombardi* in *Ps.* 17, vs. 13 (*P. L.* 191, 192).

Lines 204 to 206, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 264 to 268; on lines 204 to 206 cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, I, pars 9, ch. 4 (*P. L.* 176, 323).

Lines 207 to 209, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 269 to 271.

Lines 210 to 213, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 272 to 275.

Lines 214 to 217, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 306 to 310.

Lines 230 to 234, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 276 to 278.

Lines 235 to 237, cf. *infra* Melitona, 279 to 280.

Lines 238 to 240, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 281 to 282.

Lines 241 to 248, cf. *infra* Melitona, lines 283 to 291.

Lines 247 to 248, cf. Hugo, *De sacramentis, lib.* 1, *pars* 9, *c.* 4 (*P. L.* 176, 323).

Lines 255 to 310, *aliquo modo saltem infra* Melitona, lines 311 to 331.

Lines 262 to 274, cf. Melitona *infra*, lines 297 to 305.

Lines 274 to 310 *aliquo modo habetur infra*, Melitona, lines 311 to 331.

Lines 317 to 318: Igitur dispositio ad gratiam non est nisi ab homine, vel ab eo quod est supra hominem et naturam, et huiusmodi est gratia divina: this is the reading of the *ms.*; apparently, however, to make sense in the paragraph it should read instead: Igitur dispositio ad gratiam non est <tunc *perhaps*> ab homine, sed ab eo quod est supra hominem et naturam, et huiusmodi est gratia divina.

Lines 327 ff., cf. Aug., *De lib. arbit.*, II, ch. 19, n. 50 (*P. L.* 32, 1268) and *Retract.* I, ch. 9, n. 4 (*P. L.* 32, 597).

Line 373, cf. Aug. *supra* in text lines 327 ff.

WILLIAM OF MELITONA: QUAESTIONES DE SACRAMENTIS

(Cf. *Franciscan Studies, June-Sept.* 1957, p. 251 ff.)

Lines 4 to 31, cf. *Quarta Pars Summae Fratris Alexandri* (Alexandri Halensis), *ed.* Venetiis, apud Franciscum Franciscium, 1575, p. 46 ab (Q. V, memb. 1, art. 1).

Lines 6 to 7, cf. Hugh of Saint Victor, *De sacramentis*, I, par. 10, ch. 9 (*P. L.* 176, 342): ,Imago in speculo fides in corde tuo. Ipsa enim fides imago est, et sacramentum. Contemplatio autem futura res et sacramentum . . . Fides ergo sacramentum est futurae contemplationis.'

Lines 15 to 17, *Rom.* 13, 11, *Glossa Lombardi* (*P. L.* 191, 1510).

Line 20, *non invenimus.*

Lines 32 to 64, cf. *Summa Fratris Alexandri, ed. cit.*, p. 54 rab (Qu. V, memb. III, art. 5).

Lines 65 to 71, cf. *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, p. 52 rb. (Qu. V, memb. III, art. 5, 'Primo ergo quaeritur etc.').

Lines 68 to 71, cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacr.*, Lib. 1, pars 2, cap. 2 (*P. L.* 176, 343).

Lines 76 to 87, cf. *Summa Fratris Alexandri, ed. cit.*, p. 52 vb, (Qu. V, memb. III, art. 5, 'Consequenter quaeritur, etc.').

Lines 76 to 77, Cf. Bede, *In Luc.*, lib. I, super 3, 21 (*P. L.* 92, 358).

Lines 76 to 78, cf. *Bruxelles Bibl. Royale* 1542, *infra* lines 18 to 20.

Lines 79 to 82, cf. *infra Bruxelles Bibl. Royale* 1542, lines 21 to 24.

Lines 79 to 82, cf. Aug. *Tract. 80 super Ioh.* 15, 3, (*P. L.* 35, 1840)

Lines 83 to 87, cf. *Bruxelles infra* lines 25 to 28.

Lines 85 to 87, cf. Lombard, *IV Sent.*, dist. 1, ch. 4 (*ed.* Quaracchi, II, 747).

Lines 88 to 90, cf. *Summa Fratris Alexandri, ed, cit.*, p. 52 rb, 'Contra, Aug.', (Qu. V, memb. III, art. 5).

Lines 88 to 91, cf. *Bruxelles Bibl. Roy.* 1542, *infra*, lines 32 to 37.

Lines 89 ff., *non invenimus.*

Lines 92 to 95, cf. Lombard, *II Sent.*, dist. 27, ch. 5 (*ed.* Quaracchi, I, 446); cf. also Aug., *De libero arbitrio*, ch. 19, (*P. L.* 32, 1268; see also Petrus Pictaviensis, *Sent. III*, ch. I, (*P. L.* 211, 1041).

Lines 96 to 107, cf. *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, p. 52 vb (Qu. V, memb. III, art. 5).

Lines 96 to 97, *Ps.* 118, 73, cf. Aug. *Ennar. in Ps.* 118, 73, (*P. L.* 37, 1553).

Lines 99 to 103, cf. *infra Bruxelles Bibl. Roy.* 1542, lines 38 to 41.

Lines 104 ff., cf. rather Isidore of Seville, *Etymol.* VI, c. 19, 39—42. (*P. L.* 82, 255 c—256 a). Cf. D. Van den Eynde, O. F. M., *La définition des sacrements pendant la première période de la théologie scholastique*, Rome-Louvain-Paderborn, 1950, p. 3 and p. 175.

Lines 104 to 107, cf. infra *Bruxelles Bibl. Roy.* 1542, lines 42 to 47.

Lines 108, cf. Lombard, *IV Sent.*, dist. I, ch. 5 (*ed.* Quaracchi, II, 747).

Lines 110 to 115, cf. *Bruxelles Bibl. Royale* 1542, lines 52 to 62.

Lines 110 to 155, cf. *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, p. 52 rv (Respondeo sine praeiudicio, etc.) (Qu. V, memb. III, art. 4).

Lines 116 to 140, cf. *Bruxelles Bibl. Royale* 1542 lines 63 to 89, *infra.*

Line 131, I *In.* 1, 8.

Lines 141 to 146, cf. *Bruxelles Bibl. Royale* 1542 *infra*, lines 97 to 102.

Lines 151 ff., cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, lib. 1, pars 9, ch. 4 (*P. L.* 176, 322).

Lines 156 ff, cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, lib. I, pars 9, ch. 4 (*P. L.* 176, 325).

Lines 156 to 159, cf. *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, p. 52 vb (Qu. V, memb. III, art. 5).

Lines 168 to 192, cf. *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, p. 53 ra (Qu. V, memb. III, art. 5) (Ad alia obiecta . . . in operando).

Lines 173 to 175, cf. Augustinus, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 17, n. 33 (*P. L.* 44, 901).

Lines 176 to 192, cf. *infra* Bruxelles *Bibl. Royale* 1542, lines 111 to 127 (Ad quod obicitur . . . ut efficacius operetur).

Lines 193 to 197, cf. *Brux. Bibl. Royale* 1542, infra, lines 143 to 150, (Ad quod obicitur . . . spiritualis).

Lines 193 to 201, cf. *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, p. 53ra (Qu V, memb. III, art. 5).

Lines 198, cf. supra line 104 ff.

Lines 198 to 201, cf. *Bruxelles Bibl. Royale* 1542, lines 151 to 154. (Item, prima . . . ut dictum est).

Lines 204 to 210, cf. *Bruxelles Bibl. Royale* 1542, lines 157 to 164 *infra* (Ex dictis patet . . . efficax sit in operando ipsa.).

Line 232, cf. Aug., *In Ioh.* tract. 80. *P. L.* 35, 1840.

Line 236, cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, lib. 1, pars 11, cap. 2 (*P. L.* 176, 343).

Line 242 ff., cf. Aug., *De libero arbitrio*, II, c. 19, n. 50 (*P. L.* 32, 1268); *Retract.* I, c. 9, n. 4 (*P. L.* 32, 597).

Lines 254 to 260, cf. *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, p. 53rb (Qu. V, memb. III, art. 5).

Line 254 to 291, cf. *Bruxelles Bibl. Royale*, 1542, lines 226 to 262, ('Tertio quaeritur . . . sed medicina').

Line 257, cf. *Glossa Lombardi*, in *Ps.* 17, *vs.* 13, (*P. L.* 191, 192).

Line 264, cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, Lib. I, pars, 9. c. 4 (*P. L.* 176, 323).

Line 290 to 291, cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, lib. I, pars 9, c. 4, *P. L.* 176, 323).

Lines 318 to 331, cf. *Bruxelles Bibl. Royale* infra, lines 275 to 287. ('Si obiciatur . . . universi')

Lines 332 ff., cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, lib. I, pars 9, c. 2, (*P. L.* 176, 317).

Line 347 ff., Aug., *In Ioh. Evangel.* tract. 80, n. 3 (*P. L.* 35, 1840).

Line 365, *Jn.* 3, 3.

Line 384 ff., *Lev.* 19, 2 Glossa, *ed.* Antverp. 1617, I, 1071.

Lines 395 to 453, cf. *Summa Fratris Alexandri*, p. 54rv (Qu. V, Memb. III, art. 5).

Lines 397 to 398, cf. Aug., *In Ioh. Evangel.* tr. 80, n. 3 (*P. L.* 35, 1840).

Lines 403 to 404, Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacr.* II, pars 6, ch. 2 (*P. L.* 176, 443).

Lines 406 to 407, cf. Aug. *In Ioh. Evangel.* tract. 80, n. 3 (*P. L.* 35, 1840); Lombard, *IV Sent.*, d. 3, c. 1 (*ed.* Quar. II, 755).

Lines 408 ff., cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, lib. II, pars VI, ch. 2 (*P. L.* 176, 443).

Lines 434 ff., cf. Aug., *Contra Faustum*, lib. 19 (*P. L.* 42, 357).

Lines 456ff., S. Gregorius, *Homil. in Evangel.*, Lib. I, hom. 17, (*P. L.* 76, 1148).

BRUSSELS BIBL. ROYALE 1542: ANONYMUS
(Cf. Franciscan Studies, June-Sept. 1957, p. 264 ff.)

Lines 12ff., Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, Lib. I, pars 11, c. 2 (*P. L.* 176, 343).

Lines 12 to 16, cf. *supra* Melitona lines 68 to 71.

Lines 18 ff., cf. Lombard, *IV Sent.*, dist. 3, (*ed.* Quaracchi II, 759).

Lines 21 ff., cf. Augustinus, *Tract. 80, supra* 15, 3 (*P. L.* 35, 1840).

Lines 21 to 24, cf. *supra* Melitona, lines 79 to 82.

Lines 25 to 28, cf. *supra* Melitona lines 83 to 87 (Item . . . praestabant).

Lines 27 ff., cf. Lombard, *IV Sent.*, dist. 1, c. 4 (II, 747).

Lines 32 to 37, cf. *supra* Melitona, lines 88 to 91.

Line 33, *non invenimus.*

Lines 38 to 41, cf. *supra* Melitona, lines 99 to 103.

Lines 42 ff., cf. rather Isid., *Etymol.* VI, c. 19, (*P. L.* 82, 255 to 256).

Lines 42 to 45, cf. *supra* Melitona, lines 104 to 107 ('Item, Dionysius . . . sicut organa').

Lines 48 to 49, cf. Lombard, *IV Sent.*, dist. I, cap. V (II, 747).

Lines 52 to 58, cf. *supra* Melitona, lines 110 to 115 ('Respondeo . . . separantem animam').

Lines 63 to 89, cf. *supra* Melitona lines 116 to 140, ('Ad hoc . . . characterizare').

Lines 79 ff., I *In.* 1, 8.

Lines 97 to 102, cf. *supra* Melitona, lines 141 to 146 ('Ad quod obicitur . . . non ratione suae substantiae').

Lines 111 to 127, cf. *supra*, Melitona, lines 176 to 192, 'Ad quod obicitur . . . ut efficaciter operetur.'

Lines 143 to 150, cf. *supra* Melitona, lines 193 to 197 'Ad quod obicitur . . . redditur sanitas corporalis'.

Lines 151 to 154, cf. *supra* Melitona, lines 198 to 201 ('Ad quod dicit, . . . ut dictum est').

Lines 150, *Iac.* 5, 14.

Lines 151, cf. Isidor. *Etymolog.* VI, c. 19, 39 to 42 (*P. L.* 82, 255 to 256).

Lines 211 to 225, *mutil.* in *Bruxelles* 1542.

Lines 229 ff., cf. *Glossa Lombardi* (*P. L.* 191, 192).

Lines 226 to 262, cf. Melitona, *supra*, lines 253 to 291 ('Tertio quaeritur . . . sed medicina').

Lines 236 ff., cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, I, pars 9, ch. 4 (*P. L.* 176, 323).

Lines 261 ff., cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, I, pars 9, c. 4 (*P. L.* 176, 323).

Lines 266 to 270, cf. *supra* Melitona, lines 292 to 295 ('Ad quod obicitur quam alterum').

Lines 275 to 288, cf. *supra* Melitona, lines 318 to 331 ('Si obicitur . . . universi.')

Lines 286, cf. Ps. Dionysius, *De cael. hier.* c. 4, 1 sq., and *De div. nominibus*, c. 4, 1sq. (P. G. 3, 137, and ibid. 694).

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BOOK REVIEWS

*S. Bernardini Senensis Opera Omnia, studio et cura PP. Collegii S. Bona-
venturae ad fidem codicum edita* (Quaracchi-Florentiae). Tom. I—II,
1950 ($ 24.00); tom. III—IV—V, 1956 ($ 40.00).

It may seem somewhat of an *apologia pro domo sua* for me to speak of
the work of Quaracchi, yet one cannot help but admire the painstaking labor
and careful scholarship that have gone into the preparation and publication
of the critical edition of Saint Bernardin's *Opera omnia*, and at the same
time lament the very poor response the edition has received from the Fran-
ciscan and / or Italian public. A glory of the Order (perhaps a future doctor
of the Church) and a light of Italy, a sound theologian and economist,
Bernardin is also a mirror of his times. Hence his Latin works, like his *Prediche
volgari*, are of deep interest not only for the theologian or student of Francis-
can history, but likewise for the Renaissance historian, the sociologist and
the economist.

This is, of course, not the first, but rather the fifth edition of his writings
(or even the seventh, though some were but partial editions or mere re-
prints). It is, however, the first truly critical edition, since the editors have
had direct recourse to the manuscripts which Saint Bernardin wrote himself
and to copies made at his direction; whereas earlier editions had, unfortunate-
ly, relied on manuscripts of much less authority replete with faulty readings.
To make this edition even more accurate and scholarly, the members of the
Bernardinian Commission have likewise spared no efforts to trace not only
the explicit citations of the Saint but also the innumerable passages he
borrowed literally from many sources. Some of these were already known
and studied; e. g., his use of Ubertino da Casale and Pierre Olieu (Olivi);
others are made evident for the first times, e. g., William of Auvergne, Hugh
of Saint-Cher, Saint Thomas, Gilles de Lessines, etc. (cf. tom. I, pp. xv—xvii;
tom. III, pp. xiv—xv). The very copies used and annotated by Bernardin
have helped the editors in such discoveries. Thus the world of scholarship
possesses for the first time, in a handsomely printed form with ample indices
(in tome V), the thoroughly authentic text of the most popular preacher of
the fifteenth century.

These five volumes by no means complete the Latin works of the Saint,
but contain his two most important writings: the Lenten series *De christiana
religione* (written before 1436; tom. I—II), and the second great Quadra-
gesimale, *De evangelio aeterno*, or *De caritate* (c. 1436-1440; tom. III—V).
Neither series represents his actual sermons, but were intended to be source-
books for himself and for others. Each article in such sermons, he declared,
might provide sufficient material for one popular discourse (tom. II, p. 472).
If his written works are of such length as to seem more tracts than sermons,
the spoken word need not follow such a procedure: "I abbreviate or expand,

re-arrange, or vary the material to fit the time and circumstances and the needs of my audience, and expect my readers will do the same" (tom. III, p. 17).

Given the nature of these two works, a certain overlapping or duplication of material may well be expected. Yet Bernardin, without adhering to a rigid order of topics, succeeds in achieving a certain unity and distinctiveness in each series. The Lenten course"On the Christian Religion" takes as its central theme the *bene vivere* of a Christian, *ut minus periti discant vivere sicut christianos decet* (I, p. 4). It begins with faith as the foundation of the Christian life, providing some apologetics as well as dogma on that virtue; and proceeds to detail the role faith must play in guiding all forms of that life. There is little in mediaeval or Christian society that escapes attention, whether in the priestly or religious life, marriage and the family, the home, or the political sphere. The famous practical, down-to-earth homeliness of Bernardin's Italian sermons is reflected in his Latin texts, as he berates such social vices as detraction, duplicity and lying, blasphemy, gambling, party-politics of Guelfs and Ghibellines, or the petty and un-Christian failings of human vanity in men as well as women. The motif of the second series is contained in its title: it sets forth the Gospel as eternal and applicable to all souls in all ages, that they may be perfected in charity. To preach this eternal Gospel of charity it is not sufficient to limit oneself, the author says, to the Gospels and Epistles of Sunday Masses; we must take in the whole sweep of the Gospel, with emphasis on love. "Since the people are bogged down in vices and are become strangers to virtue, and are not stirred to something higher either by fear of the judgment and punishments to come or by desire of things eternal, there is no more fruitful remedy than to present the fulness of Christ's teachings and to stress the role of charity, as we have tried to do in this work" (III, p. 18). This is the approach he uses even when he preaches and writes on such problems as human ignorance, homosexuality, political and social conditions, contracts, interest, usury, buying and selling (the honest merchant rates a special sermon), or more lofty themes as the Holy Name, the Eucharist, religious life, the sanctification of Sundays and holydays.

The two series of some 131 sermons are thus a mirror of men and manners in the fifteenth century. If the theologian can find much not only for such doctrinal topics as Christology, Mariology, and the Eucharist, but also on mysticism, religious life, virginity, and moral questions, the appeal of Bernardin's works is not limited to him alone. Sermons 43—45, "De contractibus et usuris," of the *De evangelio aeterno* (tom. IV, pp. 117—416), have long interested historians and economists, and were at least once edited as a separate treatise. Even the historian of feminine fashions must have recourse to him, if only to hear him castigate and mock the use of trailing gowns and other vanities. In consequence, though the Saint intended his works primarily for the preacher (to whom they are still of great use), their content is such that they possess an appeal much wider than one might at first suspect.

Other volumes are to follow these five tomes, to present various treatises and scattered sermons. From the prospectus of the editors (D. Pacetti,

Ratio criticae editionis, 1947), it is evident that these works will be more spiritual and dogmatic in character, though of no less importance for a full knowledge of Bernardin's thought and doctrine.

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History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. By Etienne Gilson. New York: Random House, 1955, pp. xvii and 829. $ 7.50.

This is a remarkably comprehensive and impressive work and just the sort of thing we would expect of the author. It is not a translation of his earlier work *La Philosophie au Moyen Age.* Virtually all the essential material of the French work with the exception of some chapters on the Renaissance in France and Italy are present in this English work. In addition the present work contains more material on 14th century philosophy and an excellent account of the development of Medieval logic. A chapter on Nicholas of Cusa has also been added. The treatment of St. Thomas and his influence is more extensive and the significant differences between St. Thomas and Aristotle more clearly marked. It is a very large work, containing over five hundred pages of text and close to three hundred pages of notes, and as the author well points out it should "provide teachers and advanced students with the first technical information they need in order to conduct their courses or to start their own research work." (p. v.) On the whole this work is much better organized and more systematic in its treatment of the major issues and figures in medieval philosophy.

Considering the comprehensive scope of the work and the erudition of the author, it would be both difficult and presumptuous of this reviewer to enter upon a critical discussion here of any of the major issues or individuals treated by the author. In a lesser way, however, we may indicate a point or two of agreement or disagreement.

The problem of a Christian philosophy is satisfactorily resolved by the author as early as the chapters on the Apologists and the Alexandrines. The significance and the defense of John Scotus Erigena is well taken and few would quarrel with the author's penetrating analysis of the problem of the universals or his admirable evaluation of the conflicting positions occupied by Abelard and St. Bernard of Clairvaux. On the other hand, the analysis of the Augustinian epistemology and particularly its influence upon later philosophers is inadequate. To some the validity and the merit of the Thomist position in contrast to the Scotist would be open to question, particularly perhaps on the questions of the plurality of forms and the problem of individuation. For this reviewer a more precise formulation of the relation of theology in the Thomist synthesis would have been desirable, although perhaps not feasible in a survey of this nature.

Some of these points of criticism would undoubtedly be subject to further evaluation if the author had given a more extended treatment of the major philosophical positions. In fact, my principal criticism of the book

lies in the disproportionate amount of space that is given to certain lesser philosophical figures in comparison to the space allotted to the major figures in medieval philosophy. Thus, St. Augustine receives only eleven pages to fifteen pages for John Scotus Erigena, Duns Scotus but ten pages in comparison to eighteen for Roger Bacon, and even St. Thomas is given but five more pages than St. Albert the Great. True, we can always turn to Professor Gilson's own works on the major figures, but this will be of little help to the average reader if those works, e. g. the *Introduction à l'Etude de Saint Augustin* and the *Jean Duns Scot, Introduction à Ses Positions Fondamentales*, are not available and in translation. The need for a more detailed study of these three major figures is born out by the significance the author attaches to their views in his closing remarks.

Aside from these minor differences of opinion, I can recommend the present work most heartily as invaluable for those who are concerned with the teaching of medieval philosophy or for those who are interested in research in medieval philosophy. Nowhere have I found a more effective account of the principal trends and the basic issues of medieval philosophy than in the author's brilliant summation and conclusion. Scholarship of a very high order is revealed everywhere in this work but the manner in which the author transcends mere scholarship and captures in a comprehensive grasp the grand perspectives of the medieval tradition in philosophy is the work of philosophical genius.

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1. *The Tractatus de successivis Attributed to William Ockham*, edit. Ph. Boehner, 1944. $ 2.00.
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THE SYNTAX OF TIME-DISTINCTIONS[1]

1. Truth and Time in Ancient and Modern Logic

Truth, on the face of it, is a property of propositions which is liable to alter with the time at which they are put forward. Thus 'Socrates is sitting down' is true at any time at which he is in fact sitting down, and false at all other times. Against this, it is not uncommonly argued that the sentence 'Socrates is sitting down' does not express a complete proposition, but rather a function of a date. It is short for 'Socrates is sitting down at —,' where the blank is understood as being filled by some unambiguous indication of the date at which the sentence is uttered ('4 P. M. on April 3, 325 B. C.,' for example). It therefore expresses different propositions when uttered at different times, and each one of the propositions it expresses is either true always or false always.

Modern exact logicians commonly operate with 'propositions' in the second (timelessly true) sense, while ancient and medieval logicians had in mind 'propositions' of the first ('tensed') sort. It should be emphasised, however, that there are no grounds of a purely logical character for the current preference, and that 'propositions' in the ancient and medieval sense lend themselves as readily to the application of contemporary logical techniques and procedures as do 'propositions' in the modern sense. (At this point Strawson, who regards it as a limitation of modern methods that they cannot cope with 'propositions' in the ancient and medieval sense, and Quine, who objects to the use of such 'propositions' in logic because modern methods cannot handle them, would seem to be equally in error[2].) Moreover, the actual application of these techniques and procedures to tensed propositions promises to yield results of considerable interest both logically and metalogically. This was dimly seen by C. S. Peirce, who 'never shared' the common opinion that time is an 'extra-logical' matter, though he thought, in 1903, that 'logic had not yet reached that state of development at which the introduction of

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[1] Presidential Address given at the New Zealand Congress of Philosophy, August 27, 1954.
[2] For this dispute see W. V. Quine, 'Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory', *Mind*, October 1953, pp. 440—443.

temporal modifications of its forms would not result in great confusion.'[3]
What the time was not ripe for in 1903, it may well be ripe for now, for
in the intervening period we have acquired a vast fund of knowledge
about the possible structures of modal systems, and (as the scholastic
logocians knew[4]) tense and mood are species of the same genus. We have
also begun to learn how to handle a logic of three truth-values, and we
shall find this to the point too.

Suppose we use the ordinary variables 'p', 'q', 'r', etc. for 'proposi-
tions' in the ancient and medieval rather than the modern sense, and
employ the usual truth-operators in the following way (admitting in the
meantime only two truth-values): —

'Np' ('Not p') is true at any time at which 'p' is false, and false at all
    other times.

'Kpq' ('Both p and q') is true at any time at which both 'p' and 'q'
    are true, and false at all other times.

'Apq' ('Either p or q') is false at any time at which both 'p' and 'q'
    are false, and true at all other times.

'Cpq' ('If p then q') is false at any time at which 'p' is true and 'q'
    false, and true at all other times.

'Epq' ('If and only if p then q') is true at any time at which 'p' and
    'q' have the same truth-value, and false at all other times.

The classical propositional calculus, with its symbols thus interpreted,
will then hold in its entirety, unaltered. For in the formula 'Epp', for
example, 'p' will be equivalent to 'p at x', where 'x' is the date of utter-
ance, and the whole therefore to 'E (p at x) (p at x)', in which the argu-
ments are propositions in the *modern* sense, substitutable for the variables
in the 'Epp' of the propositional calculus as currently interpreted; and
a similar proof will be available for all formulae of the calculus in its
new interpretation.

When the new interpretation is employed, it becomes possible to
enrich the calculus with a pair of non-truth-functional operators which
cannot intelligibly be attached to the timelessly-true 'propositions' of
the current interpretation. These are namely the tense-operators 'It has
been the case that,' symbolised here by 'p', and 'It will be the case that,'
symbolised here by 'F'. The functions formed by these operators are
themselves propositions whose truth may vary with time. Thus 'Pp'
('It has been the case that p') will be false until it *is* the case that p for

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[3] C. S. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 4. 523.

[4] See E. A. Moody, *Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic* (Amster-
dam 1953), § 12.

the first time (unless it has always been the case that p), and true thereafter; 'Fp' ('It will be the case that p') will be true until it has forever ceased to be the case p (unless it will never be the case), and false thereafter.

We may also introduce the following two abbreviations: —

Df. H : H = NPN

Df. G : G = NFN.

'Hp' may be read 'It has always been the case that p.' For 'It has been the case that p' means 'It has at some time been the case that p,' so that 'NPp' ('It has not been the case that p') means 'It has at no time been the case that p,' and 'NPNp' means 'It has at no time been the case that not p,' i. e. 'It has always been the case that p.' (A logic of only two truth-values, it may be recalled, is being used at this stage.) For similar reasons, 'Gp' may be read 'It will always be the case that p.'

With this symbolism, we shall begin by examining the formal features of what we may call the logic of futurity, i. e. the calculus obtainable by adding to the classical propositional calculus the operator 'F' and its derivative 'G' with suitable axioms and rules. We shall then discuss in succession the full P-F (past-future) calculus; the interpretation of this within a calculus employing 'propositions' in the modern sense, quantifiers binding 'date-variables' and the dyadic predicate 'later than'; and the modifications which would be imposed on these calculi by the admission of a third truth-value for certain future events and by certain results of modern physics.

2. The Logic of Futurity

In its general structure the logic of futurity bears an obvious resemblance to modal systems, the operator 'F' being analogous to 'M' ('It is possible that') and 'G' to 'L' ('It is necessary that'). To bring out this analogy, and also the precise point at which it fails, let us suppose that the 'Mp' of modal systems is interpreted as synonymous with our 'Fp', i. e. let us take it to mean 'It will be the case that p,' and let us see how the resulting system compares with the classical modal systems, e. g. the systems M, M' and M'' of von Wright.[5]

The system M of von Wright adds to the classical assertoric propositional calculus the axioms

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[5] G. H. von Wright, *An Essay in Modal Logic* (Amsterdam 1951), Appendix II.

B1. CpMp

B2. EMApqAMpMq,

the rules

RB1. E $\alpha\beta \rightarrow$ EM α M β

RB2. $\alpha \rightarrow$ L α

and the definition

Df. L: L = NMN.

If we interpret 'Mp' as 'It will be the case that p' (and 'Lp' in consequence as 'It will always be the case that p'), all these axioms and rules will be found to hold except B1. 'If it is the case that p then it will be the case that p' expresses no law, for it might be that p is now the case for the last time. What does still hold when 'Mp' is interpreted as suggested is the law CLpMp (for if it will always be the case that p, then it will be the case that p), but whereas in the system M this is a theorem deducible from B1, in the present system it will require to be immediately laid down.

At this point our system closely resembles that which would be obtained if 'M' were interpreted as 'It is morally permissible that' (and 'L' in consequence as 'It is not morally permissible that not,' i. e. as 'It is obligatory that').[6] For just as 'It will be the case that p' does not follow from 'It is the case that p,' but does follow from 'It will always be the case that p,' so 'It is permissible that p be done' does not follow from 'p is done,' but does follow from 'It is obligatory that p be done.' There is, however, at least one significant formal difference between the futurity-system and the permissibility-system. It is not at all clear what the form 'It is permissible that it be permissible that p be done' would mean, but there is no such difficulty about 'It will be the case that it will be the case that p.' Moreover, it is clear enough that this form implies the simple 'It will be the case that p.' Hence if 'M' be interpreted as 'It will be the case that,' we may lay down the special axiom of von Wright's system M' (equivalent to Lewis's S4), namely

C1. CMMpMp.

Common notions on the subject of time suggest that we may also lay down the converse of this, CMpMMp; for if it will be the case that p, then (at any time between now and the time when p is the case) it will be the case that it will be the case that p. This converse, however, cannot be deduced (as it may in ordinary modal systems) by substituting 'Mp' for 'p' in CpMp, since in the futurity system the latter does not occur.

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[6] Ibid. Ch. V. See also A. N. Prior, *Formal Logic* (published by the Clarendon Press), III. i. 6.

The special axiom of von Wright's strongest system M" (equivalent to Lewis's S5), namely

C2. CMNMpNMp,

cannot be affirmed in the futurity system, for if it will at some time be the case that it will not (i. e. will never) be the case that p, it does not follow that it is now already the case that it will never be the case that p. Its converse CNMpMNMp does hold, though once again it is not provable in the usual way by substitution in CpMp. It need not be laid down as a special axiom, however, as it is provable from what we already have, as follows: —

1. CLpMp

2. CMMpMp

3. CCNpqCNqp

4. CCpqCNqNp

5. CCpqCCqrCpr.
    3 p/MNp, q/Mp X Df. L = C1—6.

6. CNMpMNp
    4 p/MMp, q/Mp = C2—7.

7. CNMpNMMp
    5 p/NMp, q/NMMp, r/MNMp
        = C7—C6 p/Mp—8.

8. CNMpMNMp.

In sum, the system in which possibility is interpreted as futurity stands in between that in which it is interpreted as moral permissibility and von Wright's system M'. Von Wright's system M and the futurity system, while both are contained in M' and contain the permissibility system, are mutually independent. For CpMp is provable in M but not in the futurity system, while CMMpMp is provable in the futurity system but not in M.

The above considerations suggest that the logic of futurity may be axiomatised by subjoining to the axioms and rules of the classical propositional calculus the following special axioms for 'F' and 'G':

F1. CGpFp

F2. EFApqAFpFq

F3. CFFpFp

F4. CFpFFp,

the rules

RF : E αβ → EF α F β

RG : α → G α,

and the definition

Df. G. : G = NFN.

An equivalent axiomatisation would be that in which 'G' is taken as undefined, and we replace F2 above by

F(2). CGCpqCGpGq,

delete RG, and replace Df. G by

Df. F : F = NGN.

The equivalence of these two systems may be proved in the same way as Sobociński proves the equivalence of von Wright's system M and the system which he calls T, which is obtained by modifying M in the same way as we have modified our first system for F. What is required is to prove F(2) and the equivalence corresponding to Df. F from the first basis, and conversely to prove F2, RG and the equivalence corresponding to Df. G from the second basis. Sobociński's proofs[7] of the analogous metatheorems do not employ the axiom B1, CpMp, or, when starting from the system T, the analogous axiom CLpp (each of these is used only to prove the other); these proofs may therefore be taken over for our purpose without any alteration beyond the systematic replacement of 'M' by 'F' and 'L' by 'G'.

The form 'Mp' might be introduced into the F-calculus not simply as a synonym for 'Fp' but as an abbreviation for 'ApFp' ('It either is or will be the case that p'). This is in fact how 'possibly' was defined by the Megaric logician Diodorus. If we adopt this definition, we obtain a system which is not merely contained in but equivalent to von Wright's middle system M' (or to Lewis's equivalent system S4), or which at all events is at least as strong as this system without being as strong as the system M'' (or Lewis's S5). This I have proved elsewhere,[8] using F2, F3, RF, RG and Df. G. (Von Wright's B2, C1, RB1, RB2 and Df. L are proved from their F-analogues and the new definition of M, while his B1. CpMp, is proved for the new definition of M and CpApq; his C2 is disproved by proving its false F-analogue from it). The system M'' or a system at least as strong, is obtained if 'Mp' is introduced as an abbreviation for 'AApPpFp' ('It either is or has been or will be the case that p'). This point cannot be enlarged upon, however, until we have passed from the F-calculus to the full tense-calculus in F and P.

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[7] B. Sobociński, 'Note on a Modal System of Feys-von Wright,' *Journal of Computing Systems*, July 1953, pp. 173—4.
[8] A. N. Prior, 'Diodoran Modalities' (forthcoming, in the *Philosophical Quarterly*), Section I.

3. The PF Calculus

A calculus of pure pastness would have exactly the same structure as the calculus of pure futurity; we could axiomatise it by simply taking the axioms, rules and definition of the latter calculus and replacing 'F' throughout by 'P' and 'G' throughout by 'H' ('It has always been the case that'). A complete tense-calculus in P and F would require more, however, than the simple adjunction of this P-calculus to the F-calculus. For it would need to contain also those laws which relate to the interaction of pastness and futurity, e. g. the pair

PF1, CpGPp

('What is the case will always have been the case') and

PF2, CpHFp

('When anything is the case, it has always been the case that it will be the case'). PF1 and PF2, it may be noted, are obtainable from one another by the systematic replacement of 'P' by 'F' and 'F' by 'P' (written in full, PF1 is of course CpNFNPp, and PF2, CpNPNFp). If we lay it down (as it seems we may) that if α is any law or rule of the PF calculus, we may obtain another law or rule by thus systematically interchanging 'P' and 'F' in α, we may cut down our other axioms and rules for this calculus by half.

A very wide range of laws is obtainable if we simply add PF1, and the rule just suggested (call it RA, the Rule of Analogy), to the basis already given for the F-calculus. Among the theorems provable is, for example,

CAApPpFpFPp,

'Whatever is or has been or will be the case, will have been the case.'[9] Its proof is as follows (using our *second* basis for the F-calculus): —

  F1.   CGppFp

  F(2). CGCpqCGpGq

  F3.   CFFpFp

  PF1. CpGPp

    1.   CCpqCNpNp

    2.   CCpqCCqrCpr

    3.   CCpsCCqsCCrsCAApqrs

         1 X RG = 4.

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[9] This proposition is mentioned by Professor J. N. Findlay as one which a tense-calculus might contain, in a footnote to his 'Time: a Treatment of Some Puzzles,' in A. G. N. Flew's *Logic and Language* (first series, 1951), p. 52.

4. GCCpqCNqNp
   F(2) p/Cpq, q/CNqNp = C4—5.
5. CGCpqGCNqNp
   2 p/GCpq, q/GCNqNp, r/CGNqGNp
   = C5—CF(2) p/Nq, q/Np—6.
6. CGCpqCGNqGNp
   2 p/GCpq, q/CGNqGNp, r/CNGNpNGNq
   = C6—C1 p/GNq, r/GNp—7.
7. CGCpqCNGNpNGNq
   7 X Df. F = 8.
8. CGCpqCFpFq
   F3 X RA X RG = 9.
9. GCPPpPp
   8 p/PPp, q/Pp = C9—10.
10. CFPPpFPp
    2 q/GPp, r/FPp = CPF1—CF1 p/Pp—11.
11. CpFPp
    2 p/Pp, q/FPPp, r/FPp = C11 p/Pp—C10—12.
12. CPpFPp
    11 X RG = 13.
13. GCpFPp
    8 q/FPp = C13—14.
14. CFpFFPp
    2 p/Fp, q/FFPp, r/FPp—C11—CF3, p/Pp—15.
15. CFpFPp
    3 q/Pp, r/Fp, s/FPp = C11—C12—C15—16.
16. CAApPpFpFPp

It cannot be claimed, however, that the F-calculus supplemented by PF1 and RA is sufficient to prove all laws about pastness and futurity. We shall shortly find reason for believing, for example, that although the thesis CMNMpNMp (the C2 of von Wright's system M'') is clearly a law when 'Mp' is introduced into the PF calculus as an abbreviation for 'AApPpFp,' it is not provable from the basis suggested. But how our system may be best completed, and how completeness is to be tested in this field, is a matter that still awaits investigation.

4. The 1-Calculus, and the Interpretation of the PF-Calculus within it.

The PF-calculus is interpretable within a calculus having as its elements

a) the variables 'x', 'y', 'z', etc., standing for *dates;*

b) the two quantifiers 'Πx' and 'Σx' (binding date-variables) and the usual truth-functions 'N', 'C', 'K', etc.;

c) the variables 'p', 'q', 'r', etc., standing for 'propositions' in the ancient and medieval sense, but now considered as functions of dates, forming with the date-variables the timelessly true propositions 'px', 'qy', etc. (read 'p at x', 'q at y', and so on); and

d) the dyadic function 'l', taking dates as arguments, and read 'is later than' (though no difference whatever would be made to the structure of the calculus if it were read 'is earlier than').

We may call this the 'l-calculus', after its distinctive operator.

In interpreting the PF-calculus within the l-calculus, we may use any arbitrarily chosen date-variable, say 'z', to represent the date at which the proposition under consideration is uttered. We then interpret

'p', 'q', 'r', etc., without tense-operators, as 'pz', 'qz', 'rz', etc.;

'Fp' ('It will be the case that p') as 'ΣxKlxzpx' ('For some x, x is later than z, and p at x,' or 'p at some time later than z');

'Pp' ('It has been the case that p') as 'Σxklzxpx' ('For some x, z is later than x, and p at x', or 'p at some time earlier than z');

'Gp' as 'ΠxClxzpx' ('For all x, if x is later than z then p at x', or 'p at all times later than z');

'Hp' as 'ΠxClzxpx' ('p at all times earlier than z').

And the laws of the PF-calculus will be not only interpretable but provable in the l-calculus if the latter contains

(i) the usual laws and rules for truth-operators and quantifiers; and

(ii) a set of special axioms expressing the properties of 'l', e. g. ClxyClyzlxz (the law of transitivity for 'l'), ClxyNlyx (the law of asymmetry for 'l'), AAIxylxylyx ('Either the date x is identical with the date y or it is later than y or it is earlier' — the law of trichotomy for dates.

When we consider those laws of the PF-calculus which have so far come to our notice, the formulae by which they are interpreted in the l-calculus fall into two distinct groups. Those of the first group are provable by means of the ordinary logic of truth-operators and quantifiers alone. This group includes F2, F(2), PF1 and PF2, and also RF and RG. For example, PF1 (CpGPp) becomes on interpretation

Cpz ΠxClxz ΣyKlxypy,

('If p at z, then if x any time later than z, there is a time than which x is later, at which p'; e. g. if Socrates is sitting down at z, then if x is

any time later than z, there is a time than which x is later, at which Socrates is sitting down'). This is provable as follows (using Łukasiewicz's rules for quantifiers, and 'a', 'b' and 'c' as variables standing for propositions in the timelessly-true sense): —

1. CKabKba
2. CCKabcCaCbc
     1 a/py, b/lxy $X\Sigma 2y$ = 3.
3. $CKpylxy\Sigma yKlxypy$
     2 a/pz, b/lxz, c/$\Sigma yKlxypy$
        = C3 y/z—4.
4. $CpzClxz\Sigma yKlxypy$
     4 X $\Pi 2x$ = 5.
5. $Cpz\Pi xClxz\Sigma yKlxypy$.

PF2 (CpHFp) becomes on interpretation
    $Cpz\Pi xClzx\Sigma yKlyxpy$,

which is of course provable in exactly the same way. Both alike hold in virtue of the principle that guarantees, for example, that if Susan is a hairdresser, then whoever loves Susan loves someone that is a hairdresser.

The other group require for their proof one or more of the special axioms for 'l'. This group includes even F1, CGpFp, which becomes on interpretation

    $C\Pi xC\Pi 1xzpx\Sigma xK1xzpx$;

though all that this requires for its proof, over and above the laws of truth-functions and quantification, is the law xlxz, asserting that there is a date later than any given date. The dependence of F1 upon the infinite extent of the future is not perhaps immediately evident; but the dependence of its analogue CHpPp, i. e. CNPNpPp, upon the infinite extent of the past, is evident enough. For if time had a beginning, then if at the beginning of time it has not been the case that not p, it has not yet been the case that p either. And similarly if time has an end, if at the end of time it will not be the case that not p, it will not be the case that p either. Of our other axioms F3, CFFpFp, requires for the proof of its l-interpretation the law of transitivity ClxyClyzlxz; and F4, CFpFFp, requires the law

    $Clxz\Sigma yKlxylyz$,

asserting that between any two dates there is another date. The law that if it is or has been or will be the case that it neither is, nor has been

nor will be the case that p, then it neither is, has been nor will be the case that p (CMNMpNMp, where Mp = AApPpFp), would seem to require for its proof the law of trichotomy. To see that this is so, let us consider our reason for assenting to the l-interpretation of one part of this law, namely that if it ever *has been* the case that p neither is, has been, nor will be the case, then it *is now* the case that p neither is, has been, nor will be the case. In terms of the l-calculus this means

> 'If for any time x, earlier than z, p at no time earlier than or later than or identical with x, then p at no time earlier than or later than or identical with z.'

And we believe this because we believe that 'p at no time earlier than or later than or identical with x', no matter what time x may be, amounts to 'p at no time at all'; and this is just the negative side of the law of trichotomy. Since the law of trichotomy is independent of the laws which we have seen here to be required for F1, (F2), F3, F4, PF1 and RG, and is not derivable from them by any l-equivalent of the Rule of Analogy, we seem to have here a proof that CMNMpNMp is independent of F1, F(2), etc. This is in any case one *kind* of method by which independence in the PF-calculus might be established.

The interpretation of the PF-calculus within the l-calculus is clearly a device of considerable metalogical utility. But is it more than that? Can we turn it into an 'interpretation' in the sense of a metaphysical explanation of what we mean by 'is', 'has been' and 'will be'? If so, we would have to regard our symbols 'P' and 'F' as not being genuine propositional operators but as artificially constructed quasi-propositional operators, very much as the class-symbols of the Boole-Schröder algebra of classes are treated in *Principia Mathematica* not as genuine names of objects but as artificially constructed quasi-names. Moreover, if the l-calculus is in this sense metaphysically fundamental, we would, I think, have to agree substantially with those logicians of whom Peirce wrote, who considered time to be an 'extra-logical' matter. For the l-calculus, as we have seen, consists essentially of the ordinary logic of truth-operators and quantifiers, with special axioms concerned with the relation 'l' — which could be, so far as logic is concerned, any 'material' relation ordering objects in an infinite and continuous linear series — superimposed upon it.

There are strong reasons, however, for refusing to attach this metaphysical significance to the interpretability of the PF-calculus in the l-calculus. As an 'interpretation' in the metaphysical sense of the 'now' which is understood in all the 'propositions' with which the PF-calculus

is designed to deal ('Socrates is sitting down' means 'Socrates is sitting down *now*,' 'Socrates will be sitting down' means 'It is *now* the case that it will be the case that Socrates is sitting down,' and so on), the 'z' which we have used in the l-calculus is surely a complete sham. For 'now' is not the name of a date (it has the same meaning whenever it is used, but does not refer to the same date whenever it is used). In fact the whole movement of events from the future through the present into the past is inexpressible in the l-calculus. If there is to be any 'interpretation' of our calculi in the metaphysical sense, it will probably need to be the other way round; that is, the l-calculus should be exhibited as a logical construction out of the PF-calculus rather than *vice versa*. How this could be achieved in detail has yet to be investigated, but as a first step we may point out that 'The date of p's occurrence is later than the date of q's occurrence' seems to be equivalent to 'It either is or has been or will be the case that it both is the case that p and is not but has been the case that q' (AAKpKNqP-qPKpKNqPqFKpKNqPq).

5. The l-calculus and the Three-valued PF-Calculus

To what has just been said we may add that even on the purely formal side the interpretability of the PF-calculus within the l-calculus can only be asserted with a qualification. The PF-calculus which was sketched in Sections 2 and 3 can only be asserted in its entirety if only two truth-values are admitted. If we assign a 'neuter' truth-value to propositions in the future tense about matters whose outcome is undetermined at the time of utterance, the PF calculus will need to undergo radical revision; and it is by no means certain that the calculus when thus amended will be interpretable even in an amended l-calculus. (We shall certainly not, if it is, be able to employ exactly the same interpretations as before.)

The most striking difference between the two-valued and the three-valued PF calculi is that in the latter the Rule of Analogy fails. For example, while it continues to be a law that what is the case will always have been the case, it is no longer (on the three-valued hypothesis) a law that what is the case has always been going to be the case; that is, we now have PF1, CpGPp, but not its analogue PF2, CpHFp. (We are assuming throughout that expressions beginning with 'P' or 'H' cannot take the third truth-value, that 'Pp' is true if 'p' has at some time been true, and false if 'p' has at no time been anything but false or indeter-

minate, and that 'Hp' is true if 'p' has always been true, and false if 'p' has at any time been false or indeterminate.)

But it is quite impossible to discriminate in this way between the l-interpretations of these two laws. For these l-interpretations have exactly the same structure, and are proved in exactly the same way; their proof, moreover, involves no special assumptions about the character of the relation 'l', but only the rules for quantifiers and two laws of the propositional calculus, CKabKba and CCKabcCaCbc. Nor does their proof even depend on the fact that the l-calculus, as presented in the last section, uses the propositional calculus in its two-valued form. For CKabKba and CCKabcCbc are laws in Łukasiewicz's three-valued calculus also (though the converse of the second is not. This is one of a number of points at which three-valued logic and the calculus of strict implication stand as it were on opposite sides of the two-valued assertoric calculus.[10] In this last we have both a 'law of exportation' CCKabcCaCbc and a law of importation CCaCbcCKabc; but where 'C' is interpreted as strict implication we have the latter but not the former, and where it is the 'if' of Łukasiewicz's three-valued calculus we have the former but not the latter). It seems obvious, indeed, that the l-calculus is deterministic in its whole conception — time is represented in it as spread out once for all, with no ever-moving 'now' but only a series of 'dates' timelessly characterised in various ways (Socrates eternally sitting down at x but not sitting down at y, and so on). There can really be no 'neuter' truth-value for the only kind of 'proposition' which this calculus will admit. Time, one might say, figures in the l-calculus not as it does in medieval logic (which, as we have pointed out earlier, took tenses far more seriously than our own common logic does, and which already had such laws as our PFı,[11] but rather as it does in medieval theology, in which God is said to behold all events in an unchanging present.

The introduction of the third truth-value into tense-logic also destroys the equivalence which makes it reasonable to introduce the form 'It has always been the case that p' as an abbreviation for 'It has not been the case that not p.' Formally it is of course still possible to do this, but in its natural acceptation the form 'It has always been the case that p' is not equivalent to 'It has not been the case that not p' if we admit the third truth-value; for if 'p' has always been neuter the

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[10] Cf. A. N. Prior, 'Three-valued Logic and Future Contingents,' *Philosophical Quarterly*, Oct. 1953, p. 321.
[11] See, e. g. William of Ockham, *Tractatus de Praedestinatione*, Franciscan Institute edition (1945), p. 4.

latter is true but the former is not. It may be noted that it is only in its natural acception that CpHFp is not a law on the three-valued assumption, if it is merely short for CpNPNFp, 'If it is the case that p, it has not been the case that it will not be the case that p,' it holds even in the three valued system. On the other hand, the law CHpPp, 'If it has always been the case that p, then it has been the case that p,' holds in the three-valued system if its natural interpretation is assumed, but not if it is taken to be short for CNPNpPp, 'If it has not been the case that not p, it has been the case that p.' But F1, CGpFp, holds on both interpretations, and so does PF1, CpGPp. In its l-interpretation, the equivalence of H and NPN amounts to the equivalence in quantification theory of Πx and NΣxN, and so does that of G and NFN. This equivalence — of Πx and NΣxN — is one which still holds if the ordinary rules for Π and Σ are superimposed on Łukasiewicz's three-valued propositional calculus, though it fails if they are superimposed on Heyting's intuitionist calculus.[12] But even if we operate in the l-calculus with intuitionist quantification, we cannot obtain in it (at least by the interpretations suggested in the last section) a model of the three-valued PF calculus; for while we could then destroy (as we want to) the equivalence of the interpretations of H and NPN, we would not preserve (as we also want to) the equivalence of the interpretations of G and NFN. This confirms our contention in the last paragraph that the whole conception of time underlying the l-calculus is different from that underlying the three-valued PF calculus.

Another difference between two-valued and three-valued tense-logic is that whereas F(2), CGCpqCGpGq, is a law in both, F2, EFApqAFpFq, is a law in the former but not in the latter (though the P-analogues of both hold in both systems). For suppose we have a situation of *limited* indeterminacy (the sort of situation which seems often to occur in atomic physics), in which what will happen must be either p or q, but which of them it will be is not fixed. We will then have FApq but not AFpFq. It is true that — as we have mentioned earlier — Sobociński has proved the M-analogue of F2 from that of F(2); but this proof assumes the law of importation CCpCqrCKpqr, which does not hold in the three-valued calculus.

So far as I can see, the admission of the third truth-value does not affect the axioms F3 and F4, the rules RF and RG, or the P-analogues of these (CPPpPp, etc.). A query that might be raised about F3, CFF-

[12] Cf. A. Heyting, 'On Weakened Quantification,' *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, Vol. XI (1946), p. 119 ff.

pFp, is this: — A proposition of the form 'It will be the case that p' is liable (on the three-valued assumption) to be indeterminate at first and then to become true (as the element of freedom is eliminated by later choices and the outcome of the matter becomes inevitable); and might we not describe this position by saying that 'It will be the case that it will be the case that p' is now true though 'It will be the case that p' is as yet only neuter? This will not do, however. If it is really indecided whether it will be the case that p, then it is undecided whether it will be the case that it will be the case that p. (It may be decided *that* it will be decided, but it cannot be decided *how* it will be decided.)

Modern quantum mechanics and relativity theory would no doubt suggest yet other modifications of our ordinary logic of time-distinctions.[13] For example, according to some versions of quantum mechanics time is discontinuous, and if this is so we must drop our F4, CFpFFp; for it may be that it will be the case that p after the minimum time-interval, so that there is no time future to now but past to the being-the case of p at which it 'will be the case that it will be the case' that p. The formal consequences of abandoning F4 are in case worth studying. (For ordinary purposes they turn out to be very slight; none of the theorems which seemed worth establishing in Sections 2 and 3 required F4 for their proof). The most obvious effect of the theory of relativity is on the laws of asymmetry and trichotomy in the l-calculus. Relativity theory distinguishes between an absolute and a relative sense of 'later'; and if 'lxy' means 'x is absolutely later than y,' the law of asymmetry holds (no time is at once absolutely later and absolutely earlier than the same time) but the law of trichotomy does not (time x may be neither absolutely earlier nor absolutely later than time y without being identical with time y); whereas if 'lxy' only means 'x is later than y from *some* point of view,' the reverse is the case.

The theory of relativity also raises a more profound and vexing question. The three-valued PF-calculus gives formal expression to the deep-seated ancient feeling that what is past is beyond our control (and so 'necessary') in a way that what is future is not; but it may well be doubted whether relativity theory is compatible with so radical a distinction between the past and the future as this. At least in many of its presentations, relativity theory seems to be as closely bound up with the 'spread-out-eternally' view of time underlying the l-calculus as

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[13] In what little I have been able to say on this point, I am indebted to conversations with Mr. J. Gabriel of the University of Otago, and Mr. W. W. Sawyer of Canterbury College.

medieval theology was. On this, one possible comment is that this may be simply a philosophical defect of which the theory of relativity will eventually have to rid itself, in the same way as the differential calculus eventually had to rid itself of the incoherences pointed out by Berkeley. Further, within relativity theory itself it has often been pointed out that the only events which occur in one time-order from one point of view and in the opposite time-order from another, are events which from both points of view are 'outside the future' in the sense of being incapable of being affected by what happens 'here and now' and 'outside the past' in the sense of being incapable of affecting what happens here and now; and this very way of putting the matter reflects something of that ancient feeling about past and future to which we have referred. The solution of such questions as these, however, must depend on future collaboration between mathematical logicians and mathematical physicists, or on the work of those who have become familiar with both fields.

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ANTITHESIS OF FRANCISCANISM

One of the most striking proofs of the singular appropriateness of Franciscan spirituality to modern needs of mind and soul is the existence of Existentialism. This curious and fashionable cult of rationalized despair and studied pessimism is typical of de-Christianized Western man. In almost every one of its aspects it is the dark opposite of Franciscanism as Satan is of the Seraphic Saint. It is a sort of Wailing Wall towards which many wilfully turn their faces. It appeals to many perverse folk who prefer — to use an Irish bull — to walk in the light of their own shadows. Unlike Communism, to which it is often compared, it is not a petrified philosophy. Indeed, it is not, properly speaking, a philosophy at all, but an amorphous thing in the moral atmosphere resembling a November fog. It is a proof, *e contrario*, that modern man is hungry for holiness and holiness, for light and laughter, for some code that will give point to existence, dispel the terrible *Angst* that corrodes the heart of man and make death, with which he is obsessed, a door to fullest existence.

Existentialism, as the Victorian novelists use say in a memorable labor-saving phrase "is better imagined than described." It is certainly easier to describe than define. There are several Existentialist philosophers, such as Jaspers, Heidegger and Sartre, but no philosophy. Sartre, who is the present high-priest of the cult, describes it as "nothing else but an attempt to draw all the consequences from a coherent position," and admits that there are two types of Existentialists — atheists, like himself and Heidegger, and Christians, such as Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel.

That gloomy Dane and "cragsman of Christ," Soren Kierkegaard, is regarded as the founder of Existentialism, and the scholar who gave it its name. All that we can know, he said, are the moments of our experience in the here and now; we feel, endure fatigue and fear, anxiety and frustration in a succession of moments. These moments — our "existence" — are the only real things we know. He broke with all previous philosophical methods in seeking more immediate and intimate

contacts with life. In place of the principles and ideas of other systems he sought to comprehend "being" in man's intimate existence. In place of the accepted categories of quality, quantity, substance, accident, etc. he substituted those drawn from experience — *Angst*, fear, frustration and death. His philosophy was itself a reaction against Hegelian rationalism, an existential view of life set against one of essence. As against the speculative philosophy of Hegel, Kierkegaard places emphasis on the individual and on freedom of choice.

It is sometimes fondly imagined that metaphysics should be as aloof as physics from human temperaments and the complications of environments and conditioned reflexes. In point of fact philosophies are as impregnated with the moods and tensions of their creators as musical compositions. Since melancholy marked Kierkegaard for her own, Existentialism grew up melancholy and has since developed into a veritable cult of *accedia*. The poetic temperament of Kierkegaard hungered for God and was "hot for certainties." But the Lutheran atmosphere of Denmark was inimical to such a mind. Instead of the living Christianity for which he instinctively longed, he saw a rigid formalism, incapable of growth or development and impotent to minister to the mind or spirit diseased. As he grew older Kierkegaard took harder and harsher views of Luther, and on his death-bed refused the ministrations of the Lutheran clergy. It was tragic that having rejected the Lutheran Lie he had no opportunity of knowing the Light, for the Catholic Church had been in total eclipse for three centuries before his time in Denmark and he never experienced a living Catholicism.

Kierkegaard's cult might have vanished like so many others of its kind were it not for the fact that there was a spiritual vacuum in Lutheran countries, where youth was still eager for some news of God and the hereafter. A general *Weltschmerz* had spread all over Europe, it is true, but it was a fatally real fact in Germany, while the Latin countries could sigh about the *dégoût de la vie* with studied poses. Philosophers began to preoccupy themselves with the question whether life was worth living and if it had any aim or purpose. Most of them returned the answer of the demented Macbeth.

While the intellectual classes were indulging in melancholy, the masses were rising in power and importance. The time had come for the thinking secularized man of Western culture to choose between absorption in the life of the masses and so allow himself to be drained of personality, or face the tragic situation with Stoical recognition of his plight, without enthusiasm and without hope. For Kierkegaard and

Heidegger, the "authentic man" is he who chooses the latter course, he is "the tragical man," who refuses to take easy comfort in the life of the unthinking multitude or in faith in God.

It was Heidegger who fitted Existentialism to the modern mood and endowed it with those dogmas of despair, dereliction and spiritual darkness which have been popularized by Sartre. It is with Heidegger that Existentialism appears as the devil's caricature of Franciscanism. One of the many sources of Franciscan joy is the assurance of God's personal interest in each one of us. The hairs of our heads are numbered, and God loves us with an infinite love. We matter tremendously to Him because He has willed our existence. "Consider, O man," St. Francis wrote, "how is the excellence in which the Lord has placed you, because He has created and formed you to the image of His beloved Son according to the body, and to His own likeness according to the spirit." God's love has conferred immense privilege on man: "Behold what manner of love the Father has bestowed on us that we should be called children of God: and such we are." (I John 3. I.)

In Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* we find one of the main tenets of Existentialism of the atheistic variety, which is repeated in Sartre with monotonous insistence — the utter dereliction of man in the world — *Die Geworfenheit des Daseins*. This idea of abandonment occurs in Sartre's *L'Etre et le Néant* and *La Nausée*. The idea is not, of course, very new or original. It can be found, for instance, in some blasphemous stanzas of Thomas Hardy:

> "Has some vast Imbecility,
>   Mighty to build and blend,
>   But impotent to tend,
> Framed us in jest, and left us now in hazardry."

But whereas in most men it was a passionate protest, like a lost child's who has wandered off and forgotten the way back, with our atheistic Existentialists it is given the sanction of a philosophic argument. It is a strange fact that though they depict man as being "thrown" into the world, they have nothing to say about the "Thrower!"

This dogma of dereliction led to the second best-known dogma of Existentialism — *Angst* — which has begun to flit to and fro in modern literature with the easy familiarity of the Missing Link in the last century. This *Angst*, which has come to be regarded as the occupational disease of modernity, comes from man's realization of his predicament. Few mortal men have taken Christ at His word so literally as St. Francis of Assisi, and few cast their care on Him so completely. Has he not been

called "the most desperate lover of poverty the world has ever known," and was he not to devote his Order to the services of the Lady Poverty in a special manner? To be sure his knights of the Round Table had to suffer many things, but *Angst* and stomach ulcers were not mentioned among them. They were, indeed, singularly happy, and their leader was the happiest of all, and God, who fed their sisters the birds, did not allow them to die of hunger. Franciscanism preaches by word and example that it is good to be alive, whereas the Existentialists say that "catastrophic man's dread is not so much the fear of dying; it is rather the fear of living — *la peur de vivre.*" To use Sartre's favourite expression, they are "nauseated" by existence. He regards life as "a dull and obscene existence given to man for — nothing," and man himself as "a useless passion." Why bother, then, being even an Existentialist?

As Jean-Paul Sartre has come to be regarded as the chief exponent and popularizer of Existentialism, and as it has seeped through to the masses from his plays and novels, it may be well to step aside and meet him. He was born in June, 1905, his mother being a Protestant and his father, who died when he was four years old, a Catholic. His mother took up residence in her parents' house, and the boy seems to have been brought up in the Calvinist tradition. All this is evident in his attitude to an implacable fate, and the tensions of his mind, which produced *l'angoisse*, had their roots in the conditions of suffrance under which he and his mother were permitted to live. He was, besides, afflicted with much sickness and bodily pain as a child and youth, and this no doubt led him to regard life with nausea.

When he had acquired his *Agrégé* from the Normale Supérieure at Paris he turned to writing books, the first of which bore the very significant title *L'Ange du Morbide*. Then came *L'Etre et le Néant*, the novels *Le Sursis* and *L'Age de Raison*, and the plays *Les Mouches* and *Huis-Clos*. The latter play, translated under the title *The Vicious Circle*, has been banned in several countries. He visited the U.S.A. on two occasions to study drama technique for his new style of "drama of situation" to replace the traditional "drama of character." The only important philosophic work of his translated into English is *Existentialism and Humanism*. For the general drift of his philosophy, however, it is best to consult *La Nausée*, translated as *The Diary of Roquentin*, a quasi-autobiographical novel. It deals with the gratuitousness of being and *le sentiment de l'absurde*, the "proud asceticism" which regards "despair without end" as a duty, and the nausea which obsesses the hero in face of reality. It is compounded of dirt, defeatism, despair and the "absurdi-

ty" of life and death. It is as far removed in spirit from the *Fioretti* as a starless night from a summer noon.

What Berdyaev said of Communism is profoundly true of Existentialism: "It was not born out of joyful abundance of creative forces, but from a deep unhappiness." It is this almost frightening unhappiness hanging over it, like a mist over a bog, that first strikes us as the obvious characteristic of Existentialism. It is here that its greatest spiritual menace lies, and it is precisely here that it is most un-Franciscan. We recall how the gentle and charitable Francis was wont to reprimand any Friar whom he saw with a gloomy countenance, reminding him that dour looks were the marks of the devil's disciples, whereas God's troubadours, who were called upon to lift the hearts of men to spiritual joy, ought wear serene and smiling faces. He condemned wilful sadness as the sign of Satan as the Fathers looked on *accedia* as one of the deadly sins. Dante placed those who wilfully lived in sadness in the lowest Inferno: those who were "sullen in the sweet air" he buried in the dreary marsh, there to sigh for ever:

Tristi fummo
Nell aer dolce che dal sol s'allegra

The unhappiness of the atheistic Existentialist has its origin, not so much in the absence of God as in the insane desire that God should not exist. No lover of St. Francis needs to be reminded how he loved God and his fellow-men. For Sartre "Hell is — other people!" That phrase occurs in *Huis-Clos* — an almost perfect antithesis of the Franciscan life. Here we have four people, inimical to each other, shut into a room without windows. Here is the hatred, the mental stagnation and claustrophobia, the spiritual desolation which are the very opposites of that eternal freshness and creative love and energy we associate with Franciscanism. Existentialism is a sort of black mysticism, a devil's inversion of the right order of living and thinking, a terrible and corrosive caricature of Franciscanism.

Though the Sartrean Existentialism has become its best known brand, it is by no means the only variety. The cult, it must be remembered, started as a very sincere search after God by a man whom scholars place on a par with St. Augustine and Newman as an earnest searcher after truth and the representative of his age. Kierkegaard remained to the last an intensely religious man, fascinated by "the cold smile upon the face of Truth." And there are today such charming Christian Existentialists as Gabriel Marcel, described by a Franciscan critic of Sartre's

psychology, as "a prophet of hope, of sympathy and love, a poet of the family mystery, of communion among men: his vision can transcend the confines of the world and reach the Infinite and Absolute." It may be that Franciscan spirituality can establish a bridgehead here, and by informing Christian Existentialism reach the atheistic variety. We cannot escape the feeling that many of Sartre's followers are like wilful children sulking in a dark corner till they are taken notice of. It is worth while taking notice of them since it has been said, with pardonable hyperbole, of St. Francis, that he listened to those to whom God no longer harkened.

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EXISTENTIAL IMPORT AND "LATIN AVERROISM"

In a recent paper[1] we discussed the validity of inferences from universal propositions to particular ones, namely from A to I and from E to O in the Aristotelian Square of Opposition. We had occasion to mention that such inferences fitted in very well with the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world, since this doctrine ensured that there would always be individuals in each species to function as subjects for such propositions. On the other hand, we suggested, these inferences fitted awkwardly into the creationist metaphysics of St. Thomas, in which there is no necessity at all that any given species have any members in it at any given moment. And this awkwardness becomes clearer when we consider the universal agreement among scholastic logicians that, as Joyce sums it up, "Logic *is the science which treats of the conceptual representation of the real order;* in other words, which has for its subject matter things as they are represented in our thought."[2] So for scholastics, logic and metaphysics are related in such a way that a certain position in one entails a certain position in the other.

Let us now illustrate the point at issue by taking an A-type proposition which is generally accepted as true: "All men are rational." If it implies, as it does in the traditional Square, that "Some men are rational," then if no men existed, the particular proposition would be false thereby involving the falsity of its corresponding universal proposition. For the generally accepted interpretation of an I proposition — SIP — is: *"There exists at least one S which is a P."*

Now it is significant to note that Siger of Brabant, the leader of the thirteenth-century "Averroist"[3] movement, explicitly raised the question

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[1] "Is the Square Back in Opposition ?", *Philosophical Studies*, (Maynooth 1957).

[2] G. H. Joyce, *Principles of Logic*, (Longman's, 1908), p. 2; see also P. Coffey, *The Science of Logic*, (Longman's 1938), vol I, ch. ii pa*ssim;* and Jacques Maritain, *Formal Logic*, (Sheed & Ward, 1946), Introd.

[3] We use the term "Averroist" in this context only as a matter of convenience. Prof. F. van Steenberghen's Belfast Lectures — see *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century*, (Nelson, 1955), pp. 76—93 — seem to leave little doubt about the falsity of the popular appelation. But see the bibliographical notes he gives and see E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, (Random House, 1955), pp. 389—90, 719; and F. Copleston, *History of Philosophy*, (Burns, Oates & W., 1950), vol. ii, pp. 437—441.

whether man is an animal although there were no men in existence: and his answer was, No.[4] In other words the truth of the universal proposition, "Every man is an animal" depends on the existence of men. Yet Siger was in no embarrassment over the truth of such evidently true universal propositions and over the validity of inferring from A to I[4a] *since he accepted the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world*, a doctrine involving eternally membered species. As Prof. F. van Steenberghen says on this point: "... the question is answered in accordance with radical Aristotelianism, by the affirmation of the eternity of the human species."[5] The eminent Professor also tells us of Siger that: "His philosophical system is dominated by a theory of knowledge that is strictly Aristotelian ... *He bases the absolute value of judgements of the abstract order on the eternity of the world and all the species.*"[6] (our italics.) This coincidence of Aristotelian logic with Aristotelian cosmology furnishes an admirable illustration of the above-mentioned thesis that logic treats of the conceptual representation of the real order — we should add here, "real order *as seen by Aristotle.*" But what about the real order as seen by St. Thomas and by other Christian thinkers?

In opposition to the Aristotelian doctrine of the *necessary* eternity of the world with its consequent rejection of creation,[7] and to Siger's doctrine of the *necessary* eternal creation, or more correctly *emanation*

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[4] "Queritur utrum hec sit vera: homo est animal nullo homine existente. Et videtur quod non, quia si homo non sit ens, homo non est animal, eo quod ad negacionem superiorum sequitur negacio inferiorum." *Quaestio Utrum Haec sit Vera: Homo est Animal Nullo Homine Existente*, by Siger de Brabant, pubd. in P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroisme Latin au* XIIIme *Siècle*," (Fribourg, Suisse, 1899), Appendices p. 49, 11. 1—3. For the whole text, see *ibid.*, pp. 47—54. For Mandonnet's comments, see *ibid.*, pp. cxxxvi—cxxxix. Cf. also F. van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West*, (Louvain, 1955), p. 214; A. Little S.J., *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism*, (Dublin, 1949), p. 145; and Prof. Lottie H. Kendzierski, "Eternal Matter and Form in Siger of Brabant," *The Modern Schoolman*, (vol. xxxii, no. 3, March 1955), pp. 238 n. 71, 239.

[4a] For Siger's inference from A to I see: "Preteria, nullo homine particulari existente, *si homo est animal, aliquis homo est animal* ut socrates, vel plato, vel cicero. Si igitur per ypothesim nullus singularium sit animal *cum nullus sit*, videtur etiam quod homo non sit animal." *op. cit.*, p. 49, 11. 4—7; (our underlining).

[5] *Aristotle . . .*, p. 214.

[6] *ibid.*, p. 222.

[7] Cf. F van Steenberghen, *The Philosophical Movement . . .*, p. 81: — "In the *De erroribus philosophorum*, Giles of Rome denounced the errors of all the pagan philosophers, starting with those of Aristotle, all of which he ascribed to ignorance of creation." Armstrong summarises the general view on the matter when he says: "There is no place in genuinely Hellenic thought for omnipotence or a transcendent Creator in the Christian sense." A. H. Armstrong, *An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy*, (Methuen, 1957, 3rd ed.), pp. 4—5; see also Copleston, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 489.

of the world, St. Thomas maintains that the existence of the world is purely contingent upon God's free will. It might never have existed. It could, as a mere contingency, have been created so as to have existed eternally: but in fact we know from revelation that this is not the case. Reflecting this cosmological position in his logic, St. Thomas says that rationality belongs to humanity even though there were no men in existence.[8] Even though no creatures at all existed, man would still be rational.[9] From this it would seem to follow that A-type propositions are non-existential: and as Fr. Little says: "St. Thomas's attention must have been directed to this truth by its denial by Siger de Brabant denying all existence to the universal previous to the singular."[10] In fact it is difficult to see how else one could interpret the following words of St. Thomas: *"Omnis autem essentia vel quidditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo: possum enim intelligere quid est homo vel phoenix, et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura. Ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quidditate . . ."*[11]

It is also difficult to see how existential import allows for creation at all. Admittedly it will allow for a neo-platonising *necessary* creation, or rather *emanation*, to which Siger subscribed; but that is creation only in a very Pickwickian sense, and carries its own refutation with it. Let us take the identical proposition "All men are men" as our test case for creation. Since the subject is identical with the predicate, the whole proposition is necessarily true. Now if it implies "Some men are men," then it implies that men exist, since the latter proposition cannot be true unless men exist. Now the universal proposition, being necessary,

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[8] "Remotis omnibus singularibus hominibus adhuc remaneret rationalitas attribuibilis humanae naturae." *Q. Quodlib.*, 8, 1, ad 1. Compare this with Siger's: ". . . natura tamen humana est aliquid quod non potest esse sine istis carnibus et istis ossibus et *sine aliquo individuorum . . .," op. cit.*, p. 51, 11. 31—33; (our underlining).

[9] "Si omnes creaturae ab esse deficerent natura humana maneret talis quod ei competeret rationalitas." *ibid.*, ad 3.

[10] *op. cit.*, p. 159, n. 3.

[11] *De Ente et Essentia*, cap. V.: Siger says on the contrary: ". . . non potest remanere homo in esse essenciali quin remaneat in esse actuali, nam ad esse essenciale hominis pertinet actualitas essendi . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 50, 11. 22—24. Albertus Magnus, whom Siger mentions (*op. cit.*, p. 51, 11. 16—25) and with whom he disagrees, holds an identical position with St. Thomas: ". . . cum sit de aptitudine essentiae quae est ante materiam et compositum, patet quod nullo existente homine particulari, adhuc est vera, homo est animal, et hujusmodi aliae locutiones." *Lib. I De Intellectu et Intelligibili*, — tract. II, c. 3, p. 494 b, (Vivès ed., Paris, 1890, vol. ix). For Siger's identification of *ens* meaning essence with *ens* meaning existence, cf. the text quoted in note 4.

is eternally true in virtue of its terms. So if it implies that there are some men in existence, then men will exist necessarily merely in virtue of the necessary truth of the universal proposition: and then where is the need of creation, or even its possibility, since whatever exists necessarily, cannot be created?

Alternatively if "All men are men" is true only on condition that men exist, then it will be false in the case that no men exist, and then you will get the strange situation in which an identical proposition can be false, so violating the principle of contradiction. Furthermore, if it is false that men are men unless a man exists, what idea of man is in the mind of God before creation? The difficulties could be multiplied. As Fr. Little says: ". . . Siger de Brabant argues against Albert and Thomas in one of his extant determinations *Utrum homo sit animal nullo homine existente*, and he answers the question in the negative. Actually he here should logically deny the absolute necessity of the principle of identity, since he asserts that A(nimal rationale) is not A(nimal) unless on condition that a rational animal exists."[12] Fr. Little goes on to say that such a contingency did not arise for Siger since he had already accepted the necessary existence of members of the various species.[13] So Siger is saved from denying the principle of identity at the price of denying the doctrine of *free* creation (whether in time or eternally).

We might add here that necessary truth of a universal proposition cannot depend upon any putative individuals whose existence it is supposed to imply, for there is no necessity that any individual *as individual* should have any one nature rather than another. A mere counting of individuals will only produce a contingent truth that a certain number of individuals happen to have a given set of characteristics. The necessity of such universal propositions as "Man is rational" lies in the fact that the predicate in some way explicates the nature of the subject. That there happen to be any individuals possessing the nature stated by the subject of the proposition is totally accidental to its truth.[14] That such a conclusion is a statement of St. Thomas's

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[12] *op. cit.*, p. 145.

[13] *ibid.;* and cf. Kendzierski, *op. cit.*, pp. 237—239.

[14] "Socrates est rationalis quia homo est rationalis, et non e converso; unde dato quod Socrates et Plato non essent adhuc humanae naturae rationalitas competeret." *Q. Quodlib.*, 8, 1, c. — Compare this with Siger's: "Si igitur ablatis individuis aufferantur ea sine quibus non potest esse natura humana, aufferretur et ipsa natura humana. Quia eis ablatis non manet homo aliquid in rerum natura, nec animal nec aliud . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 51, ll. 34—35.

position on the matter can be easily verified by an inspection of the passages from his works that we have already quoted.

Now since the time of the new logical studies in the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there have arisen energetic and sometimes acrimonious controversies over the existential import of universal propositions, the Aristotelians generally affirming it and the non-Aristotelian symbolic logicians generally denying it. Most scholastic logicians, whether or not they have concerned themselves with the controversy, still continue to teach the Aristotelian doctrine of the inference from A to I and from E to O[15] with the existential import that such inferences demand. The burden, seemingly, rests on the shoulders of these logicians to show that what they are teaching in this context does not lead to the "Averroism" of Siger and his followers and to all the consequences — including the "double truth"[16] and the denial of *free* creation — that this position involves.

We had previously pointed out[17] that some inferences from the traditional interpretation of the Square bear a striking resemblance to the Ontological Argument. It is of interest to note that Ambrose and Lazerowitz "prove" the existence of God making use only of the Square of Opposition, thus concluding that the Aristotelian Square cannot give a correct account of the relationship between A, E, I, and O propositions.[18] Letting S stand for "absolutely perfect being," and P for "happy," they point that at least one of the propositions in the Square must be true. Therefore finally I or O or both are true, so involving the existence of at least one member of S. Once more then we are faced with the spectre of the Ontological Argument to which St. Thomas took such explicit exception.[19] Now although we accept the Russelian criticism of the Square as far as existential import goes, our agreement goes no further. Contrary to the views of that school we maintain that the

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[15] Concerning the non-existential import in medieval logic of negative propositions, see E. A. Moody, *Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic*, (Amsterdam, 1955), p. 51.

[16] Whereas the "Averroist" 'double truth' concerned propositions which were both true although mutually contradictory in philosophy and theology, if there were a double truth here, it would concern logic and metaphysics. As to whether this doctrine was subscribed to by either Averroes or Siger, see F. van Steenberghen, *The Philosophical Movement . . .*, p. 89.

[17] *op. cit.*, p.

[18] A. Ambrose and M. Lazerowitz, *Fundamentals of Symbolic Logic*, (Rinehardt & Co., 1950), pp. 187—8.

[19] Cf. I, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2.

logical relations in the Square are *fundamentally valid*,[20] and that its traditional invalid existential interpretation is only incidental to it. This point will be developed in a future paper.

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[20] Cf. J. B. Ogden and H. B. Veatch, "Putting the Square Back into Opposition," *The New Scholasticism*, (vol. xxx, no. 4, 1956), pp. 409—440 for a refutation of various misinterpretations of the Square of Opposition.

FORERUNNERS OF THE FRANCISCANS:
THE WALDENSES

Medieval scholastics pointed out that "natura non vadit per saltum." And the modern historian further observes that neither do great men and movements develop "per saltum." Like life itself, movements — and the men who make them — cannot be understood except in terms of organic growth. Unfortunately, this medieval aphorism has been thoroughly disregarded by most students of the important 13th century movement inaugurated by Francis of Assisi. Some writers acknowledge, in a general way, that the 12th century confraternities, the Beguines and the Humiliati, for example, had organizations which in many ways resembled the Franciscan Order. Few, however, have paused to investigate the significance of this resemblance.[1] Mere chance similarity might imply that the Franciscan movement was not subject to the natural laws of generation and growth. More often, however, physiognomic resemblance suggests an organic development — a "blood" relationship.

In the following pages I undertake such an investigation. Although it goes into some detail, the examination is limited to a study of the 12th century Waldenses who so closely resembled the Franciscans of the early 13th century. Without attempting to measure the influence which the Poor Men of Lyons had on the followers of St. Francis, I wish to outline some of the parallels existing between the two groups and show that the similarity is not entirely fortuitous.

The Waldenses derive their designation from the name of their founder, Waldo, a wealthy merchant of Lyons.[2] Later sources refer to

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[1] A check of English literature in the field of Franciscana bears this out. Of the better known works only Vida D. Scudder's *The Franciscan Adventure* (New York: Dutton, 1931) gives more than cursory attention to the 12th century movements. Most works touching on the problem, are of a popular nature and discuss it only in general terms. A work which, to judge by the title, sounds more promising is E. S. Davidson's *Forerunners of St. Francis* (Boston, 1927).

[2] In the following sketch of Waldo's life and conversion I have followed E. Comba, *History of the Waldenses of Italy from their Origin to the Reformation*, trans. from revised edition by T. E. Comba (London: Truslone & Shirley, 1889). Information on the medieval sources is found in P. Melia, *The Origin, Persecutions and Doctrine of the Waldenses from Documents, many now the first time collected and edited* (London: Jos. Tooney, 1870), and S. R. Maitland, *Facts and Documents Illustrative of the History, Doctrine and Rites of the Ancient Albigenses and Waldenses* (London: C. J. Rivington, 1832).

him as Peter, the name he is reported to have assumed at the time of his "conversion." His personal history and the story of his religious development must be pieced together from 13th century documents not always reliable, and seldom sympathetic to the Waldenses. Details are furnished principally by: 1) the *Chronicon universale anonymi Loudunensis*, written about 1220 by a Premonstratensian monk of Laon; and 2) the *Tractatus de septem donis Spiritus*, a work of the Inquisitor, Stephen of Bourbon, O. P. (d. 1262).

The anonymous chronicler of Laon tells how Waldo heard an itinerant ballad singer recite the popular legend of St. Alexis who abandoned his bride at the altar in order to take a vow of poverty and make a pilgrimage to the East. Disturbed by the story, Waldo consulted a theologian to find the surest path of salvation, for he wished to follow the perfect way. The theologian answered in the words of the Gospel, "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come take up thy cross and follow me." (Matt. XIX, 21.)

Waldo acted promptly. He made over the real estate to his wife; turned a part of his money back to those from whom he had acquired it, and left some to the nuns of Fontrevrault to whom he entrusted the care of his two daughters. The remainder, a sizeable amount, he distributed to the poor. After he had disposed of his last earthly possessions he took a vow of poverty. According to E. Comba this happened in 1173.[3]

Desirous of acquiring first-hand knowledge of the Gospel teaching, he requested two ecclesiastics to translate the Four Gospels into the dialect of the country. Later they also made a small collection of maxims from the writings of the Church Fathers. The Scriptures thus opened to him, he was made aware of another command: "Go into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature." (Matt. XXVIII, 19.)

Waldo's action stirred the imagination of the Lyonese. The ideal of apostolic poverty appealed to latent feelings and hidden desires. Waldo's example attracted imitators, particularly among the lower, uneducated classes. Waldo's followers, preaching in the streets and public places, discoursed on poverty and called men back to the evangelical ideal. N. A. Weber writes in the Catholic Encyclopedia, "The organization of the Waldenses was a reaction against the great splendor and outward display existing in the medieval Church — amid such ecclesiastical conditions the Waldenses made the profession of extreme poverty a

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[3] *op. cit.*, p. 24.

prominent feature in their own lives and emphasized by their practice the need of the much neglected task of preaching."[4]

Although the Waldenses justified their mission to preach by the necessity of explaining the Scriptures, the Archbishop of Lyons sought to silence them. The Waldensian practice was doubly offensive to Church authorities, for it was not customary for the laity to preach, and the uneducated laity were more liable to doctrinal error than their clerical counterparts. Peter responded to archbishop's prohibition by saying, "Judge ye whether it be lawful before God to obey you rather than God: for we cannot refuse to obey him who hath said, 'Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature.'"[5]

Banished from Lyons, Waldo journeyed into Italy to appeal his case to the Pope. He arrived in Rome about 1177, on the eve of the Third Lateran Council; but there is no record of him attending that assembly except for the highly colored account of Walter Map in his *De nugis curialium*.[6] The *Chronicon Loudunensis* suggests that Pope Alexander III sought a compromise solution to the thorny question of preaching. He forbade the Waldenses to preach "nisi rogantibus sacerdotibus."[7] All hope for a relaxation of this ban was throttled by Alexander's successor, Lucius III, in 1184 (according to Maitland, 1183) in a famous decree:

"In the first place, therefore we lay under a perpetual anathema, the CATHARI, PATARINI, and those who falsely call themselves HUMILI-ATI, or POOR MEN OF LYONS, PASSAGINI, JOSEPHINI, and AR-NALDISTAE; and since some, having a form of godliness, but, as the apostle has said, denying the power of it, have assumed to themselves the office of preaching — though the same Apostle says, 'how shall they preach, except they be sent?' — we include, in the same perpetual anathema, all who shall have presumed to preach, either publicly, or privately, either being forbidden, or not sent, or not having the authority of the Apostolic See, or of the Bishop of the diocese."[8]

Although the Cathari and the Albigensian tenets are clearly pro-scribed by the Third Council of the Lateran, there is no hint that the Waldenses had visited the assembly. This omission is significant. "We infer from that," writes G. K. Brown, "that the development of the

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[4] Vol. XV, s. v. "Waldenses," p. 528.
[5] Cf. E. Comba, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
[6] Dist. I, cap. XXXI, quoted by E. Comba (*op. cit.*, pp. 34—35). HE-FELE-LECLERQ (Tome V, Pt. 2, p. 1108) discusses the accuracy of this passage. If the interview took place as reported by Walter Map, it seems odd that there is no mention — implicit or otherwise — of the Waldenses in the official proceedings of that council.
[7] Quoted by E. COMBA, *op. cit.*, p. 307, N. 116.
[8] S. R. MAITLAND, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

Vaudois opinions was gradual; that they did not begin with a criticism of dogmas — but with a criticism of the Church's representatives who were unfaithful to the demands of their sacred office."[9] As the moorings which bound them to the Roman Church were cut loose one by one, the Waldenses drifted away from Catholic doctrine. They came to deny purgatory, indulgences, and prayers for the dead. They denounced all lying as a grievous sin, and they refused to take oaths. Because they condemned all shedding of human blood, they considered war and capital punishment unlawful. (Some points in this teaching suggest the influence of the Cathari.)

When one turns from the Waldenses to the Franciscans he is immediately struck by the parallel in the careers of the two founders. In Assisi it was the merchant's son rather than the merchant himself, who experienced a religious metamorphosis. Though younger than Peter Waldo, Francesco Bernadone was attracted by the same ideal. When on the feast of St. Matthias in 1208, he heard the words of the Gospel: "Going therefore preach, saying: the kingdom of God is at hand. Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purse: no scrip for your journey, nor two coats nor shoes, nor staff, for the workman is worthy of his meat. When you come into a house salute it, saying, peace be to this house." (Matt. X, 7 ff.)

The ideal of evangelical perfection had the same appeal for 13th century Umbria as it had for 12th century Lyons. Before long, a group of like-minded men had gathered about the youthful, religious maverick. Although Francis did not at first contemplate the founding of a religious order, the old monastic organizations which he knew had a restricted apostolate which influenced fewer and fewer of the growing urban populace. Francis' aims were broader. "His intention was not only the preaching of a Crusade, but a universal dissemination of the Gospel of Christ."[10] Like Waldo before him, Francis demanded little more of his followers than a dedication to evangelical ideals. In his official biography of the saint, *The Legenda Major*, Bonaventure brings out this point:

Now when the servant of Christ perceived that the number of the Brethren was gradually increasing, he wrote for himself and for his Brethren

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[9] *Italy and the Reformation to 1550*. (Oxford, 1933), p. 28. The doctrinal synthesis which follows is based on P. MELIA, *op. cit.*, pp. 87—92 and 100—123. Cf. also H. C. Vedder, "Origin and Early Teachings of the Waldenses, according to Roman Catholic writers in the 13th century," in *American Journal of Theology*, IV (1900), 465—489.

[10] R. HUBER, OFMConv., *A Documented History of the Franciscan Order, 1182—1517*, (Milwaukee, 1943), p. 10.

a Rule for their life, in simple words. Herein the observance of the Holy Gospel was set as the inseparable foundation, and some few other points were added that seemed necessary for a consistent manner of life.[11]

This, the primitive rule of the Franciscans, was the one Francis submitted to Pope Innocent III in 1209. The journey to Rome is another intriguing parallel in the career of the two religious innovators. But if Waldo and Francis followed similar paths to the City of the Popes their receptions were very different. Alexander III was willing to approve Waldo's way of life — except for preaching. Pope Innocent hesitated at sanctioning the absolute poverty — near destitution — adopted by the small band from Assisi. Surprisingly, he showed less reluctance in granting them permission to preach. Only one or two of Francis' adherents were clerics, but Innocent ingeniously salvaged the letter of the canons which forbade laymen to preach. St. Bonaventure reports that he "made all the lay Brethren that had accompanied the servant of God wear narrow tonsures, that they might preach the word of God without hindrance."[12]

More than a haircut is necessary to turn a layman into a professional ecclesiastic. Although the subsequent history of the Order is evidence that Innocent's ingenious solution proved only temporary (eventually Francis himself had to become — however reluctantly — a deacon in order to continue his preaching ministry), the origin of the Franciscan movement is deep in the "lay tradition." It seems that St. Francis was all too conscious of the fact, for if there is one refrain that rings through his admonitions and commands to the brethren, it is "obedience to the Holy Roman Church." The Order, however, continued — and perhaps, continues — to show the impress of its beginnings in the many friars who adhered to the Ghibelline cause.[13]

The Franciscans shared many of the Waldensian tenets, including the objection to oaths.[14] Despite the strong lay tradition, however, the

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[11] Chap. III, 8. Trans. by E. Gurney Salter in *Everyman Library*.

[12] *Legenda Major*, Cap. III, n. 10. The basic study on Franciscan preaching for this period as to content and method is Hilarin Felder's *Histoire des Etudes dans l'ordre de Saint François*, (Paris, 1908), pp. 39—65; cf. M. Bihl, O.F.M., in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, II (1909), 131—136.

[13] Another aspect of the Franciscan movement, the Third Order, evidences a further tie which the friars had with the "lay tradition" and merits a special study. Fr. Philip Hughes sees the Franciscan Third Order as an outgrowth of a similar group organized by Pope Innocent III. Sadly, he does not document his remarks, cf. P. Hughes, *History of the Church* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1948) vol. II, p. 357.

[14] The Third Order Rule, chaps. 17—18. J. MEYER (ed.) *The Words of St. Francis*, (Chicago, 1952), p. 320.

friars did not erect it into a doctrinal position as did the Wal-
denses. The Waldenses liked to regard themselves as a movement of
reform within the Church, but they broke with it over the question of
orders. To them it seemed intolerable "that a worldly priest, even if his
life was not, in the technical sense, irregular, was qualified to carry on
ministrations which had been founded, in great poverty by the apostles.
Indeed, Peter de Vaucernai represents as their common teaching that
no priest celebrates validly unless he lives in Waldensian poverty."[15]
Poverty becomes — as it became for some of the spiritual Franciscans
of the 14th century — a surrogate for Holy Orders. Accordingly, the
Waldenses taught that every Christian had authority to hear Con-
fessions, provided that he observe the precepts of apostolic poverty.[16]

Chapter XX of St. Francis' first Rule underlines the similarities and
points of difference between the two groups:

> Let my blest brothers, both clergy and laymen, confess their sins to
> priests of our Order. Should they not be able, let them confess to other
> prudent Catholic priests, firmly convinced and aware that from whichever
> Catholic priests they receive penance and absolution, they will be absolved
> beyond doubt from those sins if they take care to comply humbly and faith-
> fully with the penance enjoined on them.

> If, however, at the time they cannot have a priest, let them confess to
> one of their brothers, as the Apostle James says (5, 16): 'Confess your sins
> to one another.' Only, let them not for that reason fail to have recourse to
> the priests, because the power of binding and loosing has been given only
> to the priests.[17]

Similar and yet dissimilar. The Franciscans observed the same
abuses but saw them in another perspective. The Waldenses and the
Franciscans preached the same ideal, but their works had a different
ring. G. K. Brown makes the obvious comparison when he writes that
the Waldenses "were among the Reformers before the Reformation,
just as the Franciscans were among the counter-Reformers before the
Counter-Reformation."[18]

Apparently the men of the 13th century also recognized the Francis-
cans as the Church's stalwarts in the face of the Waldensian menace,
for in the *Chronicon Urspergense* there is the following entry under the
year 1212:

> At the time when the world was already growing old, there arose two
> orders in the Church whose youth was renewed like the eagle's and these

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[15] R. KNOX, *Enthusiasm*, (New York, 1950), p. 107.
[16] P. MELIA, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
[17] J. MEYER, *op. cit.*, pp. 272—273.
[18] *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

orders, the Order of Friars Minor and the Order of Preachers, were confirmed by the Apostolic See. Perhaps they were approved at this time for two sects, originating in Italy sometime back, continued to flourish. Pope Lucius had previously included them among the heretics on account of their superstitious doctrines and practices. Moreover in their private discourses which they generally delivered in secret places, they disparaged the Church of God and the priesthood.

They were called the Poor Men of Lyons, and at that time, I saw of their number at the Apostolic See with one of their leaders — Bernard, I believe — who were trying to get their sect confirmed and approved by the Apostolic See. They wandered through town and country, stoutly affirming that they, imitating the life of the Apostles, wanted to have neither possessions nor a place of their own. But the Lord Pope objected to them because their conversation revealed certain superstitious usages, viz., they cut off the tops of their shoes and went about nearly barefoot; though they dressed as if they were members of a religious order, they would not cut their hair except after the fashion of laymen. It seemed scandalous, moreover, that their men and women appeared together in the street, often staying together in the same house, and — it is rumored — sometimes occupying the same bed; all of which they claim has come down from the apostles.

The Lord Pope, on the other hand, confirmed some others who rose up in their place, men who called themselves *Pauperes Minores*. These latter repudiated the aforementioned superstitions and abuses: they went about both winter and summer completely barefoot; they did not accept money nor anything besides food unless it happened that someone might of his own accord offer them some necessary clothing; neither did they ask anything of anyone. Upon considering, however, that too much talk of humility becomes boasting and that the title of poverty, falsely assumed by so many, was vainglorious in the sight of God, they chose to be called *Minores Fratres* rather than *Minores Pauperes*, being in all things obedient to the Apostolic See.[19]

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[19] This translation is made from the critical text of the *Chronicon Urspergense* edited by O. Abel and L. Weiland in MGH Scriptorum XXIII (p. 376):

"Eo tempore mundo iam senescente exortae sunt duae religiones in ecclesia, cuius ut aquilae renovatur iuventus, quae etiam a sede apostolica sunt confirmatae, videlicet Minorum fratrum et Praedicatorum. Quae forte hac occasione sunt approbatae, quia olim duae sectae in Italia exortae, adhuc perdurant, quorum alii Humiliatos, alii Pauperes de Luduno se nominabant, quos Lucius papa quondam inter haereticos scribebat eo quod supersticiosa dogmata et observationes in eis reperirentur; in occultis quoque predicationibus, quas faciebant plerumque in latibulis, ecclesiae Dei et sacerdotio derogabatur. Vidimus tunc temporis aliquos de numero eorum, qui dicebantur Pauperes de Luduno, apud sedem apostolicam cum magistro suo quodam, ut puto Bernhardo, et his petebant, sectam suam a sede apostolica confirmari et privilegiari. Sane ipsi dicentes, se gerere vitam apostolorum nichil volentes possidere aut locum certum habere, circuibant per vicos et castella. Ast domnus papa quaedam supersticiosa in conversatione ipsorum eisdem obiecit, videlicet quod calceos desuper pedem precedebant et quasi nudis pedibus ambulabant; preterea cum portarent quasdam cappas quasi religionis, capillos capitis non attondebant nisi sicut laici; hoc quoque probrosum videbatur in eis, quod viri et mulieres simul ambulabant in via

More than a century ago, S. R. Maitland demurred at dating the passage in 1212 since the chronicler "speaks as if the Franciscan and Dominican Orders were already become considerable, (and thus) it may, perhaps be necessary to place him as late as 1225." Maitland's observation exhibited remarkable insight for later study has shown the *Chronicon*, as we know it, to be the work of Conrad of Lichtenau (d. 1240) who brought it up to date and cast a new redaction about 1230.[20] A few years more or less do not lessen the importance of the passage for it clearly shows that contemporaries of Saint Francis, Brother Leo, Caesar of Speyer, et al., regarded the Order of Friars Minor as the Church's answer to the Poor Men of Lyons.

A phrase in the *Chronicon*, "in all things obedient to the Apostolic See," is reminiscent of the first and last chapters of the *Regula Bullata*. Emphasis on obedience to the Church's hierarchy is readily understood in light of the many external similarities common to both the Waldenses and Franciscans. Allegiance to the Holy See was the Order's badge of orthodoxy. In spite of this loyalty, however, the superficial likeness of the two groups seems to have confused at least one 13th century chronicler. In listing the orders which "sprouted forth" in the time of Pope Gregory IX, he makes an obvious reference to the Order of Friars Minor, calling it the order "Humiliatorum seu Nodosorum vel Nudipedum" — names generally reserved for the heterodox sects.[21]

A passage with an entirely different tone goes far in justifying the

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et plerumque simul manebant in domo una, et de eis diceretur, quod quando-que simul in lectulis accubabant, quae tamen omnia ipsi asserebant ab apostolis descendisse. Ceterum domnus papa in loco illorum exurgentes quosdam alios, qui se appellabant Pauperes minores, confirmavit, qui predicta supersticiosa et reprobrosa respuebant, sed precise nudis pedibus tam aestate quam hieme ambulabant et neque pecuniam nec quicquam aliud preter victum accipiebant et si quando vestem necessariam quisquam ipsis sponte conferebat; non enim quicquam petebant ab aliquo. Hi tamen postea attendentes, quod nonnunquam nimiae humilitatis nomen gloria-tionem importet et de nomine paupertatis, cum multi eam frustra sustineant, apud Deum vanius inde gloriantur, maluerunt appellari Minores fratres quam minores Pauperes, apostolicae sedi in omnibus obedientes."

This text agrees substantially with the one S. R. Maitland reproduces from Binius' famous collection *Concilia generalia et provincialia*. Maitland offers an English translation based on this latter text, cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 398—399.

[20] Cf. MGH Scriptorum XXIII, p. 334.

[21] Chronicon Emonis, MGH Scriptorum XXIII, p. 517. One wonders if the friar apprehended and imprisoned in 1228 was the unfortunate victim of similar confusion. The *Chronica Albrici* says laconically: "Quidam autem de isto ordine, qui publice quasdam hereses Parisius predicaverat, captus fuit et incarceratus."

existence of the new religious orders. The compiler of the 13th century *Chronicon Montis Sereni*, steeped in monastic chauvinism, asks if the new mendicant foundations can be regarded as anything but a slap at the traditional orders. The Rules of St. Augustine and St. Benedict should suffice, he says, for anyone who is truly seeking sanctity and, furthermore, it is hard to believe that any Friar, Minor or Preacher, will ever surpass these two great luminaries.[22] The good monk betrays a total lack of, what we would call today, social conscience. He was evidently unaware of the appeal of the Waldenses, the Albigenses, the Humiliati and others whose zeal among the poor and in the growing urban centers, attracted a great following. The sarcasm in the chronicler's remark that the Order of Friars Minor was founded by a "peddler" is, perhaps, the best measure of just how far he was out of touch with the times.

The popes, Alexander III, Lucius III and Innocent III were conscious of the threat which self-appointed apostles present. Although the zealots acted to meet an urgent need, they were inimical to the hierarchical structure of the Church. In this situation, Pope Innocent was understandably reluctant to extend official recognition to the band from Assisi who visited him in 1209. That its members resembled the adherents of the Waldenses explains his hesitation, but paradoxically, it was this very resemblance which made the success of the friars possible. Ronald Knox said, "it is permissible to suggest that if St. Francis had lived a century earlier, there would have been no Waldenses."[23] It is also

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[22] "Duo nove conversacionis ordines in provincia et precipue in ipsa civitate Magdeburgensi haberi ceperunt, unus eorum, qui sanctos Predicatores se nominant, alter eorum qui Minores fratres appellantur ... Et prior quidem clericorum tantum est, sequens vero et clericos et laicos recipit, quem dicunt ab institore quodam principium accepisse. Quid autem est huiusmodi novitatum introduccio, nisi quedam exprobacio neglecte et ociose conversacionis eorum, qui in ordinibus constituti sunt, in quibus ecclesia primitus est fundata ? Denique beatissimi Augustinus et Benedictus, qui ita docuerunt ut vixerunt, ad quantum sanctitatis culmen ex sua conversatione pervenerint, notum est, quorump receptis si quis obedienciam servare voluerit, nullis novis institucionibus sanctitas queritur, illa posset sufficere, ad quam predicti patres sanctissimi secundum suas vivendo regulas pervenerunt. Non enim facile credi potest, quod quisquam vel ex ordine sanctorum Predicatorum vel Minorum fratrum Augustino vel Benedicto sanccior sit futurus. Absit autem, ut quorumlibet bonis studiis derogando hec dixerim, sed quia dolendum et valde dolendum est, quod primitivi ordines ex eorum, qui eosdem professi sunt, inordinata conversacione ad tantum deducti sunt contemptum, ut seculum renunciare volentibus ad salutem sufficere non credantur. Si enim posse sufficere putarentur, numquam novi alii querentur." MGH Scriptorum XXXII, pp. 220—221.

[23] *Op. cit.*, p. 104.

legitimate (and much more in keeping with the record) to postulate that if it weren't for Peter Waldo, there would have been no Franciscans. It is the poison which demands the antidote, and as history shows, it is the Reformation which brings forth the Counter-Reform.

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TRHEE FRIARS, A QUEEN AND A CARDINAL
AND NEW SPAIN

PREFACE

Groping in the dark is as hazardous intellectually as it is physically. In the darkness of night there is always the fear of stubbing one's toes or banging one's nose before reaching the switch across the room. The briefest survey of any subject is like throwing on the switch immediately upon entering a room. One gets a glimpse of the size of the room, its shape and arrangement, and its furnishings in one short, quick look, before making a detailed study of individual items.

Much has been written about Spanish Indian Policy. Treatises on the subject are mostly studies of individual phases and aspects of it. No one author traces the underlying thinking in the formation of Spanish Indian Policy, allowing a grasp of the general policy, giving one a brief look at the whole picture. Excellent books are available on the legal aspect of Spanish Indian Policy, on the encomienda system, on slavery, on the payment of tribute by the Indians, on social and economic experiments in one period or another of Spanish colonial life. These are all worthwhile contributions. But it is much like taking individual pieces of furniture out of a room and scrutinizing them separately without ever having had the benefit of seeing the room itself as it is normally arranged and furnished.

More specifically, the present approach to the subject strives to unravel the pattern of arrangement and the motivation of Spanish Indian Policy. The Spanish Crown did have a definite Indian Policy. The implementation of that policy necessarily varied to meet varying circumstances. But the Crown's underlying principles remained unchanged.

The two main, twin objectives of civilization and Christianization were not idle, empty terms but concepts fraught with meaning. The lot of the natives of the New World might have been that of outright slavery, such as that of the Negroes taken captive in Africa. Instead, the Spanish

Crown sought from the beginning to civilize and to Christianize the Indians as its consistent and determined policy.

How this policy took form and finally crystallized is here told in the analysis of the lives of Queen Isabella, Cardinal Xímenez and three Franciscan friars who labored among the Indians throughout the sixteenth century. The impact of these five personalities, thoroughly imbued with Christian ideals, contributed greatly to the development of Spanish Indian Policy. The three friars — Motolinía, Sahagún and Zumárraga — are treated from the viewpoint of the most characteristic feature of their lives: that of the missionary, that of the scholar and that of the administrator, respectively. It is understandable that in a short study only the broad outlines of the topic have been considered, and these but sketchily.

CHAPTER I

THREE PIONEERS IN THE SPIRITUAL CONQUEST

This is an account, sketchy though it be, of three humble and gifted Franciscan Friars, who were born, bred and educated in Spain, but left an impress of note upon the course of events in the New World, the discovery of which is the just pride of their native land.

The prime title to fame of these three distinguished Catholic figures rests, without any doubt, on the singular role they played in the capacity of missionaries. Their chief purpose, as that of many others, was to win the Indians of New Spain to the love and practice of the divine teachings of the Savior of all men, the Savior of the inhabitants of the Old World as well as the New. They, however, because of a series of circumstances found themselves in a position to help determine the policy to be followed in the attainment of the desired goal.

When the three Friars made their appearance on the scene, Cortés and his diminutive military force were permanently entrenched in the new country; the sad night ("Noche Triste") when the Spaniards, besieged on all sides in Mexico City, were obliged to make a sally to escape annihilation, belonged to the past. Hernán Cortés had definitely taken Mexico City (Tenochtitlan) on August 13, 1521, after having once been driven from it. It did not go unnoticed that August 13 was the

feast of St. Hippolytus, with whom the Indians later became better acquainted.[1]

Cortés was as deeply and sincerely anxious for the conversion of the natives to Christianity as anyone could be. No one conversant with his life would charge him with tepidity as regards his Faith, so proudly manifested and openly professed, nor did he hide his devotion to the Blessed Mother of God. This is not to imply in any manner whatsoever that Cortés was a saintly man or deserving of canonization. Like other mortals, whatever their station in life, irrespective of learning or illiteracy, of race, nationality or creed, he was not impeccable.[2] Final reward or condemnation of his conduct, the exact appraisal of its worth, as that of all men, will be determined unerringly on the last day by divine justice. Meanwhile, human judgment, subject to error, can endeavor to arrive at as accurate an estimate of his actions as is possible. He will long remain a contradictory figure.

Within Cortés, the military commander, there was another Cortés who loved his religion immeasurably and consequently called upon the Crown to send him zealous missionaries for the task of Christianizing the Indians and continuing the apostolate already begun in sporadic fashion by the two priests[3] who had accompanied the expedition. In due time the missionaries came, with the approval of the Crown of Spain and their religious Superiors.[4] Among those commissioned for the Lord's

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[1] Francis Borgia Steck, O.F.M., *Motolinia's History of the Indians of New Spain* (Washington, D. C., 1951), 146. This scholarly English translation will be cited hereafter as Motolinía, *History*. Cf. also Elizabeth Andros Foster, *Motolinia's History of the Indians of New Spain*, Cortes Society (Berkeley, California, 1950). Spanish readers may cf. Daniel Sánchez Garcia, O.F.M., (ed.), *Historia de los Indios de Nueva España . . . por R. P. Fr. Toribio de Benavente o Motolinia* (Barcelona, 1914), on which Fr. Steck's translation is based.

[2] Profession of faith by adherents of the Catholic Church is confused at times with impeccability. Christian Doctrine is perfect; but the Christian may exemplify it anywhere from 0 to 100 percent. Moral perfection is the ideal as 100 percent in every examination makes the perfect student.

[3] Fr. Bartolomé de Olmeda, a Mercedarian, and Juan Diaz, a diocesan priest, came with Cortés. Three Flemish missionaries, Juan de Tecto, Juan de Aora and Peter of Ghent or Gante, were on their way at the same time. Charles S. Braden says that Bartolomé de Olmeda was a Franciscan monk; later, in the same book, he says the same priest was a member of the Mercedarian Order. (Fr. de Olmeda was not a Franciscan but a Mercedarian.) Charles S. Braden, *Religious Aspects of the Conquest of Mexico* (Duke University Press, North Carolina, 1930), 87; 140, n. 15.

[4] Diocesan priests need permission of their bishops to leave their dioceses to undertake work elsewhere and those belonging to religious communities, that of their religious Superiors. The permission of Rome is another matter. For example. Zumárraga had permission from his Provincial but no confirmation from Rome prior to his departure from Spain. Hence, though bishop-elect, he was not consecrated, a fact decidedly to his disadvantage.

vineyard known as the Aztec Empire were Motolinía, Zumárraga and Sahagún, who arrived at different times between the years 1524 and 1530.

Of the three, Zumárraga alone was born before Columbus made his epochal discovery and was a mature man, a priest and a member of the Franciscan Order, by 1492. One may say that he was in the late autumn of life when appointed the first Bishop (later, Archbishop), of Mexico City. The office required a person of experience and balanced judgment. He was selected by the Emperor himself, Charles V. The other two first saw the light of day while Columbus was still voyaging across the Atlantic as the Admiral of the Ocean Sea and Castile. All three, from their teen age, had solemnly dedicated themselves to God, within the historic framework of Catholicism, for the purpose of furthering the supernatural[5] interests of the Babe of Bethlehem. They had resolved to highlight within the circle of their influence those things which belong to God, yet, at the same time, to respect the rights of Caesar.

The pattern of their lives was basically the same. They were admitted to and professed in the religious order founded by the widely beloved St. Francis of Assisi, the humble beggar of the first decade of the thirteenth century. Later, they were ordained, becoming priests, for not all members of the Franciscan family received the Sacrament of Holy Orders,[6] enabling them to celebrate Mass and administer the Sacraments. Eventually they all became missionaries in the foreign lands of the New World claimed immediately after discovery by the Castilian Crown as part and parcel of its possessions. The three even lived contemporaneously in Mexico for a number of years, the land that was the scene of the labors of all three during the better part of the sixteenth century.

Let it not be concluded, because of the basic similarities in their lives which have been pointed out, that they were products of an inflex-

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[5] The supernatural is radically distinct from anything in the world of nature. Only angels and men are capable of participating in divine life, the supernatural, which is the essence of religion. Short of the supernatural, all religion is reduced to humanitarianism. Human beings have a capacity for the divine and to share in it is the primary reason for religion. "Supernatural Order," *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, 1912), Vol. XIV, 336—339; *The New Catholic Dictionary* (New York, 1929), 927; *A Catholic Dictionary* (ed. by Donald Attwater, New York, 1949), 481. *Summa Theologica* (Tr. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, New York, 1947), Pt. III, Q. 23, Art. 2.

[6] Herbert I. Priestly, *Mexican Nation, A History* (New York, 1924), 98—99. The author refers to Peter of Ghent (Gante) as a priest. He was never ordained.

ible mould. This decision would be contrary to fact. The simple story of their missionary endeavors sustains the proposition of their individuality. Each reveals his talents variously in accord with his employment as each bent his energies in different directions. Zumárraga was the able administrator of a vast diocese, the highest ecclesiastical authority over it, in matters purely spiritual, subject only to the Pope. In questions touching on political administration, to that same extent, he was subject to the Crown and the Crown's authorized representatives. Often the Bishop found himself obliged to make difficult decisions between Spaniards themselves, as well as between Spanish colonists and natives; often against his Spanish countrymen, in favor of the defenseless Indian. Most trying of all was the exercise of restraint and patience, in judicious measure, when the governmental finger was thrust too close to his episcopal nose.

Motolinía's fundamental problems differed from those of the Bishop. Although missionaries can reach a lowest common denominator wherein their problems are the same and demand like solutions, there are a host of minor difficulties and problems peculiar to each set of circumstances. These must be solved by the individual missionary alone. Motolinía took the lead in the major problems, and with the deft hand of a skilled surgeon, did his work with a sureness and exactness of judgment, that arouses no little amazement when his opinion on the administration of Baptism to the primitive Indian under emergency conditions is considered.[7] He was ever earnestly active among the Indians. He travelled long distances from one town to another without escort of Spanish arms. Alone with the Indians, he went about on foot from Mexico City to Guatemala at a time when the great Coronado of New Mexico fame was referred to vaguely by Motolinía as a captain. Motolinía held various positions of trust within the Franciscan Order, among them, that of Provincial of the Province of the Holy Gospel, the first to be created by the Franciscans in New Spain. He was intimately connected with the founding of the city of Puebla,[8] which to the historian as well as the tourist, remains a veritable gem. He was the intrepid pioneering missionary par excellence.

Sahagún survived Zumárraga by more than forty years and Motolinía by not less than thirty. This singular figure labored in Mexico for sixty

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[7] Motolinía, *Historia*, 184—191.
[8] Marino Fernández Echeverría y Veytia, 2 volumes, *Historia de la Fundación de la Ciudad de la Puebla de los Angeles* (Fidel Solis ed. Puebla, 1931), 1, 75—94.

years, passing to his eternal reward in 1590. Though, Zumárraga, the bishop, returned to Spain on business, the other two men, after their arrival in the western hemisphere, remained uninterruptedly among the Indians, without ever again going back to Europe. Throughout his surprisingly long missionary life, Sahagún displayed a seemingly insatiable craving for deeper and deeper knowledge of all phases of Indian life. His studies began aboard ship, before setting foot in the Indies, his first teachers being Indians who were returning to their native land from Spain. He mastered the principal tongue of the Aztecs (Nahuatl) to almost as high a degree of perfection as that attained by any non-Indian. He was surpassed perhaps by only Fray Alonso de Molina,[9] a Spanish Franciscan, who came to the New World as a child with his parents and thus had the advantage of mingling with the Indian children, learning their tongue the easier way, much as American children of military parents in particular have surpassed their elders in grasping Japanese or German or French. His masterpiece, the history of ancient Mexico, consisting of twelve books, is the result of years of relentless study, of intense investigation, checked thrice for errors in a scientific manner, each time in a different locality, with the aid of the most learned Indians available.[10] His finished product is in three languages: Nahuatl, the language of his original work, Spanish and Latin, to which he committed what was in the first instance so painstakingly recorded in the Indian language of that region. More will be said later of this mine of Mexican antiquities.

It is sufficient for the moment to indicate that the three Friars were not as alike as black-eyed peas. The time came when they would fix their sights on the main purpose of Christianizing the Indians. With a common educational background, the three exploited their individual talents, each in a different direction. After the dust of years settled, Sahagún emerged as the scholar, par excellence; the dauntless Motolinía, as the exemplary missionary, whose heart craved the winning of all the Indians to a love of Christ, and who would not be satisfied with less; and Zumárraga, as the administrator, charged with the delicate task of guiding the Church, then in her infancy in New Spain.

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[9] Fray Bernardino de Sahagún, *A History of Ancient Mexico, 1547—1577* (Fiske University Press, Nashville, Tenn., 1932), 3. Translation and biographical sketch by Fanny R. Bandelier from the Spanish edition of Carlos María Bustamente. Only the first four of the twelve books are translated in the one volume published. It will be hereafter cited as Sahagún, *History*.

[10] Sahagún, *History*, 4.

Of the three it was Zumárraga who held the most difficult post. Being the second bishop of the land, he shouldered the responsibility for the ecclesiastical course charted. Little did he dream, when the tremendous news of the momentous discovery broke in Spain, that he would sail the same seas as did the Admiral; that he would go, not under the reign of the renowned Isabella nor that of Ferdinand, but under a king yet to be born; that he would go more than thirty-five years later when that still unborn king would rule Spain as King Charles I and Germany as Emperor Charles V; that he would be destined for the Aztec Empire yet unheard of and not to be conquered by Cortés for a quarter of a century after the epochal voyage of 1492. Zumárraga's work began, about thirty-five years after the discovery; so did that of Sahagún. Motolinía's had begun some five years earlier.

Before examining what these three Friars contributed to Spanish Indian policy, it is imperative to go back to the days of the incomparable Queen Isabella herself. She took the first and most important steps toward the formulation of Spanish Indian policy. How and why she took the adamant stand she did in defense of the Indians is intriguing and sheds unfading lustre upon her name. It is necessary to review briefly her rise to power, followed by a cursory view of the twenty-five critical years in the islands subsequent to the discovery of the New World by Columbus.

CHAPTER II

THE QUEEN OF FAITH WHO KNEW HER MIND

After the startling news of the discovery reached Isabella's ears, she had important decisions to make. The most significant in the annals of human freedom concerned the strange inhabitants of the New World, mistakenly called Indians. In respect to them, she made a decision considered surprisingly novel and not at all in keeping with the thinking of the times. It was generally believed by Christians everywhere that barbarous and savage people could be lawfully enslaved. Accordingly, the Portuguese sold into European servitude Negroes taken in Africa. Columbus was aware of this practice of the Portuguese, who had been in the forefront in making geographical discoveries and had been the preeminent navigators for several decades. The Moslems had been practicing slaveryp withcaptive Christians. Christians believed that

those who were not Christians could be enslaved. Thus Columbus saw nothing wrong in indulging in the sale of Indians, who were taken to Spain on the return voyages from the New World.[11] But opinion was crystallizing, particularly among theologians, who resolutely opposed the enslavement of the Indians and argued for their free status.[12] Having heard the two sides of the controversy, the Queen made up her mind. Once convinced, she remained adamant in her position that the Indians were free human beings, not to be enslaved. The plans of the opposition, and those of Columbus were thwarted by the Queen, who rose up suddenly like a maternal giantess, to protect the helpless Indians. She was the very Queen who had dealt sternly with the astute Jews of Spain and the warring Moors of Granada.

This kindly attitude towards the Indians came to be a unique characteristic of Spanish rule in the Americas but it originated with Isabella. One historian has said of it:

> The Queen's order was issued June 20, 1500, a date that the world should keep in mind because it marks the first recognition ever made of the respect due the dignity and freedom of all men, no matter how uncultured and primitive they might be; a principle which no law had ever proclaimed before that time nor much less had any nation ever practiced.[13]

The motives underlying the Spanish conquest of the Indies, sometimes summarized as gold, glory and gospel,[14] according to most historians, certainly do not apply to the missionaries in that sequence, nor to Isabella, the first of the Spanish sovereigns to sponsor missionary activity in the New World. The Queen of Castile, who caused Columbus' enterprise to be undertaken under the auspices of the Spanish Crown, declared over and over again that her most intimate desire was the conversion of the Indians to the Catholic Faith. She insisted fiercely that these coarse, rude natives be given appropriate care in order that their souls might be saved. These were her strict and constant demands. On November 25, 1504, three days before her death, in the codicil of her will, she besought their conversion, civilization and humane treat-

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[11] Dr. P. Venancio D. Carro, O.P., *La Teología y los Teólogos-Juristas Españolas ante la Conquista de América*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1944), I, 41.

[12] José María Ots Capdequí, *Manual de Historia del Derecho Español en las Indias* (Buenos Aires, 1945), 200.

[13] Rafael Altamira, *A History of Spain*. Translated by Muna Lee. (Toronto, New York and London, 1949. Reprinted, 1952), 285.

[14] Bannon-Dunne, S. J., *Latin America, A Historical Survey* (Milwaukee, 1950), 105.

ment.[15] From the very beginning, as though by instinct, she struck the accurate approach toward the natives.

Uppermost in her mind was the winning of them to the Faith. One historian expresses his forthright conviction on this point in this manner:

The unfailing support that she gave Columbus and the enthusiasm with which she regarded the discovery of the New World were prompted not so much by a feeling of riches, power and expansion that the Indies might bring to Spain, as the anticipatory joy at the tremendous scope for new 'conversions' offered by the American Indian.[16]

By and large, the missionaries deserve high praise. Like good shoemakers, they stuck to their lasts, despite the damaging inroads made on their work by a radical change, in subsequent years, in colonial policy. For example,

In the period which elapsed between the formulation of the Spanish and of the English colonial policies religious ideals were displaced by the commercial, and in the exaltation of the commercial ideal England took the lead. Colonies, from being primarily fields for the propagation of Christianity and incidentally for the production of wealth, became the field primarily for industrial and commercial development and incidentally for Christian work. The change no doubt has contributed vastly to the wealth of the world and to progress, but it has been fatal to the native populations. The Spanish policy aimed to preserve and civilize the native races, not to establish a new home for Spaniards, and the colonial legislation provided elaborate safeguards for the protection of the Indians. Many of these were a dead letter but the preservation and civilization of the native stock in Mexico, Central and South America, and above all in the Philippines stand out in marked contrast, after all allowances and qualifications have been made, with the fate, past and prospective, of the aborigines in North America, the Sandwich Islands, New Zealand and Australia, and clearly differentiate in their respective tendencies and results the Spanish and English systems. The contrast between the effects of the Spanish conquest in the West Indies, Mexico and the Philippines reflects the development of the humane policy of the government. The ravages of the first conquistadores, it should be remembered, took place before the crown had time to develop a colonial policy.[17]

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[15] William H. Prescott, *History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella the Catholic*, 3 vols., ed. by John Foster Kirk (Philadelphia, 1883), III, 181. Hereafter to be cited as Prescott, *Ferdinand and Isabella*.

[16] Reginald Merton, *Cardinal Ximenes and the Making of Spain* (London, 1934), 36.

[17] Edward Gaylord Bourne, "Introduction," *Philippine Islands, 1493—1803*, 55 vols., ed. by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson (Cleveland, 1903—09), I, 35—36. This is appraised as an "excellent historical introduction." Cf. *A Guide to Historical Literature* (New York, 1949), 951, V, 211.

In New Spain, where Motolinía, Sahagún and Zumárraga labored, and in many other parts of the globe, the Indians had steadfast friends in the missionaries. In the Queen, they had not only a true friend but also the most powerful advocate they have ever had. It is now four and a half centuries since the evangelization of the Indians got under way. Where the missionaries planted the seed of the Catholic Faith, it flowered and has remained. The Spanish language has, in the main, been retained; and the native populations are much in evidence. This is the finest tribute to the efforts of Christianization and civilization of the Spanish Crown and the missionaries. Isabella, the Catholic Queen of Castile, set the norm of this huge task, at the very outset, by insisting that the Indians were human beings and were to be instructed in the Catholic Faith.

Exactly fifty years after Isabella issued the historic order that the Indians were free men, a famous debate took place in Valladolid. It was the culmination of a long standing controversy over the enslavement of the Indians. The debaters were the noted Las Casas, the bishop of Chiapas in New Spain, and Sepúlveda, the erudite humanist and brilliant theologian, who had never crossed the seas. One was the bishop; the other, the plain priest. But both possessed keen minds and were well-equipped to discuss their respective contentions. The verdict of the judges went against Sepúlveda, who, nevertheless, maintained to his dying day that he by no means advocated the "spoliation or enslavement of the natives but merely their subjection to a Christian power."[18]

What had been the life of this singular Queen who first championed the cause of the natives of the New World in a manner so much in advance of her times? Had her climb to political power been easy? How did she rule those within her own borders? Numerous questions, in respect to her, beg for answers.

If one looks into the background of her life, he will find that Isabella did not travel a smooth road to the heights of royal power; that there was no certainty of her ascending the throne, nor, once upon it, of her enjoying ease and comfort, ruling her subjects from a distance. Isabella was not one to stand idly by. She was known, in time of disorder, to mount a horse and betake herself as speedily as possible to the scene of trouble, to ascertain personally the differences of the dissenting parties. A notable instance occurred three years after her coronation, in 1477,

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[18] Aubrey F. G. Bell, *Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda* (Oxford University Press, 1925), 47.

when she deposed Cabrera from the government of Segovia.[19] Nor did Ferdinand, her husband, have the path before him blueprinted in advance, made easy for his pleasure. Isabella was a Princess and Ferdinand a Prince but those magic names, of fairy tale fame, did not save either of them from obstacles besetting their rise to power. Both these historical figures come nearer assuming their true stature if, besides stating that they were married at Valladolid on October 29, 1469, a few of the barriers which they individually and jointly had to hurdle, are kept in mind.

Isabella cannot be said to have been a schemer for prestige or power. Nor, on the other hand, did she demur when opportunity plainly knocked and fortune beckoned her to assume an important political position. She did not seek advancement or grandeur, but neither did she decline or ignore responsibility. She was both gracious and graceful, blessed with a goodly measure of sound sense, capable of winning to her side all kinds of personalities. In the main, she made her own decisions, as she did in the selection of a husband, despite the pressure from her half-brother, Henry IV, King of Castile. His permission was needed by virtue of the agreement at Toros de Guisando, as will be presently explained. It is enough to state merely the names of those in quest of her hand in marriage, the matches proposed or attempted for her, to understand her position.[20] There was Don Pedro Girón, the grand master of the Order of Calatrava; Don Carlos, Count of Guiana, to whom Isabella was betrothed when thirteen years old; there was a brother on Henry IV of England, and others.

The King of Castile, after the death of Don Carlos, Count of Guiana, promised Isabella in marriage to the widower King of Portugal,[21] who was rejected as far too old for her. The crafty King Louis XI of France tried to arrange a marriage with her for his brother, but Isabella made her own choice, Ferdinand, who had been considered a likely prospect rather early in the serious business of making an appropriate selection. Handsome and active, strong and courageous, he appealed to her above all the others. The deduction that Isabella and the Kingdom of Castile were a worthwhile prize has much to substantiate it, if the number of wooers and suitors from near and far is a dependable index. Certainly,

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[19] Prescott says one year after her coronation. Prescott, *Ferdinand and Isabella*, I, 280—282. Pulgar says it was three years. Fernando del Pulgar, *Crónica de los Reyes Católicos* Espasa-Calpe, A. S., 1943), I, 269—272. Hereafter to be cited as Pulgar, *Crónica.*

[20] For the important prospective marriages, cf. Pulgar, *Crónica*, Chapters: 7, 8, 9; 28—34.

[21] Pulgar, *Crónica*, Chapters: 7, 8, 9; 28—34.

Isabella of Castile enjoyed an enviable popularity, not altogether de-
tached from the growing esteem inspired by her charm and the increasing
significance of Castile.

The father of Ferdinand, King Juan II of Aragon, married twice.
Three children were born of his first marriage to Queen Doña Blanca
of Navarre, one of them being the Count of Guiana, Don Carlos, to
whom Isabella was betrothed. Blanca of Navarre died and Juan II took
Doña Juana Enríquez, the daughter of a man known as the Admiral
of Castile, for his second wife. Doña Juana showed a strong dislike for
her three stepchildren and the impression left of her in written accounts
fits the traditional description of stepmothers found in fiction. Of the
three children, Don Carlos was the only boy, the Prince of Viana, with
rights to the throne of Navarre. His father tried to have him disinherited,
failing in which he imprisoned him, but popular sentiment compelled
his release. For a time, the Prince lived as a refugee in Italy, and the
Pope and others extended him their protection. The sudden death of
the Prince resolved these difficulties.[22]

When the first child was born to King Juan II of Aragon and Queen
Juana Enríquez, on March 10, 1452, there was sun and warmth for him
on earth. He entered this world on the eve of the fall of Constantinople
to the Turks. The child was named Ferdinand. His half-brother, Don
Carlos, was destined to die suddenly[23] and leave Ferdinand the only
heir to the Crown of Aragon. Ferdinand, meanwhile, had a mother who
consumed herself in providing for him, while she continued to frown
noticeably upon her three stepchildren. The queen mother put into
play all her ingenuity to the accomplishment of a single end, that
Ferdinand be fitted physically, socially and mentally to take his place
adroitly upon a throne some day. The son did not fail his mother. He
became the craftiest ruler of Renaissance Europe, and Niccoló Machia-
velli's (1469—1527) model of the ideal ruler, the hero of the latter's
noted work on statecraft, entitled *The Prince*.[24]

Isabella's father also married twice. By his first wife, María of Aragon,
he had one child, Henry, who became Henry IV of Castile. After María's

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[22] For a succinct summary of the Prince's difficulties, Cf. Altamira, *A
History of Spain*, 259—260.

[23] Don Carlos, disillusioned, turned to intellectual pursuits. He translated
the *Ethics* of Aristotle into the vernacular in 1509. Nearly fifty years after
his death, it was printed for the first time at Saragossa. Prescott, *Ferdinand
and Isabella*, I, 143.

[24] R. Trevor Davies, *The Golden Century of Spain, 1501—1621* (London,
1937), 32. Perhaps it is not out of place to remark that Machiavelli was born
the year Ferdinand married Isabella.

death, he married Isabella of Portugal. Of this marriage were born two children, Alfonso and Isabella, the latter destined to be the most memorable queen of Europe, the champion of Columbus in his daring venture. In 1454, Isabella's father, Juan II, died, and this event forthwith placed Isabella's half-brother, Henry IV, on the throne of Castile. Though she gave the matter little thought, Isabella knew that she was that much nearer the throne herself. The breath-taking circumstances that almost kept her from becoming queen upon Henry's death, merit some attention.

Henry IV married the Princess Doña Blanca of Navarre,[25] with whom he lived ten years. During that time they were not blessed with children. He then entered upon his second marriage with Doña Juana of Portugal. After five years, Juana, Castile's queen, gave birth to a daughter. This precipitated a political crisis in the realm, and a roar was heard that rent the kingdom in two.[26] The daughter, it was rumored by evil tongues, was not the child of the impotent King Henry, but that of a favorite of his, Don Beltran de la Cueva,[27] created Duke of Albuquerque by him.[28]

The masters of the military orders of Santiago, Calatrava and Alcantara, joined by counts and prelates, spearheaded a revolt against the king, who, in an attempt to pacify them, gave recognition to his half-brother Alfonso as the hereditary prince. The embittered rebels, emboldened, made the eleven year old Alfonso their king in 1465. Civil war ensued and the rebellious hosts were defeated near the village of Olmedo. Worse still, Alfonso took sick and died.

His passing, however, in no wise healed the division in the kingdom. The immediate thought on the part of the revolting faction was to install Isabella, next in line, as the Queen of Castile and Leon. The Princess was dwelling then at Avila (Cardeñosa), where she had lived with her brother Alfonso before the insubordiante nobles proclaimed him king. When entreated to accept the Crown, she peremptorily rejected it, explaining that she was profoundly displeased with the discord, destruction and tyranny daily growing more acute in the land.

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[25] Henry married the Princess Doña Blanca of Navarre, the daughter of the Queen Doña Blanca of Navarre. Cf. El P. Mro. F. Henrique Florez, del Orden de S. Augustín, *Memorias de las Reynas Católicas* (Madrid, 1761), II, 724, 738.
[26] Prescott states that Henry lived with his first wife twelve years and that it was after eight years of married life with his second wife that a daughter was born. *Ferdinand and Isabella*, I, 237, n. 1. Pulgar gives ten and five years respectively. *Crónica*, I, 4—5.
[27] Pulgar, *Crónica*, Chapter I, 5.
[28] *Ibid.*, Chapter II, 11.

She declared that she would never consent to become queen as long as her elder halfbrother, Henry, lived.[29] Still the agitation and civil strife continued until a compromise was forced from the King, who publicly acknowledged the right of succession of the Princess Isabella and denied the right to the daughter of the Queen consort, to whom history refers as La Beltraneja.[30] Moreover, the Queen, Doña Juana, was to return to Portugal within four months, her marriage being declared null and void because the divorced wife of Henry IV, set aside for not begetting children, was still alive. In naming Isabella his successor, Henry IV imposed the condition upon her of not marrying without the permission of the King. Peace and harmony were thus temporarily restored. Such, in substance, was the agreement at *Toros de Guisando*,[31] signed on September 9, 1468, to end the protracted civil wars.

It was at about this time that Isabella's hand was sought in marriage by her various suitors and that she made up her own mind to take Ferdinand. Henry IV kept withholding his permission but Isabella, who always had a mind of her own, arranged the matter with the help of her friends. While the King was away in the southern part of the kingdom, she obtained the consent of the communities and the people for the nuptial ceremony to take place in Valladolid. When the arrangements were completed, Ferdinand was notified, and asked to come to Valladolid.

To slip out of the Kingdom of Aragon, cross the frontier and journey to the designated city was no easy undertaking for the young prince. He had to disguise himself and endure many discomforts, even to the point of imperilling his very life. His behavior is worthy of inclusion among the most exciting tales in the history of romance. No knight of the romances of chivalry underwent more real peril or engaged in more interesting adventures for his lady love. With the celebration of the marriage, amid hilarious enthusiasm — though the bride and groom were short of money — the two Kingdoms separated for over eight hundred years, were, by marriage, more closely knit than ever before. When the wedding was over, Isabella sent three gentlemen to apprise Henry IV that she had married Ferdinand, that she did so after mature deliberation and with the consent of the nobles and knights of the realm. The messengers were: Pero Vaca, Diego de Ribera and Luis de Antesana.[32]

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[29] Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter II, 9—10.
[30] Altamira, *A History of Spain*, 239.
[31] Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter II, 12—15.
[32] Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter 10, 35.

Almost five years after the wedding, on October 13, 1474, immediately subsequent to the death of Henry IV, Isabella was proclaimed Queen of Castile. Her legitimate claim to the throne lay, not in mere legalities, but in the overwhelming support given her by the nation, whose will was expressed by its representatives in the Cortes. The determination of succession in this manner had abundant precedents.[33]

Isabella loathed chaos and disorder. She had given evidence of this years before when she refused to be a party to the prolongation of civil war against her half-brother, Henry IV. As soon as she became the ruler of Castile, she set about the greatly needed reorganization of the government. The banditti who ravaged the land were subdued through the instrumentality of *La Santa Hermandad*. She reformed jurisprudence, revised the laws and had a new code drawn up by Doctor Alfonso Diaz de Montalvo, the eminent jurist of his day, entitled *Ordenanzas Reales*. She effectively subjected the nobles to her power and gradually annexed to the Crown the grand masterships of the three powerful military orders of Santiago, Calatrava and Alcantara, which had led the revolt years before against the Crown in the days of the weak Henry IV. She revived trade by stabilizing the value of money. Isabella soon brought order out of chaos and all Castile became aware of her royal presence.

This remarkable woman found time, amidst the burdens of government, to master Latin in one year, sufficiently well to enable her to read it intelligently and to understand whatever she heard.[34] Latin was used extensively in those days by both historians and men of letters. The humanists were becoming more popular every year. Besides, there were always papal documents to be had first-hand only in Latin. The King and Queen appreciated the person who spoke another language. That was one of the chief reasons, when Granada surrendered, for entrusting the business of drawing up the treaty to Gonzalo de Córdoba. He spoke Arabic fluently[35] and was thoroughly acquainted with Moorish customs and habits. The Queen allowed no talent, either her own or anyone's else, to lie idle, if she could help it.

It is one thing to deal with objections which arise in a realm and another to deal with those which present themselves within one's own

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[33] Prescott, *Ferdinand and Isabella*, I, 54.

[34] Se dió al trabajo de aprender letras latinas, y alcançó en tiempo de un año saber en ellas tanto, que entendía qualquier habla o escritura latina. Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter 24, 76—77. In this chapter, the author portrays the Queen's character, describes her physical appearance and appraises her intellectual attainments.

[35] Walter Starkie, *The Grand Inquisitor* (London, 1940), 175.

household. The Queen, who had a tender heart and a clear mind, was soon faced with an unexpected thrust by the prince of her choice. Ferdinand, in his ambition, harbored the thought of supplanting his queen in her royal prerogatives, so justly won and held. The contention arose over the right of a woman to rule. In Aragon, females were excluded from succession to power, not so in Castile and Leon.[36] Isabella, with sterling royal dignity, employed the most delicate and persuasive argument against her husband. At the time they had but one child, a daughter. If Isabella admitted the argument against female succession in her own case, then, in the event of the death of her royal spouse, their only daughter would never rule.[37] Because she made him see the folly of her yielding to his political ambition, Ferdinand gave up his demands. Isabella remained supreme in her established royal authority; in practice, Ferdinand would be treated in kingly fashion in Castile as her consort.[38]

In 1478, before Ferdinand had succeeded to the throne in Aragon, an effective aid to the political power of the Crown in Castile was established. It was the Spanish Inquisition, a distinct institution from the Papal Inquisition of the Middle Ages that was destined to gain notoriety through the centuries. The Crown, faced with a wave of reversion to the abjured faith of the Jews and Mohammedans recently converted, felt it could not tolerate heresy in its domains, nor permit the government to be undermined by beliefs that were contrary to those held in the realm by its Catholic ruler. If heresy were allowed to go unchecked, it would grow, to the detriment of the Catholic Faith,[39] which the Crown devotedly and genuinely professed. In this instance, Isabella felt that it was her duty to defend and protect the purity of the Faith of her subjects as positively as it had been her duty to protect and maintain their civil rights by restoring law and order after she ascended the throne.

The principal purpose of the Inquisition was to win the erring peaceably to the practice of the Catholic Faith they had embraced and then abandoned.[40] Those who refused reconciliation to the Church were released to the civil authorities to be punished by the secular courts of justice.[41] That was the law of the land.

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[36] Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter 22, 71.
[37] Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter 22, 72—73.
[38] Isabella stated explicitly that Ferdinand was, in effect, the King of Castile. ". . . vos, como mi marido, sois rey de Castilla." You, as my husband, are King of Castile." Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter 22, 72.
[39] Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter 96, 335.
[40] Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter 96, 334—335.
[41] Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter 96, 336.

The reason Prescott gives for the Papacy's alleged ready consent to the Inquisition is entirely without foundation. He says:

Sixtus the Fourth, who at that time filled the pontifical chair, easily discerning the sources of wealth and influence which this measure opened to the court of Rome, readily complied with the petition of the sovereigns, and expedited a bull bearing the date of November 1st, 1478, authorizing them to appoint two or three ecclesiastics, inquisitors for the detection and suppression of heresy throughout the dominion.[42]

It is necessary at this point to go into the origin, character and purpose of this institution, Isabella's loyalty to which is frequently singled out as evidence of her heartlessness.

Prescott cites Pulgar as his first authority. Nowhere in his reference is there a shred of evidence faintly indicating that the Pope stood to gain in "sources of wealth and influence." His reference to Pulgar does say the following concerning source of income resulting from anyone's condemnation by the Inquisition:

. . . e inhabilitaban sus fijos para que no oviesen oficios ni beneficios. Déstos fué fallado gran número cuyos bienes y heredamientos fueron tomados e aplicados al fisco del Rey e de la Reyna.[43]

The only other references to income in the entire chapter are these two:

. . . e les eran tomados sus bienes: de los quales, e de las penas pecuniarias que pagaban los reconciliados, por quanto eran de aquellos que habián ido contra la fe, mandaron el Rey e la Reyna que no se distribuyesen en otra cosa, salvo en la guerra contra los moros, o en otras cosas que fuesen para enalzamiento de la fe católica.

This refers to the goods left behind by those going into voluntary exile, into Portugal, Italy and France, or those whose worldly goods were confiscated. The fines and the moneys resulting from confiscation by the Holy Tribunal went to the royal treasury of the kings of Spain to pay for the propagation of the Faith and the wars against the Moor. It follows that the Pope could not be enriched by impoverished refugees nor by funds which never came into his hands.

The final reference indicates that even the Spanish realm stood to lose financially by the Inquisition, in the long run:

E como quier la absencia de esta gente despobló gran parte de aquella tierra é fué notificado a la Reyna que el trato se diminuía; pero estimando en poco la diminución de sus rentas, e reputando en mucho la limpieza de sus tierras, decía que todo interese pospuesto quería alimpiar la tierra de aquel pecado de la heregia . . .

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[42] *Ferdinand and Isabella*, I, 344.
[43] *Crónica*, I, Chapter 96, 336. This corresponds to Prescott's citation of an older edition, Pulgar, part. 2, cap. 77.

In effect, as plainly stated, the Crown gladly forwent financial loss for the good derived from ridding the land of heresy.

Pulgar, as Prescott cites him, does mention the bull of Sixtus the Fourth of 1478. But Prescott's next authority does not refer to the bull of 1478 but to an entirely different one, that of 1480, issued by the same Pope. Bernáldez, the authority cited, makes only the following terse mention of it, at the very end of the chapter:

. . . y ovieron Bulla [sic] del Papa Sixto IV, para proceder con justicia contra la dicha heregiá pro via del fuego. Concediôse la Bulla y ordenóse la Inquisición el año de 1480.[44]

The only reference in this chapter to "sources of wealth and influence," as Prescott's phrase has it, is not against the Pope in any wise, but, in fact, what mention there is of riches is directed against the Jews themselves.

Muchos de ellos en estos reinos en pocos tiempos allegaron my grandes caudales é haciendas, porque de logros é usuras no hacían conciencia, diciendo que lo ganaban con sus enemigos, atándose al dicho que Dios mandó en la salida del pueblo de Israel, robrar á Egipto, por arte y engaño demandándoles prestados sus vasos é tazas de oro é plata; é así tenían presuncion de soberbia, que en el mundo no habia mejor gente, ni mas discreta, ni mas aguda, ni mas honorada, que ellos por se de linaje de las tribus é medio de Israel.[45]

Prescott's third authority is Llorente (1756—1823). It has not seemed worthwhile to check his history of the Inquisition in four volumes, published in Paris, 1817—18. It was translated into Spanish in 1822. Llorente was appointed Secretary-General of the Inquisition. He was an "Afrancesado," a Spanish term of reproach for a Spaniard who sided with the French in Napoleon's invasion of Spain. Because of that, Llorente was exiled for high treason, went to France, and wrote his history there. He can hardly be expected to be impartial. As a matter of fact, a modern authority has said, "Llorente's history is now distrusted by all serious historians."[46]

Prescott emphasized the establishment of the Inquisition as the only blemish on the character of Isabella, for whom he evinced a favorable regard. He has no sympathy for Spanish historians who, he contends,

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[44] Andrés Bernáldez, *Historia de los Reyes Católicos*, 2 vols., Sociedad Bibliófilos Andaluces (Sevilla, 1896), I, Chapter 43, 128. Hereafter to be cited as Bernáldez, *History*.

[45] Bernáldez, *Ibid.*, I, 127—28. The biblical reference is to the Jews winning their release from Egyptian bondage. Before they left Egypt, the Jews stripped the Egyptians, obtaining from them vessels of gold and silver, and very much rainment. Exodus: 12, 35—36.

[46] Starkie, *op. cit.*, 480.

excuse her conduct in respect to the Inquisition as a sin of the age in which she lived.[47]

The viewpoint of a modern English historian of note concerning the Inquisition authorized by Sixtus IV at the request of Ferdinand and Isabella can be grasped to some extent from the following excerpt:

The value of the Inquisition as a royal instrument for strengthening the monarchy and unifying the country would be difficult to exaggerate. The whole organization was completed under royal control, papal sanction being little more than a matter of form. The *Suprema*, which managed the Inquisition, was merely one of the royal councils; and the officers of the Inquisition, from the Inquisitor-General downwards, were paid servants of the Crown, which could appoint or dismiss them at its pleasure. Also, except for a brief period (1507—17), there was but one Inquisition and one Inquisitor-General for the whole of Spain . . . Popular tradition dies so hard that it is still necessary to point out that the Spanish Inquisition, judged by the standards of the times, was neither cruel nor unjust in its procedure and its penalties. In many ways it was more just and humane than almost any other tribunal in Europe.[48]

Walter Starkie, another historian of today, has this to say:

The word 'inquisition' which in Latin means a 'formal investigation,' has become so sinister a word that it has given an absurdly false idea of Spain to the foreigner. Many simple souls firmly believe that it was only in Spain that people were persecuted, tortured and burned at the stake, and unscrupulous publicists are always able to rouse the ignorant masses to a riot of indignation against the Spanish Government of the day by a few veiled references to the Inquisition. People who in other matters possess sane common sense and the virtue of being able to see both sides of a question, assume an air of selfsatisfied complacency when they accuse the Spaniards of cruelty, bloodlust, fanaticism, intolerance. To hear them talk one would imagine that other countries had never tortured and burned heretics, whereas the truth is that the 'pain of death' against heretics was common to all European countries and to all confessions in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[49]

Still another historian of our times adds, and rightly so: "But the Inquisition cannot be judged or even considered apart from the age in which it was framed."[50]

Let us return to Isabella and her true attitude towards the Inquisition and heresy. Two years after its establishment, she expressed herself as being opposed to the cruel punishment of heretics. She spoke of heresy

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[47] Prescott, *Ferdinand and Isabella*, I, 343, n. 27.

[48] R. Trevor Davies, *Golden Century of Spain, 1501—1621* (London, 1937), 12—13.

[49] Walter Starkie, *op. cit.*, 161—162.

[50] Reginald Merton, *Cardinal Ximenes and the Making of Spain* (London, 1934), 35.

as that horrible sin (pecado orrible), and the urgent need of cleansing her subjects of it. However, she reminded those in charge of the Inquisition and the execution of its judgments to be mindful of the command of God and Holy Mother Church to make use of all gentle means, sound doctrine and good example to draw the erring to the Faith; that only those means were to be enforced which complied with the precepts and regulations of the sacred canons and not the cruel punishment by fire. She particularly pleaded that none, once having been Christians, be subjected to that penalty, for, she explained, it was inhuman and cruel to burn anyone calling on the name of Christ, professing to be a Christian and desiring to live as one. These are Pulgar's words:

E que considerada la piedad de Dios y lo que la Sancta Madre Iglesia manda usuar en este caso, con dulces racones y blandas amonestaciones e con buenas doctrinas y enexemplos se devían traer a la Fé aquellos errados. E seguiendo los precebtos y reglas de los santos cánones, los devían reducir e admitir en las penas que leyes disponen, e no con aquella cruel pena del fuego. Especialmente aquellos que confesavan su yerro e se convertian a la Fé de Cristo, Nuestro Redentor; porque decian que era cosa ynumana y cruel llevar al fuego a ninguno que llamava el nombre de Cristo, e confesava ser cristiano, e quería biuir como cristiano.[51]

On January 19, 1479, King Juan II of Aragon died and his son, Ferdinand, succeeded him on the throne. That year marked the beginning of the period properly called the reign of the Catholic Kings.[52]

Isabella remained Queen of Castile; Ferdinand became King of Aragon. The two kingdoms continued to be distinct entities politically. It was a dual monarchy and not the fusion of two into one. The royal pair had to face social and economic problems, each within his or her kingdom, but one objective loomed as the most important to both. The soil of Spain had to be fully reconquered from the Moor. Never did Isabella waver in this task. Although her subordinates were often discouraged, she constantly spurred their flagging spirits and frequently rode on the field of battle, superbly mounted and in complete armor. Her appearance on the battlefield inpired the Spanish soldiers in their darkest and bitterest hours. The Queen felt an irresistible moral urge to conquer the infidel.

The Catholic Kings, however, kept a sharp eye on matters of state, even while preparing for the final drive against the Moors. Isabella, genuinely religious, was constantly aware of the limits between political and ecclesiastical power. She strongly desired that appointment to

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[51] Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter 120, 439—440.
[52] Rafael Altamira, *A History of Spain*, 261.

benefices and church administrative positions should go to Spaniards rather than to foreigners. It was on this point that she clashed fearlessly with Pope Sixtus the Fourth. The occasion was the appointment by the Pope of his nephew, a native of Genoa, and a Cardinal, to the See of Cuenca in Spain. The Crown, who had been protesting the matter, refused to give an inch. The Pope capitulated to the Crown's wishes by appointing Fray Alonso de Burgos, Bishop of Cordova, to Cuenca. Thereafter, the King and Queen adopted the policy of suggesting the names of candidates for all such appointments and the Papacy acquiesced. A transcendental practice had been confirmed.

In gaining this point, the Crown appealed to precedent in Spanish history. It maintained that Pontiffs in the past had accorded Spanish kings the privilege of selecting their nominees for ecclesiastical posts.[53] There had been such a practice, of that there is no doubt. Before the existence of the Visigothic State and its close union with the Catholic Church, the Catholic bishops were chosen in the traditional manner by clergy and people, and were approved by the bishops of the province. After the Visigothic State came into being, the kings made episcopal appointments.

This tremendous power of the king over the Church, the taproot of evil for the Church in the medieval world appears to have been asserted almost from the time of the Gothic conversion to Catholicism. The Arian kings enjoyed this prerogative in their own sect; the same right was claimed or assumed by their Catholic successors.[54]

Prescott alleges that the Pope acceded to the demand because he feared the unendurable exposure of corruption and abuse in the Church, threatened by the Sovereigns of Spain, who proposed calling a council of all Christian princes to discuss the issue involved.[55] That Ferdinand and Isabella proposed the calling of such a council is true, but there is no basis for the implication that they threatened an exposure of the nature described by Prescott. The more likely explanation is that the Pope realized that the princes, for purely political reasons, would inevitably agree with the contention of Ferdinand and Isabella, since it would give them all greater control over the Church in their respective realms. Merriman correctly adduces political reasons,[56] while Pulgar

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[53] Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter 125, 542.

[54] Aloysius K. Ziegler, "Church and State in Visigothic Spain," *Studia Theologica* (Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., 1930), no. 32—35, 44.

[55] Prescott, *Ferdinand and Isabella*, I, 316.

[56] Roger Bigelow Merriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and the New* (New York, 1918), Vol. II, 153—154.

supplies no evidence for Prescott's wild statement of fear of exposure of corruption in the Church. Starkie appraises Prescott's history of Ferdinand and Isabella by saying that it

may be regarded as the classic on the period. Its erudition and shrewd sketches of personality still fascinate the reader and guide him to the contemporary chroniclers. Nevertheless, Prescott wrote with all the prejudice of a nineteenth-century Puritan from the New World. Many of his judgments have to be reversed today, when we try to ascertain what was the spirit of the folk of the fifteenth century.[57]

The incident of Cuenca and its final solution, which gave the Crown the right of presentation, had a far-reaching effect in the establishment of the Church in the New World, after the discovery. It is significant in the consideration of the background. Isabella possessed a deep faith; but sentiment did not cloud her clear vision. With the added power gained in the conflict over appointment to Church positions, came a more profound responsibility, of which she became conscious.

In things spiritual, she recognized the full authority of the Head of Christendom. At the marriage ceremony of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Archbishop of Toledo publicly announced that the required dispensation from the impediment of consanguinity had been granted by Pius II. Years later, Isabella was stricken with genuine consternation when she discovered that Ferdinand had forged the document and that actually the dispensation had not been obtained. She immediately sought complete exculpation in the affair for the peace of her conscience, and had the marriage regularized.[58] Isabella obtained the dispensation desired from Sixtus IV, the very Pontiff whom she fought tooth and nail for the rights of the *Patronato Real*. In this instance she did not demand, but pleaded for and begged humbly the dispensation that only the Pope could give. In matters pertaining to the spiritual domain, Isabella did not falter.

The expulsion of the Jews from Spain in the month of July, 1492, stemmed from her firm religious beliefs. This action affected some one hundred and sixty thousand souls. Bernáldez, who baptized ten or twelve rabbis, gives this number. One of the baptized rabbis, Zentollo, to whom Bernáldez gave the Christian name of Tristan Bogado, estimated that to be the number of Jews subject to the Crown.[59] The order of expulsion, to be effective if peaceful means of conversion failed, must

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[57] Walter Starkie, *Grand Inquisitor*, 480.
[58] A. Paz y Melia, "Notas Biograficas e Historicas," *El Cronista, Alonso de Palencia* (Madrid, 1914), 419.
[59] Bernáldez, *History*, I, Chapter 110, 338.

be judged in the light of that day's political thinking. Christianity was the cardinal philosophy of the country, as much as democracy is the political dogma in the United States of America today. Communism is considered a threat to democracy and we find in the United States laws being adopted to oust communists from its political life, from its labor unions, from its educational institutions. The Spain of Isabella's day feared the growth of Judaism within its borders as a serious threat to its Christian Faith. The Queen clearly expressed herself on the necessity of eliminating religious heresy from Spain as early as 1478. There is nothing unique about the position of the Crown, Spain or Isabella on this matter. In our own times, the present Queen of England, when she opened Parliament in October, 1952, had to make an affirmation that she is and will remain a Protestant. When she is crowned in June, 1953, she must answer "I will" to the following oath:

Will you, to the utmost of your power, maintain in the United Kingdom the Protestant reformed religion established by law? And will you maintain and preserve inviolably the settlement of the Church of England, and the doctrine, worship, discipline and government thereof, as by law established in England? And will you preserve unto the bishops and clergy of England and to the churches committed to their charge all such rights and privileges as by law do and shall appertain to them or any of them?[60]

When Isabella was informed that, through the departure of a noticeable number of Jews, Spain would suffer a decline in population and material prosperity, she is said to have replied, naturally, that it was better so than to have the land tainted with heresy.[61]

Isabella was equally inexorable with Catholics. They fell within the jurisdiction of the Inquisition and she thereby had an effective weapon with which to deal with them. She travelled through Spain and took a personal interest in its religious life. She gave alms without ostentation and often in secret; she desired churches to be decently kept; she visited monasteries and other religious houses, at her own volition, and saw to it that religious life was in keeping with religious constitutions and regulations; she was always aiming at the attainment of conscientious observation of Catholic life in all its phases.[62] She was a perfectionist.

Her asserted privilege of nominating ecclesiastics was one thing; that of making provision for a learned and holy clergy was another. That was the duty of the Pope. No Spanish sovereign had ever so

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[60] Cf. *The Evangelist*, Vol. XXVII, No. 42, Albany, New York, Friday, December 5, 1952.
[61] Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter 96, 337.
[62] Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter 24, 77.

wholeheartedly and zealously entreated the Father of Christendom for the formation of a clergy of the highest caliber.[63] It was her custom to reward eminent members of the clergy with the most influential and important positions. There is nothing but truth in the statement that the Queen was devoted to her Faith. Spain was to her a vast diocese; and she its bishop to a feasible extent.

It should be explained in passing that the Catholic Church has always stressed reform, the emendation of life for all her children. The Catholic Church's statements on reform can easily be misunderstood, even as can those of Isabella's day. The call for reform does not imply corruption. It is rooted in the fallen nature of mankind that human beings are weak and prone to err. Every single year, the Pope himself makes a retreat, the prime purpose of which is the amendment if his life to a greater degree of perfection. He spends eight days in prayer, meditation and listening to four conferences and meditations daily. A retreat master delivers the four discourses each day. The Pope listens and prays that his mind will be illumined so that he might know himself more nearly as the all-searching eye of God sees his soul. Retreats are mandatory on all cardinals, priests, nuns, brothers, on all who have dedicated their lives to the Church. A goodly number of lay Catholics also make retreats. A retreat is a time set aside with an eye to the reform of one's life. Retreats must be made once a year. The Church never stops talking about personal reform but that does not signify that her members are corrupt. The object of constant reform is to make one's life more nearly conformable to the model who is Christ.

Isabella did not attempt to improve the doctrine of the Catholic Church or to change it from what it has been since Apostolic times. To do so would have enmeshed her in the very heresy she abhored. The key principle of her policy, in both private and public life, was that all her subjects — Jew, Moor and Catholic — had to live according to sound Christian Doctrine. Ultimately, that was the policy that crystalliz- ed in her lifetime and became securely established in her kingdom before she died. She ruled Spain like a stern schoolmaster, who expels from his school those not measuring up to the standards; like a business man who discharges an incompetent manager; like a social club that rids itself of undesirable members. Isabella would not tolerate a lax clergy, nor unruly Spanish subjects, nor heretics, nor infidels. Historians laud her for reforming the clergy but condemn her for uprooting heresy and

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[63] Pulgar, *Crónica*, I, Chapter 25, 77.

for expelling the outright infidel. To most historians, she is perfectly right when she exercises her religious ardor toward the clergy but equally wrong when she does so toward heretics and infidels. Isabella was consistent but too many historians fail to grasp her consistency.

Such is an insight into the personality and character of Queen Isabella, the Catholic, who dared rebuke even Columbus, the discoverer of the Indies, for selling its natives into slavery. When Isabella declared that she wanted the conversion and civilization of the Indians accomplished through humane treatment, she meant every word of it. Her deathbed wish was in harmony with her constant desire throughout her fruitful reign in Spain.

Be it understood, Isabella did not christianize Spain. Catholicism in Spain is as old as the Catholic Church itself. The desire of St. Paul to visit Spain is contained in the Book of Books, the Bible (Rom. 15:24, 28). That he preached the Gospel there is established by the Muratorian Fragment (of the second century).[64] The Catholic Faith has prevailed in Spain ever since Apostolic times. The Spanish won the Visigoths away from the heresy of Arianism. They kept their Catholic Faith despite seven gruelling centuries of conflict with Mohammedanism. When Isabella came to the throne, the tree of the Catholic Faith had been growing for over fourteen hundred years, with its roots sunk deep in the soil of the land. Isabella, by her reforms, pruned that tree. At the same time, she gave Spain, for weal or woe, a strong central government.

To the people of the twentieth century, Isabella is an unbelievable character, viewed as a Sovereign. This is the reason for having to explain her life and history in broad outlines. To know and understand her is to know the Spain she moulded. The Spain she created provided the background for Spanish colonial life in America. In that colonial life, the missionaries were the principal sowers of the seed of the Catholic Faith in the hearts of the people of the New World.

CHAPTER III

TWENTY-FIFE CRITICAL YEARS, 1492—1517

In a period of twenty-five years, from 1492 to 1517, much of major importance happened in Spain and beyond Spain's confines. The year 1492 marked the epochal discovery of Columbus, the Italian navigator

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[64] "Spain," *Catholic Biblical Encyclopedia* (New York, 1950), 604.

in the employ of Castile, who sailed in search of a direct route to the East Indies and stumbled upon some islands in the "unknown" world of the western hemisphere. Those islands have been called the West Indies and the natives of the New World, Indians, for Columbus actually thought he had reached his intended destination and perhaps died in that conviction.

The year 1517 brought the grandson of Queen Isabella to the throne of Spain as King Charles I. In the extreme use of his imagination he could not have suspected what immense reaches of territory would come within the orbit of his political jurisdiction. He was but seventeen years old. Before he abdicated, in favor of his son Philip II, in the year 1556, his domains embraced a great portion of Europe, northern Africa, parts of Asia, and extensive stretches of both North and South America. Only Australia, then uninhabited by the white man, lay beyond the limits of his political authority. He was still fresh on the throne of Spain when Cortés startled Europe with his discovery and conquest of the Aztec Empire, which collapsed on August 13, 1521. Thither King Charles, who had become Emperor, would send missionaries. There Motolinía, Sahagún and Zumárraga would labor, inevitably influencing Spanish policy toward the Indians.

When Charles became king, Spain and her missionaries had been in possession of the islands for twenty-five critical years. It is this period which now concerns us. What happened in Spain itself politically and what Spain tried to do for the natives of the islands during these years is of utmost importance to the working out of Indian policy. During this period the reins of government changed hands rather frequently in Spain. Also, in the islands there were changes of administration in the attempt to establish a successful Spanish colonial government.

Queen Isabella, who had expended so much of her energy in the conquest of Granada from the Moors, and who became the first European sovereign to hold possessions in both the Old World and in the New, ruled Castile until 1504. Domestic calamities took their toll of her life. Her health was impaired from incessant fatigue. Her only son Prince Juan, in whom she placed the hopes of Spain's political future, died prematurely in 1497. Her own mother, a distinct source of joy to her, had passed away in 1496. On December 7, 1492, she almost lost her husband, who was grievously wounded in the back of the head and on the shoulder by a would-be assassin. In 1503, Ferdinand became seriously ill and Isabella nursed him back to health while she succumbed to illness herself a year later. She died on November 26, 1504, at the age

of 53 years, 7 months and 3 days, having reigned 29 years, 5 months and 14 days.[65]

She went to her grave with a heart burdened with family sorrow, naming her daughter Jane heir to the throne of Castile, though fully aware of her mental illness. Jane had married the Archduke Philip of Austria, son of Emperor Maximilian of Germany. Queen Isabella had been distressed at the treatment of her daughter at the hands of her son-in-law. At any rate Spain's incomparable Queen was gone. Gucciardini, the Florentine ambassador, had remarked of her years before: "I must note a paradox in this Kingdom of Castile, for the Queen is King and the King is her servant." The stern disciplinarian who never spared herself was no longer at the helm. How would Spain fare?

Philip, who disliked Spain deeply, was now desirous of returning with his wife from Flanders to Spain. Jane was the sole heir of Castile and the new Queen. It was his ambition to be king. He was only twenty-seven years old and seemingly with a long life before him, though he was a total stranger to Spain and unsympathetic to its way of life. Eventually, Philip and his Queen arrived in Spain. Ferdinand, recognizing the rights of his daughter and the desire of Philip that he leave the kingdom, withdrew to Aragon, leaving Philip as King of Castile. But it was not for long. One day, September 25, 1506, after a game of tennis, Philip caught cold, and died six days later. The Queen, his wife, whom he contrived to have esconced somewhere,[66] now had to assume responsibilities she could not meet. Castile besought Ferdinand to hasten back to take hold of the reins of government. Ferdinand dragged his feet. He stopped at Rome and received the cardinal's hat for Ximénez, the Archbishop of Toledo, who had been *de facto* ruler of Spain in the interim between the death of King Philip and the return of Ferdinand. His actual status was that of president[67] of the regency formed on the eve of Philip's death. More than eight months later, on June 4, 1507, Ferdinand left Naples in no particular hurry, ostensibly, to reach Castile.

Ferdinand, the Sovereign, had been consistently interested in European affairs, especially in wars in Italy. As regent of Castile, he now had a stake in the New World that gradually grew in importance. As time passed, it absorbed more of his energies. Early in his regency, he planned the formal colonization of the New World, which heretofore

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[65] Baltasar Porreño, *Dos Tratados Históricos . . . Cardenal Ximénez de Cisneros*, La Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles (Madrid, 1918), 87.

[66] Porreño, *op. cit.*, 126.

[67] Don Modesto Lafuente, *Historia General de España*, Illustrated ed., 6 vols. (Barcelona, 1877—82), II, 391.

had been largely left to chance. "En esas tierras el Rey tiene el proposito de establecerse y levantar castillos."[68]

It was Peter Martyr (Pedro Mártir de Anglería) who acted now somewhat in the capacity of a one-man clearinghouse for all the information reaching Spain from the New World to keep Ferdinand informed. As an official of the royal court of Castile, Peter was enabled from that vantage point to gather news, sift and digest it quickly and then reduce it to writing. The entire court, as well as King Ferdinand himself, was pleased to listen to news from across the seas.[69] At times, the King would receive with honor and personally hear natives taken to Spain, as he did in the instance of Caizedo and Colmenares, inhabitants of Darién.[70] The King and palace officials, avid for accounts of what went on overseas, frequently visited the home of Peter Martyr.[71] Hardly any adventurer arriving at the court failed to call on him, or at least write him, of events and occurrences. Numbered among his callers, in the course of years, were Columbus, Vasco Da Gama, Vespucci, and Magellan.

Peter Martyr is generally considered the first historian of the Americas.[72] A highly reputable scholar of our day declares that Peter Martyr is a careful and impartial observer, a scrupulous and diligent narrator.[73] It is this historian, much consulted and respected by subsequent historians,[74] who records the devotion of certain Indians of Cuba to the Blessed Mother of God, and of her appearances to them in beautiful white garments,[75] years before the apparition of Our Lady of Guadalupe. He also relates how some Indians invoked the Devil and adduces proof of diabolical intervention.[76] The Catholic Faith gleams through his writings. Both natural and supernatural happenings find a place in his works; sacred and profane events alike are chronicled by him. He, more than Las Casas deserves perhaps the appelation of the last medieval historian of modern Europe. He wrote with facility, being perfectly at home with his subject, and does not seem to be attempting to describe

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[68] Pedro Mártir de Anglería, *Décadas del Nuevo Mundo* (Buenos Aires, 1944), 107. Henceforth to be cited as Anglería, *Décasas*.

[69] *Ibid.*, 168.

[70] *Ibid.*, 167.

[71] *Ibid.*, 168.

[72] A. Curtis Wilgus, *Histories and Historians of Hispanic America* (New York, 1942), 3.

[73] Augustín Millares Carlo, "Noticias Biográficas" in *Pedro Mártir de Anglería*, Biblioteca Enciclopedica Popular (Mexico, 1945), No. 51, vii.

[74] Prescott, *Ferdinand and Isabella*, II, 75.

[75] Anglería, *op. cit.*, 163—164.

[76] *Ibid.*, 169. Moral evil proves there is a devil. For a humorous treatment of the machinations of Satan in everyday life, Cf. C. S. Lewis, *The Screwtape Letters* (New York, 1948).

the interior of a building he had never entered. This historian who has imparted to multitudes the epochal story of the New World from 1492 to the date of his death in 1526 is the selfsame person who kept Ferdinand abreast of developments in the possessions beyond the seas until that sovereign, as Porreño puts it, surrendered his soul to God on January 23, 1516.[77]

Again Cardinal Ximénez was called upon to take over the governmental helm of Castile. He constitutes the connecting link between Queen Isabella and Ferdinand, rulers of the diarchy of Castile and Aragon, and the coming to power of Charles I that united the two monarchies into a single one. Queen Isabella chose this plain Franciscan friar as her confessor in 1492, when he was approximately fifty-six years old. She selected him to be the Archbishop of Toledo over the remonstrances of her husband, who in time learned to value the ingenious friar and secured for him in Rome the cardinal's hat he brought to him in Spain. From the moment of Isabella's selection as her confessor, the prestige, the influence and the stature of the great Cardinal increased, and were never diminished to the moment of his death. A saintly man, stern and unbending with himself first of all, he demanded strict observance of a Christian life by both the regular and the diocesan clergy. His own Franciscan brethren thought him far too severe.[78] But he enforced the Franciscan rule of life without deviation from the strict vow of poverty, obedience to bishops, and renunciation of all that was mundane. Pope Honorius III, centuries before, when approached by St. Francis of Assisi for the approval of the Franciscan rule, had reminded the Poverello from the Umbrian hills that it seemed too much to expect from human nature. The earnest Cardinal insisted on the rigorous observance of the rule in his day. The basic reform among the diocesan clergy, instituted by Queen Isabella through the influence of Ximénez, pertained to material possessions. Emoluments that were justly theirs but which had become excessive for men who should exhibit a spirit of sacrifice were, in large part, withdrawn. As adviser to the Queen in matters of Faith the Cardinal did his most lasting work. An appreciation of his religious zeal will provide an insight into the genuine religious aspect of the Spanish conquest of America.

The same Ximénez who strove to eliminate laxity among the catholics of Spain in the practice of their faith; the Ximénez who personally preached the faith among the Moors of Granada, is the person who most

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[77] Porreño, *op. cit.*, 186.
[78] Lafuente, *op. cit.*, II, 356.

desired the conversion of the Indians. He was thoroughly in love with his Catholic Faith. He set an example for the missionaries to the New World in his earnest and personal appeal to the Moors in 1499 to abandon Mohammedanism and embrace Catholicism. One of his biographers, Reginald Merton, gives him high praise for reforming the lax catholics of Spain. He lauds his zeal. But when that same zeal is exercised in winning the Moors, the same author brands it as fanatical. Not uncommonly English historians seem to have a dual standard. Yet, the same author, it is to be noted, declares that Cardinal Ximénez was consistent in his faith throughout his life.[79] That the Cardinal was consistent is granted; that the Cardinal's zeal mysteriously became fanatism when employed toward the Moors cannot be granted. Nor is it true that he used force in the conversion of the Moors. This is a false charge.[80] His principal method in making converts was to win leaders among the unbelievers.[81] These would win the others. With all his sterness and austerity, he was characteristically kind. He bestowed gifts on the Moors. The instructed and baptized Moors were not the ones who mutinied. This is a fact of paramount importance to bear in mind.

He realized that Mohammedanism was the greatest foe of Christian Europe in his day. He desired the defeat of the enemy, not only in northern Africa but also in Palestine, the land of the Savior of the world. More than anything else, he yearned to see Jerusalem in the hands of Christians.[82]

Cardinal Ximénez was firmly convinced that a devout and learned clergy would redound to the glory of Spain and the Catholic Church. Accordingly, he founded the University of Alcalá de Henares, not far from Madrid. He laid the cornerstone in 1500.[83] To the principal college, St. Ildefonso, he added six subordinate colleges: the Tri-lingual College, the College of Metaphysics, Physics, Logic, and two Colleges of Grammar.[84] Theology, humanities and science were basic studies. Porreño devotes some seventy-five pages of his book[85] to the naming of outstand-

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[79] Reginald Merton, *Cardinal Ximénez and the Making of Spain* (London, 1934), 78.
[80] Pedro de Quintanilla y Mendoza, *Archetypo de Virtudes. Espejo de Prelados ... F. Francisco Ximenez de Cisneros* (Palermo, 1653), 57.
[81] *Ibid.*, 55.
[82] Don Pascual Gayangos y Don Vicente de la Fuente, ed., *Cartas del Cardenal Don Fray Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros dirigidas a Don Diego López de Avala* (Madrid, 1867), 191.
[83] Porreño, *op. cit.*, 341.
[84] *Ibid.*, 342.
[85] *Ibid.*, 359—444.

ing scholars graduated from the university and mentions their chief writings and publications. The written treatises range in subject from mathematics and commentaries on Galen to the liturgy and the ritual. Men went out from this University to teach at Oxford and the Sorbonne in Paris.

The Cardinal provided for the education of women.[86] He also thought of poor students, and set aside special endowments for intelligent youngsters who might not otherwise have an opportunity of entering the university.[87] He did not forget that professors need relaxation and had quarters which they could use for rest and leisure.[88] For sick students he established a university hospital.[89]

His deep reverence for the Word of God led to his famous undertaking of the Complutensian Polyglot Bible. This project, which he began in 1508,[90] contained the Sacred Scriptures in the four languages of Greek, Latin, Hebrew and Aramaic in four parallel columns. He was likewise responsible for the preservation of the Mozarabic Rite, still used in Toledo, Spain. He preserved what otherwise might have been lost.

Cardinal Ximénez, the first Inquisitor General of all Spain, knew that force had to be repelled with force. During his regency (1516—1517), he established a military organization to confront the nobles and Navarrese who threatened rebellion.[91] While Prince Charles delayed his coming, the Cardinal kept order in the kingdom at great sacrifice. Repeatedly, he besought the Prince to hasten from his native Flanders to take over the reins of government in Spain. But the Prince tarried, insisting on being named king in his own name, in contravention of the stipulation in Isabella's will that Jane was to be Queen as long as she lived. Incidentally, she did not die until April 11, 1555. Despite the opposition of the Cortes, Ximénez, with great reluctance, proclaimed Charles King of Spain.[92]

A pestilence raged in Spain in the midst of these trying days and news of the failing health of Spain's venerable prelate spread from mouth to mouth. At long last, word came that Charles had left Flanders for Spain. The sick and aged Cardinal prepared to go to meet his young

[86] Merton, *op. cit.*, 138.

[87] *Ibid.*, 134.

[88] *Ibid.*, 189.

[89] Quintanilla, *op. cit.*, 183.

[90] *Ibid.*, 176.

[91] Lafuente, *op. cit.*, II, 421.

[92] Rafael Altamira y Crevea, *Historia de España y de la Civilización Española* (Barcelona, 1902), II, 402—403.

King. He got as far as Roa and could go no farther. Charles I, newly
designated King, thanks to the Cardinal, made no effort to reach the
dying prelate. Like his father, Philip I, he arrived in Spain surrounded
by Flemish courtiers, retainers and advisers. The Cardinal begged in
vain for one interview with the seventeen year old King, but the Flemish
courtiers feared the influence of the saintly and learned Churchman who
had for so many years been the chief adviser to Isabella and Ferdinand
and had been now governing Spain for Charles for almost two years.
The Cardinal, who had observed the mistakes of Philip the Handsome,
was more than well-equipped to give sound counsel to his son.[93] But this
was not to be. Instead, the King wrote a final letter, suggestion that the
Cardinal return to his diocese to rest and there await the recompense of
his labors, which only Heaven could give. "Se retirase a su diocesis a
descansar y aguardar del cielo la recompensa de sus merecimientos."[94]
With that act of black ingratitude, Charles I began his reign.

The great Cardinal, who had watched, prayed and worked indefati-
gably for Castile, for Spain, and for Christian civilization; who had ad-
vised Queen Isabella, King Ferdinand, Queen Jane and King Philip,
and who had befriended many of lesser rank, passed on at a critical
moment without being heard. In experience, he towered over those in
authority in 1517 like a cypress over a grove of dwarfed oaks. Before
breathing his last, he made a general confession of his life to Fr. Diego
Machado on Saturday, November 7, and received Viaticum, after which
Vespers and Compline of the Dead were chanted. The destinies of
Spain had fallen on young and inexperienced shoulders, on one who
was a foreignet to Spain and things Spanish.

For our purpose, the importance of Cardinal Ximénez lies in his
intense catholicity. He illustrated eminently in his life the twin traits
of true catholic leadership: knowledge and holiness. Of the two the
Catholic Church gives preeminence to holiness. The Cardinal was truly
a saintly man.[95] His historic and scholarly work on the Bible gives
ample evidence of both his love of learning and holiness. The Sacred
Word of God the missionaries would impart to the Indians. He establish-
ed churches, schools and hospitals. He provided for the whole of man,
body and soul. So would the missionaries trained in his day do in the
New World. Love of God and neighbor, of all men, was fundamental in
his life. He never placed his whole reliance on natural resources. The

[93] Quintanilla, *op. cit.*, 292—293.
[94] Rafael Altamira y Crevea, *op. cit.*, 403.
[95] Esprit Fléchier, *Histoire du Cardinal Ximénes*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam,
1693), II, 872—73.

supernatural permeated his life. It motivated his actions. As a missionary to the Moors, he won many to the Faith; as Archbishop and Cardinal of Toledo, he administered the affairs of the Church; as regent of Castile, he ruled firmly and wisely, proving himself an excellent governor; as builder of colleges and an outstanding university, he showed his love of learning. It is interesting to note how the early missionaries to the New World exemplified the same virtues in their endeavors to civilize and Christianize the Indians. Only thus can the magnificent work of men like Motolinía, Sahagún and Zumárraga be understood.

His accomplishments were to have a direct bearing on the New World. It was during this period that missionaries went out to evangelize the Indians. They came from a clergy whom he had imbued with renewed fervor. Though he himself was a Franciscan, he had, as confidant of Queen Isabella, exerted his influence over all of the clergy, both diocesan and regular, in her domains. The colleges he founded focused attention on the necessity of thorough training in language, art, and science. Demetrio Cretense, Antonio de Nebrija, Lopez Zúñiga, Fernando el Pinciano, were brilliant professors of classical languages, attracted by Ximénez to Alcalá.[96] The missionaries to the New World would be confronted with a diversity of languages. In setting up two colleges of Grammar, the Cardinal evinced a deep insight into the needs of the times. The hospitals he had constructed for students at Alcalá and soldiers at Orán showed still further his regard for the corporal as well as the spiritual works of mercy. In accomplishing all this, he was enunciating no new doctrine but merely adhering to the age old doctrine preached by Christ himself.

The basic, elemental doctrine of Christianity as regards human beings holds that human beings are created by God in His own image and likeness; that Christ died for all without exception; that one single human being, however lowly, is worth more than the physical sun plus all other tangible treasures. Like the rainbow that arches the sky, the influence of Cardinal Ximénez for good extended from Spain to the New World.

With all this background it will be easier to trace the development of Spain's administrative policy as regards the New World. At Santa Fe, in Granada, on February 17, 1492, a contract between the Catholic Kings and a heretofore "unknown" dreamer was drawn up. The con-

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[96] Hemeterio Suaña y Castellet, *Elogio del Cardenal Jimenez de Cisneros . . . Estudio Critico Biografico del Maestro Elio Antonio de Nebrija* (Madrid, 1879), 52.

tract conferred on Christopher Columbus the title of viceroy, the most important aspect of the agreement; this made Columbus ruler in the name of the Crown of Spain. Further, Columbus had the power to name mayors and constables of villages and cities established. These and other powers enjoyed by Columbus made him master, virtually, of all that he discovered. In the contract the Crown had implicit, reserved rights which it asserted before Columbus sailed on his second voyage,[97] and eventually led to the replacement of Columbus by a royal governor.

From the inception of Spanish colonization in America, two schools of thought appeared as regarded the treatment of the Indians. One favored their enslavement; the other vehemently subscribed to the proposition that Indians were free men and could not be enslaved. Queen Isabella took her stand in favor of Indian freedom, and this set the official pattern for royal policy. She decreed, on June 20, 1500, that all Indians brought to Spain from the New World and sold into slavery were to be set free and returned to their native land.[98]

By royal ordinance of March 9, 1501, the Crown, convinced of the inability of Columbus to be an effective administrator, appointed as governor and supreme justice Nicolás de Ovando, Knight of the Order of Calatrava. In his instructions is found the first concrete expression of the Crown's humane and Christian policy toward the natives. The instructions were motivated by Queen Isabella's profound religious convictions and deep faith. The gist of the instructions, given before Las Casas ever set foot in the New World, was that

. . . all the Indians of Española be freed from forced labor; that they be in no wise molested; that they be allowed to live as free vassals and governed with the same justice as it meted out to the vassals of the kings of Castile; that the governor take steps for their conversion to and instruction in the Holy Catholic Faith. Further, that no violence be done them; that they be well treated; and that their caciques be informed of these wishes of Their Highnesses; that information be gathered concerning the Indians who had been sent to Castile, in order that these might be returned; that the Indians pay tribute; that they gather gold but for wages . . . that they pay tithes and the first fruits to the Church as Catholic Christians . . .[99]

In order to bring the Indians within the framework of the economic, social and political life of the colony, Queen Isabella issued new instructions, modifications of former ones, on December 20, 1503. As a result

[97] José María Ots Capdequí, *Manual de Historia del Derecho Español en las Indias* (Buenos Aires, 1945), 351.
[98] Capdequí, *op. cit.*, 201.
[99] Bannon-Dunne, *Latin America. A Historical Survey* (Milwaukee, 1947; second printing, 1950), 88.

the encomienda system began to unfold. Indians were entrusted to specified Spaniards who held lands, the number apportioned depending on the office held by the recipient. Hence, the Spaniards who received the Indians were called encomenderos, the word derived from the Spanish verb *encomendar*, to entrust. Each encomendero had an encomienda. The encomenderos, to whom the Indians were entrusted, made use of their services (economic aspect); paid a peso of gold per year for each Indian entrusted to them (fiscal aspect); and were to instruct the Indians in the Catholic Faith and inform them on it (spiritual aspect).[100] Roaming Indians, without settled habitation, could hardly be civilized. Hence, the encomienda seemed to be a good solution to the problem.

El 20 de diciembre de 1503, recibidos los informes de Ovando, Isabel la Católica dictó en Medina del Campo una cédula que consagró legalmente los repartimientos de indios, aceptando, contra lo mandado en la instrucción anterior de marzo, el trabajo *forzoso* de los indígenas, aunque se les debía pagar salario por ser hombres libres, como se había declarado desde los primeros años de la colonización. La cédula de Medina del Campo explicaba, que habiéndose declarado la absoluta libertad de los indios conforme a las primeras instrucciones dadas a Ovando, huían de la comunicación de los cristianos y no querían trabajar ni con paga y que tampoco se les podía doctrinar . . .[101]

In 1504, three days before she died, Isabella dictated a codicil to her will. She entreated again that the natives of the New World be justly treated and amends be made for any mistreatment of them. That was the last official act of the Queen.

But there is many a slip between the cup and the lip, and abuses crept into the encomienda system. The encomenderos neglected the personal welfare of their charges, while they exploited their personal services. The missionaries, in particular Antonio de Montesino, inveighed against the abuses. As a result the Laws of Burgos were passed for which Antonio de Montesino is mainly responsible according to Hussey.[102] These thirty-five statutes were promulgated on December 27, 1512, after protestations made directly to King Ferdinand by Father Montesino.

Llevado el asunto al conocimiento de los reyes, produjo las deliberaciones de Burgos, en que chocaron las opuestas doctrinas de repartimiento, y de la libertad de los indios, según por Las Casas sabemos, principalmente. Resul-

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[100] Capdequí, *op. cit.*, 205.
[101] Silvio A. Zavala, *La Encomienda Indiana* (Madrid, 1935), 4.
[102] Roland D. Hussey, "Text of the Laws of Burgos (1512—1513) concerning the Treatment of the Indians" in *The Hispanic American Historical Review* (Durham, North Carolina, 1932), XII, 304.

tado de ellas fueron las llamadas Ordenanzas o Leyes de Burgos, de 27 diciembre de 1512, especie de compromiso o transacción entre las dos tesis, pero con notoria derrota de la de los dominicos, puesto que las dichas leyes sancionaron con carácter general el sistema de repartimiento, bien que rodeándolos de diversas garantías encaminadas a un trato humano de los indios.[103]

However, even before the enactment of these laws, protective legislation "had been developed very extensively"[104] by way of individual laws passed by the Crown, as the need dictated. In fact the Laws of Burgos had hardly been passed when they were modified. Fr. Pedro de Córdoba, recalled to Spain to answer for charges made by the missionaries, especially by Fr. Montesino, was offered the opportunity by King Ferdinand to revise the laws as he thought best but declined.[105] Nonetheless, the King called a junta to make necessary revisions. Five new regulations were proposed and four of them were duly proclaimed on July 28, 1513, as the "Clarification of the Ordinances" of Burgos already made.[106]

In 1516, Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, who stood foursquare against the encomienda system, brought his complaints to Cardinal Ximénez de Cisneros, then regent of Castile. He lent attentive ear to the fiery missionary and adopted a plan according to the suggestions of Las Casas, to rectify the injustices perpetrated against the helpless natives. In the Cardinal, as Capdequí phrases it, Las Casas had "Su ejecutor desde las altas esferas del gobierno . . ." (his executor in the high levels of government).[107]

The Cardinal set up a Commission of Jeronymite Friars to go to the New World, empowered with the authority of the Spanish government, to see what could be done to protect the Indians. He chose representatives from this religious order because they had none of their members as missionaries in the islands, thereby endeavoring to eliminate any charge of selfinterest. The Cardinal contemplated the total suppression of the encomienda system; he desired free villages established with the Indian caciques as rulers. If, in the last analysis, these and other alternatives proposed by him could not be effected and the repartimiento

[103] Rafael Altamira, "El Texto de las leyes de Burgos de 1512," in *Revista de Historia de América* (Mexico, 1938), No. 4, p. 68.

[104] Rafael Altamira, *A History of Spain* (New York, Toronto and London, 1949; reprinted, 1952), 408.

[105] Hussey, *op. cit.*, 305.

[106] *Ibid.*, 305.

[107] Capdequí, *op. cit.*, 205.

or encomienda system had to be retained, then the Laws of Burgos of 1512 and 1513 had to be fully enforced.[108]

The vociferous Las Casas was to accompany the Commission and was given the title of "Protector of the Indians." The Commission sailed in 1516, as did Las Casas, though on a different ship. But the next year the famed Cardinal died. King Charles had to have some time to get used to being king and was not readily persuaded to any immediate drastic action. By the time Charles got himself adjusted to regal life, Cortés had conquered Mexico. The imperial overseas horizon of Charles began rapidly to expand and the islands no longer commanded concentrated attention. For the time being the eye of the Emperor-king was rivetted on the Aztec Empire which had fallen to one of history's youngest conquerors — Cortés, who immediately called for missionaries.

One other aspect of Spanish colonial policy needs to be considered and that is the ecclesiastical. Columbus and his companions on the voyage of discovery, being thoroughly Catholic, gave expression to their religious convictions upon reaching the New World. Bernáldez, a historian of that day, takes pains to tell of the order in which Columbus named the lands to which he came. If this order is indicative of his sense of values, then Columbus rated his Faith first, the Sovereigns of Spain second, and the country of Spain third. According to Bernáldez,[109] the first strip of land on which Columbus set foot, he named San Salvador (Watling Islands, in the native tongue, Guanahani), in honor of Our Savior; the next island he called Santa Maria, out of devotion to the Mother of Our Savior; the third and the fourth were named Fernandina, out of deference to King Ferdinand, and Isabella, to show his esteem for the Queen. The fifth island was given the name Juana in honor of Prince John, the only son of the Catholic Kings. ". . . a la quinta isla que halló, puso nombre Juana, en memoria del Príncipe D. Juan . . ."[110] The next island was given the name Española (Little Spain), out of regard for the country that supported his "wild" adventure.

Were one disposed, it is possible to garner a fund of Catholic Doctrine from the multitude of names given during the early years of exploration, as well as later on. This is significant, since it was a practical expression of the work of evangelization so ardently desired by the Crown. For

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[108] *Ibid.*, 207.
[109] Andrés Bernáldez, *Historia de los Reyes Católicos* (Sevilla, 1869), Part I, 360—361.
[110] *Ibid.*, 360—361.

example, the first settlement in the New World founded on Christmas Day, 1492, was naturally named La Navidad (The Birth), in commemoration of the birth of the Son of God at Bethlehem. Trinidad, an early establishment on the island of Cuba, reminds us of the basic Christian teaching of the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity.[111] The Cuban city of Sancti Spiritus honors the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity, while Vera Cruz (True Cross) recalls the Crucifixion of Christ on Calvary. Los Angeles is named for the angels, created spirits having intelligence and free will but no bodies; Santa Fe, for the Catholic Faith to which those who chose the name adhered. Concepcion was used to refer to the Blessed Mother, the only human being conceived without original sin, that is, immaculately conceived (The Immaculate Conception). Fundamental Christian truths sparkled originally in many other names. Time has dimmed them somewhat because of the variations the names have undergone. Yet, the Christian light within them has not been altogether extinguished.

On his return to Spain, Columbus brought with him six Indian companions. Originally, there had been ten, but four had died on the way. The Indians must have been a strange sight, with golden rings dangling from their ears and wide nostrils, the color of their skin being neither black nor white, but bronce with reddish tints. Columbus explained they roamed naked in their native land. These six Indians were the first inhabitants of the New World to receive the Sacrament of Baptism.[112] The Sacrament was administered to them in Barcelona, with King Ferdinand and his son, John, acting as their godfathers.

With the baptism of the Indians, America "entered the Communion of Saints" writes Louis A. Dutto in his life of Las Casas.[113] This is an erroneously conclusion that is not in harmony with the spirit of Catholic Doctrine. Any person saving his soul is a saint and belongs to the Communion of Saints. The Catholic Church has never taught that no native ever saved his soul prior to the baptism of the six Indians. In fact the Catholic Church has always taught that one who follows the dictates

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[111] The doctrine of the Trinity is sublime. There is but one divine nature in the Godhead; but there are three divine persons. There is only one human nature; but millions of human persons. However, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost have the very selfsame divine nature in common. Human persons do not have their nature in common, strictly speaking. Their human nature is similar but not the same.

[112] Porreño, *op. cit.*, 55.

[113] Louis A. Dutto, *The Life of Bartolomé de las Casas* (St. Louis, 1902), 41—42.

of his conscience sincerely and does the best he knows in matters pertaining to his soul may attain salvation.[114]

The earnest desire for the conversion of the inhabitants of the countries and islands discovered, or to be discovered, was repeatedly expressed by Alexander VI, the Spaniard, who became Pope on August 11, 1492. He issued several bulls in 1493 in immediate succession regarding the line of territorial demarcation between Spain and Portugal. In the very first of these he charged the Crown with sending to the aforesaid countries and islands

. . . worthy, God-fearing, learned, skilled and experienced men in order to instruct the aforesaid inhabitants and dwellers therein in the Catholic Faith, and train them in good morals.[115]

The same urgent insistence is found in "Eximiae" — May 3, 1493, and in "Inter Coetera" — May 4, 1493.[116] On what grounds did the Pope base this obligation, imposed upon the Crown? He explained:

. . . we exhort you very earnestly in the Lord and insist strictly — both through your reception of holy baptism, whereby you are bound to our apostolic commands, and through the bowels of mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ, that inasmuch as with upright spirit and through zeal for the true faith you design to equip and despatch this expedition, you purpose also, as is your duty, to lead peoples dwelling in those islands to embrace the Christian profession . . .[117]

These selfsame documents did not authorize the Crown to take any and all territory in the New World upon which its agents might stumble. The Pope granted and assigned such countries as were discovered or might be discovered only in the case "they at no time have been in actual temporal possession of any Christian owner."

The church in the New World was committed to the Real Patronato and in this, the missionaries were affected. Juan de Solorzano, after a thorough study of the question, believed that the Kings of Spain would have enjoyed the privileges of the Real Patronato by virtue of prescription, even if Pope Julius II (1503—1513) made no such concessions to the New World. In the second bull of Alexander VI (1492—1503), however, are found the seeds of the Real Patronato. According to that bull, the

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[114] A Seminary Professor, *Exposition of Christian Doctrine* (New York, 1945), Part I, 441, n. 1. This refers to the Encyclical of His Holiness, Pius IX, August 10, 1863. For a concise distinction between the doctrine of the Communion of Saints and that of the Mystical Body of Christ, which the Rev. Dutto very likely had in mind, Cf. Steinmueller-Sullivan, *Catholic Biblical Encyclopedia* (New York, 1950), 132, 451—53.

[115] "Inter Coetera" — May 3, 1493, Blair and Robertson, 55 vols., *The Philippine Islands* (Cleveland, 1903—1909), I, 101.

[116] *Ibid.*, 103—111.

[117] *Ibid.*, 99—100.

Pope laid the duty of founding and endowing churches in the Indies on the shoulders of the Catholic Kings. In return for assuming this obligation, they obtained, in perpetuity, the tithes paid to the Church by the inhabitants.[118]

To conclude from this or any other royal prerogative that the rulers of Spain were the heads of the Church in Latin America is grossly false. In England the King did become the head of the Anglican Church. The Act of Supremacy in 1534, passed by the English parliament did appoint the king and his successors the *only Supreme Head of the Church and Clergy of England*.[119] Refusal to take the oath of supremacy was high treason. St. Thomas More, the chancellor of England, refused to take the oath and was beheaded. Spain, however, was loyal to the Catholic Faith. The Catholic Kings of Spain always and implicitly recognized the supremacy of the Holy Father in Rome in all matters spiritual. On this point Robert Ricard says:

El régimen del Patronato, al que no concedí en mi libro la importancia que merecia, aun desde el punto de vista metodologico, acentuó todavía mas ese rasgo de la Iglesia de América. Es verdad que el rey de España no era jefe de esta iglesia, que nunca aspiró, ni remotamente, a sacudir la autoridad de la Santa Sede.[120]

The Spanish Crown spontaneously turned to the Church for missionaries to the newly discovered territories. The Emperor-king Charles was the first to send missionaries to Mexico, upon its conquest by Cortés In 1523 he sent three Flemish Franciscans: Juan de Tecto, Juan de Aora and the brilliant Franciscan lay brother, Fray Pedro de Gante. The following year he besought the Pope for more missionaries. It is in 1524 that the first of the three Friars in which we are interested appears upon the scene. The Indian policy of Spain had begun to take definite shape in the twenty-five critical years of 1492 to 1517.

CHAPTER IV

MOTOLINIA, THE MISSIONARY

Fanning out from the West Indies, the Spaniards undertook exploring and conquering expeditions. One or more priests usually accompanied any sizable expedition. However, as soon as Cortés had conquered the

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[118] Capdequí, *op. cit.*, 405.
[119] William L. Langer, *An Encyclopedia of World History* (Boston, 1948), 370.
[120] Robert Ricard, *La Conquista Espiritual de Mexico* (Mexico, 1947), 31.

Aztecs, the missionaries came, not from the islands but directly from Europe. Mendieta, one of the early American historians, a Franciscan himself, observes that many missionaries, from every country of Christendom, offered their services with gladness.

Divulgóse en breve esta novedad tan nueva del nuevo mundo descubierto, y de tantas y tan nuevas gentes, por todos los reinos de la cristiandad, y de todos ellos hubo muchas personas religiosas que se ofrecieron á Dios en sacrificio, deseando pasar en estas partes para predicar a los indios infieles.[121]

The first group of missionaries to go to Mexico consisted of three Flemish Franciscans: Fr. Juan de Tecto, who had taught theology at the Sorbonne for fourteen years; Fr. Juan de Aora, a relative of the King of Scotland; and Fray Pedro de Gante, a Franciscan lay brother. One year later, in 1524, a second group of Franciscans arrived. They had been recruited in Spain, in the province of Estremadura, whence had come Cortés himself. There were twelve of them and because of this, they are frequently referred to as *The Twelve*, and are looked upon, to this day, as the founding Fathers of the "Mexican" Church.[122]

Among *The Twelve* was Motolinía, his name appearing almost consistently as the sixth in the listing of them. They were approved, not only by the Emperor, but also by the Holy See and were armed with apostolic authority. To them were granted the most extensive faculties possible in order to facilitate in every way the propagation of the Faith, so ardently desired by Cortés,[123] by the Emperor and by the Holy Father. Accordingly, the reigning Pontiff, Adrian VI, issued the bull, "Exponi nobis" of May 13, 1522. His immediate predecessor had also issued a bull on same matter entitled "Alias Felices" of April 25, 1521.[124] The three Flemish Friars had had the approbation of their provincial superior and that was sufficient under the circumstances. However, there was no direct authorization from the Holy See.

The Twelve sailed from Sanlúcar de Barrameda on January 25, 1524[125] and arrived at San Juan de Ulúa (Vera Cruz) on May 13, 1524, the Vigil of Pentecost. Cortés gave them a touching welcome that made

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[121] Fray Geronimo de Mendieta, ed. Joaquín Garcia Icazbalceta, *Historia Eclesiástica Indiana* (Mexico, 1870), 187.

[122] *Ibid.*, 187.

[123] George Folsom, "Introduction," *Despatches of Hernando Cortés* (New York, London, 1843), 1—2.

[124] P. Marino Cuevas, S. J., *Historia de la iglesia en Mexico*, 3 vols. (Mexico, 1942), I, 163.

[125] Francis Borgia Steck, O.F.M., *Motolinia's History of the Indians of New Spain* (Washington, D. C., 1951), 185, n. 4. The author calls attention to the fact prior to 1582, the civil year was reckoned as beginning on March 25.

a lasting impression upon the natives. As soon as he had news of their arrival, Cortés asked that the path over which *The Twelve* would journey be swept clean, that village bells be rung at their approach, that every mark of respect be shown them, that the Spaniards kneel to kiss their hand and Franciscan habit. So Bernal Diaz del Castillo explains in his forthright and moving history.[126] In an unforgettable manner, he relates how Cortés and the Friars met. Speaking for himself — for he was present — and for the rest, Bernal Diaz, the veteran of many campaigns, relates that Cortés, the Spanish captains, many soldiers, the Indian caciques, and Guatimozin, the Indian ruler appointed by Cortés, and the three Flemish missionaries hastened from Mexico City to welcome *The Twelve*. Cortés was first among the welcomers to kneel and reach out for the hand of Fray Martin de Valencia, the head of the band. Out of deference to the Conqueror, the fifty-year old Friar did not consent to this. Instead, Cortés kissed the folds of the missionary's Franciscan habit. The Indians, overwhelmed by the display of courtesies, revered the Friars from that day forward. Then, too, the barefooted Friars, going on foot and not mounted on horses, poorly clad, sallow of countenance, had a spontaneous appeal for the Indians. Yet there is no doubt that a major attraction was the obeisance to the missionaries of the great Conqueror himself.

Motolinía must have been the object of some special attention, for the Indians, seeing the Franciscans so modestly attired, exclaimed in their own language, "Motolinía, Motolinía." Fray Toribio de Benavente's curiosity having been aroused, he asked what the exclamation meant. Upon being told that it meant "poor ones," he then and there resolved that would be his name henceforth.[127] Bernal Diaz says simply that the Indians gave that name to him.[128]

After the enthusiasm of the reception had abated, Fray Martin de Valencia asked the Flemish Friars what they had done in the year which had elapsed since their arrival. Fray Juan de Tecto replied that they had been employed in studying the theology ignored by St. Augustine, that giant intellect of northern Africa of the fourth century. The reply, completely unexpected by Fray Martin, left him non-plussed. He had to ask for an explanation and the response was pointed and concise. It was

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[126] Bernal Diaz del Castillo, *Historia Verdadera de la Conquista de la Nueva España* (Mexico, 1950), 335.
[127] Mendieta, *Historia Eclesiástica Indiana*, ed. Joaquin Garcia Icazbalceta (Mexico, 1870), 211, 619.
[128] Bernal Diaz Del Castillo, *op. cit.*, 335.

the Aztec language. Heaps of theology and mountains of learning availed nothing, if a medium of communication was not a their command. They might as well be bereft of all learning, for all the practical good it would do, without the knowledge of the native language. The Friars had to conquer the difficult languages and dialects of the Indians, a task that would require far more time than it took Cortés to conquer the Aztec Empire.

In order to learn the strange languages, entirely foreign to any they already knew, the Friars became as little children. The native children were selected as their companions in preference to all others. To them the Friars listened attentively as the tiny tots never wearied of repeating, over and over again, words, expressions, phrases, dinned into the Friars' ears.

It should be remarked that the twelve Franciscans belonged to the Province of San Gabriel, formed out of the older Province of Santiago. San Gabriel had been given its autonomy in 1520, just four years prior to the coming to Mexico of *The Twelve*. A youthful Province, its members were zealous and enthusiastic, anxious to erect new provinces elsewhere, just as theirs had recently been erected in Spain. A new province adhered to a stricter interpretation of the Franciscan rule and adopted greater austerity in matters of religious life and discipline than the older provinces observed. There is nothing singular in this attitude, just as there is nothing extraordinary in a federal judge who interprets United States law more strictly than another. Yet, the spirit of the San Gabriel province was reflected in its members, particularly in *The Twelve*.

The information on the life of Motolinía is scanty, as is the case with almost all the twelve Franciscan pioneers. Very likely he was born in Benavente in 1499. Records do not show where he studied, nor is the year he became a Franciscan known. But since he belonged originally to the Province of Santiago, it follows that it was under its aegis that he made his studies, was received into the Order and ordained. He later transferred to the Custody of San Gabriel which, as has been mentioned, became a separate province in 1520. In 1524, Motolinía was in the bloom of youth, unlike some of his eleven companions. Fray Francisco de Soto, for example, a bit up in years, used to sigh over his age, wishing that he were young that he might expend his physical and mental energies doing good among the natives, of whom there were so many millions, scattered over immense tracts of territory. But Motolinía had his life yet before him. From 1524 on, he gave himself with devotion, complete and entire,

to the cause of the Indians until, having survived the other eleven, he passed to his eternal reward in 1569.[129]

Two weeks after their arrival in Mexico, the Franciscans held a chapter.[130] Mexico City was their headquarters and the chapter, of course, was held there. The Chapter decided to make Mexico City and three other Indian towns the centers of their activity. The other three towns were: Texcoco, Tlaxcala and Huejozingo. Motolinía was appointed Guardian in Mexico City and Fray Martin, as Custos of the group, also resided in Mexico City. In that official capacity, he was charged with the protection of the Indians against any abuses by the Spaniards. In 1525, when Cortés undertook his illfated expedition to Honduras (Hibueras), Fray Martin and Motolinía were accused of meddling in civil and criminal affairs and of usurping the powers of civil authorities because they took the side of the Indians. Motolinía defended his superior. The civil authorities notified Motolinía that he would have to appear before the city council and present the required papal and royal credentials authorizing him and the Custos to act[131] as they were doing in defense of the Indians. He complied but intimated at the same time that he, if need be, would press for the compliance of the civil authorities with the full intent of the credentials, which empowered the missionaries to defend the Indians against all abuses. He fearlessly showed his determination to stand firm in the defense of the natives. He had come for the express purpose of laboring in behalf of the Indians and was determined to do just that.[132]

While Cortés was away from New Spain between 1528 and 1530, to defend himself against the charges of his enemies, a cruel persecutor of both the Indians and the missionaries was the president of the Audiencia in Mexico City. Nuño de Guzmán, militarily protected, went on missions of his own choosing and did not hesitate to treat the natives most ruthlessly, causing many of them to turn against the Spaniards. Discontented Indians might well scalp any white man they found travelling unarmed. But Motolinía journeyed from place to place, unafraid, making extended trips without armed protection. He had full confidence in the natives and penetrated regions where few, if any, white men had been before.[133]

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[129] Steck, *op. cit.*, 30—31, adduces reasons to render acceptable the year 1565 as the date of Motolinía's death, contrary to other biographers.
[130] *Ibid.*, 7, calls attention to the fact that there were seventeen Franciscans: *The Twelve*, the three Flemish Friars and Fr. Diego de Altamirano and Fr. Pedro Melgarejo de Urrea. Fr. Diego was a cousin of Cortés.
[131] Steck, *op. cit.*, 9.
[132] Steck, *op. cit.*, 9.
[133] Steck, *op. cit.*, 21.

Motolinía made three journeys to Guatemala and went to Honduras from Guatemala. With eight other Friars he travelled to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, where arrangements were to be made for some of them to go to China. He was constantly on the go from one place to another, even when stationed as Guardian in Tlaxcala or Huejozingo, near Puebla. In truth, he went from Tlaxcala to Puebla to help found the city in which he was to play a dominant role. The Indians of the various localities came to know him from his travels. Those who became acquainted with him best where those who lived within the limits of his jurisdiction while he was Guardian or Provincial of the first Franciscan Province, that of the Holy Gospel, in Mexico City. Mutual confidence characterized his more than forty years of continuous dealing with the Indians. He seemed to strive to keep one eye on the immediate problem and the other on the general welfare of all concerned.

That he was a man of many interests who had a remarkable ability for close observation is evidenced by the history he was asked to write of the land as he knew it since 1524, the year of his arrival, and of what could be ascertained of pre-Cortésian days. He fulfilled his task between 1536 and 1541 while stationed at Tlaxcala. He wrote history as fearlessly as he defended the Indians in their everyday life. He had a critical but fair judgment that permitted him to see the merits of the viewpoint of the Spanish settlers as well as that of the natives. Although he loved the Indians and had an abundance of mercy and understanding for them in his heart, he abhorred their pagan rites and practices, especially human sacrifice. What he knew to be contrary to sound Christian teaching he endeavored to uproot, just as he struck boldly at the abuses of the Spaniards. On one occasion, he sternly warned the Spanish constable, Pedro Nuñez, who had come to take the Indian Chiefs at Huejozingo to trial at Mexico City, to leave town in nine hours or be excommunicated. He believed in justice for the Indians but also held that the natives had obligations toward the Crown. In his opinion, the Indians were subject to taxes, the same as any other subject of the king, but the amount of the tax should be proportionate to their ability to pay. He thought there should be no tax for the time being because the Indians were unable to pay any. Throughout his life, he strove to comprehend all he could ascertain about the Indians and their culture. Indicative of this is his study of the Aztec calendar. Motolinía's conception of Indian chronology is contained in his illustration appended to his Memoriales,[134] edited by

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[134] Luis García Pimentel, ed., *Memoriales de Fray Toribio de Motolinía* (Paris, 1903).

Luis García Pimentel. Nothing of any value seemed foreign to the mind of the good Friar. He delighted in the beauties of nature as well as in the beauties of the supernatural. Such was the man chosen to write a history for posterity and to him and his superiors all lovers of history are indebted.

It must be constantly borne in mind that Motolinía and his confreres were among the very first to enter New Spain as missionaries, that they had no precedent to guide them in dealing with the natives in the work of conversion. Their task was both difficult and unique. The Aztecs, with their well organized and developed system of life, differed greatly from the Indians of the West Indies, who had built no cities. It is true that Cortés had lived some fifteen years in the islands and was well acquainted with problems of administration and government. But the missionaries had no such experience. Nonetheless, the "Twelve Apostles" had certain factors that proved favorable to their work. They found established communities in which to begin their work; the faith of the Indians in their pagan gods was rudely shaken by their failure to afford the people adequate protection and to give them victory against the Spaniards and there existed among them the prophecy of the coming of a white god, Quetzalcoatl. These things proved powerful factors in the work of evangelization.

Be it said to the credit of the Spaniards, their philosophers, theologians, jurists and humanists spontaneously raised the question concerning the justification of the Spanish invasion of the Indies. Had not freedom of speech existed in Spain, no such question would have been proposed, nor would it have been thought of had there been no Christian conscience to arouse them. What was the Spanish legal title to the occupation and conquest of the Indies? Various answers were made or attempted but the stark fact remained that Cortés had overthrown the most advanced native culture in North America without justifiable provocation. How did Motolinía, in his own mind, resolve the problem? His reasoning was this: Moctezuma, the native emperor, had recently conquered neighboring peoples and acted in tyrannical fashion, permitting, among other shameful practices, that of human sacrifice. His title to rule the people in such a manner had no moral justification. The Spaniards had brought the missionaries, who were laboring indefatigably to eliminate the nefarious practice of human sacrifice as part of religion. On this point he was treading on solid ground.[135] Who would say that this intrepid

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[135] Don Antonio de Solis, *Historia de la Conquista de Mejico* (Paris, 1884), 556, n. 1, discusses the Spanish title to the Indies.

missionary, in his battle to eradicate human sacrifices, was not proving himself a true friend of the Indians? Motolinía was not a modern tourist in the Indies, anxious to have his curiosity satisfied about many things in order to hasten back to Spain to lecture and perhaps write an account of some sort to obtain publicity for himself. Motolinía had come out of love to live among the Indians, that he might show them what was right and what was wrong, preaching to them the rudiments of Christianity. Human sacrifice was a practice in direct opposition to Christian Doctrine. It had to be eliminated.

Cortés reveals the thinking of the Spaniards and of Christians of his day concerning the relationship of all members of the human race. Bernal Diaz del Castillo tells what Cortés had to say to Moctezuma on this point. The Conqueror, reflecting the general and prevalent beliefs of his day, told the conquered emperor that God created all things, that all men are brothers, that they have a common father and a common mother ultimately in Adam and Eve, that there was concern for the supernatural welfare of the natives of his land and of himself, that there was to be no worship of idols nor human sacrifices, for all men are brothers.

Y luego le dijo, muy bien dado a entender, de la creación del mundo y cómo todos somos hermanos, hijos de un padre y de una madre, que se decían Adán y Eva, y cómo a tal hermano, nuestro gran emperador doliéndose de la perdición de las ánimas, que son muchas las que aquellos sus ídolos llevan al infierno, donde arden en vivas llamas, nos envió para que esto que que [sic] ha oído lo remedie, y no adoren aquellos idolos ni les sacrifiquen más indios ni indias, pues todos somos hermanos, ni consienta sodomías ni robos.[136]

What Cortés had to say was true Christian doctrine. Catholicism today holds to the same teaching. Motolinía sought to have this teaching put into practice, after having first taught the natives. In no small measure, Motolinía won in this tremendous undertaking of his. Once within the folds of the Catholic Church, the natives stood a far better chance of being treated fairly by the Spaniards. Christian doctrine is meant to influence the social fabric of mankind. Unlike some esoteric pagan philosophies, Christian Doctrine is for all men. With burning zeal, Motolinía set about the work of implanting the Faith in the hearts of the natives. He did not believe that God withheld his grace and glory from these rude natives who were made to his image and likeness also. He expresses his mind on this matter in a succinct and cogent manner:

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[136] Bernal Diaz del Castillo, *Historia Verdadera de la Conquista de la Nueva España* (Mexico, 1950), 169.

Y por qué no dara Dios a estos que a su imagen formó su gracia y gloria, disponiéndose tan bien como a nosotros?[137]

This is the bedrock of Christian teaching; man's high estate in being made to the image and likeness of the Creator; and man's elevation to the supernatural state of grace and glory. In the whole gamut of Christian teaching this is the pinnacle to which any man can aspire. Motolinía taught this doctrine, which Christ gave to mankind. Motolinía lived it, practiced it, imparted it to the natives. He defended the natives as capable of participation in divine life, to the same extent as any other human being. Whatever else may be said of Spain, it did adhere to integral Christianity, even if individual Spaniards, at home and abroad, did not conform in their daily lives, to their beliefs.

During the days when Motolinía was actually working among the Indians, instructing and baptising them, the question as to whether the natives of the New World were rational beings raged in the Old World. Pope Paul III put an end to the argument by declaring that the Indians were rational; that they were human beings; that they had immortal souls; that they were capable of receiving the Sacraments.[138]

Between the years 1526 and 1537 this fundamental question in regard to the Indians had been thoroughly threshed out. In his final paragraph on Paul III and the Indians, Plancarte arrives at this conclusion. He says that the celebrated bull of Pope Paul III — now over four hundred years old — in which he declared the rationality of the Indians, proclaimed their liberty, recognized them as children of mankind, merits for that Pope the title of Father of the Indians and for the magnificent bull itself, written in fine Ciceronian style, the title of Magna Carta of the American continent.

Esta es la célebre bula del Papa Paulo III, quien hace más de cuatrocientos annos, declaró la racionalidad de los indios, proclamó su libertad, abolió su esclavitud y reclamó como hijos; por lo que con justo título, el debería ser proclamado y reconocido como Padre de los indios, y su bula como la Carta Magna del Continente Americano.[139]

It was mainly at the instance of Bishop Julian Garces of Tlaxcala that the Pope issued his famous bull. The Bishop, failing to obtain the results from the Council of the Indies in the enforcement of the absolute

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[137] R. P. Fr. Toribio de Benavente o Motolinía, *Historia de los Indios de la Nueva España* (Barcelona, 1914), 73.

[138] Salvador Escalante Plancarte, *Fray Martin de Valencia* (Mexico, 1945), 240. The bull of Pope Paul III is entitled "Sublimis Deus," dated June 2, 1537.

[139] *Ibid.*, 250; Dr. P. Venancio D. Carro, O.P., *La Teologia y los Teologos-Juristas Españoles ante la Conquista de America*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1944), I, 88—91.

abolition of slavery, as provided in the Law of 1531, turned to the Pope for assistance.[140] The significant bull of Paul III delivered a mortal blow to erroneous thinking — rather wishful thinking — concerning the Indians' status as rational beings fully worthy of being numbered among the children of the human race. The impetus, at the opportune moment, had come from Tlaxcala, more than a decade before the new laws of 1542, largely attributed to Las Casas.

Este error llegó a necesitar decisiva de la Santa Sede, que dió el Papa Paul III a representación de Fr. Julian Garces, obispo electo de Cuba, y que lo era ya de Tlascala, declarando en la bula dada en Roma a 4 nonas de junio de 1537, ser verdaderos hombres y capaces de la fe.[141]

Motolinía, of course, was Guardian at Tlaxcala for six years, 1536—42, and certainly was well acquainted with the bishop. Moreover, one of *The Twelve* had been Guardian at Tlaxcala in 1524. Tlaxcala was one of the four original centers chosen by the band of twelve Franciscans to be a center of missionary activity. It was fitting that a bishop of Tlaxcala should have played so important a part in behalf of the Indians of the whole American continent. At Tlaxcala, Cortés had been befriended on his march to Mexico City and on his disastrous retreat from the Aztec capital, it was there that he found refuge. These inhabitants had embraced the Catholic Faith and remained loyal to it. Bishop Garcés, the rival of the learned Antonio Nebrija, found strong supporters in the Franciscans, who had done the missionary spade work in the region. Not the least of his well-wishers was Motolinía, heartily in accord with both the Bishop and the Pope, for he stated that by 1536 some five million Indians had been baptized.[142] Moreover, Fray Martin de Valencia, with five of *The Twelve* and other Franciscans had signed a letter, dated May 6, 1533, to Charles V, defending the ability of the Indians, in complete agreement with the stand later taken officially by the Bishop and the Pope.[143]

Motolinía had early put his shoulder to the wheel in treating the natives as human beings, capable of being admitted to the Catholic

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[140] Venancio D. Carro, *op. cit.*, 89.

[141] *Diccionario Enciclopedico Hispano-Americano* (Barcelona, 1892), XI, 133.

[142] *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, 1912), XV, 767. Cf. Lesley Byrd Simpson, *The Encomienda in New Spain* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1950), 31, wherein he states, with apparent blandness, that "the two great Mendicant orders were centuries-old rivals." Bishop Garces was a Dominican; in his diocese labored Franciscans. A history of the two orders, who have labored in many parts of the world for seven centuries, reveals a traditional friendship.

[143] Plancarte, *op. cit.*, 245—47.

Faith, of being incorporated into the Mystical Body of Christ. The extraordinary number of his baptism is testimony to his sincere understanding of the natives. It was exactly what Queen Isabella had desired; what Alexander VI had commanded; what Christ Himself commissioned His Apostles to do. While academicians debeated the rationality of the Indians, Motolinía and the other missionaries acted. They were instruments in the hands of Providence, helping the Indians to prove themselves. In this manner the Indians provided the most persuasive argument in their own favor. Motolinía must have been delighted with their response, for the religious acts of the Indians convinced the skeptical among the Spaniards.

> Maravillanse muchos Españoles y son muy incredulos en creer el aprovechamiento de los Indios, en especial los que no saben de los pueblos en que residen Españoles, o algunos recién venidos de España, y como no lo han visto, piensan que debe ser fingido lo que de los Indios se dice, y la penitencias que hacen, y tambien se maravillan que de lejos se vengan a bautizar, casar y confesar, y en las fiestas a oir misa, pero vistas estas cosas es muy de notar la fe de estos tan nuevos cristianos.[144]

Proudly, like an earnest professor singling out his successful students, Motolinía tells of how the Indians resolved to live according to the law of God in their married lives; how devoted Indians took it upon themselves to carry the Faith into interior lands, how they confessed and received Holy Communion.

> De estos Indios se han visto muchos con propósito y obra, determinados de no conocer otra mujer sino la que con quien legitimamente se han casado despues que se convirtieron, y también se han apartado del vicio de la embriaguez y hanse dado tanto a la virtud y al servicio de Dios, que en este año pasado de 1536 salieron de esta ciudad de Tlaxcallan dos mancebos Indios confesados y comulgados, y sin decir nada a nadie se metieron por la tierra adentro más de cincuenta leguas, a convertir y enseñar otros Indios; y allá anduvieron padeciendo hartos trabajos e hicieron mucho fruto, porque dejaron enseñado todo lo que ellos sabian y puesta la gente para recibir la palabra de Dios, y después son vueltos y hoy día están en esta ciudad de Tlaxcallan.[115]

Don Juan, the chief lord and native of a town in the province of Michuacan serves as a remarkable example to show that the natives were capable of grasping the social implications of Christian life, its economic aspects and responsibilities. He read the life of St. Francis, translated it into his language and resolved to become a friar. In proof of his sincerity he liberated all his slaves, taught them the Ten Command-

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[144] R. P. Fr. Toribio de Benavente o Motolinía, *op. cit.*, 73.
[145] *Ibid.*, 128.

ments and whatever else he knew of Catholic doctrine, saying he would have freed his slaves sooner, had he known differently, but now they were free.

Un mancebo llamado Don Juan, señor principal y natural de un pueblo de la provincia de Michuacan, que en aquella lengua se llama *Turecato*, y en la de México *Tepeoacan*; este mancebo, leyendo en la vida de San Francisco que en su lengua estaba traducida, tomó tanta devoción que prometió ser fraile, y porque su voto no se le imputase a liviandad, perseverando en su propósito vistióse de sayal grosero, y dio libertad a muchos esclavos que tenía, y predicóles y enseñóles los mandamientos y lo que el sabía y mismo que antes les hubiera dado libertad, y que de allí adelante supiesen que eran libres, y que les rogaba que se amasen unos a otros y que fuesen buenos cristianos, y que si así lo hacían, que él los tendría por hermanos.[146]

In military circles it has been said that one's best defense is a strong offense. *Mutatis mutandis*, Motolinía employed that strategy in the defense of the natives. What better defense could anyone make for them in refutation of the opposition than by pointing to the Indians as Christians and to their Christian deeds? The argument is cogent: it is a thundering argument of mute testimony, whose reverberations have not been silenced to this day. In the year 1540 Motolinía could say that where the doctrine of the word of God had beeen preached, the ancient idolatries had vanished as far as he could ascertain.

. . . porque adonde ha llegado la doctrina y palabra de Dios no ha quedado cosa que se sepa ni de que se deba hacer cuenta . . .[147]

No one will deny that knowledge is power. Motolinía strove to teach the Indians all he could. He records that the Indians were able to read and write, to sing and play musical instruments. One Indian singer, a native of Tlaxcala, had composed an entire Mass. Its notation was a piece of pure ingenuity. There were schools of manual training and the natives were proficient in working leather and casting bells. Motolinía says that all that they needed to be good silversmiths were tools. They learned how to tan hides and to make blacksmith's bellows, to manufacture various styles of footwear, to be weavers, stonemasons, carpenters and woodcarvers.[148]

Motolinía did not excuse the excesses of the conquerors nor did he remain silent on the matter. On the contrary, he denounced the wrongdoing of the Spaniards in respect to the Indians as unequivocally and as unmistakably as anyone. He inveighed against the heavy tributes and services imposed on the Indians; he excoriated the white man for the

[146] *Ibid.*, 132—33.
[147] *Ibid.*, 254.
[148] *Ibid.*, Treatise III, Chapters XII and XIII, 213—17.

Faith, of being incorporated into the Mystical Body of Christ. The extraordinary number of his baptism is testimony to his sincere understanding of the natives. It was exactly what Queen Isabella had desired; what Alexander VI had commanded; what Christ Himself commissioned His Apostles to do. While academicians debeated the rationality of the Indians, Motolinía and the other missionaries acted. They were instruments in the hands of Providence, helping the Indians to prove themselves. In this manner the Indians provided the most persuasive argument in their own favor. Motolinía must have been delighted with their response, for the religious acts of the Indians convinced the skeptical among the Spaniards.

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[146] *Ibid.*, 132—33.
[147] *Ibid.*, 254.
[148] *Ibid.*, Treatise III, Chapters XII and XIII, 213—17.

use of slave labor in the gold mines; he remonstrated against the displace-
ment of Indians in provisioning the mines with labor.[149] He laid a
heavy charge on the consciences of the Spaniards for their greed; he
reminded them of the strict accounting they would have to give at the
time of the Last Judgment, that for their neighbor's soul they would
have to render their own; that restitution would be required for all
ill-gotten goods of whatever kind.[150]

In his defense of the Indians and in the promotion of their welfare,
Motolinía made use of all the ingenuity that the love of the natives
inspired, to bring the offending Spaniards to their senses. He was the
grand missionary, making his life one with that of those whom he served.
His weapons were not ruthless force and physical compulsion, for he
had none of these, but only the persuasive use of the word of God, his
priestly zeal, his Franciscan example. That he was loved by the Indians
there is no doubt.[151] This is the clinching proof that he and his fellow-
Friars were true apostles and effective missionaries, moulding, to the
best of their ability, a kindly, humane and just policy toward the
downtrodden natives. Motolinía was a Spaniard too, as were the bulk
of his co-workers. Many Spaniards did try to be fair. Motolinía was an
effective missionary. The influence of effective missionaries lives and
perpetuates the thinking of their times.

One of the thorniest problems in the social and economic administra-
tion of the Indies centered around the encomienda system. Should it be
abolished outright? Lock, stock and barrel? There were those who
sincerely thought so and vehemently condemned its existence *in toto*,
without any qualification whatsoever. Motolinía saw in the absolute
and sudden abolition of it, greater harm than good. He was thoroughly
opposed to the abuses connected with it and strove for their elimination.
But he did not believe that the encomienda was an evil institution in
itself. Had he thought so, he could not have maintained the position he
did in respect to it.

The encomienda system was not peculiar to the New World nor
applied for the first time in the Indies. It had its origin in Spain; it had
been employed in that country to advantage. That the system as applied
in the New World resulted in the exploitation of the natives constitutes
an abusive use of it. But the abuse of a thing does not take away its
legitimate use.

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[149] *Ibid.*, Treatise I, Chapter I, 17—18.
[150] *Ibid.*, Treatise III, Chapter XI, 211—12.
[151] *Ibid.*, Treatise II, Chapter IX, 134—35.

Motolinía said that it was wrong for the Spanish to lord it over the natives and make them serve them in fear.[152] He seems to be glad to relate that in Puebla, the city he helped to found, not many Indians had been assigned in encomienda.[153] He condemns greedy encomenderos without mercy.[154] He berates encomenderos for stripping the Indians of gold and precious stones.[155] Motolinía forthrightly decries and denounces the greed of the encomenderos. Greed was at the root of the evil in the encomienda. Indolence, too, played its part. But the real evil was greed. To find the cure for human greed would be to find a cure for the root of evil of the encomienda system, and, it may be added, for the shortcomings of many other economic and social institutions of the present and the past. Who has the formula for extinguishing in the human breast the *sacra auri fames* that manages to flicker universally? It has meant the death of much that is good. As someone has said, gold, silver and arsenic go together.

Motolinía would have had it otherwise than it was with the encomienda. With characteristic logic, he put his finger on the sound approach, one that would have made the encomienda accomplish a worthwhile purpose. He advocated that the Spaniards themselves should bend their backs in tilling and cultivating the fields, and teach the natives by example.

Edificóse este pueblo a instancia de los frailes menores, los cuales suplicaron a estos señores, que hiciesen un pueblo de Españoles, y que fuese gente que se diesen a labrar los campos y a cultivar la tierra al modo y manera de España. . . . y que también los Indios tomarían ejemplo y aprenderían a labrar y cultivar al modo de España.[156]

Father Steck makes this comment:

. . . While not opposed to the *encomienda* system as such, the Franciscans in Mexico always urged that the Spanish settlers themselves should cultivate the lands and in this way set the Indians an example of good citizenship, instead of acting merely as managers and taskmasters and compelling the Indians to do the hard work. What the friars condemned were the abuses connected with the *encomienda* system. Being realists in this respect, not theorists, they sided with those in high places and low who defended the *encomienda* system against the enforcement of the so-called New Laws of 1542 which decreed the abolition of the system.[157]

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[152] *Ibid.*, Treatise I, Chapter I, 16.
[153] *Ibid.*, Treatise III, Chapter XVII, 241.
[154] *Ibid.*, Treatise III, Chapter XX, 253.
[155] *Ibid.*, Treatise III, Chapter XX, 255.
[156] *Ibid.*, Treatise III, Chapter XVII, 237.
[157] Steck, *A History*, 319, n. 2.

That the Franciscans had their two feet on the ground on this question is borne out by the reaction wherever the New Laws were put into effect. Due to the influence of the Franciscans, the New Laws "remained virtually inoperative in Mexico; in Chiapas and Guatemala they led to serious disturbances, and in Peru they resulted in civil war fraught with crimes and horror, amidst which the aborigines suffered greatly."[158]

With respect to the results to be anticipated from the natives instructed in the Faith, Motolinía too was a realist, appraising their ability and realizing that they were new in the Faith. A solid grounding in the rudiments of the Faith necessarily would require time. It was no overnight task. Some expected too much. Motolinía likened the impatient to "a man who buys a very lean sheep and, after giving it a piece of bread to eat, feels its tail to see if it has become fat."

. . . parécenne los tales a uno que compró un carnero muy flaco y dióle a comer un pedazo de pan y luego tentole la cola para ver si estaba gordo.[159]

Nor did Motolinía want for a vision of an ideal approach to the natives. He, too, saw the incalculable benefit of missionaries laboring among the inhabitants without the intrusion of Spanish arms, without any previous military conquest,

. . . para que allí predicasen el Evangelio y palabra de Dios, sin que precediese conquista de armas.[160]

He envisioned spiritual and material prosperity for the land, in the prayerful hope it would one day have home rule.[161]

Motolinía was a man of action, primarily. But his actions were seasoned with thought, tempered by prayer and divine guidance. The task, as he saw it, was an enormous one. Ideal solutions were abundant. But idealism, praiseworthy as it is, often fails to carry the day. He made the most of circumstances he could not change. He had an eye for the feasible. This he undertook with vigor, courage and determination, with a boundless confidence in the unfailing assistance of Divine Providence.

His success was his greatest means of defending the Indians. Those who would deny them the capabilities of human beings or belittle them, he refuted by the fruits produced, by what was actually achieved. Academic disquisitions, beneficial as they may be, pale before deeds. Words move an audience but example draws it. Motolinía, with an

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[158] *Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, 1912), X, 602.
[159] R. P. Fr. Toribio de Benavente o Motolinía, *op. cit.*, 112.
[160] *Ibid.*, Treatise III, Chapter V, 172.
[161] *Ibid.*, Treatise III, Chapter IX, 200.

abundance of confidence in the natives, gave them an opportunity to show their mettle. They proved themselves, even by martyrdom. What more persuasive argument could there be for a humane Indian policy?

A beautiful tribute was paid to Motolinía by the Cabildo or municipal authorities of Guatemala on October 4, 1545, though it was not designed to be that. Motolinía was being transferred to Mexico City. His departure did not mean that the area would be left without an ample number of missionaries — ample, considering the time, the place and the circumstances. But the people must have been exceptionally fond of him. Hearing of his transfer, the Cabildo wrote to the Franciscan Commissary and the Bishop of Mexico City, begging that Motolinía be allowed to remain in Guatemala. Evidently he was greatly esteemed.

Que por cuanto el P. Fr. Toribio, Comisario, hace grande falta en la tierra por la falta hace su persona a causa de su ausencia se escriba al Comisario General de México, e al Sr. Obispo de allí, lo envie.[162]

Throughout his life among them, Motolinía was popular with the Indians. This is the impression one gets from a study of his missionary career.

Despite the long years of arduous and successful missionary endeavor by Motolinía; despite his scholarly and informative history of New Spain and other writings; despite his baptisms, numbering some four hundred thousand; despite the responsible posts he held as guardian, vice provincial, vice commissary of Guatemala, and provincial of the Province of the Holy Gospel; despite the enormous amount of good he did by sacrificing himself to the cause of Indian evangelization and civilization for over forty years of uninterrupted labor; despite all this, sensationalists seem to recall his name only in connection with a stinging letter he wrote to the Emperor on January 2, 1555. As some erroneously believe, this letter was not occasioned by the New Laws of 1542. The dates alone of the two documents are almost enough to demonstrate that fact.

Bartolomé de las Casas, P. O., in 1542, wrote a tract and published it, in conjunction with eight others, about ten years later. The tract by Las Casas charged the Spaniards with the destruction of the Indies. The title of the tract tells of its contents — "A Very Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies" *(Brevisima Relación de la destrucción de las Indias)*. This tract fell into the hands of Motolinía and his reaction to it is contained in his letter of January 2, 1555. Las Casas spent a few brief years in Guatemala. Motolinía had firsthand evidence of his activities

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[162] R. P. Fr. Francisco Vásquez, *Crónica de la Provincia del Santisimo Nombre de Jesús de Guatemala*, 4 vols. (Guatemala, 1937—1944), II, 166.

there.[163] Motolinía revealed some extremely unpleasant facts about the personal conduct of Las Casas that should have been left unsaid. The letter was written to the Emperor Charles V and runs to some twenty pages of fine print. He writes specifically about Las Casas and time and again mentions him by name. Las Casas resigned his bishopric of Chiapas in the New World and returned to Spain. In the very first sentence of the letter, Motolinía refers to Las Casas as the Bishop-that-was of Chiapas (las Casas, Obispo que fué de Chiapa).[164] Motolinía expressed his three reasons for writing the letter. The first reason was to describe the civilization and religion of the Indians (Mexicans) before the conquest; the second reason was to show the transformation wrought by the missionaries in winning the natives to Christianity; the third was to question the validity of the position of Las Casas, who said the encomenderos and merchants of New Spain could not be absolved in the Sacrament of Penance, without a public repudiation, under oath, of their encomiendas. Motolinía requested the Emperor to have this question submitted for solution to men of learning. Motolinía defends the conqueror Cortés, the viceroy Mendoza and his successor, then ruling as viceroy, and states that they were excellent characters. He declares that in 1555 the Indians were being as fairly treated as possible, that an honest effort was being made to better their condition.

Motolinía speaks of Las Casas as ill-mannered, insulting, ill-humored, as a trouble-maker, restless and harmful. He refers to him as one who has studied a few canons. He states that Las Casas, who posed as the friend of the Indians, actually used the Indians as carriers (tamemes) and paid them nothing for their labors in his behalf. He explains how Las Casas refused to baptize an Indian who had made a long journey in order to be baptized, and was deemed worthy of baptism by several other missionaries. He charges Las Casas with using more Indian carriers than twenty other friars. Motolinía says that Las Casas went to Spain to have himself made a bishop and then resigned his diocese. Even Fray Domingo de Betanzos, who encouraged Las Casas to become a Dominican was of the opinion that Las Casas had done much harm. As Bishop of Chiapas, he obtained loans from his people to pay debts he had incurred in Spain. Motolinía keeps revealing one unpleasant fact after another about Las Casas, who tried to impress others as being just about the

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[163] Steck, *op. cit.*, 28.
[164] R. P. Fr. Toribio de Benavente o Motolinía, ed. R. P. Fr. Daniel Sánchez García, *Historia de los Indios de la Nueva España* (Barcelona, 1914), 257. The letter is printed in full.

only one who was truly interested in the welfare of the Indians. Las Casas spent seven years, according to Motolinía, in the country, and five of them in the streets. Not a pretty picture of Las Casas!

By 1555, when Motolinía wrote his much-discussed letter, the Spaniards had a university in operation in Mexico City; the College of Tlaltelolco had been functioning for the education of the natives for almost twenty years; the printing press had been introduced into the land for some fifteen years; dioceses had been erected and bishops consecrated in New Spain; millions of Indians had been instructed in the Catholic Faith, baptized and confirmed. Was this the destruction of the Indies by the Spaniards, asked Motolinía. Other missionaries acted while Las Casas vituperated. What had Las Casas done? He stuck to his bishopric, after a fashion, for three years, and then surrendered it for the more comfortable living of Spain.

Motolinía was an effective missionary who did yeoman work among the rude natives. To pay too much heed to this letter is unfair. In a community of a thousand human beings who are physically normal, the abnormal hunchback is inevitably singled out for attention. This is one explanation for the undue emphasis given to Motolinía's letter. It is also one explanation for so much attention being given to the destructive writings of Las Casas. He has portrayed Spain as the abnormal hunchback among the colonizing nations, a grossly untrue description. The abnormal portrayal presented by Las Casas is remembered; a thousand splendid missionaries are overlooked.

What one writer has said of imposing tribute on the Indians might wel be applied to the Spanish colonial policy as a whole. "There is little point in belaboring the Spanish Crown for imposing tribute on the Indians. If it had not done so it would have afforded an example of high-mindedness the like of which the world has never seen."[165]

CHAPTER V

SAHAGUN, THE SCHOLAR

Fray Bernardino de Sahagún was born in 1499 in northern Spain, in the village of Sahagún, whence his name is derived. During his course of studies at the University of Salamanca, he entered the Franciscan

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[165] Lesley Byrd Simpson, *The Encomienda in New Spain* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1950), 151.

Order.[166] He continued to live in Salamanca, in the Franciscan convent of St. Francis, until 1529. When scarcely thirty years of age he was on his way to Mexico as a missionary — part of a mission band of twenty-nine Franciscans, under the leadership of Fray Antonio de Ciudad Rodrigo. This is the meager information that has come down to us about Sahagún's life and activities in Spain up to the time he sailed for the New World.

From the time of his arrival in Mexico, Sahagún applied himself assiduously to the study of Nahuatl. His mastery of the language of the Nahuas must have amazed both his fellow countrymen and the Indians themselves.

Llegado á esta tierra, aprendió en breve la lengua mexicana, y súpola tan bien, que ninguno otro hasta hoy se le ha igualado en alcanzar los secretos de ella . . .[167]

His linguistic ability became the key to an immense amount of knowledge pertaining to the individual, the family and civil, social and religious phases of the life of those ancient people of Mexico. Though giving himself intensively to what we now call scholarly research, he did not neglect missionary activities. Like the other missionaries, he instructed and baptized, preached and counselled, and helped to introduce many to the Catholic Faith. Much of his unusually long missionary life was dedicated to the education of native youths in the famous College of Santa Cruz at Santiago Tlaltelolco.

En este ejercicio de la lengua mexicana, desarraigando la idolatría, predicando, confesando, doctrinando á los indios y escribiendo para su aprovechamiento, empleó este varon de Dios sesenta y un años que vivió en esta tierra.[168]

That he was considered an able Friar by his own confreres is evident from his appointments. He was often named visitor to various convents and missions; he was guardian of a number of communities, among which were those of Tlaltelolco and Xochimilco; he was definitor of the Province of the Holy Gospel in 1552 and again in 1585. He held these positions despite his disinclination to have them. He genuinely desired to be free of these obligations in order to occupy himself in research and in directly serving the natives, particularly by imparting general knowledge to them.

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[166] Fray Geronimo de Mendieta, *Historia Eclesiástica Indiana*, ed., Joaquín García Icazbalceta (Mexico, 1870), 663.
[167] *Ibid.*, 415.
[168] *Ibid.*, 664.

En su juventud fué guardian de principales conventos; más después por espacio de cuasi cuarenta años, se excusó de este cargo, aunque en veces fué definidor de esta provincia del Santo Evangelio y visitador[169] de la Michuacan, siendo custodia.[170]

Sahagún's master piece, and the work for which he is now justly famous and remembered wherever Mexican antiquities engender interest, is his *Historia universal de las cosas de Nueva España.* To produce it, he labored thirty years, from 1547 to 1577. Several times he went through the entire work, adding or subtracting, emending and perfecting, until he had his finished product.[171] He is the author of other known works but his universal history contains, in the main, his basic ideas: what he tried to do for the natives, and how.

La bibliografía del P. Sahagún es quizá la más dificil de nuestra literatura. Ocupado casi cincuenta años en escribir, no solamente trabajó muchas obras, sino que á estas mismas dió diversas formas, corrigiéndolas, ampliándolas, redactándolas de nuevo y sacando de ellas extractos o tratados sueltos que corrían como libros distintos. Ya escribía en español en ya mexicano y agregaba el latín, ó daba dos formas al mexicano.[172]

A glimpse at Sahagún's general history of the Mexicans, their manner of life and its material and spiritual implications will give some idea of how thoroughly conversant he was with the natives, how extensive and intensive was his knowledge. The history is divided into twelve books and this is his own summary of their contents:

Book I: treats of the gods and goddesses the natives worshipped by which the same were honored.

Book II: the various feasts by which the same were honored.

Book III: the immortality of the soul and of the places where the souls were said to have gone upon leaving the body; and the suffrages offered on behalf of the dead.

Book IV: treats of judiciary astrology practised by the natives in order to know the good or evil fortune of the newly born.

Book V: treats of the auguries and omens employed by the natives to divine future events.

Book VI: treats of the Rhetoric and Moral Philosophy of the natives.

Book VII: treats of the Natural Philosophy possessed by them.

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[169] A visitor, in this instance, means one officially appointed to ascertain whether the rule of the Order of Friars Minor is being duly observed in a province. The visitation, somewhat in the nature of an inspection, is made regularly every three years.

[170] *Ibid.,* 664.

[171] A. Teetaert, "Sahagún," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* (Paris, 1939), XIV, 746, states that Sahagún revised this work four different times.

[172] Joaquín García Icazbalceta, *Bibliografía Mexicana del Siglo XVI* (Mexico, 1886), 262.

Book VIII: treats of the lords and masters of the land, their customs and methods of government.

Book IX: treats of tradesmen and handicraftsmen and their customs.

Book X: treats of the vices and virtues of the people and in particular of their manner of living.

Book XI: treats of the animals, birds and fishes of the land, and of their generation; of trees, herbs, flowers and fruits, of metals and stones and other minerals.

Book XII: deals with the conquest of Mexico.

In the prologue to the first of the twelve books of his history Sahagún sets down the above summary in his own words, as follows:

El primero de los cuales trata de los dioses y dioses que estos naturales adoraban; el segundo, de las fiestas con que los honraban; el tercero, de la inmortalidad del ánima y de los lugares donde decían que iban las almas desde que salían de los cuerpos, y de los sufragios y obsequias que hacían por los muertos; el cuarto libro trata de la astrología judiciara que estos naturales usaban, para saber la fortuna buena o mala que tenían los que nacían; el quinto libro trata de los agueros que estos naturales tenían para adivinar las cosas por venir; el libro sexto trata de la Retórica y Filosofia Moral, que estos naturales usaban; el séptimo libro trata de la Filosofia Natural que estos naturales alcanzaban; el octavo libro trata de los señores y de sus costumbres y maneras de gobernar la república; el libro nono trata de los mercaderes y otros oficiales mecánicos, y de sus costumbres; el libro décimo trata de los vicios y virtudes de estas gentes, al proprio de su manera de vivir; el libro undécimo trata de los animales, aves y peces, y de las generaciones que hay en esta tierra, y de los árboles, yerbas y flores y frutos, metales y piedras y otros minerales; el libro duodécimo se intitula La Conquista de México.[173]

Because Sahagún's talents were appreciated, he was commanded to write by Fr. Francisco Toral, the farsighted provincial of the Province of the Holy Gospel. In succeeding years others might find cause to complain that the early missionaries failed to record for posterity vital information. That there might be no grounds for any such complaint was one of the reasons for Sahagún's history.

Pues por que los ministros del Evangelio que sucederán a los que primero vinieron, en la cultura de esta viña del Señor no tengan ocasión de quejarse de los primeros, por haber dejado a oscuras las cosas de estos naturales de esta Nueva España, yo, fray Bernardino de Sahagún, fraile profeso de la Orden de Nuestro Seráfico P. S. Francisco, de la observancia natural de la Villa de Sahagún, en Campos, por mandato del muy Reverendo Padre el P. Fray Francisco Toral, provincial de esta Provincia del Santo Evangelio, y después Obispo de Campeche, Yucatán; escribí doce libros de las cosas

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[173] Fr. Bernardino de Sahagún, *Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España*, ed. Pedro Robredo, 5 vols. (Mexico, 1938), I, 6—7.

divinas, o por mejor decir idolátricas, y humanas y naturales de esta Nueva España: . . .[174]

Apart from receiving an obedience to write from his provincial, Sahagún had definite plans for an intelligent approach to civilization and Christianization of the natives. They were plans which would lead to a wise and sound Indian policy. Thoroughness is the word which characterized his work. For a half a dozen years earnest and zealous missionaries had labored among the natives of New Spain; tremendous success had attended their work. Sahagún was cognizant of all this. However, he doubted that a complete transformation, of so far-reaching a nature, could have been so readily effected. Once he grasped the language of the natives — hereafter to be referred to as Natuatl — he became convinced that a conspiracy existed among the principal native leaders. The conspiracy was to accept Jesus Christ as one of their many gods, to honor Him as the Spaniards did. It was an ancient custom of the natives to conduct themselves in this fashion. Whenever a strange people with strange gods migrated and settled among them or near them, they did that selfsame thing. Hence, there was no difficulty in their ready acceptance of Christianity, without the necessity of abandoning their ancient gods. When they were asked whether they believed in God the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, they invariably responded in the affirmative, using the word *quemachca*. The meaning of this reply, though affirmative, was with reservations, that is, that they did so according to their custom and with the reservation agreed among themselves. When asked whether they renounced their pagan gods they used the same word, *quemachca*, which meant that they did but in their own minds had no intention of doing so unreservedly.

. . . conspiracíon que habían hecho entre si los principales y sátrapas, de recibir a Jesucristo entre sus dioses como uno de ellos, y honrarlo como los mismos españoles le honran, conforme a la costumbre antigua que tenían, que cuando venía alguna gente forastera a poblar cerca de los que estaban ya poblados, cuando les parecía tomaban por dios al dios que traían los recíen llegados . . . De esta manera se inclinaron con facilidad a tomar por dios al Dios de los españolas, pero no para que dejasen los suyos antiguos, y esto ocultaron en el catecismo cuando se baptizaron; y al tiempo del catecismo, preguntados si creían en Dios Padre, Hijo y Espíritu Santo, con los demas articulos de la fe, respondían *quemachca*, que sí, conforme a la conspiración y costumbre que tenían; y preguntados si renegaban de todos los otros dioses que habían adorado, respondían también quemachca, que si, paliadamente y mentirosamento.[175]

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[174] *Ibid.*, I, 6.
[175] Sahagún, "Coloquois" in Luis Nicolau D'Olwer, Fray Bernardino de Sahagún (Mexico, 1952), 19.

Sahagún's main objective was to eradicate idolatry, the deep-seated beliefs in pagan gods. This had to be done as a condition *sine qua non* before there could be a truly genuine and wholehearted transformation of the convictions of the natives and an absolutely unreserved acceptance of Christianity by them. Upon this, the adoption of a corresponding Indian policy should rest. Fray Bernardino saw the mass conversions of the Indians as lacking profundity. The initial evangelization succeeded in cutting down the pagan brush wood, level to the ground. Below the ground, the roots were still intact and could put forth new shoots. To uproot the ancient pagan beliefs and to incorporate the natives internally and externally, both by inward conviction and outward compliance, was one of the principal preoccupations of his life.[176] Nor was he alone in the conviction that the old roots of paganism were not altogether destroyed. Other Friars too sensed this, although they had not the ability of Sahagún to demonstrate the fact. Even the gentle and saintly Fray Martin de Valencia, who headed the original twelve Franciscans to New Spain, expressed partial misgivings to the Emperor in his letter of January 18, 1535. His complaint was limited more to the older Indians, who gladly came for instructions and attended devotions but had not renounced their idols.

> . . . mayormente contra los viejos que aun no han renunciado sus ídolos, aunque todavía se llegan bien a la doctrina y con harta devoción vienen a las iglesias . . .[177]

There is no contradiction between these statements and those of the missionaries which attest to the genuine faith of Indian converts. Motolinía gives a goodly number of specific examples of Indians who laid down their lives for their faith. Certainly, there were many bona fide converts. If individuals such as Motolinía mentions were capable of this transformation, it could be validly reasoned that the opportunities of more sincere adherents were excellent. Sahagún had his eye on the overall picture and on a long-range plan. He dug down to the core of the chief problem, to that which most seriously contradicted not only the Christian Faith but also that of Abraham, the revered patriarch of the Christians. Idolatry was the cardinal error to be eradicated, for it gave honor to fictitious, false gods; it was the honor that belonged to God, the Supreme Being, alone. To have many gods was a contradiction in terms. There is but one Creator and all things are His creatures; there

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[176] D'Olwer, *op. cit.*, 18.
[177] Joaquín García Icazbalceta, *Nueva Colección de Documentos para la Historia de México* (Mexico, 1889), II, 179.

is but one universe and one sole Master of it. The Supreme Being is what He is independent of the erroneous thinking of human beings regarding Him, be they Indians of Cortesian days or pseudo-intellectuals of modern times. It was this diabolically false notion of a multiplicity of gods at which Sahagún was striking hard, albeit with equanimity and scholarly ability.

How did Sahagún's approach differ from that of other missionaries engaged in formulating a sound approach to Indian policies? Other missionaries placed immediate emphasis on the moral approach. They inculcated moral law. They attempted to eliminate apparent, gross vices. On this account Sahagún had occasion to indicate that there were worse vices than drunkeness, thievery, and lust. Graver still than these, Sahagún pointed out, were idolatry, superstition and idolatrous rites and ceremonies. He said that these were not yet completely wiped out, thereby admitting, by implication, that much had already been accomplished in that direction.

> . . . ni conviene se descuiden los ministros de esta conversión, con decir que entre esta gente no hay mas pecados que borrachera, hurto y carnalidad, porque otros muchos pecados hay entre ellos muy más graves y que tienen gran necesidad de remedio: Los pecados de la idolatría y ritos idolátricos, y supersticiones idolátricas y agueros, y abusiones y ceremonias idolátricas, no son aun perdidos del todo.[178]

While Sahagún directed his efforts toward the eradication of idolatrous practices and conceptions, it must not be thought that this was synonymous with the eradication of the intricate native culture. He knew the value of it and that the good in it could be utilized to great advantage. Nonetheless, he foresaw and realized the tremendous task involved in untangling the vicious from the virtuous elements.

> Apreció pues Sahagún, desde el primer momento, el valor de la cultura autóctona y hubo de prever difícil la tarea de suplantar en el corazón del pueblo a unos dioses en cuyo honor había levantado pocas décadas antes, la ingente mole de aquellos templos.[179]

Genuine scholar that he was, for his primary information, he had recourse to the records compiled by the natives. They could neither read nor write but had devised a means of preserving their history and recording useful information. They painted figures and images that told of their intimate secrets, of their customs and usages, and past events. As many as possible of these, Sahagún gathered up, in order to study them. These were his primary sources.

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[178] Sahagún, *Historia general*, I, 5.
[179] D'Olwer, *op. cit.*, 16.

Estas gentes no tenían letras ni caracteres algunos, ni sabían leer, ni sabían escribir; comunicabanse por imágines y pinturas, y todas las antiguallas suyas y libros que tenían de ellas, estaban pintados con figuras e imágenes, de tal manera que sabían e tenían memorias de todas las cosas que sus antepasados habían hecho y dejado en sus anales, por más de mil años atrás antes que vinieran los españoles a esta tierra.[180]

It was one of his regrets that some of these native records had been deliberately — but not maliciously — destroyed. He would like to have had everyone of them to peruse, combing each in turn for bits of needed information. Like himself, the missionaries prior to his time delved into the books of the natives. They honestly tried to ascertain, to the best of their ability, which were idolatrous and to be condemned and which should be retained. At times, books were destroyed that perhaps would have been preserved had the missionaries had a more accurate knowledge of Nahuatl and the ceremonial rites of the natives. What happened in this instance was the very thing that happened at the hands of the United States government after the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. In order to safeguard the country from possible sabotage, the government uprooted the Japanese living on the west coast, whether they were American citizens or not, and moved them to camps in the interior. Good Japanese suffered with the bad. This was done deliberately and understandably but not maliciously. Similarly did the missionaries deal with idolatrous books that impeded, in their minds, the cause of Christianization. This certainly was as laudable a cause as war. It was, in fact, a different kind of war, one waged against idolatry, immorality, demoniacal practices and the books that propagated idolatry. What happened to human beings at the hands of the United States government also happened to some books of paintings at the hands of the missionaries. The only difference is that the missionaries took care, as far as they could to separate the good from the bad. If a good book was lost, it was not so intended.

... los libros hay entre ellos que son reprobados, así como los de la cuenta de los años, meses é dias, é los de los añales, otrosí, hay reprobados que son los de idolatrías e de sueños...[181]

Despite any regrets Sahagún may have had about the destroyed documents, he did succeed in compiling sufficient information for his purposes, as can be gathered from his own statements. Others could capitalize on the fruits of his labor and save themselves much toil. Most

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[180] Sahagún, *Historia general*, X, 87.
[181] Icazbalceta, *Nueva Colección*, III, 283, quoting an ancient source — *Libro de oro y tesoro índico*.

important, a trustworthy source was made available in his writings. With the information he amassed the natives could be intelligently handled; and sound policies in the treatment of them could be drawn up. His general history, as he explains, is like a sweeping net that drags into the light an abundance of worthwhile data: meanings of words, of metaphorical language and connotations, of idioms and all sorts of ancient lore, good and bad. In a rather brief time the reader who so desired could glean from it much about the Mexicans.

Es esta obra como una red barreda para sacar a luz todos los vocablos de esta lengua con sus proprias y metafóricas significaciones, y todas sus maneras de hablar, y las mas de sus antiguallas buenas y malas; es para redimir mil canas, porque con harto menos trabajo de lo que aquí me cuesta, podran los que quisieren saber en poco tiempo muchas de sus antiguallas y todo el lenguaje de esta gente mexicana.[182]

To excuse oneself by shrugging off these matters as idle conceits and trifles, he charged to gross ignorance. Proper and exact terms as used by the natives had to be mastered. In this way, both preaching and confessions would prove much more fruitful. The cardinal point was that the terms employed by the natives and their way of life had to be clearly understood as a prerequisite for the intelligent moulding of their minds along Christian lines.

Para predicar contra estas cosas, y aun para saber si las hay, menester es de saber como las usaban en tiempo de su idolatría, que por falta de no saber esto en nuestra presencia hacen muchas cosas idolátricas sin que lo entendamos; y dicen algunos, excusándolos, que son boberías o niñerías, por ignorar la raíz de donde salen que es mera idolatría, y los confesores ni se las preguntan ni piensan que hay tal cosa, ni saben lenguaje para se las preguntar, ni aun lo entenderán aunque se lo digan.[183]

An example cited by Sahagún to illustrate his point was this. The Indians, after having gone to confession to the missionaries, were wont to ask for a signed certificate as proof of having gone to confession. The impression was that this was to indicate that they had complied with the Paschal precept. If they had gone to confession, most assuredly they would have received Holy Communion. This was not entirely foolproof but it did at least show that they had confessed. The actual reason for asking for the signed certificate was entirely different. Sahagún explained that this practice stemmed from a pagan custom. Under the ancient Aztec regime, Indians who could show this proof of having gone to the pagan priests, and obtained a similar certificate, would be free of legal

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[182] Sahagún, *Historia general*, I, 7.
[183] *Ibid.*, I, 5—6.

punishment for homicide and adultery. The law called for severe penalties
for these crimes. But the certificate absolved offenders from legal
punishment, for it meant that they had done penance already.

> . . . acabada su confesión, demandan una cédula firmada del confesor,
> con propósito de mostrarla a los que rigen, gobernador y alcaldes, para que
> sepan que han hecho pentencia y confesádose y que ya no tiene nada contra
> ellos la Justicia. Este embuste casi ninguno de los religiosos ni clérigos
> entienden pro donde va, por ignorar la costumbre antigua que tenían,
> según que arriba está escrito, mas antes piensan que la cédula la demandan
> para mostrar como está confesado, aquel año. Este sabemos por mucha
> experiencia que de ello tenemos.[184]

The brilliant Nahuatl scholar drove home his point. Just as a doctor
needs to know how to diagnose the ills afflicting the body, their symp-
toms, causes and effects, in order to cure these maladies, so also must
the confessor know the infirmities of the soul in order to apply the
adequate remedy. Not only a knowledge of the disease is necessary but
also a knowledge of the cures. Vices of the soul react on civic life as well
as on personal, intimate, private life. A morally good personal life
redounds to the betterment of public life.

> El médico no puede acertadamente aplicar las medicinas al enfermo
> [sin] que primero conozca de que humor, o de que causa proceda la enferme-
> dad; de manera que el buen médico conviene sea docto en el conocimiento
> de las medicinas y en el de las enfermedades, para aplicar conveniblemente
> a cada enfermedad la medicina contraria, [y porque] los predicadores y
> confesores médicos son de las animas, para curar las enfermedadas espiritu-
> ales conviene [que] tengan experiencia de las medicinas y de las enfermedades
> espirituales: el predicador de los vicios de la república, para enderezar
> contra ellos su doctrina; el confesor, para saber preguntar lo que conviene
> y entender lo que dijesen tocante a su oficio; . . .[185]

The keen intellect of Sahagún pierced to the very depths of the
pagan Indian mind. Up to the end of his ninety years of life — sixty of
them spent among the Indians — he gave unstintingly of his best efforts
in combatting the worst enemy of the natives whom he deeply loved.
That enemy was idolatry, superstition. One's worst enemies are closest
to one's self. As a Latin adage puts it: A man's worst enemies are those
of his own household. It was a saying of pagan Roman days. Idolatry
had embedded itself in the warp and woof of pagan Indian culture. It
would be extremely difficult to extirpate idolatrous superstition while
at the same time preserving the wholesome elements of that ancient
culture.

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[184] *Ibid.*, I, 28—29.
[185] *Ibid.*, I, 5.

It should be stated that the natives did revere one god as supreme, almighty, creator, as a pure spirit, the ruler of all things. His Nahuatl name was Tezcatlibuca. But mixed with this vague notion of the true God was the worship of a plurality of popular deities. Other basic concepts of the natives, to their credit, were a belief in the immortality of the soul, the origin of the world and its eventual end, belief in heaven, in a hell and its demons. They fasted and performed penances. Over and above these were also analogous aspects between Christian and pagan practices, such as that already illustrated in confession. But these analogous practices came to be looked upon by the missionaries as more prejudicial than useful in the propagation of Christianity. They were apt to be misleading, even to the missionaries, who were for a time misled by the pagan practice of obtaining a signed certificate after confession. All the missionaries insisted on the maintenance of the integrity of the Christian Faith, without palliatives, though they did understand and expect weaknesses to show up among the neophytes. But Sahagún made a specialty of ferreting out pagan concepts, disentangling for the less gifted the subleties of error from truth. This was his special contribution to sound Indian policy.

If certain analogies between some Christian and pagan ceremonials were evident, whence did these derive? Had any Christian missionaries been among the natives at any time in the pre-Columbian period? Sahagún rules out, unqualifiedly, the presence of any pre-Columbian missionaries. He does say that considerable doubt had been expressed on this considerably discussed question. His opinion, however, is most worthy of note, since he had such a wealth of knowledge of the native peoples. He never believed that any missionaries had been among them prior to the Spanish conquest or the discovery of the New World by Columbus. His reason is that he found nothing in pagan beliefs, rites and practices that could give any foundation to the premise that the Catholic Faith had been preached there. Then, he adds, that all he had observed and learned led him to see how totally contrary everything was to the Christian Faith.

Acerca de la predicación del Evangelio en estas partes ha habido mucha duda si han sido predicadas antes de ahora o no; y yo siempre he tentido opinión que nunca les fue predicado el Evangelio, porque nunca jamás he hallado cosa que aluda a la Fe Católica, sino todo tan contrario, y todo tan idolátrico que no puedo creer que les haya sido predicado el Evangelio en ningún tiempo.[186]

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[186] Sahagún, *Historia general*, III, 306.

This conviction did not depreciate the natives in Sahagún's eyes. Though he was a brilliant ethnologist, his viewpoints were always saturated with indestructible Christian concepts. Thus, for him, the human race was one, descending from the common parentage of Adam. On this score he drew no lines of distinction. He believed in the unity of the human race. He looked upon the natives as coming originally from the same stock as himself and all other peoples. He called them his neighbors, his brothers, whom he was obliged to love.

> Pues es certísimo que estas gentes todas son nuestros hermanos, procedentes del tronco de Adan como nosotros son nuestros prójimos, a quien somos obligados a amar como a nosotros mismos, quid quid sit.[187]

If the conviction of any truth, humanly speaking, could produce a humane Indian policy, certainly the explicit expression of the unity of the human race was a giant step toward that goal. This came from one who was much more aware than anyone else at that time of the faults and failings, of the virtues and assets, of the Indians.

Not only did Sahagún believe that no Christian missionaries had been among the Indians but also, as a corollary of this belief, that no contact had been made between the natives and Europeans. If contact had been made, the natives would have been nourishing themselves with basic foods similar to those the Europeans had in that day; the natives would have had animals like those of the Europeans. Since practically none of the native foods resembled those of the Europeans, and none of their animals were similar, Sahagún was confirmed in the viewpoint that no Europeans had discovered the presence of the Indians in the New World prior to the advent of Columbus. The natives did not have wheat, rye, barley; they had no chickens, horses, oxen, sheep or goats.

> ... que en la diversidad de mantenimientos, que casi ningunos son semejantes a los nuestros, parece que esta gente nunca ha sido descubierta hasta estos tiempos; porque de los mantenimientos que nosotros usamos y se usan en las partes de donde venimos, ningunos hallamos acá, ni aun de los animales mansos que usamos los que venimos de España, y de toda la Europa, tampoco los hallamos acá; donde parece que ni ellos vinieron de hacia aquellos partes, ni hombres de aquellos partes habían venido a descubrir esta tierra, porque si ellos hubieran venido de hacia allá, hubieran venido a descubrirlos en otros tiempos, (y) de ellos halláramos acá trigo, o cebada o centeno, a gallinas de las de allá, o caballos, o bueyes, o asnos, u ovejas o cabras, o algunos otros de los animales mansos de que usuamos.

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[187] Sahagún, *Historia general*, I, 10.

Donde parece que en estos tiempos solamente han sido decubiertas estas tierras, y no antes.[188]

These deductions of the keen observer are considered still valid today. Coupled with a minor argument or two, based on both negative and positive archaeological findings, the sound conclusions of Sahagún are still taught in American colleges and universities. The Spaniards introduced the natives to foods and animals new to them, taught them the principle of the wheel and the formation of the arch. The Spaniards also taught the natives how to read and write, accomplishments the latter had hitherto lacked.

When the tall tales of the indiscriminate and horrible destruction wrought by the Spaniards in the New World are told, it is well to recall what Sahagún wrote. He has demonstrated that to the Spaniards. They learned to read and write and thus were enabled to communicate with others. They became acquainted with a varied, more healthful diet, with food and draft animals they had never seen before, with architectural and mechanical principles unknown to them, all of which made their daily struggle for existence that much easier. Sahagún was one of the actors in this effort to civilize the natives, one of the numerous missionaries doing their part, one of a multitude of Spaniards who helped to civilize these backward peoples. The humane policy of Spain toward the Indians was much advanced for that day. The United States is in the forefront today in extending technological know-how to less progressive nations, under the Point Four Program. This is laudable but not as new as we like to think it is. Spain, in her day of worldwide influence, purposed in her colonies a policy just as altruistic, just as much dedicated to human welfare.

The favorite method of absolving oneself from the obligation of helping another is to declare that the one in need of aid is incompetent, incapable and unable to learn or accomplish anything. This attitude would have been an easy way out for the Spaniards, if they had chosen to refuse to exert themselves in behalf of the natives. But, drawing on experience, Sahagún paints a far different picture. He speaks in defense of the natives and their abilities. He declares that they were capable in all the arts and in mechanics, that they were capable too of grasping the liberal arts and even theology, the queen of the sciences. He based this declaration on actual experiences. The natives had been taught and had demonstrated ability to learn. Moreover, he praises the natives for

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[188] Sahagún, *Historia general*, XI, 306.

marriage, which has so predominant a position in any society or civilization.

Perhaps no phase of Spanish activity in the New World meant so much to Sahagún as the development of education among the natives. Education does not, in itself, ensure virtue, for no one has ever charged Satan with being ignorant, but even spiritual progress cannot take place without the enlightenment of the mind. The College of Santa Cruz, founded in 1536, in a suburb of Mexico City, a brief fifteen years after the conquest, was truly a significant event. Sahagún always maintained a vital interest in it. He was present at its formal opening; he was appointed one of its first professors. The idea was to educate the natives so that they, in turn, could take over the college and educate their own people. Ten years after the foundation of the college, it was turned over to the natives. Thus, twenty-five years after the conquest by the Spaniards, a college that was in charge of the natives was in operation in Mexico. Where can a comparable example be found elsewhere in the world? What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the culture encountered by the Spaniards was radically different from their own. This made the accomplishment all the more significant. Sahagún was one of the finest and most learned minds of his day, time and place. This is how he records these facts:

Enseñaron los frailes a los colegiales y estuvieron con ellos más de diez años enseñándoles todo la disciplina y costumbres que en el Colegio se habían de guardar, y ya que había entre ellos quien leyesen y quien al parecer fuesén hábiles para regir el Colegio, hiciéronles sus ordenaciones y eligiéronse rector, y consiliarios, para que rigieran el Colegio, y dejáronlos que leyesen y se rigiesen ellos a sus solas por más de veinte años...[195]

For twenty years the college was in full charge of the Indians themselves. It was a worthwhile endeavor, even if it did not succeed according to expectations. The Spaniards cannot be accused of not having tried, and tried hard, through their viceroys and their missionaries, to institute a native educational policy. But the college declined and it was necessary to try again. It was now forty years since its establishment and it was necessary to reorganize it completely.

Cuarenta años después de la fundación del Colegio tornóse a examinar el estado en que estaban las cosas del Colegio, y hallóse estar perdido, y fué necessario dar otro corte y hacer otras ordenaciones de nuevo, sobre las primeras, para que el Colegio fuese adelante, como parece por las mismas ordenaciones que se hicieron de nuevo.[196]

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[195] *Ibid.*, X, 89—90. For further details as regards this college, see Dr. Felix de Osores, *Historia de todos los Colegios de la Ciudad de México desde La Conquista Hasta 1780*, ed. by Dr. Carlos E. Castañeda.

[196] *Ibid.*, X, 90.

Sahagún was an eyewitness to both the foundation of the college and its reorganization, which, he said, was much more difficult than its original establishment. Pestilences ravaged the land. Two struck hard at the college: one in 1576 and another thirty years earlier. Because of the scourge of pestilence and disease, in 1576, there was hardly anyone attending the school of higher education for natives. The students had either died or taken ill.

> Yo que me hallé en la fundación del dicho Colegio, me hallé también en la reformación de el, la cual fué más dificultosa que la misma fundación. La pestilencia que hubo ahora ha treinta y un años dio gran baque al Colegio, y no le ha dado menor esta pestilencia de este año de 1576, que casi no está ya nadie en el Colegio, muertos y enfermos, casi todos son salidos.[197]

But this did not mean the end of education. When Sahagún died, the school was still functioning. The important point is that the ground-work of native education had been laid; natives had been educating natives and even the children of the Spaniards. Some natives had been educated so well that they became the collaborators with Sahagún in the production of his history. Without their assistance it would have been impossible for him to be as exact and precise as he was in recording information. The collaborating Indian scholars knew Latin and Spanish. Through these two languages, Sahagún could test the accuracy of the concepts of the natives. Once he was certain that they knew exactly what he had in his own mind, the native scholars could commit to writing those very concepts. Sahagún knew Nahuatl and, therefore, if unable to give perfect expression to his thoughts in that tongue, he at least was able to read it and know whether what he read conveyed exactly what he had in mind. Thus, the Indians and the Spaniards formed a perfect team. Sahagún gave them due credit, for, he explained, it would have been most difficult, if not impossible, to operate without the natives acting as expert examiners, writers and critics of his work.

> . . . y ellos por ser entendidos en la lengua latina nos dan a entender las propriedades de los vocablos y las propriedades de su manera de hablar, y las incongruidades que hablamos en los sermones, o las que decimos en las doctrinas; ellos no las enmiendan, y cualquiera cosa que se haya de convertir en su lengua, si no va con ellos examinades, puede ir sin defecto sin escribir congruamente en la lengua latina, ni en romance, ni en su lengua; para lo que toca a la ortografia y, buena letra, no hay quien lo esciba si no los que aquí se crían.[198]

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[197] *Ibid.*, X, 90.
[198] *Ibid.*, X, 89.

Among the outstanding native grammarians who collaborated with him, Sahagún records the names of Martin Jacobita, Antonio Valeriano, Alonso Vegerano y Pedro de S. Buenaventura. His notable amanuenses were: Diego de Grado, Mateo Severino y Bonifcio Maximiliano.[199] Some of these excellently educated Indians had been his pupils. Now he had used them as collaborators in his writings. He left the impress of his influence particularly on Indian educational policies. He had utilized the Indians themselves in compiling the books that would be used in Indian education. He had helped train natives who would teach natives. He had explored the native mind and checked his conclusions with competent native scholars.

Only in recent years have scholars begun to appreciate the nature of Sahagún's thorough task of trying to understand the natives as completely and fully as possible. This intensive study of native manners, customs, rites, ceremonies, language and literature resulted in the writing of his history, his basic and most important work, by far. Spain, in Sahagún's day, was trying to establish in the New World sound policies in human and political relations. Such policies could be determined only after some understanding of the minds, attitudes and reactions of the native population. In bringing about that understanding, Sahagún was in the forefront. Scholars have finally come to evaluate his history for what it is in fact: history, a study of ethnography and language. It is a work of the highest scientific caliber.

> ... debo añadir ahora que el más exigente método que un etnógrafo, o un linguista modernos pudieran usar, fué usado antes por el benemérito franciscano ...[200]

Next to parents in the home, teachers make the greatest impact upon a nation, through the moulding of the minds of its youth. Scholars must lead the way in the formulation of sound policies in all fields of human endeavor. Sahagún was a genuine, brilliant, outstanding scholar, who loved the Indians well enough to live among them sixty uninterrupted years, never leaving their land for even a brief visit to his own. With respect to his life among the Indians, Chavero says that Fray Bernardino de Sahagún dedicated his life to the instruction of the natives. As soon as he learned their language, he began his good influence as a teacher:

> Bernardino Sahagún, cuya vida se dedicó a la enseñanza de los naturales, tan luego como aprendió la lengua mexicana, comenzó á ejercer su benefico profesorado.[201]

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[199] Wigberto Jiménez Moreno, *Fray Bernardino de Sahagún y su Obra* (Mexico, 1938), 73, n. (110).

[200] *Ibid.*, I, 6—7.

[201] Alfredo Chavero, *Sahagún* (Mexico, 1948), 11.

Icazbalceta, who is a veritable master of the history of the sixteenth century, during which Sahagún labored among the Indians, has stated that Sahagún was an illustrious gentleman, the preserver of Mexican history, the father and teacher of the Indians:

. . . un varón ilustre, conservador de nuestra Historia, padre y maestro de los indios.[202]

Moreno, who has specialized in the study of the life and works of Sahagún, sums up the latter's accomplishments by saying that he was the first great ethnographer and linguist, the father or founder of Nahuatl literature.

Sahagún, primer gran etnógrafo y linguista y fundador o padre de la Literatura Nahuatl.[203]

From history books, one gets the impression that the Spanish were harsh towards the natives of the New World. Yet, Sahagún, conversant as modern historians are not, with both sides of the picture, indirectly reveals a different point of view. He implies that the Spanish policy was much milder than that of the Indians themselves. In the treatment of their own subjects in matters of discipline and training, the Indians were harsh indeed. They took advantage of the kindlier treatment of the missionaries under the Spanish regime. In the days of idolatry, the Indians were driven to obedience; the Spanish policy seemed to be to draw them of their own accord. But the Indians did not exert themselves nearly as much for the kindlier Spanish administrators as they did under the rigid and austere Indian rulers.

Ya tampoco nosotros no nos podemos apoderar con los que se crían en las escuelas porque como no tienen aquel humor y sujeción que antiguamente tenían, ni los criamos con aquel rigor y austeridad que se criaban en tiempo de su idolatría, no se sujetan ni se enseñan, ni toman lo que enseñan, como si estuvieran en aquella empresa pesada de los viejos antiguos.[204]

According to Sahagún, Spain, in her efforts to civilize the natives of the New World, pursued a humane policy. Nor did the missionaries feel that only their human energies were involved in the work they had undertaken. They were constantly conscious of divine guidance in the task of civilizing and christianizing, even as all of them were convinced that the discovery was providentially reserved for their period of the Christian era.[205]

(Continued)

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[202] Icazbalceta, *Bibliografía Mexicana del Siglo XVI*, 253.
[203] W. J. Moreno, *op. cit.*, 5.
[204] Sahagún, *Historia general*, X, 82.   [205] *Ibid.*, XII, 18.

BOOK REVIEWS

Ockham: *Philosophical Writings, A selection edited and translated by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M.* Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1957. Pp. lix—154.

To the scholar or to the student interested in William Ockham, the late Father Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. needs no introduction, because not only was he one of the leading authorities on Franciscan philosophy of the Middle Ages, but he was also a professor of philosophy who, through painstaking study and research, captured the genuine spirit of William Ockham.

This volume is one of a series, each of which is edited by a scholar of special competence in those branches of philosophy with which it is particularly concerned. Father Philotheus prepared his selection with the view of making the understanding of Ockham's works less laborious for the ordinary reader but, in addition, throughout the book there is paramount concern for rendering a faithful account of Ockham's doctrine, and this will be apparent to the beginner and will be most keenly appreciated by the mature reader who has some experience in the study of the texts of Ockham.

Attention is called to the unusually well-done and valuable introduction of fifty-nine pages which includes an excellent compilation in which the following matter is discussed: I. Background; II. Ockham's life; III. Ockham's philosophy, 1. The leading ideas of Ockham's philosophy, 2. Epistemology, 3. Logic, 4. Metaphysics, 5. On creatures, 6. Ethics, 7. Politics; IV. Bibliographical section with helpful notes regarding: A. Ockham's non-political writings — 1. Writings on Logic, 2. Writings on Physics, 3. Works on Theology; B. Political writings; C. Spurious writings; and D. Select bibliography on Works of Ockham. Included in the biographical section are data in regard to the dating of the various works, their dependence and information as to whether they are preserved in manuscript form or as to whether they are to be found in printed editions.

The corpus of Dr. Boehner's selection commences with a reading from the Prologue to the *Expositio super octo libros Physicorum* and it is entitled: "On the Notion of Knowledge or Science." Both a Latin text and a parallel English translation are given. Throughout the entire volume it was the endeavor of the editor to prepare texts which could be considered reliable. To accomplish this he made a comparative study of a number of good manuscripts, and while the fruits of his labors are not claimed to be critical, they can be rated as safe texts. A reading of this carefully prepared part reveals Ockham's clear exposition of 'knowledge' taken in many senses. After disclosing at least a half dozen viewpoints in regard to 'knowledge' there is a treatment of the difference between the object and subject of knowledge. The same selection embraces a scholarly consideration of the notion of 'science.'

Another section of the book gives Ockham's views about Epistemological problems. Included are: The basis of immediate cognition; Intuitive cognition

of non-existent things; The primacy of cognition of singular things; The problem of universals; Scotus's opinion on universals and its refutation; The universal as a thought-object and as an act of the intellect.

For those whose interest lies in Medieval Logic as well as for those whose field of endeavor is to be found in Contemporary Logic, the third division holds much of interest. Although this selection is culled from the *Summa totius logicae*, a work composed in the Middle Ages, it expresses the doctrine in connection with terms of one who spoke authoritatively for his age as well as for ours.

To round out the leading ideas of Ockham's philosophy there are texts and translations on: The theory of '*Suppositio*'; Truth; Inferential operations; Being, essence and existence; The possibility of a natural theology; The proof of God's existence; God's Causality and Foreknowledge; Physics and Ethics.

In his own day Ockham was extremely well aware that the Magistri had an inadequate knowledge of the new Logic of supposition and of other points essential to his conceptualism. For their instruction and to explain in a fashion that could not be misconstrued the tenets of his philosophy, he wrote the very selections mentioned above. The faithful translations of Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. together with the reliable texts should do much to expose Ockham's doctrines to a new generation of readers who hitherto have been able to read only about Ockham in authors whose efforts have failed to do justice to the *Venerabilis Inceptor*. Now, however, easy of access are the selections listed above and one may read what the *Doctor plusquam subtilis* has to say for himself in this excellent book of selected works.

Father Philotheus was aware that any presentation of a part of the works of a philosopher would serve at best as an introduction. Thus, the criticism that the edited offerings terminate just when one is at a most interesting point, should be tempered by the remembrance that the editor has presented only an introduction. Indeed, the editor exercised rare acuity in the choice of passages selected as each concerns some aspect pertinent to Ockham's philosophy. The translations read smoothly and they are couched in the English of current usage. The placing of the footnotes for both the Latin text and the English translation on the same page, instead of under their respective readings is confusing until one has accustomed himself to the scheme. The inclusion of an Index of Proper Names and an Index of Subject is most helpful.

A reading of this book will show why Ockham exercized such an influence upon fourteenth century philosophy and theology, and why the universities of Europe were indebted to him for doctrines presented with the convincing and conclusive force of his logic. The endeavor of Father Philotheus' life was to render a genuine account of Ockham's views and to aid in correcting misconceptions which have prevented a proper understanding of the philosophy of Ockham upon whose life and works Dr. Boehner labored for so many years. This book, which was in its final stages at the time of Father Philotheus' death, should do much to accomplish the editor's dual aims.

SISTER MARY ANTHONY BROWN, O.S.F.

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THE WRITINGS
OF FATHER LUKE WADDING, O. F. M

About the year 1611 solemn ceremonies were being held in a certain church in Spain. There was a great concourse of people. The bishop and the members of the cathedral chapter were present; and the sermon was being delivered by a distinguished preacher. "Cherish the writings of the saints and cherish the learned saints," he told his congregation. "I myself have a special regard for both. But I have no devotion to simpletons like Saint Francis of Assisi."[1] It was no slip of the tongue. He repeated it, and he emphasised it by saying it a third time. A murmur of disapproval passed through the congregation. The preacher stuttered and stammered. The points of his carefully prepared sermon began to slip his memory. His face went red. Confusion seized him. The people grew restive and impatient. He fled the pulpit in dismay.

At that same time Luke Wadding of Waterford, Ireland, then a young Franciscan student, was studying for the priesthood at Coimbra in Portugal,[2] and often during his summer vacations he used to visit the neighbouring Franciscan friary of Figueira da Foz to pore over the old books and manuscripts in the library and to gather material for an edition of the writings of St. Francis which he was preparing.[3] What urged him on was that about six years before, during his noviceship, a misguided but well-meaning friend wrote to him lamenting that he should have thought fit to bury his great talents in the obscurity of the cloister and above all in an order like that of the Franciscans, which, said his friend, had never been distinguished for the cult of letters or for the number of its learned men.[4] The unforeseen result was that Luke set before himself as the main part of his life's work to show the strong literary and learned traditions of the Franciscan order and to prove that even its founder was far from discouraging a balanced interest in

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[1] "non vero idiotis, qualis erat Franciscus."

[2] F. Harold, *Vita Fratris Lucae Waddingi*, 3rd ed. (cura patrum provinciae Hiberniae) (Quaracchi, 1931), chaps. v, vi, pp. 13—14.

[3] L. Wadding, *Annales Minorum*, 3rd ed., XVI (Quaracchi, 1933), 288, ad an. 1527.

[4] Harold, *Vita*, chap. vi, p. 14.

studies and scholarship. He began by seeking out every item written by St Francis, carefully studying and interpreting it. His final decision was to copy out and publish all the writings and elucidate them with his own notes and commentaries. The result was a quarto volume of over six hundred pages, which appeared at Antwerp in 1623.[5] In the address to the reader he lays bare his motives.

I know that you are also anxious to learn what inspired me to collect and comment on these writings after several centuries, since such a long period of time has passed without any of our fathers or their superiors attempting the task. I tell you frankly, this effort of mine, such as it is, for the glory of St Francis, took its origins from other people's assiduity in decrying him. For when certain sciolists, wiser than other people in their own judgment only, upbraided us with our indolence and ignorance and added that it was a hereditary disgrace derived from our founder, I desired to place before their eyes the teaching of this holy man, from which it will be seen that he was not as ignorant as they wish to make him, and that he did not hinder his friars from the study of letters, but that he counselled it, nay, even clearly ordered it in his rule, as St Bonaventure asserts.[6]

History shows, he continues, how faithfully his friars followed his example and advice, bringing glory to the whole Christian church by their writings, as any list of ecclesiastical writers will demonstrate. It will be seen that the Franciscan order is second to none in the number of its learned men. "That," he explains, "was how I began my research on the writings of St Francis. My research-work intensified my purpose, while the joy at what I found aroused the desire to find still more."[7]

Luke dedicated the volume to the brothers Trejo, one a bishop, the other a cardinal. The bishop was Anthony, under whose aegis Luke had first gone to Rome. Anthony was head of the delegation sent by King Philip III of Spain to Pope Paul V, to promote the cause of the immaculate conception of Our Lady, and Luke was its official theologian. Gabriel, the cardinal, was the person who put on record the account of the preacher who had spoken ill of St Francis, and the letter in which he describes it is printed in this same volume.[8] He deliberately refrains, he tells us, from mentioning the name of the Spanish city in which the incident occurred lest the reputation of the preacher or of the order to

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[5] *B. P. Francisci assisiatis opuscula: nunc primum collecta, tribus tomis distincta, notis et commentariis asceticis illustrata, per Fr. Lucam Waddingum..* (Antwerp, 1623).

[6] *Ad lectorem praefatio*, in op. cit., p. xlix.

[7] "Hoc meae inquisitionis Operum Francisci principium. Auxit vero studium ipsa inquisitio, dum inuentorum gaudium inueniendorum excitabat desiderium." Ibid.

[8] *Cardinalis de Treio epistola*, in id., pp. xxxiii—iv.

which he belonged should suffer. The cardinal at that time was still a layman, and was acting as auditor in the Spanish royal court at Valladolid. The preacher's remarks did not lessen his esteem for St Francis. It was due to his suggestion and influence that the feast of the stigmata of St Francis, previously celebrated only by Franciscans, was extended to the universal church.[9] More remarkable still, no sooner was the cardinal's purple conferred on him than he decided to don also the brown habit of the Third Order of St Francis.[10] "I report the case as I know it to have happened," he tells us. "I do not proclaim it a miracle, but I do look on Francis as a wise as well as a holy man." The narration of the event only confirmed Luke in his conviction of the need for publishing the correct view about Francis and his followers. The writings of St Francis were to be followed by the publication of the works of a number of other mediaeval Franciscans. Histories and a biographical dictionary of the writers of the order would further correct the false impression that was abroad.

Luke Wadding never looked back. From that till the end of his life, his publications, between compilations and editions, averaged out at well over a volume a year. And the great majority of them were about Franciscans or on Franciscan subjects or were editions of texts compiled by Franciscan friars.

Significantly enough, his greatest work is his history of the Franciscan order. He commenced work on it soon after publishing the writings of St Francis, and for the following thirty years he laboured at it assiduously as much as other important external activities would permit him. No sooner was one volume published than readers were clamouring for the next, and Luke was hard put to it at times to keep up the supply. He explained his difficulties.

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[9] Id., pp. xxxix—xl. He describes how it happened. His brother, then a Franciscan but not yet a bishop, went to spend a few days with him at Valladolid while he himself was still a layman and attached to the royal court. After supper on September 16 the two Franciscans were reciting matins for the following day, while he, walking up and down in another part of the room, was saying the Psalter of Our Lady. His curiosity aroused by hearing the frequent repetition of the name of St Francis, he enquired about what feast they were celebrating. On hearing that it was the feast of the stigmata of St Francis, he expressed surprise that such a feast, more important even than that of the death of St Francis, should be confined to the Franciscan order. There and then, he and his brother agreed that, if ever the occasion should offer, they would try to have it extended to the universal church. Ten years later his brother was vicar general of the order and he was cardinal, and they succeeded in having their wish fulfilled and had the privilege of assisting together at the first solemn celebration of the feast.

[10] *Epistola dedicatoria*, in id., p. ix; *Cardinalis de Treio epistola*, in id., pp. xli—ii.

I try adroitly to allow no moment to slip by uselessly, and no day without a line. I do not eat the bread of idleness, but in labour and fatigue. Like those building the walls of Jerusalem [who are described in the second Book of Esdras] with one hand I pursue the work, in the other I hold the sword, that is, part of the time writing, part of the time engaged in other preoccupations.

That piece occurs in the preface to the third volume.[11] For nearly every volume he had ready a similar apt text of scripture. For the fourth volume it was Proverbs, XXX, 29: "There are three things which go well, and the fourth that walketh happily."[12] While working on the fifth volume he was dragged away from the quiet, studious atmosphere of St Isidore's College, Rome, which he himself had founded, to the head house of the order at Ara Coeli, there to assume the arduous office of acting procurator general. Soon after his return to his books and manuscripts at St Isidore's he was able to publish the fifth volume. His text was, "When young Tobias returned from Ninive to his father's house he saw his progeny to the fifth generation" (Tobias, XIV, 15). So I, too, he explains, having returned from the bustling life at Ara Coeli to my own quiet cell at St Isidore's, now see the fifth generation, as it were, of my poor little mind.[13] The sixth volume was being prepared under the stress and strain of the news about the terrible war of the Confederation of Kilkenny in Ireland and the threatening disunion of forces. Wadding's work had increased immensely. He was Irish agent at Rome. He had a voluminous correspondence to deal with. He was consultor to different ecclesiastical congregations and commissions. During part of this time he was also guardian of St Isidore's college, and the full weight of its administration fell on his aging shoulders. It was only after the labours and cares of the day that he was able to settle down in his room or in the college library to continue this monumental work by which his name shall be remembered for ever. For his text he went to Genesis, XXX, 19: "And Lia conceived again . . . and . . . she called his name Zabulon." Lia, he explains, signifies "labouring," and Zabulon can mean either "a token of good-will" or "*fluxus noctis*," that is, "flowing or course of the night." He applies this to his own case. Labouring, indeed, and groaning under the weight of many tasks, have I conceived and brought forth this volume. I want it to be "a token of my good-will" towards that Franciscan order to which I have dedicated all my labours. And

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[11] Wadding, *Annales Minorum*, 3rd ed., VI (Quaracchi, 1931), (i. e. lst ed., vol. III), *praefatio*, p. xviii.

[12] Id., VIII (Quaracchi, 1932), (i. e. lst ed., vol. IV), *praefatio*, p. xxiii.

[13] Id., IX (Quaracchi, 1932), (i. e. lst ed., vol. V), *praefatio*, p. xv.

truly it was only in "the course of the night" that I was able to do any work at it.[14] Father Francis Harold, who knew him well, confirms this. Regularly, he would continue at his desk until eleven o'clock, and frequently he was so absorbed in his task that the clock of the neighbouring church of the Trinitá de' Monti would ring the midnight hour over the sleeping city by the Tiber before this indefatigable man would lay his pen aside to snatch a few hours rest.[15]

The first two volumes were dedicated to the then ministers general of the order, Benignus of Genoa and Bernardine of Siena, the third to Prince Ferdinand Enrique de Ribera, the fourth to the marquis of Castelrodrigo, the fifth to Cardinal Francis Barberini, the sixth to the Emperor Ferdinand III, the seventh to Ferdinand IV, king of Hungary and Bohemia, and the eight to King Philip IV of Spain. We can take it that none of those dedications was written without the permission of the distinguished persons concerned, and we can be certain, so high was Wadding's prestige throughout Europe, and so great was the esteem in which his work was held, that every one of them would have felt honoured to have a volume of these famed annals dedicated to his memory.

The annals begin with the birth of St Francis and end with the period of the dissolution of the monasteries and the rise of Protestantism. They tell the story of over three centuries of Franciscanism, its beginning as a tiny movement of Christian reform and its spread throughout the five continents and into every social sphere. The constitutional and legislative development of the first, second, and third orders founded by St Francis, the foundation of friaries and convents throughout the world, the careers of Franciscan popes, cardinals, and bishops, are all treated of, or at least touched upon. The literary and educational influence of Franciscans on the life of their times is also examined. It was a vast undertaking, which would have daunted a man of lesser courage, especially one with so many other commitments, but Luke was encouraged by the enthusiastic aid he received from superiors and confrères, as well as by the fact that a trail was already blazed for him

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[14] Id., XII (Quaracchi, 1932), (i. e. 1st ed., vol. VI), *praefatio*, p. xvii.
[15] "continuabat enim studia semper ad undecimam horam a meridie, nec raro sui oblitum, et in studii absorptum ipsum in se revocabat mediae noctis major campana sanctissimae Trinitatis Montis Pincii, qua nocturnae lucubrationis pertinacia reparare satagebat id litterarii laboris, quod occupationibus diurnis praeripiebatur." — Harold, *Vita*, chap. xxxvi, p. 43.

by such chroniclers as Marianus of Florence,[16] Francis Gonzaga,[17] Mark of Lisbon,[18] and Henri de Vroom.[19]

The work comprises eight large volumes, so large, in fact, that all later editors found it more convenient to divide each into two, making sixteen in all, and they are still very large volumes.[20] When Luke wrote his challenging introduction to the first volume he was an energetic man in his thirties. When he was penning his peroration at the end of the last volume, he was a failing old man, who had felt obliged to call on his nephew, Father Francis Harold from Limerick, to help him with the work and undertake to continue it down to their own times. This peroration constitutes a touching farewell not merely to the faithful readers of the annals but to literary labours in general. It is also an echo of what he wrote thirty years before about the defamers of his order, whose taunts had goaded him into historical research in the first instance. It is so revealing of the character of the man and of his life's purpose that I cannot forbear giving a summary translation of it.

I have now followed on paper the footsteps of my fellow-religious, who traversed nearly every country in Europe. I have found that they filled the earth with the seed of sound doctrine. I then crossed the seas after them to India, the Orient, and the countries to the west. There, also, I have traced the good work they accomplished. Finally, after sailing through so many years, buffeted by the tempests of the vast ocean, I am compelled to gather in the sails of my shivering boat, and, having cast anchor, to come to rest in port. Already the weight of old age presses me down, and in my worn-out body the spirit, formerly so eager, now begins to languish, and, surrounded on all sides by the pressure of affairs, finally acknowledges itself unequal to the task. It is time, therefore, for me to free myself completely from all preoccupations, and, having laid aside my pen, to look to that one thing which is supremely necessary, that is, the saving of my soul. I therefore call on you, most holy virgin, mother of God, you who are the safe refuge of the

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[16] *Fasciculus chronicarum Ordinis Minorum*, an unpublished work of which Wadding had a manuscript copy, and which, as he himself tells us in his *Scriptores*, proved helpful to him in compiling his annals. See Giuseppe Abate in *Miscellanea franciscana*, XL (Rome, 1940), 273—6.

[17] *De origine seraphicae religionis franciscanae* (Rome, 1587).

[18] The first two parts of his chronicles of the order were published in Portuguese and the third in Spanish (Lisbon, 1557; Lisbon, 1562; Salamanca, 1570; respectively). They were quickly translated into all the great European languages.

[19] Wadding found his manuscript history of the province of *Germania Inferior* most useful for the territory it covered, and also utilised his general history of the order which was published at Antwerp in 1613. See Wadding, *Scriptores Ordinis Minorum, editio novissima* (Rome, 1906), s. n. Henricus Sedulius; and Harold, *Vita*, chap. xxxiv, pp. 40—1.

[20] The most convenient edition is the third, published at Quaracchi 1931—33, with a seventeenth volume containing the indexes, Quaracchi, 1935.

shipwrecked. And your help also, I beseech, O most blessed father Francis. Your sons have done great work for God in many European countries, in the vast provinces of Asia and America, throughout the wide expanse of the new world. I, the littlest one in the house of my father, for I have called myself thy son, plodding away at my little tasks and collecting the scattered documents, have tried under your auspices, O seraphic father, to write of their illustrious deeds and of their apostolic labours. If my work merits any reward, intercede that God in His great mercy may grant me forgiveness of my sins and the recompense of eternal life.[21]

Luke Wadding's second greatest literary achievement was the publication of the whole works of John Duns Scotus. The work was divided into twelve tomes but ran into sixteen folio volumes, and was published at Lyons in 1639. Its inspiration derived from the same burning resentment at unjust aspersions and the same ardent desire to vindicate the honour of the favourite theologian of his order. There was the additional stimulus of patriotism, because in common with all seventeenth-century Irish Franciscans, Luke felt there was a good case for claiming Duns Scotus was an Irishman.[21a] In fact, the publication was in the main a joint Irish Franciscan undertaking. Fathers Anthony Hickey of Clare and John Punch of Cork gave valuable help, and abundant use was made of the already published scholia and texts and commentaries of Hugh MacCaghwell, archbishop of Armagh and Maurice O'Fihely, archbishop of Juam, the famous *Flos Mundi*.

Scientifically, it is not a completely satisfactory edition. Although a considerable advance on what went before, it is yet a fairly typical product of its age. Luke chose the best available texts and made some

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[21] Wadding, *Annales Minorum*, 3rd ed., XVI, 547—9.

[21a] Scholars had gradually been coming to agree with the opinions of Rev. Fr Ephrem Longpré, O.F.M., about the birthplace of Duns Scotus, but a recent book sets one wondering whether after all so much progress has been made since Wadding's day towards the solution of the problem. Dr D. E. Easson in his *Medieval religious houses: Scotland* (London, 1957), p. 11, after referring to the twelfth century Premonstratensian theologian, Adam "the Scot," writes: "Still more elusive is the association both with Scotland and with Scottish monasticism of the *Doctor Subtilis*, John Duns Scotus." The Brockie MS on which the case is mainly based is not, according to him, a real register but a collection of transcripts. Other material in the MS alleged to derive from the same source as the account of Duns Scotus has been found unreliable, and even the alleged source itself is subject to suspicion as being merely the elaboration of a tradition, the elements of which (with some variations) are to be found in seventeenth century Scottish writers. The statements in the account receive little or no support from existing records. The identification offered for Littledean is at best conjectural. Dr Easson concludes (p. 12): "Thus, until the authenticity of Brockie's statements is substantiated, the problem of Duns's *origines* has not, it seems, been satisfactorily solved; it stands where it did — in the limbo of uncertainties."

collations with old and trustworthy manuscripts. Both he and MacCagh-well felt justified in making what to them seemed corrections or improvements. Actually, a number of the so-called corrections were ill-advised, and some of the parts consigned ignominiously to the margins have since been demonstrated to have been written by Duns Scotus himself or at least sanctioned by him. Several good manuscripts which have since come to light were unknown to Wadding. Further, he erro-neously accepted as Duns Scotus's, and edited as such, a large number of tracts that are now acknowledged to be spurious. He was misled into thinking that the so-called *Reportata Parisiensia* were merely repetitions delivered at Paris of Duns Scotus's Oxford lectures, whereas they are really the notes taken by students who attended his Paris lectures.[22]

The chief value of Wadding's edition is that for the first time it brought together in convenient form all the works generally attributed to Duns Scotus and provided a reasonably good text. It has retained its usefulness throughout the last three centuries and will continue to do so until the completion of the critical Vatican edition, of which only four volumes have yet appeared.[23] Its impact was immense. The demand for it was so great that within two years of publication it was almost impossible to procure a copy in the shops.[24] It has been estimated that during the last three decades of the seventeenth century more than 120 folio volumes based on it were issued from the printing presses.

Luke's advocacy of the immaculate conception of Our Lady springs not merely from a tender devotion going back to childhood days in Water-ford, not merely from his training in the schools of Spain, where this doctrine was so popular, but also from its being the traditional teaching of his own order, and from its theological orthodoxy having been so brilliantly defended by his beloved John Duns Scotus. As theological adviser to the legation sent to Rome by the king of Spain, he undertook much research work into the history of the cult and the definability of the doctrine. His work is an important landmark on the road that leads

[22] See C. M. Balić, "Wadding, the Scotist," in Franciscan Fathers, *Father Luke Wadding commemorative volume* (Dublin, 1957), pp. 486—504.

[23] *Doctoris Subtilis et Mariani Ioannis Duns Scoti Ordinis Fratrum Minorum opera omnia ... studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae ... praeside P. Carolo Balić ...*, I and II (Vatican, 1950), III (Vatican, 1954), IV (Vatican. 1956).

[24] "Sane vero quam corresponderit Deus votis et opinioni Waddingi in edendis his operibus Scoti, nunc nobis palam est, quando videmus ipsum studium operamque ejus adeo prospere successisse, ipsosque libros, etsi multo aere comparandos, tam avide distractos fuisse, ut cum plurima essent exemplaria, vix biennio post eorum editionem ullum inveniretur venale, cum a multis adhuc sollicite quaerantur." — Harold, *Vita*, chap. xxvi, p. 33.

to that solemn proclamation by Pope Pius IX in 1854 of the immaculate conception of Our Lady as a dogma of the faith. His writings on the subject are to be found in his volume on the legation of King Philip III and King Philip IV[25] and in three little books on the death,[26] redemption,[27] and baptism[28] of Our Lady, which he published at Rome in the last years of his life.

Many of his smaller works can be seen as fitting harmoniously into place in the great life-plan he had set before himself. His argument against the claims that St Francis was originally a Hermit of St Augustine is of a piece with his earlier refutation of other false theories about the saint.[29] A friend of his, Father Thomas Herrera, published a long reply to Luke's short tract. But what pained Luke was that Herrera while quietly preparing it was a constant visitor at St Isidore's College, where he was treated like one of the community and was also given access to Luke's books and manuscripts. He used Luke's ammunition against himself.[30] There followed another tract from Luke and another from Herrera. To this latter, Luke prepared a brief reply, but when news reached him that Herrera had died, he desisted from publishing

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[25] *Presbeia sive legatio Philippi III. et IV. Catholicorum regum Hispaniarum ad ss. dd. nn. Paulum pp. V. et Gregorium XV. de definienda controversia immaculatae conceptionis B. Virginis Mariae, per illustriss. et reverendiss. Dom. D. Fr. Antonium a Trejo . . . Descripta ac concinnata per P. Fr. Lucam Waddingum . . .* (Antwerp, 1641). The first word is in Greek capitals, and there is a full stop after *controversia*. The plate on the preceding leaf has a slightly different wording and is somewhat shorter. The above edition, which is the one we have consulted, was the second. There an earlier one, which was published at Louvain in 1624.

[26] *Immaculatae conceptioni B. Mariae Virginis non adversari ejus mortem corporalem. Opusculum. Author Fr. Lucas Waddingus . . .* (Rome, 1655).

[27] *De redemptione B. Mariae Virginis. Opusculum secundum. Authore Fr. Luca Waddingo Ordinis Minorum* (Rome, 1656).

[28] *De baptismo B. Mariae Virginis. Opusculum tertium. Authore Fr. Luca Waddingo Ordinis Minorum* (Rome, 1656).

[29] His *Apologeticus* was first published in Madrid in 1625, then in the first volume of the first edition of the *Annales Minorum* (Lyons, 1625), and again in octavo at Lyons, 1641, accompanied by his reply to Herrera. Pedro Navarro, O.F.M., published a Spanish translation of the *Apologeticus* in Madrid in 1625. Present-day readers can most easily consult both works in the Quaracchi edition of the *Annales*, viz., *Apologeticus de praetenso monachatu augustiniano Sancti Francisci in quo deteguntur et refelluntur varii errores ex hac una controversia exorti*, in Wadding, *Annales Minorum*, II (Quaracchi, 1931), 499—562; *Apologetici defensio*, in id., pp. 563—668. The Quaracchi edition also gives the address to the reader which was prefixed by Wadding to the first edition but which was omitted in the reprint in the first edition of the *Annales*.

[30] "suspicari non poteram domesticis auxiliis, meis libris et schedis mihi parari bellum, et post tuum abscessum, quam occulte ordiebaris pugnam indicendam." — Wadding's address to Herrera, prefixed to his *Apologetici defensio*.

it, not wishing, as his biographer tells us, to disturb the shades of the dead.[31]

His volume on the writers of the Franciscan order with its syllabus of Franciscan martyrs and confessors, *Scriptores Ordinis Minorum*, is still indispensable for students of Franciscan history and is, in fact, a most valuable acquisition for any reference library.[32] It was an incidental product of his work on the annals. Other fruits of the same devotion to his order are his editions of texts of St Anthony of Padua (one volume), of Angelo del Paz (three volumes), of John Wallensis (three tracts in two volumes),[33] of Archbishop John Baptist Petrucci's poem on the life of St James of the Marches (one volume), as well as his re-arrangement in a single alphabetical list of the cases of conscience of Emanuel Rodriguez (one volume), his account of the martyrdom of fourteen Franciscans of Bohemia, and also the pious epigrams which he composed for insertion under the series of pictures in the cloisters of the Franciscan friary at Salamanca.[34]

An essay of his on the origins, utility, and excellence of the Hebrew language may seem a far cry from his main line of studies, but it is only apparently so. As a theologian he realised the need for a competent knowledge of Hebrew and studied it in Spain and Rome. Nor was a Franciscan association lacking. The essays was intended as an introduction to his edition of the Hebrew concordance of the bible of Mario of

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[31] "mortui manes non amplius agitare decrevit" — Harold, *Vita*, chap. xlii, p. 54.

[32] *Scriptores Ordinis Minorum quibus accessit syllabus illorum qui ex eodem ordine pro fide Christi fortiter occubuerunt. Priores atramento, posteriores sanguine christianam religionem asseruerunt. Recensuit Fr. Lucas Waddingus ejusdem instituti theologi. Editio novissima* (Rome, 1906).

[33] According to Hieronymus Spettmann, O.F.M., "Das Schriftchen 'De oculo morali' und sein Verfasser," in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XVI (Quaracchi, 1923), 309—22, the author of one of these, the *De oculo morali*, was not John Wallensis, as Wadding thought, nor Raymond Jordanus *(Idiota)* as Theophilus Raynaud, S.J., against whom Wadding wrote, thought, nor John Peckam, as several believed, but Pierre de Limoges alias Petrus de Ciperia (Lacepiera), canon of Évreux (d. 1306).

[34] For some details about these works, see Wadding, *Scriptores* and Sbaralea (Sbaraglia), *Supplementum et castigatio ad Scriptores*, both s. n. Lucas Wadding, etc. See also Harold, *Vita*, chaps. xv, xvi, xviii, xx. For his tract on the Bohemian martyrs, see Wadding, *Scriptores*, s. n. Hieronymus Strasser. He sent it to Strasser for correction. Strasser corrected it, but then published it under his own name! A selection from the Salamanca epigrams was published by Francis a Sosa, O.F.M., in his *Santoral seráfico* (Salamanca, 1623) and by Jacobo de Castro, O.F.M., in his *Arbol chronológico* (Salamanca, 1722). For two other little Latin poems of Wadding, see his *B. P. Francisci assisiatis opuscula* (Antwerp, 1623), p. liv. One is about his collecting of the writings of St Francis; the other is what he calls a *prosphthegma*, an address, to St Francis.

Calasio. Mario was a fellow-Franciscan and an acquaintance of Wadding in Rome. He was an excellent Hebrew scholar and was rarely to be seen, in the refectory, on the streets, or on a country walk, without a Hebrew codex in his hand. He died in 1620 with a Hebrew psalm on his lips, leaving his vast concordance unpublished for lack of funds. Through Luke's exertions, a Hebrew font was procured for Ara Coeli and the concordance in four large tomes was published the following year. The essay and all the preliminary matter were Luke's composition.[35]

Similarly, one might wonder what interest had Luke in publishing a volume on Saint Peter Thomas of Aquitaine,[36] since this man was not a Franciscan but a Carmelite. The explanation is simple enough. During his researches in the Vatican archives he had discovered twenty-nine documents which all seemed to refer to the same man, who, however, was usually referred to merely as Peter. From internal evidence he concluded this was Peter the German *(Petrus Teutonicus)*, a Franciscan bishop of Patti in Sicily. Later he discovered that most of the letters really referred to Saint Peter Thomas, the Carmelite. Nonetheless, he decided to publish them, first, lest the labour of transcribing them should be profitless; secondly, as a token of friendship towards his Carmelite brethren; thirdly, because of the close association of the Carmelite with several Franciscans; and fourthly, because of the connection between the two Peters, the Carmelite having succeeded the Franciscan as bishop of Patti.

Why, one may ask, did Wadding interest himself in publishing the life and writings of St Anselm of Lucca? During his studies of the life of Pope St Gregory VII, the famous Hildebrand, he discovered an amount of material about St Anselm. In the year 1657 he published a biography, to which he appended a number of Anselm's writings.[37] One wonders was the attraction the suitability of Anselm as a model for Irish churchmen of Wadding's time in view of the part he played in the

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[35] Wadding, *Scriptores*, s. nn. Lucas Wadding and Marius a Calasio; Harold, *Vita*, chap. xiv, p. 25.

[36] *Vita et res gestae B. Petri Thomae aquitani, ex ordine B. Mariae Virginis a Monte Carmelo patriarchae constantinopolitani et sedis apostolicae legati: authore R. Adm. P. Fr. Luca Waddingo, Ordinis Minorum chronographo, inquisitionis rom. censore et Collegii S. Isidori in urbe guardiano* (Lyons, 1637). The title-page has a full stop after the word *gestae*. The address to the reader begins: "In limine fortassis haerebis, et inquires, cur alienis me ingeram rebus, aut exterorum vitas suscipiam describendas?"

[37] *Vita S. Anselmi epicopi lucensis commentariis illustrata per R. P. F. Lucam Waddingum Ordinis Minor. Accesserunt ejusdem sancti viri opuscula* (Rome, 1657). His study of the life of Pope Gregory VII may have been connected with the ecclesiastical annals or history of Ireland which he was hoping to publish.

struggle for supremacy between church and state. Perhaps there was also a personal feeling of kinship with Anselm, since he too was scholar and diplomat, student and man of action, one who against his will was being dragged from the quiet of the cloister into the turbulent political and court life of his epoch. Here is Luke's address to the reader:

> Various are the events described — pious and political; sacred and military; economical and monastic; ecclesiastical and civil; private and public; for that holy Briareos of the Hundred Hands became all things to all men. Anselm, endowed with so many signal gifts, was able to fulfil all sorts of tasks.[38]

It is interesting to compare this with what Patrick Comerford, O.S.A., bishop of Waterford, wrote to Luke himself in 1630.

> I am sorry for you when I think of you, now in the congregation of the breviary, now in the inquisition, now in the congregation of the index, now writing your annals, now the lives of the popes and cardinals, now contending with your brothers the Capuchins, now with your confrères. O unconquerable Briareos, O Giant of the Hundred Hands.[39]

As his historical researches advanced, new avenues were constantly opening out before him. He had been given special permission by Popes Gregory XV and Urban VIII, and every facility had been extended to him by the librarian, Cardinal Cobelluzi, and the prefect, Nicolo Alemanni, to work in the Vatican archives and transcribe the necessary documents.[40] The result was that he had amassed eighteen good-sized volumes of transcripts of papal bulls and briefs.[41] He found so much information about the origins and development of the different sees of Christendom in these archives and in other out-of-the-way sources that he decided on the publication of a history of all the sees throughout the world.[42] Pope Urban VIII had requested him to help in the preparation of a new edition of the lives of the popes and cardinals by the Spanish Dominican, Alonso Chacón. This edition appeared in Rome in 1630. It

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[38] "Varia sunt, quae recensentur: pia, politica: sacra, militaria: oeconomica, monastica; ecclesiastica, civilia; solitaria, publica, sacer quippe iste Briareus Centimanus, omnibus omnia factus, tot dotibus insignis Anselmus, omnium valuit munera complecti."

[39] "Le tengo lástima quando le considero ora en la congregación del breviario . . . ora en la Inquisición, ora en la congregación del Indice, ora escriviendo su chrónica, ora las vidas de los pontífices y cardenales, ora lidiando sus hermanos Capuchinos . . . ora con sus colegiales. O invincible Briareo! O centimano!" — *Wadding papers 1614—38*, ed. B. Jennings (Irish Manuscripts Commission) (Dublin, 1953), p. 344.

[40] Harold, *Vita*, chap. xxxv, p. 42.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Harold, *Vita*, chap. xxxi, p. 37. And cf. letter of Wadding to Pier Maria Campi from Ara coeli, 25 June 1633, in *Archivum franciscanum historicum*, V (Quaracchi, 1912), 151.

was probably his collaboration in this work that led to his preparing a history of the last six popes, Clement VIII, Leo XI, Paul V, Gregory XV, Urban VIII, Innocent X, and of all the cardinals created by them. He had filled two manuscript volumes before his death.[43] The composition or drastic revision of many offices of the breviary, and especially the lessons of the second nocturns of matins devolved on him as a result of his membership of the commission for the reform of the missal and breviary and of his being consultor to the Congregation of Rites.[44] The volume of ecclesiastical consultations he was preparing[45] about various matters on which his advice had been sought in the different congregations had a similar origin, as had his report on the discussions on Jansenism. Parts of this report have been published.[46]

It was inevitable that a man of his questing mind and tireless drive would have planned the publication of far more works than he could ever hope to finish. Among those were the ecclesiastical annals of Ireland; a series of editions of medieval Franciscan texts; the acts of the general chapters of the Franciscans; a commentary on the rule of the Friars Minor; the lives of the saints of the church of Orvieto in Italy; a book on Franciscan associations with Urbina, also in Italy; an edition of a tract on the bull *Coena Domini* by Ludovicus a Cruce, a Portuguese Franciscan; and a little volume on the attitude of the fathers of the church towards the doctrine of the immaculate conception of Our Lady.[47] A valuable and readable work would have been a selection from his vast and important correspondence. Although intended to make such a selection he did not live to do so, but two volumes published during the present century partly make good the loss.[48]

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[43] Wadding, *Scriptores*, s. n. Lucas Waddingus; Migne, *Dictionnaire des manuscrits* (Paris, 1853), II, col. 1283, quoting B. de Montfaucon, *Bibliotheca bibliothecarum manuscriptorum nova* (Paris, 1739), I, 159.

[44] Wadding, *Scriptores*, s. n. Lucas Waddingus, where he tells us that, for the use of churches in Italy, Spain, Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, and other countries, he either composed completely or revised according to more reliable documents the lives of many of the saints. See also Harold, *Vita*, chap. lxxxiv, p. 132.

[45] Wadding, *Scriptores*, s. n. Lucas Waddingus.

[46] [P. Quesnel], *Défense de l'église romaine et des souverains pontifes* (Liége, 1696), pp. 389—429; A. Chiappini, *Annales Minorum . . . continuati*, XXX (Quaracchi, 1951), 123—38; L. Ceyssens in Franciscan Fathers, *Father Luke Wadding commemorative volume* (Dublin, 1957), pp. 383—400.

[47] For references to these, see Wadding, *Scriptores*, s. nn. Lucas Wadding and Ludovicus a Cruce; Harold, *Vita*, chaps. xxviii, xxix, xxx.

[48] *Report on Franciscan manuscripts preserved at the convent, Merchants' Quay, Dublin* (Historical Manuscripts Commission) (Dublin, 1906) (These manuscripts have since been transferred to Dún Mhuire, Killiney, Co. Dublin); B. Jennings, *Wadding papers 1614—38* (Irish Manuscripts Commission) (Dublin, 1953).

Some bibliographers attribute to him a tract on the exciting events (*scandala* is the word used) connected with the controversy about the immaculate conception,[49] but I am inclined to believe that this is merely a vague reference to his book *Legatio Philippi III*, which we have already discussed. It tells of controversies, not always suave and gentle, among the rival schools of thought in Rome in the early seventeenth century. Nor do I think there is any case for attributing to him the little Irish poem in honour of Fabricius Peyresius, which begins, *Nioclás Claudi, fial an fear*.[50] I have suggested elsewhere that its author is more probably Anthony Hickey, O.F.M.[51]

Much that Luke Wadding wrote is of permanent value. Although specialising in the history of his own order, he provided from unpublished and out-of-the-way sources a great amount of material that has left all students of Church history in his debt. In all, he compiled or edited over fifty volumes, and at his death he left at least half a dozen more partly prepared for the press. As time went on, he found himself branching out into several domains beyond the narrower limits that he had originally set himself. His industry made available in print a mass of valuable material and saved for posterity much historical information that might otherwise have been lost. British, Italian, French, and Spanish scholars of today find themselves still obliged at times to consult the editions of tracts by their countrymen that the Irishman Wadding re-discovered, annotated, and saw through the press. His edition of the works of John Duns Scotus, will, as has already been pointed out, retain its value for many years to come. His *Legatio Philippi III* will continue to thrill both theologians and historians as long as there remain any theologians with an interest in history or historians with any interest in theological controversy. If better editions of Duns Scotus's *Opera Omnia* or the writings of St Francis outdate his own, it is, or will be, due in some degree to the fact that he had already smoothed the way for future editors.

The general church historian will often find himself dependent on Wadding's work, but the student of Franciscan history will always feel obliged in common gratitude to hold his name in benediction. His

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[49] See, for instance, Sbaralea (Sbaraglia), *Scriptores*, s. n. Lucas Waddingus.

[50] Vatican Library, MSS Barberini Latini, 1996, f. 140. Printed version in *Monumentum romanum Nioclao Claudio Fabricio Perescio senatori* (Rome, 1638).

[51] C. Ó Maonaigh, "Uaidín Gaelach," in *Feasta*, X, no. 6 (Dublin, Sept. 1957), p. 4.

Scriptores after the passage of three centuries is still in constant use. His annals of the Friars Minor with their copious quotations from contemporary sources and judicious interpretation of the facts will never in all probability be completely superseded. Although not altogether the pioneer that some believed him to be, he ploughed a way for all future workers through what was in good part an almost impenetrable jungle. He enabled historians not merely to examine the thousand trees of the Franciscan forest but to see the forest as a whole. His sober analysis, his detached criticism, his calm judgement, his chivalrous defence of historical truth, set a high standard for all future Franciscan historians. "The ecclesiastical historian," he wrote in the second volume of his annals, "must have integrity and incorruptibility, so that he shall not dare to state anything that is false or lack courage to mention anything that is true." And he continues, "I shall blame my fellow-Franciscans when they deserve it and praise outsiders; and, when occasion demands it, without any acceptation of persons but with moderation, I shall point out the faults on both sides."[52]

CANICE MOONEY, O. F. M.

Dún Mhuire,
Killiney, Co. Dublin,
Ireland

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[52] "cum historicum ecclesiasticum, integrum et incorruptum esse oporteat; ut ne quid falsi dicere audeat, ne quid veri non audeat, . . . contra nostros ubi oportet, et pro alienis etiam dicere, et cum res postulat, utrosque nullius accepta persona sui errata, modeste tamen admonere." — Wadding, *Annales Minorum*, III (Quaracchi, 1931) (i. e. 1st ed., vol II), *Pio lectori*, pp. xiv—v.

A MEDIEVAL THEORY OF SUPPOSITION*

INTRODUCTION

Supposition and signification are technical terms in medieval semantics. Since Supposition cannot be understood without the more basic term of signification, it is necessary first to acquaint ourselves with the elements of the scholastic theory of signification.

For obvious reasons, the discussion of signification will be confined to the realm of language. The broader aspect of signification will therefore be disregarded, and hence no general theory of signs or symbols will be discussed here. But only those signs and symbols which are elements of language, that is, words or terms will be studied.[1]

Words or terms belong to the class of language signs. Language signs are characterized as follows: They are sounds, produced by the vocal apparatus of rational animals and signifying some object by convention.[2] These signs constitute our spoken language. Strictly speaking, two kinds of words are required to construct compositions of words which are called sentences (propositiones), viz., the noun and the verb. A noun is a term that signifies an object as such without also signifying the time. A verb is a term which signifies an object and also the time. The composition of a noun and a verb is called a sentence, that is, a composition of terms of which it is meaningful to ask whether it is true or false.

This is the initial material a logician needs. However, in order to be able to construct his logic he is in need of other language signs, which

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* When Fr. Philotheus Boehner died, in 1955, he was working on the present study, with the intention to have it published in the collection *Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics* of the North-Holland Publishing Company. We publish the study unfinished as it was, but edited by one of his former students.

[1] A comprehensive medieval theory of signs would concern natural physical and biological signs (smoke signifies fire; pulse or sighing signifies health or pain); or the arbitrary or conventional signs which are not words (as for instance, the barrel hoop signifies wine); or finally the religious signs, which are the sacraments, sacramentals and the symbols of liturgy.

[2] Cfr. Petrus Hispanus, *Summulae logicales*, ed. Bochenski 102: III vox est sonus ab ore animalis prolatus, naturalibus instrumentis formatus . . . Cfr. also 1. 03: Vocum alia litterata, alia non litterata. Vox litterata est, quae scribi potest . . . Vocum litteratarum alia est significativa, alia non significativa. Vox significativa est illa, quae auditui aliquid repraesentat, ut "homo" vel gemitus infirmorum, qui dolorem significat.

he also calls 'nouns,' though they are not in complete agreement with our definition. In order to make their distinction clear and to analyze the semantical relations, we shall make a new start.

a. Signification of categorematic terms

From the viewpoint of logic two main groups of nouns must be distinguished, categorematic and syncategorematic terms. Categorematic terms signify definite and certain objects; syncategorematic terms do not signify certain objects, when taken alone, but they signify objects only in conjunction with categorematic terms. Categorematic terms are, for instance, the terms 'man,' 'stone,' etc.; syncategorematic terms are, for instance, the terms 'every,' 'not,' 'is.'[3]

What are the semantical relations of categorematic terms? As signs they must satisfy the definition of a sign: A sign is something which when apprehended calls something to the mind. To take a simple or rather simplified example, let us assume that someone intelligently hears the word "tree." In this case, we distinguish a mind (M) that apprehends a word (W) which brings or presents to the mind a certain object (O). Thus signification is the relation of presenting (Pr) between a mind, a word and an object. We symbolize this triadic basic relation of the signification of a word (Sigw) as follows:

$$\text{Sigw} = \text{Def. Pr (W, O, M)}$$

But there is another relation within the relation of signification and which complicates the former relation. A clear distinction must be made between signification and meaning, or the signification and the sense of a word. Meaning is taken here in the sense of a concept, as the scholastics understood it; other words for concepts were "understanding" *(intellectus)*, "impression of the mind" *(passio animae)*, "intention," "mental term." The spoken term 'man' for instance, signifies any individual (according to the Scotistic-Ockhamistic tradition), presenting any man to the mind. But its meaning or sense is not of this or that real man, but it is the concept, the idea or the thought of man in general.

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[3] . . . hoc nomen signum accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo prout extendit se ad omne illud quod apprehensum facit aliquid venire in cognitionem alicuius . . . *This is the most general meaning of 'sign.' Sign as language sign is defined as follows:* Secundo modo hoc nomen 'terminus' accipitur pro illo quod apprehensum facit aliquid venire in cognitionem alterius et cum hoc aptum natum est pro illo supponere in propositione vel aptum natum est addi illi in propositione vel pro illo quod est compositum ex talibus. *In other words language signs must, in addition to the general requirements of any sign, have or be able to have a function in a proposition (sentence) or are a proposition.* Cfr. Albertus de Saxonia, *Logica*, I, cap. 1.

When someone intelligently utters and another understands the word 'man,' both the meaning of the word 'man,' and it is precisely for that reason that the word 'man' is meaningful.

The problem arises now as to how this new element 'meaning' or 'sense' or 'concept' (C), etc., is related to the other elements in the basic triadic relation of signification. A similar problem concerns the relation of a written word to the other elements.

b. Natural and conventional signs

It is the common teaching of the scholastics that concepts are products of nature, while spoken and written words are products of culture or convention; the former are called natural language-signs; the latter conventional language-signs. We are not concerned here with the problem of what the ontological status of such concepts is. It is sufficient for us to know that these are treated as signs or mental terms or mental words. Though they are not subject to the senses, nevertheless the relation between such a mental word, an object and a mind is like the relation between a spoken word, an object and the mind.[4] Thus we can symbolize the signification of a concept or meaning (Sig_C) of a concept (C) as follows:

$$Sig_C = \text{Def. } Pr\ (C, O, M)$$

How is the signification of a word related to the signification of a concept? It is obvious that in both relations 'O' and 'M' remain the same. Our problem concerns only the relation between 'W' and 'C.' According to the older scholastics who followed Boethius' interpretation of *Perihermenias* 3; 16 al: Spoken words are the symbols of mental impressions (παθήματα-*passiones*) and written words are symbols of spoken words; spoken words signify the concepts and through the concepts their objects. Thus the concept is the first object called to the mind by a word and the object signified by the concept is the secondary object of signification of a spoken word. Using an arrow in order to symbolize the direction of the relation within the *relata*, we can symbolize the Boethian idea of signification as follows:

$$Sig_W = \text{Def. } Pr\ (W \rightarrow C \rightarrow O \rightarrow M)$$

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[4] Terminus conceptus est intentio seu passio animae aliquid naturaliter significans vel consignificans nata esse pars propositionis mentalis . . . Ockham, *Summa logicae*, p. I, cap. 1; p. 8. Cf. Burleigh: Haec est secunda conclusio . . . scilicet quod passiones animae significant ipsas res naturaliter... *Expositio super Periherm.*, ad: Quorum autem hae . . . ed. Venice 1512, fol 68 ra.

It was Scotus, as it seems, who first broke with this traditional idea about signification. He was followed by Ockham and most of later scholastics.[5] According to this theory a word as a conventional sign is applied or 'imposed' to signify the object. The word 'man' for instance, signifies and calls to the mind primarily the object, viz., any individual man; but it does not present to the mind primarily the concept 'man.' On the other hand, the word 'man' has not been instituted or imposed without the concept 'man.' In other words, the word 'man' is meaningful because it is associated with a concept, to which it is subordinated, and only in subordination to this conept 'man' in the mind, does the word 'man' signify. Therefore, strictly speaking, it does not signify the concept but the object. In order to symbolize this relation of signification which contains the relation of association between word and concept, we shall write the symbol for concept above the symbol for word. Thus we obtain the formula:

$$\text{Sigw} = \text{Def. Pr } (\overset{\displaystyle C}{\underset{\displaystyle \updownarrow}{W}} \to O \to M)$$

It is very important for an exact understanding of the theory of supposition to keep clearly apart the signification in the strict sense (sometimes called primary signification) and signification in the broader sense (sometimes called indirect or secondary signification), or the association between word and concept.

According to the scholastics there exists between the composition of conventional and natural signs, that is between the spoken and the mental language, a certain parallelism, but not a strict correspondence. Ockham has devoted a special chapter of his *Logic* to the problem of how far this parallelism goes. It can be gathered from his discussions that only those elements of the spoken language have corresponding terms in the mental language, such that the addition or omission of which would change the truth or falsity of a proposition.[6]

It is obvious that the relation between written and spoken language is likewise understood as an association, but such that the written language is subordinated to the spoken language.

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[5] For Ockham cfr. *Summa logicae*, p. I, c. 1; 9.
[6] Cfr. Ockham, *Summa logicae*, p. I, c. 3; ed. p. 11 ss.

The formula of the signification of a written word (S) would be:

$$
\begin{array}{c}
C \\
\updownarrow \\
W \\
\updownarrow \\
\text{Sigs} = \text{Def. Pr } (S \rightarrow O \rightarrow M)
\end{array}
$$

From this it follows that there are many interrelations between written, spoken and mental terms which, however, are still increased, if we take signification in a still broader sense, though keeping within the realm of language signs. For any language sign calls to the mind similar instances of itself, even if they are not equiform, and contains the basic elements or even synonyms.

c. Survey of the relations of significations in the broad sense

The scholastics distinguished between the ultimate and the not-ultimate significate (signified object). They also distinguished between to signify properly and to signify improperly; to signify by convention and by nature. Following Dorp in his Commentary to Buridan's *Summulae*[7] and others we can distinguish at least the following relations which are of importance for our later discussions:

(1) The spoken word 'tree,' for instance in subordination under the ultimate concept 'tree,' presents to the mind the ultimate object which is an individual tree. Thus it exercises its significative function or its primary and direct signification.

(2) The written word 'tree' in subordination to the spoken word 'tree' and in subordination under the concept 'tree' presents to the mind the object which is any individual tree. This, again is primary signification.

(3) The concept 'tree' presents to the mind the object which is any individual tree. The ultimate concept exercises its primary signification, that is, properly and by nature.

The following are various kinds of signification which are not primary or proper significations and which do not concern the ultimate signified object directly.

(4) The concept 'tree' presents itself to the mind and similar instances of itself (other occurrences of this concept in the same mind at different

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[7] Tr. IV, Venice 1499; cfr. also Anthonius Silvester, *Dialectices* sititoribus quaestionum pars prima super summulas Buridani, quaestio secunda, and especially: Secunda pars *Rosarii logices magistri Antonii Coronel* . . . Olivier Senant, 1512, f. 4 ss.

times or in other minds). This is improper or secondary signification, but natural and not by convention.

(5) The concept 'tree' also presents to the mind the non-ultimate object of the spoken word (or words) 'tree,' and by means of this, the written word (or words) 'tree.' This is another secondary and improper signification.

(6) The spoken word presents itself or similar instances of itself to the mind. This, too, is improper signification of non-ultimate objects.

(7) The same relation holds in regard to written words.

(8) The spoken word 'tree' presents to the mind its corresponding (ultimate concept), viz., the concept 'tree' and similar instances of itself. But this is improper signification of the non-ultimate object (the ultimate object being the real tree).

(9) Similar relations hold between the written word 'tree' and its corresponding spoken words and concepts.

(10) We have concepts of the spoken word 'tree' and its similar instances viz., the concept which is the natural sign for all words 'tree;' this concept would be a non-ultimate concept.

(11) The concept 'tree' also presents to the mind synonymous words for 'tree.'

(12) The spoken word 'tree' (and likewise the written word, and also the concept) may present to the mind words (spoken or written) which are of a different grammatical structure.

The improper signification of metaphorical expressions will be only mentioned here without discussing its complicated nature.

All these relations will have bearing on the theory of supposition and should not be discarded as useless subtleties.

d. The general structure of a scholastic proposition (sentence)

A scholastic proposition is composed of at least two main parts, subject and predicate. The basic elements of both must be categorematic terms. The predicate may be a verb; but then it is composed of the 'root of all verbs' the copula 'is' and a categorematic noun. That which precedes the copula 'is' is subject; that which follows the copula is the predicate.[8] Using traditional terms and also the symbol 'c' for the verb, we can symbolize a scholastic proposition as follows:

$$S \ cP$$

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[8] Sicut subiectum dicitur illa pars propositionis, quae praecedit copulam, ita illa pars propositionis, quae sequitur copulam, est praedicatum. Ockham, *Summa logicae*, p. I, c. 31; p. 85.

Terms, in their function of primary signification can be suitably substituted for 'S' and 'P,' are called categorematic terms. Those terms, which cannot be suitably substituted when taken in their primary significative function and which, when added or omitted, change the truth or the falsity of a proposition, are called syncategorematic terms. Such terms are 'no,' 'every,' 'if-then;' or in general, the signs of negation, of predication, of quantification, of joining propositions or terms. These purely syncategorematic terms have a function, an office[9] within the language; they are syntactical terms. Hence, they do not signify an object in the strict sense but they have meaning. Only with and through a categorematic term do they have a relation to the object signified by the categorematic term. Hence, when taken alone, their significative function is indefinite or empty. We can symbolize this relation of signification as follows:

$$\text{Sig Sync}_{\text{W}} = \text{Def. } \Pr\!\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{C} \,\text{—} \\ \updownarrow \\ \text{W} \,\text{—} \end{array}, \; \to \text{M}\right)$$

$$\text{Sig Sync}_{\text{S}} = \text{Def. } \Pr\!\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{C} \,\text{—} \\ \updownarrow \\ \text{W} \,\text{—} \\ \updownarrow \\ \text{S} \,\text{—} \end{array}, \; \to \text{M}\right)$$

$$\text{Sig Sync}_{\text{C}} = \text{Def. } \Pr(\,\text{C} \,\text{—}, \; \to \text{M})$$

e. The meaning of the copula 'is'

Without going into a detailed study of the scholastic discussions on the meaning of the copula 'is' or the verb, we shall make clear in what sense it will be taken in the following discussions.

In one sense, the copula 'is' can be considered to be a syncategorematic term. Then it is nothing but a sign of predication in a proposition Hence it is a 'nota,' that is, a symbol for 'composition' or 'division,' two technical terms of scholastic language which mean that either subject and predicate stand for the same or signify the same in the broadest aspect of signification (this is composition) or do not signify the same (this is division). The former is affirmation, the latter is negation. Hence the copula 'is' has a syntactical function, at least primarily. And this function it exercises primarily for the predicate, and through the predicate for the subject, for the verb can be a predicate but never a subject.

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[9] Burleigh occasionally calls these terms 'officiales.'

However, the copula 'is,' as verb, has still another function which puts it beyond the realm of purely syncategorematic terms, for as a verb it also signifies time. To be more exact it indicates a special time, of the present or of the past or of the future, at which the predicate fulfills or has fulfilled or will fulfill its significative function. Only indirectly does the signification of time invested in the verb affect the subject. About this more has to be said later.[10]

In order to be explicit, we shall always indicate, in the future, in our symbolization how the copula or the verb is being taken. The letter 'c' will indicate its syncategorematic part, the letter 't' the signification of the present time, ''t' the signification of the past time, 't'' of the future time. Hence the form for which 'Man is an animal' would be a substitution we shall symbolize as follows:

$$S—ctP$$

'ctP' is considered to be one part as it is quite often expressed in the Latin language, as in 'Homo currit,' or in English: Man runs. A proposition of the past will be symbolized thus:

$$S—c'tP$$

of the future:

$$S—ct'P$$

We firmly believe that even in this simplified matter we have made explicit what the scholastics basically understood when they spoke about propositions. However, we do believe that there are important differences within this general scholastic interpretation of propositions.

f. Levels of language

Not only did the scholastics distinguish between semantical and syntactical elements, but they also distinguished between different levels of language, that is at least of a basic language and a language about the basic language, that is, a metalanguage. This they expressed in various ways. Setting aside the important distinction between the *actus exercitus* (for instance, the predicate 'animal' exercises predication in the proposition 'Man is an animal') and the *actus signatus* (in the proposition: 'Animal is predicated about man;' 'animal' is said to have an *actus signatus*) there are two distinctions to be recorded, viz., that of first and second intention and that of first and second imposition. The first distinction refers primarily only to concepts *(intentiones)*, the

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[10] Cfr. two very important questions of Albert of Saxony on this subject in the edition of Ockham's *Expositio aurea*, Bologna 1496.

second primarily only to spoken or written words. It is to be noted that the distinctions are being made on the basis of the relation of proper signification of the ultimate object.

The signification of a concept (C) can be expressed by saying, that C presents an object to the mind: $Pr(C \rightarrow O \rightarrow M)$. If the ultimate object which the concept presents to the mind is not an element of the mental language (of which C is a part), then we say C is a first intention. If, however, the ultimate object which C presents to the mind is an element of the mental language, then we call C a second intention. Hence second intentions signify first intentions, whilst first intentions signify objects which are not intentions. However, even intentions can be signified by first intentions, not, however, as elements of the mental language. For I may be convinced that an intention is a thought (as Ockham did) or an object of the mind, or a quality or an accident or a species; in all these cases the concept by which the intention is signified is not a second intention but a first one, since it does not signify the intention as an element of the mental language. However, concepts as 'intention,' 'mental term,' 'universal,' 'species,' 'genus,' 'definition,' etc., are second intentions and belong to the metalanguage or the second level of language.[11]

A similar distinction is that of first and second imposition, which, however, concerns only spoken or written words. All spoken or written words which do not signify elements of the spoken or written language are words of first imposition. Words, however, that signify words as elements of the spoken or written language, are called words of second imposition. Hence words like 'case,' 'declension,' 'conjugation' and similar grammatical expressions are, properly speaking, words of second imposition. All the others referring to objects of the first or second level of the mental language are words of first imposition.[12] Hence some first impositions signify first and second intentions and also their objects, for instance, the word 'intention.'

Strictly speaking only intentions or concepts are either first and second intentions and only spoken or written words are either first or second impositions. However, spoken or written words are associated with concepts and vice versa, and for this reason the spoken word (and also the written) 'species' can be called a second intention, and the concept 'case' can be called a second imposition.

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[11] Cfr. Ockham's chapter on First and Second intentions in *Summa logicae*, p. I, c. 12; ed. p. 38 ss.

[12] Cfr. Ockham *Summa logicae*, p. I, c. 11; p. 36 ss.

I. DEFINITION AND DISTINCTIONS OF SUPPOSITION

From signification, the scholastics distinguished other properties of terms which characterize terms only in the context of a proposition. Hence this property belongs rather to syntax than to semantics, since it determines the semantical relation or relations according to the rules of syntax. If we assume that a scholastic proposition is composed of subject, predicate and copula, the copula being in any case a part of the predicate, then there are three main classes of significative functions of a term in a proposition: The property of the copula is the copulation, of the subject supposition, of the predicate appellation. If we eliminate at once from our discussion the copulation (which, by the way, only occasionally is treated by scholastics), we can say that appellation concerns and determines the semantical relation which is had by the subject. Appellation always refers to attribution and for that reason is applied in particular to adjectival terms, be they nouns or verbs, but in a broader sense, it can be applied to any common term, since every common term can be predicated, at least in direct predication.[1] When a term is predicated, it is always determined by the verb *(appellat suam formam)*. Hence appellation of a term specifically analyzes the semantical relations of the predicate in its determination by the verb of the present, the past, the future and the modalities. Supposition, on the other hand, is, in a strict sense, the property of a term that belongs to it as subject; thus tracts on supposition, in this narrower sense, analyze the significative function of the subject as it is determined by the context of the proposition. In a broader sense, however, the name 'supposition' is applied to both supposition in this narrower sense, and to appellation. Ockham, in his *Summa logicae* takes supposition in this broader sense and deals in one tract, *De Suppositione,* (p. I, c. 63—77) with all the problems which are connected with appellation as well.[2]

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[1] Thus, for instance, the realist Burleigh states: Unde appellare uno modo idem est quod praedicare, et sic accipitur cum dicitur, quod praedicatum appellat suam formam. Alio modo appellare idem est quod esse commune, et sic est verum, quod terminus communis appellat inferiora. *De puritate artis logicae,* Tractatus Longior, Tr. I, p. 2; p. 49.

[2] Cfr. Ockham, (*S. L.,* p. I, cap. 63; p. 175). It is interesting to note that Burleigh in his *De puritate artis logicae,* written after and against Ockham's *Summa,* has fundamentally the same position: Suppositio communiter accepta est proprietas termini ad alium terminum in propositione comparati. Et isto modo convenit suppositio tam subiecto quam praedicato quam etiam verbo seu consignificatis ipsius verbi. Et isto modo ... accepta est in plus quam appellatio, quia suppositio competit tam subiecto quam praedicato, et appellatio competit praedicato tantum. Suppositio proprie dicta est proprietas termini subiecti ad praedicatum comparati ... *Op. cit.,* Tr. I, p. I, c. I; p. I s.

In the following we are going to take supposition in this broader sense and bring in discussions of the other properties at their proper places. However, our discussions will not follow a strictly historical order. Two reasons discourage this order. First, the material is so vast even in spite of the fact that most of the logical writings are still in manuscript form, that it is impossible to give a faithful historical account in a limited space. Secondly, there is a general agreement on the main teachings of this theory among all the scholastics, certainly of the 14th and 15th centuries, which warrants the presentation of one theory and by calling attention occasionally to differences in opinion on minor details.[3]

1. Definition of supposition

In a first approach we can define supposition by saying with Ockham that a term has supposition when it stands for something in a proposition; in other words when we use a term in a proposition to represent something else, so that the term can be predicated about that which it represents or about the demonstrative pronoun pointing at the represented object.[4]

After this general approach we shall try to explain the meaning of supposition more in detail. In order to simplify our procedure we shall consider only the supposition of terms which do not signify terms either as subject or as predicate. In our explanation we shall follow as closely as possibly the excellent exposition given by Georges of Brussels in his tract on supposition (ed. Venice 1507).

Only terms occurring in a proposition have supposition; but not every term of a proposition has supposition. Practically all the logicians of the 14th and 15th centuries agree on this point. The only exception of which we know is Johannes de Magistris, a Scotist, and perhaps Paulus Venetus in his *Logica magna*, who maintain that terms can have supposition outside the context of a proposition. Georges, without even

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[3] The beginnings of the theory of supposition are still shrouded in darkness in spite of the fact that some progress has been made recently. In our opinion, a recent rather satisfactory, though still a defective contribution, is that of Joseph P. Mullally, *The Summulae Logicales of Peter of Spain.* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1945). Less satisfactory, mostly because of an apparent lack of acquaintance with scholastic and modern logic is Erwin Arnold, Zur Geeschichte der Suppositionstheorie, ,,Die Wurzeln des modernen Subjektivismus", in *Symposion, Jahrbuch für Philosophie,* (München, 1952, Vol. III, pp. 1—134).

[4] Dicitur autem suppositio quasi pro alio positio, ita quod quando terminus stat in propositione pro aliquo — ita quod utimur illo termino pro aliquo, de quo sive de pronomine demonstrante ipsum, ille terminus vel rectus illius termini, si sit obliquus, verificatur. — supponit pro illo . . . *Summa logicae,* p. I, c. 63; ed. p. 176.

mentioning an opposite opinion, gives two reasons for his thesis. The first is that the theory of supposition has been developed for an inquiry into the truth and falsity which characterize only propositions and not terms taken alone. The second reason is that a precise language is needed for the proper treatment of the *consequentiae* which pertain only to propositions, and this precision, as far as the terms are concerned, is effected by the theory of supposition.[5]

Though a term has supposition only in a proposition, it is not required that it is actually understood to stand for something. It must be able to be understood to stand for something. Hence it does not matter, as far as supposition is concerned (and also signification) whether a spoken or written proposition is actually known by somebody or some mind or not; but it must be possible that, if some mind takes cognizance of it within the context of a proposition, that it refers its signification to certain objects. Hence, propositions in a closed book have supposition — provided the language can be understood by at least one mind.[6] This qualification removes the element of subjectivity from the theory of supposition and also the theory of truth and signification. Thus the proposition 'God exists,' is true, regardless of whether or not anyone reads it, or hears it, or thinks of it. It is interesting to note that the so-called Nominalists favored this theory of objective supposition (or signification) requiring only the aptitude or possibility of an understanding, while the Realists are more inclined towards the subjective theory which requires that a term has supposition and signification only when it is actually understood or 'accepted' by the mind.[7]

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[5] Dicitur quod duplex potest assignari causa. Prima est, quia suppositio est inventa ad inquirendum veritatem vel falsitatem propositionum; modo talis inquisitio non habet locum circa terminos extra propositionem positos, sed circa terminos in propositione ad invicem unitos . . . Secunda causa, quia suppositiones sunt inventae propter locutionem propriam et subtilem propter valores consequentiarum et propter veras contradictiones complexas. Modo clarum est, quod ista habent fieri circa propositiones vel circa terminos in propositionibus positos . . . et ideo terminus extra propositionem non supponit. Georges of Brussels, *ed. cit.*, fol. 86 vb.

[6] Dicitur notanter 'natus capi,' quia ad hoc quod terminus supponat, non oportet, quod actu ab aliquo ipsum apprehendente accipiatur; sed sufficit, quod natus sit accipi. Et sic termini in libris clausis positi circa quos nullus actu advertit, qui sunt partes propositionis scriptae, bene supponunt, *l. c.* fol 86 rb.

[7] Cfr. Dorp's Commentary to Buridan's *Summulae*, who discussing this problem and the opinions calls the objective theory the more common one. Johannes de Magistris, a realist, distinguishes three opinions, and accepts the subjective one: Tertius modus est realium logicorum dicentium quod suppositio logicalis nihil aliud est quam una secunda intentio sive relatio rationis existens in termino causata per actum intellectus, qua intellectus accipit terminum pro re significata per ipsum . . . *L. c.* ad: Tertio sciendum . . . Cfr. Albert of Saxony, *Logica*, Tr. I, cap. 2.

A term that fulfills the conditions that it must occur within the context of a proposition and either actually or potentially must represent something to the mind, has supposition, if furthermore, it stands for something in such a way that it can be predicated about the demonstrative pronoun pointing at the represented object or about a proper name of this object. Hence, supposition is characterized by its reference to predication in elementary propositions. Such elementary propositions are for instance: This is a man, or: Plato is a man; thus it refers to strictly singular propositions. It is stated that a term has supposition if it can be predicated in at least one of these elementary propositions. Thus the proposition 'man is an animal' contains the elementary propositions: This is an animal and This is a man.[8]

This excludes from supposition certainly all terms which do not have a signified object, in other words, 'empty' terms. Thus, for instance, the term *'chimaera'* is empty since it does not have an object. Though it has the form of a noun and functions as such, nevertheless it signifies only an imaginary and impossible object, and in consequence, every elementary affirmative proposition in which it appears as predicate, is false. This fact excludes such terms from supposition, at least according to many scholastics.[9] Georges of Brussels goes still further when he denies supposition from terms which cannot be verified in their context. Thus, the term 'man' has no supposition in the proposition: Man is a donkey.

This leads us to verification as characterization of supposition. In fact, verification is the test or the sufficient condition determining whether a term has supposition or not. In a broad sense, we can say with Faber: To be verified means to be truly and affirmatively predicated.[10] His commentator, Clichtoveus, explains this as follows by adding technical restrictions: In order to test a term in a proposition as to its supposition, or its capability of verification, we proceed as follows: We formulate an elementary proposition, in which the subject is a demon-

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[8] Dicitur notanter 'de cuius significati, etc.,' quia [ad] quod aliquis terminus supponat requiritur quod natus sit verificari de pronomine demonstrante talem rem pro qua talis terminus dicitur supponere vel de nomine talem rem adaequate significante vel de pronominibus, etc. . . . Georges of Brussels, *l. c.*

[9] Cfr. Buridan, *Summulae*, Tr. IV, c. 1: . . . sed non omnis talis dictionis (cuius interest significare) est supponere; quia solus talis terminus est innatus supponere, et omnis talis, qui aliquo demonstrato per hoc pronomen 'hoc' aut aliquibus demonstratis per hoc pronomen 'haec,' potest vere affirmari de illo pronomine; ergo iste terminus 'chimaera' non potest supponere, quia quocumque demonstrato falsum est dicere: Hoc est chimaera.

[10] Verificari est vere et affirmative praedicari. *Introductiones artificiales in logicam Iacobi Fabri Stapulensis*, per Iodocum Clichtoveum Noeportuensem collectae . . . Lyons, 1538, fol. 36v.

strative pronoun, pointing at the object for which the term to be tested stands; the term to be tested becomes the predicate, regardless of whether or not it was subject or predicate in the original proposition. The copula has to be taken in its proper form, that is, with modal or temporal determination, not, however, with the denial; the quantifiers likewise have to be dropped. A few examples, given by Clichtoveus will illustrate this: Let us suppose that we have to test the supposition of the terms in the proposition: A man is an animal. We test the elementary propositions: This is a man, and: This is an animal, by pointing at objects. If these propositions are true, then the terms have supposition. Hence we have verified the supposition of the terms in the elementary proposition, but we have not verified the original proposition. These two cases have to be distinguished. This is seen in the cases of negative propositions. For instance, the verification of the terms in the proposition: A horse is not stone, would be: This is a horse, and: This is a stone — pointing, however, at different objects. The negation of the original proposition, only demands that the '*hoc*' or 'this' of the second verification points at a different object. Or of the modal proposition: Every man is impossibly a stone. Its verifications are: This is possibly a man, and: This is possibly a stone — again pointing at different objects. A proposition in which the subject has no verification would be: Adam is living. The elementary proposition: This is Adam, is false. Verifications of extremes (subject or predicate) in oblique cases, have to be made in the nominative case. For instance: A fish is in the river *(piscis est in flumine)*. The oblique predicate has to be verified thus: This is a river. Hence it is obvious that verification of terms tests the actual capability of the supposition of a term.[11]

What we have explained up to now, is the so-called proximate verification, or verifiability of a term. From this we have to distinguish the remote verifiability of a term. The former does not suppose any change in the object, the latter, however, does presuppose such a change.

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[11] Cfr. Clichtoveus, fol. 37 s. Cfr. also Georges of Brussels, *op. cit.* 86 rb. We have simplified the verification of terms in modal propositions. Since the same applies to the verification of terms in propositions of the past or future, we give here the more exact explanation of Antonius Coronel, in Secunda Pars *Rosarii*, fol. 2 rb: Tertio notandum quod ad faciendum verificationem alicuius termini oportet taliter construere unam propositionem: ponere pronomen demonstrativum a parte subiecti demonstrando rem pro qua supponit terminus quem volumus verificari, et ipsummet terminum ponere a parte praedicati, et verbum in ordine ad quod talis terminus supponebat, vel unum aliud respectu cuius terminus eodem modo teneatur, erit copula illius propositionis. Verbi causa: Subiectum huius: 'Homo est animal' sic verificatur: Hoc est homo; et subiectum huius: 'Homo fuit animal': Hoc est vel fuit homo ...

For instance, in our previously mentioned proposition: Adam is living, the term 'Adam' has no proximate verification, since the elementary proposition: This is Adam, is false; (This is living, pointing at any living being, has proximate verification). However, the term Adam has remote verifiability, when a change in the object signified by the term without changing its signification, is the prerequisite for proximate verification. Hence, if Adam changes from being dead to being alive, the term Adam in the proposition: Adam is living, would change from remote to proximate verification.[12]

In this connection it will be of interest to call attention to an antinomy of signification of which certain scholastics were well aware. They knew, and this is a sign of their highly developed sense for formality, that in verification of the term the supposition of which is tested cannot be tested in this individual occurrence. Let us say we would verify the term 'man' in the spoken proposition: Man is white. The spoken term 'man' is gone after we uttered it, and the term 'man' in the verification: This is a man, is a numerically entirely different occurrence of 'man.' Hence we must be satisfied with similar occurrences or synonyms of the first occurrence of a term.[13] This difficulty concerns the predicate of verifications, and though it seems that they did not encounter the antimony of signification here, they encountered a genuine one in reference to the subject of verifications. For if we insist that the subject always be a demonstrative pronoun, we shall encounter the following contradiction. Let us assume the following true (affirmative!) proposition: Every individual is something not pointed at by a demonstrative pronoun. Its verification would contain the following contradiction: This (pointing at any individual) is something not pointed at by a demonstrative pronoun. Hence we need a correction of the theory of verification. Georges proposes in such cases that we take either proper names or simply symbols, that is a letter of the alphabet. Then we would obtain

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[12] Unde ille terminus dicitur verificabilis in potentia propinqua, qui sic se habet, quod si poneretur a parte praedicati et pronomen demonstrativum demonstrans solum significatum, vel nomen adaequate ipsum significans, a parte subiecti, talis propositio esset vera nulla mutatione facta in re significata per ipsum praedicatum. Et ille terminus dicitur esse verificabilis in potentia remota, qui non potest vere praedicari de pronomine demonstrante suum significatum nisi sit mutatio facta in re significata per ipsum. Georges of Brussels, *op. cit.* fol. 86 rb.

[13] Dicitur notanter 'secundum se vel secundum sibi synonymum,' quia ad hoc, quod terminus supponat non oportet quod secundum se sit verificabilis, cum sic termini vocales non supponerent, ex quo terminus vocalis semel prolatus amplius resumi non potest . . . Georges of Brussels, *op. cit.*, fol. 86 va. That this also applies to written terms becomes clear from our later discussions of supposition.

the verification: A (being the name of any individual) is something not pointed at by a demonstrative pronoun.[14]

We are now in a position to understand the differences in the scope of supposition advocated by various scholastic authors. They are due to the different requirements for verification laid down in their definition of supposition.

If we demand that supposition requires verification of a true affirmative proposition of the present, then supposition is being taken in a very narrow sense. A representative of this opinion is found in the Anonymous of the tract on Supposition in ms. Vienna Dominik. 153, f. 169 ra. This author, by the way, is well aware of the fact that this opinion is a matter of definition and not of dispute or demonstration.[15] According to his definition the terms 'Adam' and 'Noe' have no supposition in the proposition: Adam and Noe have existed. Nor has the term 'Antichrist' supposition in the proposition: The Antichrist will exist; for there is no object at which we could point by a demonstrative pronoun, and hence there is no verification in the present tense, though the first proposition is necessarily true, the second contingently true.[16] However, there is verification in the past or future tense, and thus, though the terms have no supposition, they may have ampliation.

Others do not restrict supposition to terms verified in true affirmative propositions of the present, and hence treat ampliation as a subspecies of supposition. Thus, according to them, the term 'Adam' in the prop-

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[14] Dicitur notanter 'vel de nomine adaequate significante,' quia aliquis terminus pro aliquo supponit qui non est verificabilis de pronomine demonstrante, sed solum de nomine vero vel ficto illud adaequate significante. Nam posito casu, quod nullum ens demonstratur, haec est vera: Omne ens est non-demonstratum; et praedicatum eius supponit pro quolibet ente et tamen non est verificabile de pronomine demonstrante aliquid ens, quia quolibet ente demonstrato haec est falsa: Hoc est indemonstratum. Sed bene istae essent verae: A est non-demonstratum, B est non-demonstratum, si A sit nomen unius et B alterius. Georges of Brussels, *op. cit.*, fol. 86 va.

[15] Cfr. . . . secundum opinionem communiter de suppositionibus loquentium suppositio est statio alicuius termini qui est pars propositionis pro se vel pro alio. Et ista definitio convertitur cum hac: Suppositio est terminus stans in propositione pro se vel pro alio. Haec definitio, sicut nec aliqua exprimens quid nominis, aliqua ratione evidenti poterit probari, ipsa tamen propter communitatem loquentium poterit benigniter acceptari.

[16] Ex hac definitione sequuntur aliquae conclusiones. Quarum prima est haec: Quod aliqua est propositio necessaria cuius termini non supponunt. Ista probatur sic, quia haec est necessaria: Adam et Noe fuerunt, eo quod omnis propositio vera de praeterito cuius veritas non ex veritate alicuius contingentis ad utrumlibet resurgit, sit necessaria; et tamen termini eius non supponunt, quia non stant pro se nec pro alio, ut intuenti faciliter apparebit . . . Tertia conclusio est haec: Quod aliqua est propositio contingenter vera, cuius termini non supponunt. Ista patet, quia haec est contingenter vera: Antichristus erit, et tamen termini eius non supponunt, ut ex praedicta definitione evidenter concluditur.

osition Adam has existed *(Adam fuit)*, has supposition, since it is verifiable with the past tense of the verb. But they exclude terms which are not verifiable in the form of the proposition, and in any case, empty terms like *'chimaera'* and *'vacuum.'*[17]

It seems that Ockham still admits a broader interpretation of supposition, when he not only speaks of actual supposition but also of denoted supposition. But a denoted or indicated supposition does not entail actual verification. Though he mentions the strict verification[18] at the beginning of his tract on supposition, he modifies or changes this requirement later when he expressly corrects this restriction saying that even in false propositions it is denoted that the term has supposition.[19]

Finally we have to ask, which terms have supposition in a proposition. To this question Georges of Brussels gives the following general rule: Only such terms can have supposition which signify some object or some objects in the manner of a substantive noun.[20] This excludes from the class of terms capable of supposition, all purely categorematic terms, and also all adjectival terms as long as they function as adjectives and are not being used as substantives. Thus, for instance, the adjectival term 'white' has no supposition in the proposition: 'A white man is running;' but it has supposition in the proposition: 'A man is white,' since it functions as a substantive term. A special problem is encountered with the adjectival verbs — the substantive verbs *'sum,' 'est,' 'sunt,'* etc., do have supposition. Such adjectival verbs, as for instance 'runs,' 'reads' and the like have supposition according to certain logicians, whilst according to others they do not have supposition as such. The difference of opinion, however, seems to be more verbal than real. For, those who include adjectival verbs in the class of terms capable of having supposition are satisfied with proximate verifiability in the form

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[17] Cfr. Georges of Brussels, *op. cit.*, fol. 86vb: ... tamen ille terminus Adam aliter acceptus, puta cum verbo praeteriti temporis bene verificatur de aliquo dicendo: Hoc est Adam.

[18] Est igitur una regula generalis, quod numquam terminus in aliqua propositione, saltem quando significative accipitur, supponit pro aliquo, nisi de quo praedicatur vere. *Summa logicae*, p. I, c. 63: p. 176.

[19] Cfr. *Summa logicae*, p. I, c. 72; p. 197, ad 2um, especially: Et si dicatur, ista non stant simul: 'supponit,' et 'pro nullo supponit,' quia sequitur: Supponit, igitur pro aliquo supponit. — Dicendum quod non sequitur; sed sequitur: Supponit, igitur denotatur pro aliquo supponere, vel denotatur pro nullo supponere. Cfr. also, Albert of Saxony: Unde terminum alicuius propositionis dico accipi pro illo de cuius pronomine demonstrante praedicatum in illa propositione denotatur verificari affirmative vel negative. *Perutilis logica*, Tr. II, c. 1; fol. 11ra.

[20] Ponitur talis regula: Omnis terminus qui debet supponere debet aliquid vel aliqua substantive significare. *Op. cit.*, fol. 86vb.

as we have explained before. Others, as Ockham and Buridan, for instance, deny that adjectival verbs have supposition, since in the form of verbs they cannot be predicates in elementary propositions, that is in verifications. For the verb in the proposition: 'A man runs' (the proposition: 'A man is running,' does not contain an adjectival verb), has no verification as such, since it does not make sense to say: 'This is runs.' But they concede of course, that the participle of a verb has supposition when it is used in the manner of a substantive noun. Hence 'running' in the proposition: 'A man is running,' does have supposition.[21]

A similar dissension exists among the scholastics as regards the supposition of oblique terms. Some deny it, some affirm it; but all admit supposition for them, when they are analyzed into their components. Let us finally add that all that has been said about terms being able to have supposition, concerns personal supposition.

2. Division of supposition

Up to now we have considered supposition in relation to terms having signification and exercising their significative function. In the following discussions we do not consider the significative function of a term a necessary condition of supposition. Hence we take supposition here in the large sense that a term in a proposition represents either something else or itself and we consider the exercise of its significative function only a special case of supposition.

a. An analytical division and description of supposition

The main forms of supposition in this large sense have been explained by Ockham in an analytical exhaustive manner which recommends itself for its clarity. It is found in a still unedited work, called by his author: *Elementarium*, by others *Tractatus medius logicae*. We shall follow this text paraphrasing and interpreting it.[22]

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[21] For Georges of Brussels, cfr.: Tertio principaliter dicitur ad dubium, quod verba supponunt, ut patet in istis orationibus: Ego curro, Joannes currit, legere est agere. Et similiter participia. *Op. cit.*, fol. 87rb.

For Ockham, cfr. *Summa logicae*, P. I, c. 69; p. 188: Per secundum excluditur omne verbum, quia numquam verbum potest esse extremum, propositionis quando accipitur significative . . . For Buridan, cfr. *op. cit.* cap. 2: Quarta regula est, quod nullum verbum potest subiici vel praedicari per se nisi verbum infinitivi modi, quod bene subiicitur vel praedicatur, ut secare est agere. Dorp's Commentary explains the text of Buridan in the sense of Georges of Brussels, applying the expression of *'per se verificabilis,'* which means the same as proximate potency of verification.

[22] The edition of this work is in preparation. Cfr. our article, "Three Sums of Logic attributed to William Ockham," *Franciscan Studies* II, (1951), pp. 173—193.

As Ockham informs us, anything that can be subject or predicate in a proposition, can have supposition. For, in every proposition both the subject and the predicate have the function of taking the place of some thing, for they are representing some object or are a substitute for an object. He also admits that such a term having supposition can exercise its direct and primary signification or its indirect and secondary signification. And he finally expressly admits that even meaningless terms, inasmuch as they can figure in a proposition, do have supposition. By way of exemplation he offers the following propositions in which both, subject and predicate, have supposition: 'man is an animal.' 'Every is a word'. 'If is a conjunction.' 'A white man is an animal.' 'Ba is a syllable.' 'Callial is a spoken word' (the subject here is supposed to be a meaningless word).

In order to clarify the various relations and their relations which are exemplified by these instances and others, we will make use of the following symbolism.

W   is symbol for a word
C   is symbol for a concept
S   is symbol for a written word
O   is symbol for an object
M   is symbol for a mind
p   is symbol for a proposition
mp   is symbol for a mental proposition
Sig is symbol of Signification
Pr   is symbol of the relation of presenting
Ass is symbol of the association between concept word and written word
Sup is symbol of supposition
Sta is symbol of the relation of supposition (standing for)

Then the most general characterization of supposition of a word, regardless of whether it has signification or not, would be:

$$\text{Supw} = \text{Def. Sta(W, O, p)} \cdot \text{Sig W v -Sig W}$$

However, in order not to complicate matters we shall eliminate from our further discussions the case that a word does not have meaning or signification in the broadest sense in which a syncategorematic term has meaning, though no signified object. Hence we shall only admit spoken terms for which it is true that they have a concept associated with them.

A meaningful term in a proposition either represents or stands for itself or it represents or stands for something different from itself. It is to be noted that the expression 'stands for itself' means at least in our discussions here not only standing for the numerically same term but also for the terms which have the same form (equiform).

Let us assume that a term stands for itself, as, for instance, when we say: Every is a term. Here the term 'Every' does not stand for something different from itself, but for itself and its similar occurrences. Let us remember that a term may be either mental, spoken or written.

When a mental term stands for itself, this must be in a mental proposition. Though a mental term always seems to be associated with a spoken word, we can disregard this association in our case. Hence in our definition we shall leave out the relation to a word and only consider the supposition in which a concept represents itself and its similar occurrences. Thus we obtain the first kind of supposition which we shall call Simple Supposition of a mental term;

(Sup Si$_C$).

We can symbolize the relation as follows:

I. Sup Si$_C$ = Def. Sta (C, O_1, p) $\cdot$ Pr (C, O_2, M) $\cdot$ (O_1 = C) $\cdot$ (O_1 = O_2).

We read: The relation of simple supposition of a mental term is given, if the mental term stands for something in a proposition, and if this mental term presents an object to the mind and if the object which the mental term presents to the mind and the object for which the same term stands is the mental term itself, and not the object of its signification.

A second case of a term standing for itself would be when a spoken (and similarly a written) term stands for itself in a spoken or written proposition. The type of supposition of such a term will be called material supposition. We can symbolize the material supposition of a term in a spoken proposition

(Sup Ma$_W$) as follows:

$$C$$
$$\updownarrow$$

II. Sup Ma$_W$ = Def. Sta (W, O_2, M) $\cdot$ (O_1 = W) $\cdot$ (O_1 = O_2).

We read: The meaningful word (W) stands for itself and not for the object signified by it, in a spoken proposition.

We shall not treat expressly the case of a written proposition in which a term stands for itself, since Ockham does not mention it and since it does not present special difficulties.

These are the only cases, in which a term stands strictly for itself (or its similar occurrences).

Let us now turn to the second part of the main division; viz., when a term stands for something different from itself (and its similar occur-

rences). Here again, we must distinguish between terms in mental and spoken (or written) propositions.

Let us first assume that we have a mental proposition and that the term not stand for itself, but for something different from itself. The object, for which the term stands, its supposition is then either directly and primarily signified by it or not. If the object is directly and primarily signified by the mental term, then, according to our previous discussions, it will stand for that which it naturally signifies. This is personal supposition, which is defined as: A term standing in a proposition for something which it naturally signifies (Sup Pec).

III. Sup Pe_C = Def. Sta (C, O_1, p) . Pr (C, O_2, M) . ($O_1 = O_2$).

We read: A mental term has personal supposition in a mental proposition, when the concept C stands for the object in the mental proposition p and so that the concept C calls the same object to the mind for which it stands.

It is understood that the object of supposition and natural direct signification can be anything, even a mental or spoken or written sign. For instance, in the mental proposition: A word is a sound, both subject and predicate have this personal supposition.

If we now assume that the term, still in a mental proposition, has indirect or secondary signification, that is, only because of the relation of association with a spoken or written word, then its object or supposition must be just such a spoken or written word. Of course, it then does not exercise its significative function; therefore it cannot have personal supposition. Again, since it does not stand for any other natural sign (concept), it cannot have simple supposition. Therefore, it has material supposition. Hence material supposition of a mental term is given, when it stands for the word associated with it in a mental proposition. We can symbolize this relation as follows:

IV. Sup Ma_C = Def. Sta (C, O, p) · Pr (C, O_2, M) · As (C, W) · (O_1 = W) · ($O_1 \neq O_2$).

An instance of this kind of material supposition would be the mental proposition: Man is monosyllabic.

Let us now turn to spoken or written propositions in which the term does not stand for itself. Then, again two possibilities are open. The object, for which the term stands, is either directly and primarily signified by the term, or not. In the first case, the term exercises its significative function for which it was instituted, and hence we have a

second type of personal supposition, viz., that of a spoken (or written) term. The relations of this type of supposition can be symbolized as follows:

V. Sup Pew = Def. Sta (W, O_1, p) · Pr (W, O_2, M) · As (W, C) · ($O_1 = O_2$).

An instance of this personal supposition is 'man' and 'animal' in the spoken or written proposition: Man is an animal.

If the spoken or written term indirectly or secondarily signifies its object, then it does not exercise its significative function but stands for the concept (we disregard the association between spoken and written word) associated with it. In this case we have another type of simple supposition, of which the relations can be defined in the following way:

VI. Sup Sigw = Def. Sta (W, O_1, p) · Pr (W, O_2, M) · As (C, W) · ($O_1 \neq O_2$) · (O = C).

An instance of this simple supposition is the term 'man' in the spoken (or written) proposition: Man is a species.

Up to now we have considered spoken terms (or written) terms which are equiform. At least the Latin language admits of another kind of words which are grammatical forms of a word, viz., the various *casus*. Now, material supposition is extended to these grammatical forms of a word which are not equiform. Thus, for instance, in the proposition: *Animal praedicatur de homine*, '*homine*' stands for '*homo*' in the proposition: *Homo est animal*. In order to meet this situation we have to introduce the relation of grammatically equiform. Thus we may symbolize:

$$\overset{C}{\underset{}{\updownarrow}} \qquad\qquad \overset{C}{\underset{}{\updownarrow}}$$

VII. Sup Magram. eq. = Def. Sta (W_1, O_1, p) · Pr (W_1, O_2, M) ·

gram. eq. (W_1, W_2) · ($O_1 = W_q$) · ($O_1 \neq O_2$).

Though the scholastics were aware of still another kind of material supposition in which a term stands for its synonymous terms (cfr. n. 11, on page 245), as for instance in the proposition: The synonyms of man, or: Man in Latin is disyllabic; but since Ockham does not mention it here, we shall abstain from symbolizing the relations entering into it.

However, we shall mention another material supposition and two types of it, viz., when the term having material supposition is a proposition. This is the case, for instance, in the following proposition: 'Man

is an animal' is a spoken proposition, where 'Man is an animal' stands for itself and its equiform occurrences. We symbolize:

VIII. Sup Map = Def. Sta $(p_2, O, p_1) \cdot (p_2 = O)$.

We purposely leave out here the relation of signification of a proposition and of the association of a spoken proposition with a mental proposition.

When the proposition does not stand for its equiform occurrence, as for instance, in the Latin proposition: *Hominem esse animal est verum*, we must add the relation of being grammatically equiform. Thus we can symbolize:

IX. Sup Magram. eq. p = Def. Sta $(p_2, O, p_1) \cdot$ gram. eq. $(p_2 = p_3) \cdot$ $(O = p_3)$.

Here we shall rest our analytical discussions of the main types of supposition. Now let us add a few historical notes concerning the main types, personal, simple and material supposition, which concern terminology more than the doctrine itself.

Historical notes on the main divisions of supposition

Ockham admitted, as we say, three main kinds of supposition; viz., personal, simple and material supposition. Others, however, admitted more or even fewer main divisions of supposition. Before discussing some of the other forms, not mentioned by Ockham, let us, in a first approach, present here the simplified survey given by Mengus Faventinus.[23] He says (in translation): "As to the division of supposition, note that there have been four opinions concerning the number of the division.

(First opinion). One opinion posits only personal supposition and rejects all the others. This is the opinion of Petrus Mantuanus as is evident from his Logic.[24]

(Second opinion). Another opinion admits only two forms of supposition, viz., material and personal supposition; of this opinion is the Magister (viz., Paulus Venetus) in his *Logica Parva*.

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[23] Cfr. his Commentary to the *Logica* or the *Summulae* of Paulus Venetus, Venice, 1511, fol. 32 rb.

[24] Already Ockham in his *Elementarium Logicae* gives us a device which would eliminate material and simple supposition as he understood them. For, instead of saying: Man is a monosyllable, we can say: The word man is a syllable; in the latter case, subject and predicate have personal supposition; the same holds for simple supposition: Quamvis enim expressius dicatur et minor daretur occasio (errandi), si sic loqueremur: Haec vox homo est vox significativa, et sic de aliis; . . . tamen usus habet quod termini saepe nullo addito eis supponunt pro seipsis.

(Third opinion). A third opinion admits three kinds of supposition; viz., material, personal and simple supposition. Of this opinion is the Magister (P. V.) in his *Logica Magna*. And this is the common opinion, though there is a difference among those who hold it, mainly between the terminists and the realists, as I shall presently explain. Peter of Spain, the best among the realists, says that personal supposition is the acceptance of a common term for its (logical) inferiors; simple supposition is the acceptance of a common term for the universal thing signified by it, as for instance, when we say: Man is a species. Material supposition, on the other hand, is the acceptance of a term for itself, as for instance, when we say: Man is a monosyllable. Ockham, however, the prince of the terminists, maintains that personal supposition is given, when a term stands for its signified object, no matter whether this object is a being outside the mind or a word or an intention of the mind or a written expression . . . Simple supposition is given, when a term stands for an intention of the soul and is not taken in its significative function . . . Material supposition is given, when a term does not stand for the signified object, but for the spoken or written expression . . .

(Fourth opinion). The fourth main opinion posits four kinds of supposition, viz., material, personal, simple and natural supposition. This opinion is held by Saint Vincent, O. P.; he says that it (the division) is in agreement with the mind of the Commentator (viz., Averroes) and Albertus (viz., Magnus) and foremost of St. Thomas."

Let us now turn to the discussion of a few details and additions. Our text does not mention the distinction into material and formal supposition, which is quite frequently encountered with logicians of the 15th century. They, then, subdivide formal supposition into personal and simple suppositions. This distinction is first found, as far as we know, in William Shyreswood; St. Thomas and the classical scholastics do not make use of this distinction. We encounter it again in Burleigh and in logics of the 15th century, Javellus, O. P., for instance, and others, and it became quite common in late and modern scholasticism. The distinction is derived from that between the matter of a term (the material sound or inkmark) and its form (the significative function). Since, according to these authors, a term primarily signifies the corresponding concepts (for which it does not stand in personal supposition), or the nature or the universal, and secondarily for the objects signified by the concepts, formal supposition is divided into simple and personal supposition.

Another and more important difference is expressed by the distinction into natural and accidental supposition. It seems that its meaning has been largely misunderstood. Thus, for instance, Mullally explains it as follows: "A substantive term possesses natural supposition when it is taken by itself. It is only when the term enters into a statement that it has accidental supposition."[25] In our opinion, however, this distinction comes practically down to the same as that of William Shyreswood into supposition (copulation) *in habitu et in actu*.[26] For it is characteristic of this natural supposition that it abstracts from the 'adjunct' of time, that is from the time element and thus it does not demand a verification in the present tense for a definite supposition or an individual. If we admit that only individuals (and no universals or abstract essences and natures) exist, then such terms would have no verification, if we restrict verification to the present tense, but not if we extend it to the other tenses and even the mode of possibility, that is, if we abstract from tense completely. What this tenseless proposition (which, of course, contains a verb, and a verb signifies with time!) would be in its ultimate analysis, is not easy to determine. Though I am convinced that the scholastics are here as closely as possible to an interpretation of universal propositions, and only such have natural supposition, as conditional propositions. It is certain that the nominalists were driven into the direction of this interpretation; whether they have ever reached it is not known to me. In any case, Buridan refers such natural supposition to terms in a proposition which has no existential import. Such propositions would be, for instance: 'Man is an animal; The magnet attracts iron.' In short, they are scientific propositions (in the scholastic sense of the word), that is, necessary propositions. Accidental supposition, on the other hand, concerns only the supposition of a term for a certain time. Buridan, in rewriting the *Summulae* of Peter of Spain, says:

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[25] Cfr. *Summulae Logicales* of Peter of Spain. Publications in *Medieval Studies*, (University of Notre Dame, VIII, 1945, p. XLVII). The author interprets this from the following text: Item suppositionum communium, alia naturalis, alia accidentalis. Suppositio naturalis est acceptio termini communis pro omnibus his pro quibus aptus natus est participari; ut iste terminus 'homo', per se sumptus, supponit pro omnibus tam qui sunt quam qui erunt et qui fuerunt. Accidentalis suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro omnibus his pro quibus exigit suum adiunctum, ut 'Homo currit.' Hic iste terminus 'homo' supponit pro omnibus hominibus praesentibus . . . *Op. cit.*, p. 4, 44 ss.

[26] Et notandum, quod suppositio et copulatio dicuntur dupliciter, sicut multa huiusmodi nomina, aut secundum actum aut secundum habitum . . . Secundum autem quod sunt in habitu dicitur suppositio significatio alicuius ut subsistentis. Quod enim tale est, natum est ordinari sub alio . . . *Op. cit.*, p. 74, 19 ss.

"Insofar as a term indifferently stands for everything for which it can stand, for present, past, and also future objects, its supposition is called *suppositio naturalis*. Of this supposition, we make use in the demonstrative sciences. But, insofar as a term stands only for present objects, or for present and past, or for present and future objects according to the requirement of the verb or the predicate, its supposition is called *suppositio accidentalis*. Of this supposition we make use in the descriptive sciences and in history, and also the sophists make use of it."

Any scholastic, therefore, who demands existential import for a proposition in accordance with the form of the verb, that is, either for the present, the past, or the future, or even with the mode of possibility, will not admit the *suppositio naturalis*. This is certainly true for Ockham and Albert of Saxony and most of the so-called Nominalists. The realists, on the other hand, will admit it as distinct from the *suppositio personalis*, which belongs to accidental supposition, because they admit in predicates about reality, 'eternal truths' and necessary or essential predicates, which exist independently of a human mind.[27]

From this it follows that if a scholastic admits a *suppositio naturalis*, he will prove himself to be a Nominalist, if he understands it as a subdivision of *suppositio personalis;* he will prove himself to be a realist, if he understands it as distinct from *suppositio personalis*.

Still another distinction is frequently encountered, viz., that into absolute and relative supposition. The former concerns absolute terms, the latter relative terms in the grammatical sense of the word.

We shall close by presenting here two schemes of divisions which are fairly representative of the two main schools of scholastic Logic. The first is taken from the work of a late terminist, Jacobus Faber Stapulensis.[28] Though he leaves out simple supposition as a special

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[27] Cfr. Javellus, *op. cit.*, fol. 170 v: Quantum ad secundum adverte, quod terministae non dividunt suppositionem formalem naturalem, quoniam eam non ponunt distinctam a personali, ideo non aliter dividitur apud eos quam suppositio personalis . . . Ratio autem propter quam non ponunt eam distinctam a personali est, quia non concedunt praedicatum reale, sive sit essentiale sive accidentale, verificari de subiecto, nisi subiectum existat in rerum natura. Ideo, sicut ista est personalis: Aliquis homo currit, sic ista: Aliquis homo est animal . . . est sicut illa est falsa nullo homine existente, sic est ista. Apud reales autem in praedicatis essentialibus non requiritur existentia subiecti, quoniam propositio per se est sempiternae veritatis . . . In praedicatis autem accidentalibus requiritur existentia subiecti, quoniam non verificantur de subiecto nisi subiectum existat. Et ideo distinguunt reales inter suppositionem formalem naturalem et formalem accidentalem, quae est respectu praedicati accidentalis. Cfr. p. 39, Clichtoveus.

[28] Cfr. Introductiones artificiales in *Logicam* Jacobi Fabri Stapulensis, per Iodocum Clichtoveum Neoportuensem collectae, Lyons, 1538. Faber's text is in italics.

subdivision, his treatment recommends itself for its classical brevity. Hence we shall give it here in translation:

"Material supposition is the supposition of a term for its non-ultimate signified object; viz., for the spoken or written word or for the concept.

The non-ultimate signified object is a written or spoken word or a concept which the term does not signify in the proper sense, neither by convention nor by nature.

Personal supposition is the supposition of a term for its ultimate signified object.

The ultimate signified object is that which a term signifies in the proper sense, either by convention or by nature.

Absolute supposition is the supposition of a term that is not relative in the grammatical sense.

Relative supposition is the supposition of a term that is not relative in the grammatical sense.

Grammatical relatives are, 'who,' 'which' *(qui, quae, quod)* he, the same, his *(ille, ipse, is, idem, suus, et sui).*

Proper supposition is the supposition of a term that is not taken in a metaphorical sense.

Improper supposition is the supposition of a term that is taken in a metaphorical sense.

Natural supposition is the supposition of a term in a proposition, the copula of which abstracts from time.[29]

Accidental supposition is the supposition of a term as it is required by the tense (time) expressed in the copula."

The Realist and Thomist, Chrysostomus Javellus, presents the second scheme of division. According to him, *suppositio is* divided into:

Absolute and relative supposition. Relative supposition concerns the supposition of grammatical relative pronouns.

Absolute supposition is divided into:

Proper or improper (that is metaphorical) supposition.

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[29] Here the explanation of Clichtoveus: Absolvitur autem copula a tempore, cum nullam temporis differentiam importat, neque praesens, neque praeteritum neque futurum neque possibile, sed solum unionem praedicati cum subiecto, ut cum dico: Homo est animal, copula 'est,' nullum importat tempus, sicut dicendo: Homo et asinus, coniunctio 'et' nullam habet temporis significationem. Proinde, si nullus esset homo, item si nullum esset animal, immo si nullum esset tempus, nihilominus praedicta propositio esset vera, et eius tam subiectum quam praedicatum supponeret ... Sunt enim propositiones necessariae (in quibus potissimum haec suppositio locum habet) sempiternae veritatis et earum copula per 'aptum natum' resolvitur, ut: Homo est animal, valet hanc: Homo natus est esse animal.

Proper supposition into:
  Material or formal
    Formal into:
      Natural or accidental
        Accidental supposition into:
          Simple or personal
            Personal, then is further subdivided.

It seems that this division of supposition is that of Saint Vincent Ferrer (1372).[30]

However, it seems that the division of Burleigh[31] is in greater favor with modern scholastics than any other. Hence we shall give, without comment this scheme:

Suppositio propria et impropria.

Formalis et materialis.

Personalis et simplex.

b. Material supposition

We are now prepared to enter into a more detailed discussion of the three main divisions of supposition. We shall always start our discussions with an exposition of Albert of Saxony treatment of the matter and then compare it with that of other scholastic logicians.

Albert of Saxony defines material supposition as follows: 'Material supposition is the acceptance of a term either for itself or for something similar or dissimilar to itself, having the same or another kind of supposition as itself, but so that the term which has material supposition does not signify that for which it stands, either by convention or by nature in the proper sense.'[32]

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[30] For Vincent of Ferrer Cfr. Ivo Thomas, O. P., "Saint Vincent Ferrer's De Suppositionibus," in *Dominican Studies*, V (1952), 88 ss. Cfr. also the long discussion of this division of Saint Vincent Ferrer by Menghus Faventinus in the *Summulae of Paulus of Venice, ed. cit.* fol. 47va ss.

[31] Cfr. *De puritate artis logicae*. Tractatus Longior, ed. Ph. Boehner, Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series No. 9, The Franciscan Institute, 1955, p. 6 s.

[32] Suppositio materialis est acceptio termini qua accipitur pro se vel pro aliquo sibi simili vel dissimili eodem modo vel aliter supponente, cui non imponitur ad significandum nec illud pro quo supponit naturaliter proprie significat. *Op. cit.*, Tr. II, c. 3; fol. 11rb.

Let us first call attention to the fact that Albert includes in material supposition concepts which stand for concepts not signifying them properly speaking. Hence in the mental (not in the spoken or written proposition): Man is a species, 'man' has material supposition.[33] In this case also, 'man' which is a concept that naturally and properly signifies individual men *(significare naturaliter proprie)*, naturally and commonly *(naturaliter et communiter)* signifies also itself and its similar or dissimilar instances. Hence we have the two general forms of material supposition expressed in the following two definitions:

(Sim = similar; Dis = dissimilar).

$$C \qquad\qquad C$$
$$\updownarrow \qquad\qquad \updownarrow$$

Sup Ma$_W$ = Def. Sta (W, O$_1$, p) $\cdot$ Pr (W, O$_2$, M) $\cdot$ (O$_1$ = O$_2$).

[(O$_1$ = W) v (O$_1$ = Sim W) v (O$_1$ Dis W)]

Sup Ma$_C$ = Def. Sta (C, O$_1$, p) $\cdot$ Pr (C, O$_2$, M) $\cdot$ (O$_1$ = O$_2$).

[(O$_1$ = C) v (O$_1$ = Sim C) v (O$_1$ Dis C)]

We have no evidence whether Albert accepts as a case of material supposition what we have defined previously on p. 260 as material supposition of a concept. This must not be confused with Albert's second general definition. It seems, however, that our definition IV would be considered a type of material supposition by Albert.

If we now confine ourselves only to spoken propositions, the following cases can be distinguished, which we consider a serious attempt to disentangle complicated grammatical structures of the Latin language, and to their supposition.

Material supposition is given:

(1) When a term stands for itself. An instance would be, if we have and consider only one occurrence of 'man,' and we say: 'Man' is a monosyllable. This is a strictly singular proposition. Of course, it also could be uttered as a particular proposition and even as a universal proposition by adding the appropriate quantifier, as we shall see later.

(2) When a term stands for something similar to itself, and (a) has the same kind of supposition. For instance, let us assume that Socrates says: 'Man' is a monosyllable, and that Plato says: 'Man' is uttered by Socrates; here 'man' has material supposition in both propositions.

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[33] Buridan, the teacher of Albert, considers this spoken or written proposition also a case of material supposition and thus eliminates simple supposition completely.

(b) Has not the same kind of supposition. For instance: Socrates says: Man is an animal; and Plato says: 'Man' is uttered by Socrates. 'Man' has personal supposition in the first and material supposition in the second proposition.

(3) When a term stands for its occurrences which are dissimilar to it. Again two cases can be distinguished: (a) The terms have the same supposition. We shall give the following instance, not given by Albert: 'Men' is a noun in the plural; Plato utters: 'Man' is uttered in the plural. (b) The term has a different kind of supposition, This type is quite common and the example given by Albert is readily understood in the Latin language, but not in English.[34] We could formulate the following example: Socrates utters: Men are animals, and Plato says: Man is uttered by Socrates in the plural.

In all the examples of the various forms of material supposition, it is clear that the term does not stand for its formal or ultimate object signified by it. But, it is not exact to say that a term has material supposition when it stands for itself or its occurrences in similar or dissimilar grammatical forms (even including *synonyma*). For there are certain terms which formally and ultimately signify themselves. Such terms are for instance: 'Word,' 'sign,' 'being,' etc. For every word is a being, and even the word 'being' is a being. Albert expressly admits this reflexive use of certain terms, admitting, therefore, the following relations for the word 'word': Word is a sound *(Vox est sonus)*

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{C} \\ \uparrow \\ \downarrow \end{array}$$
$$\text{Sta (W, O}_1\text{, p)} = \text{Pr (W, O}_2\text{, M)} \cdot \text{(O}_1 = \text{O}_2 = \text{W).}$$

We have not found any scholastic who has denied this reflexivity for certain terms.

In order to distinguish the use of a term for its ultimate signified object, including itself, that is in personal supposition, from the use of the same term for its non-ultimate signified object, including itself, the scholastics have introduced certain signs which they called signs of materiality and which are equivalent to our quotation marks. Such

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[34] Exemplum, qualiter terminus supponit pro sibi dissimili materialiter; nam si dicitur: Animal praedicatur de homine, iste terminus 'homine' supponit pro isto termino 'homo' posito in ista propositione: Homo est animal. Similiter in ista propositione: Homo est animal. Similiter in ista propositione: Sortem currere est verum; ista oratio 'Sortem currere,' supponit materialiter pro ista: Sortes currit, cuius subiectum supponit personaliter et est sibi dissimile, *l. c.*

signs are the old French article: 'li' or 'ly,' or even expressions as: the term or the proposition.[35]

We shall not go deeper into this problem of reflexivity at the present time and we shall postpone it to the discussion of personal supposition. However, we should like to point out, that most of the later scholastics expressly admitted quantification within the realm of material supposition. Hence they admitted propositions like this: Every 'man' is a monosyllable, some word is a spoken noun, etc. According to Javellus this was the custom of the so-called Nominalists.[36] We shall take this quantification into account later.

c. Simple supposition

Albert of Saxony defines simple supposition as follows: Simple supposition is the acceptance of a spoken or written term for an intention of the mind of which it is not a conventional sign.[37] Hence according to Albert, simple supposition is applied only to a spoken or written term, never to an intention itself; and a spoken written term has this supposition when it stands for a concept without being instituted to signify it, hence not because of its signification but because of its association with a concept. It follows, that Albert assigns simple supposition only to the Definition VI (p. 261) not to Definition I (p. 259) of the divisions of Ockham. Albert explicitly excludes this simple supposition from his definition.[37a] Hence we can define simple supposition according to Albert:

$$\text{Sup Si} = \text{Sta } (W, O_1, p) \cdot (C, O_2, M) \cdot \text{As } (W, C) \cdot (O_1 = O_2) \cdot (O_1 = C).$$

with C above and a vertical double-arrow $\updownarrow$ over the (C, O_2, M) term.

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[35] Cfr. Paulus Venetus, *op. cit.*, fol. 33 rb. Signa materialitatis sunt ista: Ly, iste terminus, ista propositio, ista oratio, et huiusmodi, sed potissimum est ista vox ly.

[36] Cfr. *op. cit.*, fol. 109 r: Quantum ad secundum adverte quod terministae dividunt suppositionem materialem in discretam et communem. Communem in determinatam, etc. . . ., quas divisiones et singularum partium definitiones et exempla vide tu in Paulo Veneto, quia nolo hic esse merus recitator . . . Reales autem non multiplicant tot divisiones de suppositione materiali, sed existimant sufficere addiscenti, si dividant in discretam et communem et illic sistere.

[37] Suppositio simplex est statio termini vocalis vel scripti, qua accipitur pro intentione animae, cui non imponitur ad significandum, *l. c.*, fol. 11 ra.

[37a] Et notanter dico 'termini vocalis vel scripti,' ad designandum terminum mentalem non posse supponere simpliciter sed materialiter vel personaliter. Si enim supponat pro seipso in mente vel sibi simili in mente vel in voce vel in scripto, supponit materialiter. Si autem pro re extra, cuius est naturalis similitudo, quam quidem rem significat terminus sibi subordinatus ex impositione, tunc supponit personaliter, *l. c.*

We have not to distinguish between simple supposition of a word or of a concept, since only words have this supposition.

Contrary, therefore, to an oversimplification of history, it is not correct to say that the so-called Nominalists dismissed simple supposition. Certain logicians have dropped it as a special kind and have united it with material supposition as Buridan, Paulus Venetus, Faber and Clichtoveus, Paulus Pergulensis and Petrus Mantuanus. Others confined simple supposition to spoken or written terms in reference to concepts or intentions of the mind, as Albert of Saxony, the Anonymous of the Vienna manuscript and Georges of Brussels. Ockham applied it to concepts standing for themselves also.

The realistic tradition on the other hand needs simple supposition, since it admits a *significatum* or object signified which is neither the concept nor the individual thing and which is usually called, not only by Scotists — the common nature. This common nature conceived in abstraction from its individualization in which it exists in individuals is considered to be the signified object of a term in simple supposition. The realists, therefore, admit two formal signified objects, the individuals (and that only in personal supposition) and the common nature, and that in simple supposition. For that reason, according to them not only natural supposition is different from personal supposition, but also simple supposition, though both, natural and simple supposition exercise their significative function.[38]

It seems that the first clash on this score took place between Ockham and Burleigh. Ockham openly qualifies this opinion of the realists or the '*communiter loquentium*' as a falsehood.[39] Burleigh went immediately over to the counterattack. He wrote: "Some criticize the formulation: Simple supposition is given when a term stands for that which it signifies; for they criticize the older ones and say that this is false and impossible. They rather say that personal supposition is given when a term stands for that which it signifies or for the things signified. But that simple supposition is given, when a term stands for the intention or the intentions of the mind ... But without any doubt this is quite irreasonably said ...[40]

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[38] Cfr. Javellus, *op. cit.*, fol. 172b, (a Thomist); a very instructive explanation is given by the Scotist, Johannes de Magistris, *Summularum Petri Hispani glosulae exactae ad mentem Doctoris Subtilis*, Tr. VII, Venice, 1490.
[39] Cfr. *Summa logicae*, p. I, c. 64; p. 178, 33 rss.
[40] Burleigh, *De puritate artis logicae*, Tractatus longior, Tr. I, p. I, c. 3; ed. p. 7, 5 ss.

However, it seems that this controversy between realists and nominalists has had hardly any bearing on logic as such. Both realists and nominalists give the same examples. While realists do not admit quantification of a term having simple supposition — they consider the proposition in which such a term having simple supposition occurs a singular proposition — the so-called nominalists, certainly the later ones, admit quantification of simple supposition.[41]

d. Personal supposition

Albert of Saxony defines personal supposition as follows: Personal supposition is the acceptance of a spoken or written term for that which it signifies by convention, or the acceptance of a mental term for that which it naturally and properly signifies.[42]

This definition is in line with Ockham's theory of signification and of that of the terminists in general. When a term in a proposition is taken in that significative function which it has either by convention or by nature, that is, if it has its primary signification, then it signifies the *supposita* — the individuals. Our definitions III, V, on pp. 260 and 261 cover the two main types of this, viz., the supposition of a mental and of a spoken term.

Those logicians who admit some kind of commonness of a nature distinct from the individuals and primarily signified by the concepts and indirectly by the spoken and written terms, cannot, of course, define personal supposition in reference to the formally signified object, since everyone admits that personal supposition concerns only the standing of a term for individuals. They have to introduce distinction which we shall present following Javellus literally.[43]

"A common nature, for instance, 'man,' 'body,' can be considered in two ways by the mind. First, insofar as it has existence and is diversified in the *supposita* (individuals); in this case, the intellect attributes to it real predicates which belong to this common nature by reason of the individuals. For instance, by saying: 'Man is white,' 'man is healthy, sick,' etc. Such predicates cause the term to have personal supposition. In a second way, (the intellect can consider the common nature) insofar

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[41] Cfr. Javellus, *op. cit.*, fol. 172: . . . quoniam suppositio simplex non convenit termino supponenti respectu suppositorum, immo convenit ut abstrahit a suppositis, non est dividenda ut dividitur suppositio personalis, scilicet in discretam et communem et indeterminatam et confusam, etc. . . .

[42] Suppositio personalis est acceptio termini vocalis vel scripti pro illo, cui est impositus ad significandum, vel est acceptio termini mentalis pro illo quod naturaliter proprie significat. *Op. cit.*, C. IV, fol. 11 va.

[43] Cfr. *op. cit.*, fol. 172 v.

as it is common to many and predicable about many and as agreeing in the same definition of the same common nature. In this case it (the common nature) is one and is not referred to the individuals by which it is diversified, but it is considered in abstraction from the individuals. Thus the intellect attributes to it intentional predicates explained by one of the five universals (of Porphyry); for instance, by saying: 'Man is a species,' 'Animal is a genus,' 'Rational is a difference,' etc. And these predicates cause the term to have simple supposition according to the realists."

It is obvious that simple supposition is connected with natural supposition, as we explained before, according to the realists. When we discuss the existential import of propositions, we must be on our guard. A proposition can have an existential import according to realists (in simple and natural supposition) while it has none according to the Nominalists, or vice versa.

At least, the Nominalists consider personal supposition to be the basic one. This is already emphasized by Ockham when he states a term always and wherever it is put in a proposition and in whatever context it may occur, can have personal supposition unless it is agreed upon by convention that the term has a supposition other than personal supposition. This strong statement certainly emphasizes the fact that personal supposition is more basic than any other supposition and belongs primarily, though not exclusively, to the object language, while the other two kinds of supposition belong only to a metalanguage.[44] If we want to take a term in another supposition than personal, it must be indicated, either through the context or through signs of materiality, which we have mentioned before.

Hence, Ockham gives the general rules:

(1) Any term that is not brought in relation to another term which signifies a concept or a spoken or written word, has only personal supposition and no distinction must be made.[45]

(2) If a term capable of having personal, simple and material supposition, is in a proposition referred to another extreme (predicate or subject)

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[44] Notandum est etiam, quod semper terminus, in quacumque propositione ponatur, potest habere suppositionem personalem, nisi ex voluntate utentium artetur ad aliam, sicut terminus aequivocus in quacumque propositione potest supponere pro quolibet significato suo, nisi ex voluntate utentium artetur ad certam significationem. *Summa logicae*, p. I, c. 65; p. 179.

[45] Sed terminus non in omni propositione potest habere suppositionem simplicem vel materialem, sed tunc tantum, quando terminus talis comparatur alteri extremo, quod respicit intentionem animae vel vocem vel scriptum, *l. c.*

which is a common term for words or propositions, spoken or written, then this term can have either personal or material supposition and the proposition must be distinguished accordingly.

(3) When, finally, such a term is referred to another term which is common to objects and words and concepts, the proposition must be distinguished, because the term can have personal, material or simple supposition. Such a threefold possible supposition is given in the proposition: Man is predicated about many.[46]

However, the third rule also applies to transcendental terms like 'being,' 'something,' etc. Here our problem of reflexivity reappears. For, if for clarity's sake, we consider the supposition of the term 'object' in the proposition: An object is something knowable, it is obvious, according to the scholastics that 'object' also signifies primarily itself; for 'object,' as such, is an object. The term 'term' is a similar instance, which primarily signifies itself and all the other terms. As far as we know, all the scholastics admit this reflexivity.[47] However, most of them maintain that the addition of a sign of materiality, or through the context, it can be determined whether a term signifies itself in personal supposition, or whether it is taken only in simple or material supposition. In the latter case, reflexivity is avoided.[48]

We must here terminate our discussions of a very interesting problem of scholastic semantics which needs a special investigation in a broader context. Its bearing on the problem of the *Insolubile*, where we have terms which are reflexive, is obvious.

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[46] *L. c.*

[47] Cfr. for instance, Dorp in the *Expositio* of Buridan's *Summulae:* Corrolarie sequitur, quod ly ens significat se conceptu ultimato et conceptu non ultimato. Patet corrolarium; nam ille terminus 'ens' conceptu generalissimo omne existens significat ad placitum ultimate, et tamen ille terminus 'ens' est et quoddam existens, ergo seipsum significat ad placitum ultimate. Similiter iste terminus ens uno alio conceptu speciali significat se praecise et alios terminos sibi (ubi) similes, et hoc naturaliter communiter, sicut quaelibet res mundi est sui ipsius significativa mediante uno conceptu qui est naturalis similitudo sui. Ex quo patet, quod isti termino 'ens' correspondent duo conceptus, unus ultimatus, quo mediante ad placitum significat omne existens, et alius conceptus non ultimatus quo mediante significat naturaliter se et alios terminos sibi similes.

[48] Cfr., however, the radical approach of Paulus Venetus and his disciple Paulus Pergulensis who maintain that terms that signify themselves cannot have material supposition. We shall present here the interesting text of Paul of Venice, *op. cit.*, fol. 32vb: Secundo sequitur, quod quilibet terminus qui est de se ipso verificabilis sine tali signo habet unum solum significatum, et illud est formale et formaliter significat, sicut isti termini 'ens,' 'aliquid,' 'nomen' et 'terminus' et huiusmodi. Nam sicut illa est vera: Ens est ens, ita illa: Ly ens est ens, et sicut illa est vera: Nomen est nomen, ita illa: Ly nomen est nomen. Manfredus de Medicis rejects this view in his *Annotationes* on fol. 152rb.

II. THE SUBDIVISIONS OF SUPPOSITION
AND QUANTIFICATION

The subdivisions of the main divisions of supposition to be discussed in this part concern the range of (primary or secondary) signification of a term in a proposition, and hence, they represent a medieval theory of Quantification. Since these subdivisions are distinguished by the different scope of terms, expressed or not expressed by signs of quantifications, and this scope has been systematically studied by scholastics, we shall present first their general theory of quantification or the Logical descent.

1. The Logical descent and its forms

In order to define the relations of quantification, the scholastics have introduced *consequentiae*, that is, conditional propositions of the form of equivalences mostly. A few of these *consequentiae* are already found in Peter of Spain who rather hesitatingly makes use of them. They dominate, however, and penetrate the entire theory of supposition of Ockham, who systematically defines the subdivisions of personal supposition with their help. Later scholastics, expecially of the 15th century, have studied more systematically these inferences from common terms to their singularized form in propositions. Some of them have united the results of their investigations in a special tract or present them in a special chapter. The title of these tracts or chapters is usually: *De descensu et ascensu.*[49]

We shall confine ourselves here only to an explanation of the theory of the descent, and we shall disregard the inverse function of the ascent. Furthermore, we shall present it here in the more elaborate form of the later scholastics following mostly Tartaretus and George of Brussels.

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[49] For instance, Petrus Tartaretus, *Tractatus de descensu*, which is found as a special work at the end of this *Expositio . . . in summulas Petri Hispani*, 1506, fol. XCII ra ss. There is a long tract, *De descensu et ascensu in Secunda Pars Rosarii Logices Magistri Antonii Coronel* (Oliver Senant), fol. XXI—XLVII. We encounter it as a chapter in the tract on *Suppositio* added by George of Brussels to his *Commentary to Petrus Hispanus*, Venice 1507, fol. 88 ra—vb. — C Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, vol. 4, Leipzig 1870, p. 207s, maintains that the theory of the descent was introduced by *Tartaretus*. He writes: "So spricht er (Tartaretus) bei der Suppositio — was Spätere nachgeahmt haben —, von einem doppelten descensus . . .." This is in fact the only information — an incorrect one to be sure — that the historian of the logic in the West is able to give concerning this important theory which was constantly used by all the logicians, certainly after Ockham.

Tartaretus gives the following definition: "An inferential descent is a formal consequentia, in which one argues in virtue of supposition from a term having common supposition to its inferiors in regard to supposition, but so that all the other terms from which the descent is not made, be they categorematic or syncategorematic, remain unchanged.[50] The definition needs careful interpretation of the technical terms in which it is stated:

(1) A descent is a formal consequence, that is, a conditional proposition which is always true regardless of the categorematic terms (that is, the content), but precisely because of the syncategorematic terms (which are the form). Hence, a formal consequence remains valid or true, even if all the categorematic terms occurring in it are uniformly substituted by any other terms, as long as the form remains the same. To the identity of the form belong, according to George of Brussels, the same quality and quantity, the same copula and the same arrangement of the terms.[51]

(2) A descent is made from the logically higher to the logically lower; however, it is to be noted that lower and higher does not concern the relation of signification in general — a term may have signification within and without a proposition and may be considered to be lower the higher its place is in the Porphyrian tree — but only that of supposition of a term exercising either the significative function or not. As regards supposition the 'inferiors' are always the singularizations of a common term. Hence, as far as supposition is concerned, 'man' is not inferior to 'animal,' but 'this man' is inferior to 'man' and 'this animal' is inferior to 'animal.' From this and the preceding it follows that proper names cannot be the names to which a descent is made, but only common

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[50] Sed descensus arguitivus est consequentia formalis, in qua arguitur a termino communiter supponente ad eius inferiora in supponendo virtute suppositionis, ceteris tamen terminis sub quibus non fit descensus, tam categorematicis quam syncategorematicis non variatis. *Op. cit.*, fol. XCIIrb.

[51] Cfr. *op. cit.*, fol. 102 ra: Consequentia formalis est consequentia quae tenet in omnibus terminis consimili forma arguendi retenta. Unde ad identitatem formae alicuius consequentiae quatuor requiruntur, scilicet similis qualitas et quantitas, similitudo copularum et similis situs terminorum . . .

Formal consequence is, therefore, taken here in the strictest sense as a logically true proposition. Thus the consequence: A man is running, therefore, an animal is running, is not logically valid or valid because of the form. However, assuming the existential import of the universal proposition, this would be a formal consequence: Every man is an animal, therefore, this man is animal. Cfr. the interesting text of Albert of Saxony, *Logica*, Venice 1517, fol. 24 ra—b: Consequentia formalis dicitur illa, cui omnis propositio similis in forma, quae si formaretur, esset bona consequentia, sicut hic: B est A, ergo quod est A est B . . . Ockham does not take *consequentia formalis* in this strict sense, hence would admit the inference: A man is running, therefore an animal is running, as a *consequentia formalis*.

names with a demonstrative pronoun. For, even if we implicitly suppose that Peter is a man, the inference from Every man is an animal, to Peter is an animal, is not a formal consequence.

It is obvious, then, that the descent in scholastic logic takes the place of specification in modern logic. In fact, some scholastics use a similar name for it, viz., '*singularizatio.*' Singularization, therefore, is specification, as for instance, in the following consequence: Everything is good, therefore, this thing is good and that thing is good, and so forth for everything. This lends itself immediately to symbolization in modern logic. In fact, it is an instance of the thesis:

$$(x) \, f \, (x) \equiv [f \, (x_1) \cdot f \, (x_2) \ldots f \, (x_n)]$$

However, specification will not always yield an equivalence. Hence, the scholastics, especially of the later period, distinguished between a sufficient and insufficient descent. They demand the following conditions for a sufficient descent:

The first condition is the complete enumeration of the singulars for which the common term stands by using the common term and a demonstrative pronoun. In order to indicate this complete enumeration which in most cases for practical reasons is impossible, the formula is added: '*et sic pro singulis.*'

The second condition is that the descent with its singularization of the common term has to be made in such a way as the kind of supposition requires. For a term with a universal quantifier requires a descent different from that with a particular quantifier, as we shall see later.

The third condition is that the consequence be an equivalence.

After these clarifications, we now turn to the division of the descent. Later scholastics used to enumerate four, of which Ockham only uses three. For the sake of completeness we shall deal with all four of them, though the fourth one will turn out to be of minor importance. In order to distinguish these four types by names, we shall make use of expressions formed from the Latin language and coined by the scholastics. Hence, we shall distinguish the copulative *(copulativus)* and the copulated *(copulatus)*, the disjunctive *(disjunctivus)* and the disjunct *(disjunctus)* descent.

A *copulative descent* is given when a hypothetical (that is compound) copulative proposition is inferred in which the term from which the descent is being made is singularized. This descent can be adequately expressed in modern logic as we showed before, provided we have transcendental predicates.

A *disjunctive descent* is given, when a hypothetical disjunctive proposition is inferred in which the term from which the descent is being made, is singularized. This also can be symbolized in modern logic as follows:

$$(x) f(x) \equiv [f(x_1) \ v \ f(x_2) \ \ldots \ v \ f(x_n)]$$

An instance would be: Something is an animal, therefore, this is an animal and that is an animal and so forth for every animal.

The *copulated descent* is given, when a categorical proposition is inferred in which the singularizations of the term from which descent is made are joined by the conjunction 'and.' Since this descent, as well as the following one, does not fit into the pattern of the functional calculus we shall abstain from modern symbolization. However, we shall give an instance of this descent: All Apostles are twelve, therefore, this and that Apostle and so forth for every Apostle, are twelve.

The *disjunct descent* (also called *descendere disjunctim*), is given when a categorical proposition is inferred in which the singularizations of the term from which the descent is being made are joined by the conjunction 'or.' An instance would be: Every man is an animal, therefore, every man is this or that animal and so forth for every animal.[52]

These four types of logical descent are four kinds of quantifications, of which three at least are being used to determine subspecies of the main kinds of supposition in which a common term is referred to more than precisely one individual. It seems to be overlooked by historians of scholastic logic, that the scholastics made use of more than two quantifiers, and that in scholastic propositions we must always distinguish between the quantification of the subject and the predicate. Only two of these quantifiers have a special name, viz., the universal and the particular one, but even these, certainly not the particular quantifier are always expressed. It was necessary, therefore, for the scholastics to elaborate rules for the fixation of the quantification of the terms in context. With these rules we shall deal later. At present we shall introduce a definition of these four quantifiers in their context taking into account the special structure of the scholastic categorical proposition. For that reason we must introduce a new symbolism.

If 'S c P' symbolizes a scholastic categorical proposition, S symbolizes the subject, P the predicate, c the copula; then the universal quantifier

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[52] Cfr. Tartaretus, *op. cit.*, fol. XVII va. For the time being we are not considering the problem of the existential import.

'ü' can be defined in context as follows: (taking into account in Definition I the Subject; in Definition Ia the predicate).

Def. I (üS c P) $= [(S_1$ c P) $\cdot$ $(S_2$ c P) ... $(S_n$ c P)]

Def. Ia (S c üP) $= [(S$ c $P_1)$ $\cdot$ (S c P_2) ... (S c P_n)]

A term having this kind of quantification, that is a copulative descent, is said to have confused distributive supposition *(suppositio confusa et distributiva)*.

The particular quantifier 'a' can be defined in context for both subject (Def. II) and predicate (Def. IIa) as follows:

Def. II (aS c P) $= [(S_1$ c P) v $(S_2$ c P) ... v $(S_n$ c P)]

Def. IIa (S c aP) $= [(S$ c $P_1)$ v (S c P_2) ... v (S c P_n)]

A term having this kind of quantification or having a disjunct descent is said to have determinate supposition *(suppositio determinata)*. It is called 'determinate' because one verification of one part of the disjunctive proposition is sufficient to verify the supposition of such a term.

The collective quantifier 'i' can be defined in context for both the subject (Def. III) and the predicate (Def. IIIa) as follows:

Def. III (iS c P) $= [(S_1 \cdot S_2 \dots S_n)$ c P)]

Def. IIIa (S c iP) $= [(S$ c $(P_1 . P_2 \dots P_n)]$

The supposition corresponding to this descent is sometimes called collective supposition. An instance would be: All Apostles are twelve, therefore, this Apostle and that Apostle ... and so for all Apostles, are twelve.

The disjunct quantifier 'ö' can be defined in context for the subject (Def. IV) and the predicate (Def. IVa) as follows:

Def. IV (öS c P) $= [(S_1$ v $S_2 \dots$ v $S_n)$ c P]

Def. IVa (S c öP) $= [S$ c $(P_1$ v $P_2 \dots$ v $P_n)]$

The supposition corresponding to this quantification or to the disjunct descent is called 'only confused supposition' *(suppositio confusa tantum)*.

It is not our intention to discuss all the details and to elaborate the rules concerning the descent formulated by the scholastics, for what we have said is sufficient for an understanding of the various kinds of supposition. However, we shall discuss at least a few points in a more general way.

It is obvious that a descent cannot be made from a term which is the name of an individual, be it a proper name or a common name determined by a demonstrative pronoun or equivalent to a proper name. Positively expressed, a descent can be made only from a common term, which functions as a common term and which is capable of being singularized. The latter condition excludes also the so-called adjectival verbs, like the verb 'runs.' In this grammatical form this verb cannot be singularized: however, the form 'running' functions as a truly common term and can, therefore, be singularized.[53]

When a descent is being made from one term, the range of all the other terms from which a descent could be made, must be kept constant. This means that the other terms must not have supposition for more individuals in the consequent than they have in the antecedent. Such an incorrect descent, in fact an invalid consequence, would be the following: Every animal that is not a man is irrational, therefore, Every animal that is not this man is irrational, and Every animal that is not that man . . . and so forth for every individual man. For it is obvious that in the antecedent, 'every man' is excepted from the range of the term 'animal' and in the consequent in each of the copulative propositions is only one individual.

For similar reasons we must be on our guard when we make a descent in conditional propositions and in general in compound propositions. The following descent would be invalid: If every animal is running, then every animal is moving; therefore, if this animal is running, then every animal is moving; and if this animal is running, then every animal is moving; and so forth, for every individual. In order to avoid such faulty descents the scholastics, not having at the disposition a theory of the range of quantifiers, require that first a complete descent be made from the subject of the antecedent, and after that from the term of the consequent. Hence, indicating the 'if-then' conjunction by seq. we can symbolize the descent in this form (A-animal, R-running, M-Moving) leaving out the quantification of the predicate,

$$[(\text{ü}A \text{ c } R) \text{ seq. } (\text{ü}A \text{ c } M)] \equiv [(A_1 \text{ c } R) \cdot (A_2 \text{ c } R) \ldots A_n \text{ c } R)] \text{ seq.}$$
$$(A_1 \text{ c } M) \cdot (A_2 \text{ c } M) \cdot [A_n \text{ c } M).$$

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[53] Secunda regula: Sub quolibet termino communiter tento, quantum est ex se potest fieri descensus, dummodo habeat plura supposita et dummodo singularizari . . . Dicitur notanter, dummodo possit singularizari propter verba adiectiva, quae non possunt singularizari, ut Sortes currit; ibi sub ly 'currit' non potest fieri descensus, cum ad ly currit non potest addi signum singulare. . . . Tartaretus, *op. cit.*, fol. XCIII va.

This leads us to another rule, according to which in categorical propositions a descent has to be made only from one common term at a time. Hence, if the descent is made from one extreme (subject or predicate), the other extreme must be kept constant. Each term, even when occurring more than once in the same proposition, needs its own quantification and descent.[54] However, there is no reason why after one descent is made, another descent should not be made. This applies not only to the terms within the proposition, but also to the various descents. The first case is of no particular interest and no special rules have been formulated, at least not concerning the subject or predicate in simple categorical propositions,[55] though there is a priority of the descent of terms in compound terms and compound propositions, about which something will be said later. Here we are only interested in the sequence of descents from the same term. The scholastics have formulated the rule that it is allowed to make an inference from the copulative descent to the disjunctive and from the disjunctive to the disjunct descent, but not vice versa. Hence, we have the following consequences:[56]

$$\text{(üS c P) seq. } [(S_1 \text{ c } P) \cdot (S_2 \text{ c } P) \ldots (S_n \text{ c } P)$$

$$\text{seq. } [(S_1 \text{ c } P) \text{ v } (S_2 \text{ c } P) \ldots \text{ v } (S_n \text{ c } P)$$

$$\text{seq. } [(S_1 \text{ v } S_2 \ldots \text{ v } S_n) \text{ c } P]$$

Finally we have to say a few words about the existential import, since the logical descent includes the *conclusio ad subalternatam*. The scholastics were quite aware of this problem and have offered various solutions. One of them is the *constantia singularium*. 'Constancy of the

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[54] This rule has been formulated by Dorp in his *Commentary* to the *Summulae* of Buridan, *op. cit.*, in Tract. IV, ad: Sed suppositio alicuius termini . . . He says: Secundo notandum est, quod quando sub uno extremo unius propositionis fit descensus, tunc aliud extremum non debet variari, sed debet manere in propositione, per quam fit descensus. Et maxime de suppositione termini absoluti. Verbi gratia, si fiat sub praedicato huius propositionis: Omnis homo est animal, subiectum non debet variari sed manere in propositione, per quam fit descensus, ut dicendo: Ergo omnis homo est hoc animal vel hoc animal et sic de singulis.

[55] When the subject or predicate in such propositions is a compound there are certain rules which will be discussed later. Cfr. in any case Antonius Coronel, II Pars *Rosarii* fol. XXVII ss.

[56] George of Brussels, *op. cit.*, fol. 88 va: Unde sub illo termino sub quo potest fieri descensus copulativus, potest etiam fieri descensus disiunctivus et disiunctus, sed non e contra. Causa est, quia ex propositione in qua ponitur terminus sub quo fit descensus copulativus sequitur una propositio copulativa composita ex terminis singularibus in supponendo illius termini sub quo fit descensus; ad quam copulativam sequitur disiunctiva ex eisdem terminis composita; et ad propositionem disiunctivam sequitur propositio categorica de disiuncto extremo vel de disiuncta parte extremi in qua ponuntur singularia disiunctim.

singulars' is the name of a proposition which has to be added to the antecedent in the descent. This proposition must fulfill the following conditions: It must be categorical and affirmative; the subject must be composed of the common term from which the descent is to be made and the demonstrative pronoun, both in the plural, the predicate must be the same common term and a collective sign, both in the plural, as, for instance: *Isti sunt omnes homines* (These are all men). If, however, there is only one object or *supposition*, all the terms have to be in the singular. As, for instance: *Iste est omnis sol* (This is all Sun!) Such a complete descent with the constancy of the singulars in the antecedent would be, for instance: Every man is an animal, and these men are all men, therefore, this man is an animal and that man is an animal and so forth, for every animal.[57] We can symbolize this as follows (M for man and A for animal):

$$[(\ddot{u}M \ c \ A) \cdot (M_1 \cdot M_2 \ldots M_n \ c \ \ddot{o}M)] \equiv [(M_1 \ c \ A) \cdot (M_2 \ c \ A) \ldots (M_n \ c \ A)]$$

Whether there is really much gained in this way, since we have to assume that the 'constancy of the singulars' must have existential import, it is not easy to say. However, it certainly allows the interpretation of a proposition in which the terms have 'natural supposition' as a proposition in which the terms have also accidental and supposition with existential import. It seems that the scholastics themselves felt that something was at least awkward about the constancy of the singulars, and, in fact, only few of them, as far as we know, insist on it.[58]

Other scholastics have introduced a conditional proposition in order to guarantee the descent or rather they add a conditional clause to the singularized term in the descent *(de extremo conditionato)*. Thus, for

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[57] Cfr. George of Brussels, *op. cit.*, 88 va. The demonstrative pronoun together with the copula guarantees the existential import of a proposition. George expressly excludes, however, such propositions: 'This man exists' *(de est secundo adiacente)* from a *sufficient* constancy of the singulars: Constantia proprie loquendo est propositio categorica de est secundo adiacente; sed talis non sufficit ad descensum. Sed constantia singularium sufficiens ad descensum est propositio de est tertio adiacente in qua subiicitur pronomen demonstrativum pluralis numeri cum termino sub qui fit descensus demonstrans omnia illa pro quo supponit terminus sub quo fit descensus. Et praedicatum est terminus sub quo fit descensus sumptus cum signo collectivo pluralis numeri, si ille terminus pluribus supponat . . .

[58] Except George of Brussels and Antonius Coronel, we know of no other. The latter writes, *op. cit.*, p. II, fol. XXV: . . . advertendum est quod de constantia vix constat quid dicendum sit. Antiqui sophistae dicebant constantiam esse propositionem affirmativam in qua subicitur pronomen demonstrativum pluralis numeri demonstrante adaequate illa pro quibus supponit terminus . . . Propter istud argumentum aliqui damnant modum antiquorum positum et dicunt ex antiquitate mortem incurrisse.

instance, an anonymous logician of the 14th century demands that in every descent from an affirmative proposition of the form '*si sit*,' (if it exists) is to be added to the singularization of the respective term, but only if the proposition is affirmative.[59] Perhaps we could symbolize by using our formula and expressing existence by Exi, as follows, as far as the universal affirmative proposition is concerned:

$$(\ddot{u}S\ c\ P) \equiv [S_1Exi\ seq.\ (S_1\ c\ P)] \cdot [S_2\ c\ P)] \ldots [S_nExi\ seq.\ (S_n\ c\ P)]$$

This is expressly required also for particular quantification.[59]

Tartaretus also introduces the conditional form into the term.

It is certain that Ockham and others do not require the constancy of the term from which a descent is being made. For them the copula as such has existential import in every affirmative proposition.

2. The subdivisions of Supposition

Every main type of supposition, viz., simple, material and personal supposition admits the same subdivisions. At least, they are admitted by the nominalist tradition since the fourteenth century. Since the realists admit them at least for the personal supposition, we shall explain them here, using examples proper to personal supposition. Both, realists and nominalists, define them with the help of *consequentiae* assigning a certain descent to them. There are certain differences in the opinion of the schools only as regards the *Suppositio confusa tantum*, to which we shall briefly call attention when dealing with it. In order to prove, however, the basic agreement between realists and nominalists, we shall explain the subdivisions following Ockham, but quote texts mainly from Burleigh.

Let us present first the divisions in form of a scheme:

Personal *suppositio*
    /   \
  discrete   common
         / \
      determinate confused
           / \
      only confused   confused and distributive
             /\
       mobile immobile

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[59] Nam sub terminis huiusmodi determinate supponentibus non contingit descendere solum disiunctive, eo quod tunc posset quandoque in bona consequentia antecedens esse verum consequente existente falso; sed contingit descendere simul disiunctive et conditionatim. Unde sequitur: Homo est animal; ergo ille homo, si sit, est animal, vel iste homo, si sit, est animal, et sic de singulis . . .

We shall now explain each member of this division following Ockham's *Summa logicae*, p. I, cap. 70, p. 189 ss.

Discrete supposition is given when a proper name or a demonstrative pronoun taken in significative function stands for one individual. This occurs only in a singular proposition as in these cases: Socrates is a man, This man is white.[60]

Common supposition is had when a common term has supposition.

Determinate supposition for a common term is had when the descent through a disjunctive proposition to the singulars is valid; thus the following descent is correct: A man is running, therefore, this man is running, or that man is running and so on for every individual man. This kind of supposition is called determinate, because the proposition in which the term having determinate supposition, denotes that it is true for some determinate singular proposition, and the truth of this without the truth of any other singular proposition of this descent is sufficient to verify the proposition from which the descent was made. For instance, for the truth of the proposition: A man is running, the truth of one singular proposition of the type: This man is running, is sufficient, and anyone is sufficient, even if all the others are false.[61]

Confused supposition *(suppositio confusa)* is every personal supposition of a common term which is not determinate.

Only confused supposition *(confusa tantum)* is given, when a common term having personal supposition does allow the descent to the singulars neither through a disiunctive nor through a copulative proposition without any change on the part of the other extreme of the proposition, but only through a proposition with a disjunct predicate, as, for instance, in the following proposition: Every man is an animal, therefore, every man is this or that or that animal a so forth for every individual animal. However, from any of the singulars, the original proposition

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[60] Suppositio discreta est, quando nomen proprium supponit vel pronomen demonstrativum demonstrans idem quod proprium nomen significat, ut: 'Sortes est homo,' 'Iste homo est homo.' W. Burleigh, *De puritate artis logicae*, Tractatus longior, Tr. I, p. I, cap. IV, ed. 1955; p. 19.

[61] Suppositio determinata, quando terminus communis supponit disiunctive pro suis suppositis, ita quod contingit descendere ad omnia sua supposita sub disiunctione, ut patet in ista: 'Aliquis homo currit;' sequitur enim: Aliquis homo currit, ergo Sortes currit vel Plato currit, et de aliis. Et dicitur suppositio determinata, non quia terminus sic supponens determinate supponit pro uno et non alio, sed dicitur suppositio determinata, quia ad veritatem propositionis, in qua terminus communis supponit determinate, requiritur quod verificetur pro aliquo supposito determinato, *loc. cit.*, p. 20.

can be inferred. As, for instance, it follows from: Every man is this animal, therefore, Every man is an animal.[62]

Confused distributive supposition is given when the descent to the singulars can be made through a copulative proposition, if there is more than one singular, and the original proposition cannot be formally inferred from any of the singular propositions. This kind of supposition is given for the subject in the following proposition: Every man is an animal, therefore, this man is an animal and that man is an animal and so forth for every individual.

Movable confused distributive supposition is given when the common term is mobilized for every object signified by the term according to the form of the proposition.

Immovable confused distributive supposition is given when the term is not mobilized for every object signified by the term, but certain objects are excepted, as, for instance, in the proposition: Every man except Socrates is white. The term man is mobilized for every man, but not for Socrates. However, in both cases the descent is copulative.[63]

We shall close our general characterization of the various subdivisions of supposition, since more details will be given in discussing the rules which assign a certain form to a certain term.

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[62] Suppositio confusa tantum est, quando terminus communis supponit pro pluribus, ita quod infertur ex quolibet illorum et ad nullum illorum contingit descendere nec copulative nec disiunctive. Isto modo supponit praedicatum in ista: 'Omnis homo est animal' . . . Istae igitur tres conditiones sunt de ratione suppositionis confusae tantum. Prima quod habens illam suppositionem supponat pro pluribus. Secunda, quod posset inferri ex quolibet pro quo supponit. Tertia est, quod sub termino sic supponente non contingit descendere nec copulative nec disiunctive. Burleigh, *loc. cit.*, p. 21. Though Burleigh does not mention the disjunct descent, it does not seem to be excluded either. The Scotist, Joannes de Monte, has the same qualification of this kind of supposition as Ockham: . . . sub termino supponente confuse tantum fit descensus disiunctim. Cfr. *Summulae Joannis de Monte super Petrum Hispanum*, Venice 1500. The Thomist Javellus has a much more complicated characterization of the *suppositio confusa tantum*, but at least admits our descent and the rest for accidental personal supposition. He calls this *suppositio, Confusa tantum mobilis* (disjunct descent) and that which has a conjunct or copulated descent *Confusa tantum immobilis*. Cfr. *op. cit.* 174 v ss.

[63] Burleigh distinguishes furthermore the absolute and relative supposition which we disregard here. As to the other two forms he says: Suppositio confusa et distributiva mobilis et absoluta est, quando sub termino habente talem suppositionem contingit descendere absolute ad quodlibet suppositum illius termini virtute distributionis . . . Suppositio vero confusa et distributiva immobilis est, quando terminus communis distribuitur pro suppositis, et non contingit descendere ad illa supposita respectu cuius fit distributio. Verbi gratia, in ista: 'Omnis homo praeter Sortem currit,' iste terminus 'homo' distribuitur respectu exceptionis, et non contingit descendere respectu eiusdem exceptionis . . . *loc. cit.*, p. 24 s.

3. The rules of supposition

We are now ready to enter into discussion of the analysis of the Latin propositions in regard to the supposition of the terms occurring in them. This analysis has been presented by the scholastics in form of rules. We shall present them by following the text of Albert of Saxony, but we shall explain and enlarge on them also with the help of other scholastics of the 14th and 15th centuries. The rules have the purpose to fix the kind of descent of terms in propositions — except, of course, singular terms which naturally do not admit any descent — and this determines the range of the terms in their context. Hence, these rules prepare the way for the consequences including the syllogistic consequences.

a. General rules of supposition

Rule 1. The subject of every singular proposition has discrete supposition.

Cuiuslibet propositionis singularis subiectum supponit discrete, sicut hic: Sortes currit, ille homo currit.[64]

George of Brussels enumerates six cases of a term having discrete supposition: (1) When a proper noun is taken in significative function. (2) When a common term is joined by a demonstrative pronoun in the same case and number, be it in personal or material or simple supposition. Instances: This man is white. This 'man' is a noun *(Hoc ly homo est nomen)*. This 'man' is a concept *(Hoc ly homo est conceptus)*. These men are running (3) When a common term is restricted either by a proper name or by an expression which is equivalent to a proper noun. For instance: The being that is Socrates is running *(Ens quod est Sortes currit)*. The being which is this man is running *(Ens quod est iste homo currit)*. We have given a translation in this case which reminds us of the iota operator, although we also could translate: A being that is Sortes... For in either case we have a singular name which is composed, or a description. (4) When a composed term contains only proper names or their equivalent, for instance: 'Socrates and Plato and Cicero are running.' 'This 'man' and that 'man' are spoken words.' (5) When a relative pronoun refers back to a discrete term. For instance: 'Socrates who is debating is running;' or: 'This 'man' which is a concept is a species.' (6) When a personal demonstrative pronoun *(pronomen demonstrativum primitivae speciei)* is being used but without a common term joined with it. For instance: 'I am running,' 'You are running,' 'He is running.'[65]

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[64] *Op. cit.*, Tr. II, c. VI, fol. 12 vb, text revised.
[65] *Op. cit.*, 89 vb.

Rule 2. The subject of an indefinite proposition has determinate supposition.

In propositione indefinita subiectum supponit determinate.[66]

This rule eliminates the ambiguity of the supposition of the subject in propositions where it is not determined by any quantifier. Hence, every proposition, be it affirmative or negative and which is not singular and in which the subject is not determined by any quantifier is a particular proposition, and consequently has to be treated exactly like particular propositions. Hence, in the proposition: Man is an animal, Man is mortal. The subjects have determinate supposition. This also applies as both Albert and George state, to propositions in which the subject has material or simple supposition.

Rule 3. The subject of every particular proposition has determinate supposition.

Cuiuslibet propositionis particularis subiectum supponit determinate.[67]

Hence, the subject in every particular or indefinite affirmative or negative proposition has determinate supposition, regardless of whether or not the subject has personal, material or simple supposition. Hence, we formulate (indicating material or simple supposition by quotation marks):

äS c P	ä'S' c P	äS c P	ä'S' c P
äS $\bar{c}$ P	ä'S' $\bar{c}$ P	äS $\bar{c}$ P	ä'S' $\bar{c}$ P

It is characterized by the disjunctive descent; cfr. Def. II.

Rule 4. Every common term immediately following an affirmative universal sign not preceded by a negation has confused distributive supposition.

Omnis terminus communis sequens signum universale affirmativum immediate sine praepositione negationis supponit confuse distributive.[68]

Again, this rule applies to terms in personal, material and simple supposition. 'Every man is an animal' would be an instance of personal supposition. George of Brussels gives the following examples of material and simple supposition: Every 'man' is a spoken noun *(Omne ly homo est nomen vocale)*, and: Every 'man' is a concept of the mind *(Omne ly homo est conceptus mentis).*[69] We can symbolize them as follows:

äS c P	ä'S' c P
äS $\bar{c}$ P	ä'S' $\bar{c}$ P

In all these cases the copulative descent is allowed. Cfr. Def. I.

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[66] Albertus de Saxonia, *loc. cit.*   [67] *Loc. cit.*
[68] *Loc. cit.*   [69] *Loc. cit.*, fol. 90rb.

Rule 5. Every negation makes a common term that follows it mediately or immediately, have confused distributive supposition. Therefore, the predicate of every negative proposition of any quantity, be it singular or particular, has confused distributive supposition, provided the predicate is not a singular term or another syncategorematic term impedes this supposition.

Negatio terminum communem, sequentem sive mediate sive immediate, confundit confuse distributive. Ergo cuiuslibet propositionis negativae, cuiuscumque fuerit quantitatis, sive singularis sive particularis, praedicatum supponit confuse distributive, nisi tunc praedicatum sit terminus singularis, vel aliquid aliud syncategorema impediat.[70]

Hence, we can symbolize the three cases concerning the predicate as follows:

S_1 c̄ üP
äS c̄ üP
üS c̄ üP

Before continuing on with an explanation of this rule, we shall introduce immediately Rule 11, which Albert puts at the end of this chapter; but in order not to change the numerical sequence of his rules, we shall number it as:

Rule 5 a. Whatever mobilizes the immobilized term, immobilizes the mobilized term, that is, every syncategorema having the force of making the term following it have confused and distributive supposition so that the term would not have this kind of supposition in the absence of that *syncategorema*, if, however, this *syncategorema* is added to the term which has mobilized supposition, then it makes it have immobilized supposition.

Quidquid mobilitat immobilitatum, immobilitat mobilitatum, id est quodlibet syncategorema habens vim confundendi terminum se sequentem confuse distributive, qui quidem terminus non sic supponeret absente tali syncategoremate, si tale syncategorema adveniens tali termino stanti iam mobiliter facit ipsum stare immobiliter.[71]

'Mobilization' means here that a term has confused and distributive supposition. 'Immobilization' means that a term has determinate supposition. The *syncategorema* which is added is the negation 'not'; the *syncategorema* to which the negation is added is either the sign of universality (and its equivalents) or the sign of particularity (and its equivalents). The equivalents can be given, for instance, in an indefinite

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[70] *Loc. cit.*   [71] *Op. cit.*, fol. 13rb.

affirmative proposition (subject and predicate being immobilized). We shall express instances in symbolization. We shall put first the immobilized form, then add successively the negations. The parenthesis indicates that the kind of quantification is not yet changed.

äS c äP, if the copula is denied we obtain: äS -c (äP) ≡ aS -c üP
äS c äP, if the whole Sentence is denied, we obtain:

$$— \ [(äS) \ c \ (äP) \ ≡ \ üS \ -c \ üP]$$

In affirmative universal proposition the predicate is neither mobilized nor immobilized unless it has the universal quantifier. For that reason we consider only the case of the subject and the universally quantified predicate.

üS cP; if the whole sentence is denied, we obtain:

$$— \ [(üS) \ c \ P] \ ≡ \ äS \ -c \ P$$

üS c üP; if we deny only the syncategorema, we obtain:

$$üS \ c \ —(üP) \ ≡ \ üS \ c \ äP$$

$$is \ (äS \ \bar{c} \ üP) \ ≡$$

† Philotheus Boehner, O. F. M.

THE THEORY OF ASSERTORIC CONSEQUENCES IN ALBERT OF SAXONY

INTRODUCTION

Albert of Saxony *(Albertus de Saxonia)* is also known as Albert of Ricmestorp, Albert of Helmstedt, *Albertutius*, *Albertucius*, and *Albertus Parvus*, the last three names obviously intended to distinguish him from St. Albert the Great. Albert of Saxony was born in Ricmestorp a town of Lower Saxony in the diocese of Halberstadt, or in Helmstedt in Lower Saxony also and near Halberstadt. The year of his birth is unknown, but c. 1316 is given as a probable date. It is likely that he began his higher studies at the University of Prague, but then he transferred to the University of Paris where he obtained his licentiate in 1351, and the same year he had his inaugural lecture as *Magister*. Albert continued his teaching career at Paris, held several offices in the *Natio Anglicana* and was the rector of the University in 1353. The last record concerning Albert's residence in Paris is found in the *Liber procuratorum Nationis Anglicanae* November 3, 1362. Afterwards, Albert took an active part in the foundation of the University of Vienna, of which he became the first rector in 1365. He and Marsilius of Inghen, the first rector of the University of Heidelberg (1386), were two great pupils of master John Buridan and the University of Paris; they both contributed to the spread of Parisian science and nominalism throughout central Europe. After a short time Albert left Vienna, and in 1366 he was appointed to the episcopal see of Halberstadt, which he occupied for twenty-four years until the end of his life in July 8, 1390, when he died *in bona senectute*. It is most probable that Albert was a secular and not a religious priest, although he has been claimed for their respective orders by Franciscans, Dominicans, and above all by Augustinian Hermits. Albert's doctrinal activities extended to logic, philosophy of nature, moral philosophy, and mathematics. In logic he was a follower of the ockhamistic movement, and in his commentaries on Aristotle's writings on philosophy of nature he follows and develops the new trends of mechanics and physics. Here we are interested only in his logical works, which we shall enumerate.[1]

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[1] The main sources of the life of Albert of Saxony are: E. Apgalter, *Scriptores antiquissimi ac celeberrimi Universitatis Viennensis ordine chrono-*

1) *Quaestiones super artem veterem*, Bologna, 1496. This work was publish-
ed together with Ockham's *Expositio aurea . . . super artem veterem*.
There are no known manuscripts.

2) *Quaestiones super libros posteriorum.*
   Editions:
   Venice, 1497; Milan, 1497.
   Manuscripts:
   Avranches, Munic., 227.
   Cracow, Jagiellon, 736, f. 1—50 (14—15 c).
   Padua, S. Antonio, 397, 116 pp. (15 c, incomplete).
   Stettin, Bibl. d. Marienstifts-Gymnasiums, 5, f. 230—239.

3) *Logica.*
   Edition:
   Perutilis logica, Venice, 1522.
   Manuscripts:
   Allegany (New York), Franciscan Institute, 9, f. 1 ra—32 vb (14 c,
   incomplete).
   Assisi, Comm., 291, f. 1—50 (15 c).
   Barcelona, Ripoll (Garcia), 84, f. 1—20 (1373).

logico propositi, Pars prima 1357—1464 (Vienna, 1740); J. Aschbach, *Ge-schichte der Wiener Universität*, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1865); H. Denifle and Ae. Cha-telain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. 3 (Paris, 1894); *Auc-tarium chartularii Universitatis Parisiensis*, Liber procuratorum Nationis Anglicanae, vol. 1 (Paris, 1894); C. Dolenz, *Scriptores Universitatis Viennen-sis ordine chronologico propositi ab anno 1365 ad annum 1541* (Vienna, 1741); C. E. Du Boulay, *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. 4 (Paris, 1668); D. A. Gandolfo, *Dissertatio historica de ducentis celeberrimis augustinianis scriptoribus* (Rome, 1704); J. F. Ossinger, *Bibliotheca augustiniana* (Ingol-stadt, 1768); J. Quétif and J. Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1719). We have based our brief outline of the life of Albert mainly in the following works: A. Dyroff, *Über Albertus von Sachsen* (Bei-träge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters; Baeumker-Festgabe; Supplementband; Münster i. W., 1913); G. Heidingsfelder, *Albert von Sachsen*, Sein Lebensgang und sein Kommentar zur Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, vol. 22, Münster i. W., 1927); M. Jullien, "Albert de Saxe, Un scholastique de la décadence," *Revue Augustinienne*, vol. 16 (January-June, 1910), 26—40. Cfr. also: Ph. Boehner and E. Gilson, *Christliche Philosophie*, Von ihren Anfängen bis Nikolaus von Cues (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1954), pp. 628—629; F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 3; Ockham to Suarez (The Bellarmine Series No. 14; London: Burns, Oates and Wash-bourne, Ltd., 1953), pp. 154—155; E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: The Random House, 1955), pp. 516—517; G. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, vol. 3, part 2: Science and Learning in the Fourteenth Century (Carnegie Institution of Washington, Publication 376; Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1948), pp. 1428—1432; F. Ueberweg and B. Geyer, *Grundriß der Philosophie*, vol. 2: Die Patristische und Scholastische Philosophie (Basel: Benno Schwabe und Co. Verlag, 1951), pp. 596, 600—602.

Bologna, Com. dell'Arch., A. 887, 99 ff. (14c).

Cremona, Govern., 8 (N. 4—12196), f. 1a—62a (1394).

Florence, Laurent. (S. Croce) Plut. XII sin., 6, 69 ff. (14c).

Erfurt, Amplon., Qu. 242, 87 ff. (14c).

Leipzig, Univ., 1367.

New York, Columbia (Plimpton), 143, 82 ff. (14c).

Oxford, Bodleian Lat., misc. e. 20, 104 ff. (15c).

Paris, BN, 6670, f. 1r—247r (1417).

Paris, BN, 14715, f. 1—59v (14c).

Paris, BN, 18430, f. 3ra—80va (14c).

Perugia, Com., 28, f. 84—125 (14c).

Prague, Univ., IV G. 4, 112 ff. (1356).

Prague, Univ., 736.

Stuttgart, Staatsbibl., Hs. X 3.

Turin, Naz., 923, 72 ff. (15c).

Vatican City, vat. lat., 1419.

Vatican City, vat. lat., 3046, 114 ff.

Vatican City, Barb., 266, 147 ff. (1378).

Vatican City, Chigi, E. VI 191, 77 ff.

4) *Sophismata.*

Editions:

Paris, 1489; 1490; 1495; c. 1496/1498. The last three editions contain also the *Tractatus obligationum* and the *Insolubilia.*

Manuscripts:

Barcelona, Ripoll (Garcia), 84.

Erfurt, Amplon., Qu. 313, f. 187 (14c).

Cracow, Jagiellon, 2330(15c).

Munich, Clm 14522 (14c).

Paris, BN, 6669, f. 1ra—89rb (14c).

Paris, BN, 16134, f. 1ra—54vb (14c).

Prague, Univ., 396, f. 105r—152r (14c).

Prague, Univ., 898.

Prague, Univ., 1008.

Vatican City, vat. lat., 3057, 80 ff.

5) *Tractatus obligationum.*

Editions:

Paris, 1490; 1495; c. 1496/1498.

Lyons, c. 1493; 1498.

The Paris editions contain also the *Sophismata* and the *Insolubilia.*

The *Tractatus obligationum* is found as an integral part in *Perutilis logica* and in the manuscript tradition of the latter.

6) *Insolubilia.*

Editions:

Paris, 1490; 1495; c. 1496/1498. The last three editions contain also the *Sophismata* and the *Tractatus obligationum.*

The work *Insolubilia* is found as an integral part of the *Perutilis logica* and in the manuscript tradition of the latter.

The principal source of our study will be the *Perutilis logica;* we shall use the Venice edition, but we have revised its text with the help of four manuscripts: Bologna, Com. dell'Arch., A 887; New York, Columbia (Plimpton), 143; Paris, BN, 14715; and Vatican City, vat. lat., 3046. The *Perutilis logica* is divided into six tracts. The first tract deals with the notions and divisions of signs and terms; terms of first and second intention, and of first and second imposition; the universal terms and the ten predicaments. The second tract studies supposition, its notion, and division into simple, material and personal supposition, and the rules of supposition. This same second tract deals with ampliation and appellation. The third tract analyzes propositions and their properties; but conversions and equivalences are left for the fourth tract, and hence, only the opposition of propositions is examined. The fourth tract is divided into two sections. The first section deals with consequences, but we shall give its contents more in detail at the end of this paragraph, because it is the most important part for our study. The second section considers the dialectical places, their notion and divisions. The fifth tract studies the fallacies and their two different types, viz., fallacies in the words as conventional signs *(fallacia in dictione)*, and fallacies outside the words *(fallacia extra dictione)*. The sixth and last tract has two sections. The first studies the insolubles, giving first some principles to solve them, and then applying these principles to several examples. The second section considers the notion, rules, and types of obligation.

The first part of the fourth tract of the *Perutilis logica* contains the following sections. 1) Notions. a) Notion of antecedent, consequent, and note of consequence. b) The notion of consequence, and the notion of matter and form of propositions. c) The division of consequences into formal and material, and the subdivision of material consequences into "simple" and "as of now" *(ut nunc)*. 2) Rules for non-syllogistic formal consequences. A) Rules for assertoric non-syllogistic consequences. a) General rules for assertoric non-syllogistic consequences with unanalyz-

ed propositions. b) Rules for assertoric non-syllogistic consequences
with analyzed propositions, viz., consequences from one quantified
proposition to another; as subalternations, equivalences, conversions,
consequences with amplified propositions, with propositions which have
terms in an oblique case, and with propositions equivalent to compound
statements. B) Rules for modal non-syllogistic formal consequences.
a) Rules for non-syllogistic consequences with modal propositions *in
sensu diviso*. b) Rules for non-syllogistic consequences with modal
propositions *in sensu composito*. 3. Rules for syllogistic consequences.
A) Rules for syllogistic consequences with assertoric premises. a) Notion
and division of syllogisms, syllogistic figures and the principles of the
syllogistic. b) Syllogistic rules, valid and invalid syllogistic moods with
positive common terms in the nominative case. The *syllogismus exposi-
torius*, syllogisms with propositions in which the divine terms of the
Blessed Trinity are used, and syllogisms with ampliative terms, oblique
terms, and infinite terms. B) Rules for syllogistic consequences with
modal premises. a) Rules for syllogistic consequences with both pre-
mises as modal. b) Rules for syllogistic consequences with only one
modal premise.

The first part of the fourth tract of the *Perutilis logica* bears a strik-
ing resemblance to Buridan's *Consequentiae*. In fact, the mentioned part
of Albert's work seems to be a transcription of the latter work, with of
course, some alterations and omissions. We are inclined to admit the
authenticity of Buridan's *Consequentiae*, but we were unable to prove
it, hence, we omit here any discussion on this point. Nevertheless, we
wish to concede that there is no known manuscript of this work, and
there are discrepancies of doctrine between Buridan's genuine work the
Perutile compendium totius logicae and the *Consequentiae*. The main
difference is the opposite stand that both works take in regard to the
doctrine of the consequences; since in the *Compendium logicae* Buridan
accepts the syllogistic as the central part of logic, and all the forms of
argumentation, such as the enthymeme, induction, argument by example,
are to be reduced to syllogisms; while in the *Consequentiae* the syllogistic
is only a part of the more embracing theory of consequences, and there
are many forms of formal consequences which cannot be reduced to the
syllogistic consequence. Only a thorough analysis of the entire literary
output of Buridan might decide the issue of the authenticity of the
Consequentiae, but this is beyond our task and power. Hence, whenever
we refer to the *Consequentiae* as a work of Buridan, we mean to qualify
its authorship in the light of the preceding remarks. It follows also, that

we cannot pass a final judgment on Albert's originality in his theory of consequences.[2]

Now we shall give an outline of Buridan's *Consequentiae*, which will show the identity of plan of this work and the first part of the fourth tract of the *Perutilis logica*. The work *Consequentiae* is divided into four books. The first book deals with non-syllogistic formal consequences with assertoric propositions. 1) The notion of truth and falsity, its application to different types of propositions, and the causes of truth of a proposition. 2) The notion of consequence, antecedent and consequent. 3) The division of consequence into material and formal, and material consequences are subdivided into material "simple" consequences and "as of now" material consequences. 4) The notion of matter and form of propositions. 5. Rules for non-syllogistic formal consequences. a) Non-syllogistic formal consequences with unanalyzed propositions. b) Non-syllogistic formal consequences with analyzed propositions, viz., consequences from one quantified proposition to another; as subalternations, equivalences, conversions, consequences with amplified terms, with infinite terms, or with terms in an oblique case. The second book studies non-syllogistic formal consequences with modal propositions. 1) The notion and different types of modalities, and the division of modal propositions into modals *in sensu composito* and modals *in sensu diviso*. 2) Rules for consequences with modal propositions *in sensu diviso*. 3) Rules for consequences with modal propositions *in sensu composito*. The third book examines syllogistic consequences with assertoric premises. 1) A list of non-syllogistic consequences is given; first, material consequences, as enthymemes, inductions, and examples; and second, formal non-syllogistic consequences, as the ones based on the definitions of the copulative, disjunctive, or conditional proposition. 2) The notions of syllogism, and syllogistic figure, and the principles of the syllogistic. 3) Rules for syllogisms. Valid and invalid syllogistic moods with positive common terms in the nominative case, syllogisms with singular terms, with the divine terms, with ampliative terms, with infinite terms, or with terms in an oblique case. The fourth book treats syllogistic consequences with modal propositions. 1) Syllogisms in which the premises are affected by some modality *in sensu composito* 2) Syllogisms in which both premises are modal *in sensu diviso*, and syllogisms in which one premise is modal and the other is not modal.

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[2] Cfr. J. Buridan, *Perutile compendium totius logicae* (Venice, 1499), t. 6, f. N4v—N5r; *Consequentiae* (Paris, c. 1493), this work in its entirety proves our point, but cfr. especially: 1. 3., f. C2v—C3v.

In this work we propose to treat Albert's theory of assertoric consequences, that is, consequences with assertoric propositions and not with modal statements; modal logic is not to be covered in our discussions, except for some notions and for reasons which will become apparent in the course of our study. We divide this work into five chapters. The first two treat the logic of propositions; the first chapter analyzes the material and formal elements of language; the second chapter studies propositional formal consequences, that is, formal consequences in which only propositional variables are used. The other three chapters embrace the logic of terms; the third chapter deals with quantification; the fourth, with quantified formal consequences, or consequences in which the variables employed are term-variables; the fifth chapter studies syllogistic consequences, and it closes with some notes on the theory of consequences as the unifying doctrine of the logical system of some medieval logicians. We shall utilize some of the symbolism of modern logic to clarify our exposition, and we shall make a comparison of Albert's doctrines and the modern parallel theories.

CHAPTER I

MATERIAL AND FORMAL ELEMENTS OF PROPOSITIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to deal with propositions, their parts, their matter and form and their formal classification; that is, we shall study the material and formal elements of propositions as described by Albert of Saxony. The aim of logic it set forth by Albert as the study of signs which are terms; that is, the study of linguistic signs which are terms properly so called, propositions, and arguments or consequences. The arguments are composed of propositions, and propositions in turn are made up of terms. Consequences can be treated in general or in particular. Consequences, when treated in general, constitute the general theory of consequences.[1]

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[1] "Cum logica solum sit de signis qui sunt termini, aut igitur est de signis qui sunt termini incomplexi, aut est de signis qui sunt termini complexi. Si autem de signis incomplexis, aut de signis incomplexis qui sunt termini secundae impositionis, aut de signis incomplexis qui sunt termini primae intentionis. . . . Si autem de signis complexis, hoc dupliciter: aut de signis complexis quae sunt propositiones, aut de signis complexis quae sunt argumentationes; . . . [hoc] quadrupliciter: quia aut de argumentatione simpliciter, aut de argumentatione demonstrativa, vel sophistica, vel dialectica." *Quaestiones super artem veterem* (Bologna, 1496), *Super librum praedicabilium*, prooemium, q. 1, f. 1 v.

Familiar notions among the grammarians and logicians of the Middle Ages, as well as of modern times, are those of the classification of sentences into declarative (also called indicative), imperative, exclamatory (also referred to as optative), and interrogative. Only indicative sentences are recognized as propositions, and the object of logical discussions. In his *Perutilis logica*, Albert does not mention these distinctions explicitly but he alludes to them, for instance, when he says that the logician admits only two fundamental parts of the statement: the noun and the verb; the noun of nominative case, the verb of the indicative mode. Moreover, as a matter of fact, he deals in his logic solely with declarative sentences.[2]

The constituents of the proposition, Albert continues, are divided by the logician into two groups: the principal parts and the accessory parts. The principal parts are the subject, the predicate, and the copula. The accessory parts are terms that are added to the subject, the predicate, or the copula.[3]

To illustrate the division of the grammarians and to compare it with that of the logicians, let us take as an instance, Priscian, who exercised a very great influence in medieval times. In his *De arte grammatica* Priscian says that according to the dialecticians the parts of the statement are the noun and the verb, since they alone are sufficient for a complete statement; other elements of the statement are called syncategoremata or consignificative parts. Priscian recalls that other authors divide the parts of speach into five, nine, ten, or eleven kinds. So many differences, remarks this grammarian, indicate that we cannot find out the different parts of the statement, unless we consider the characteristic properties of signification of each part. Examining the different modes of signification, Priscian distinguishes and studies in separate books eight parts of the statement: the noun, verb, participle, pronoun, prep-

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[2] "Orationum perfectarum alia indicativa ut: 'homo currit,' alia imperativa ut: 'fac ignem,' alia optativa ut: 'utinam essem bonus clericus,' alia subiunctiva ut: 'si veneris ad me, dabo tibi equum.' Harum autem omnium orationum sola indicativa oratio est propositio." Peter of Spain, *Summulae logicales*, ed. I. M. Bocheński (Turin: Domus Editorialis Marietti, 1947), t. I, p. 3. Peter opposes *perfecta oratio* as: 'homo *currit,*' to *imperfecta oratio* as: *'homo albus.'* Cfr. William Ockham, *Expositio aurea . . . super artem veterem* (Bologna, 1496), *Super primum librum de interpretatione*, c.. 3, f. 98r; *Ibid.*, c. 4, f. 98r. Albert of Saxony, *Perutilis logica* (Venice, 1522), t. I, c. 5, f. 3r. [Hereafter this last work will be referred to as *Log.*]

[3] "Et considerat [logicus] quod aliquae sunt principales partes orationis, et aliquae sunt accessoriae vel secundariae. Partes principales orationis sunt subiectum et praedicatum et copula; partes accessoriae et secundariae sunt aliquae dictiones seu termini qui apponuntur subiecto vel praedicato seu copulae." *Log.*, t. I, c. 5, f. 3r.

osition, adverb, and conjunction. The interjection is considered with the adverb and as an adverb.[4]

So, as Albert points out, the division of the parts of the statement is different in logic and in grammar. Furthermore, for the logician the the function of principal parts of the statement is accomplished by two types of terms: the noun and the verb. The copula 'is' is always a verb and the root of all verbs, since it is included in all other verbs; and any other verb in distinction to the copula includes the copula and the predicate or a part of the predicate. As for instance: 'Socrates runs' is equipollent to 'Socrates is running.' The noun, in addition to the verb, is the other part of the statement. Subject and predicate terms are considered as nouns, since they can be interchanged in a proposition by conversion. For instance: 'Socrates is white,' is equivalent to: 'Some white thing is Socrates.' The ultimate reason for the different versions of the parts of the statement offered by the logician and the grammarian, is that the latter makes his division solely on the basis of different modes of signification; while the former accomplishes the same thing considering signification and supposition, because the logician is interested in propositions as to their truth or falsity, which are relations of supposition.[5]

We may wonder here if the primary parts are to be understood as the most important elements of the statement, and the accessory parts as the less important. It seems that in general it cannot be done, since according to Albert, the accessory parts play a very important role; as a matter of fact, the most important in determining the truth or falsity of some propositions. It can be said, therefore, that what our author means by principal parts is that such elements are the ones which have to be present to have a proposition, and that we can form a true or false

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[4] Cfr. Priscian of Caesarea the Grammarian, *De arte grammatica*, in *Opera*, ed. Augustus Krehl (2 vols; Leipzig: Libreria Weidmannia, 1819—1820), vol. 1, p. 68—70; *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 12—18.

[5] "Ad istam intentionem ponunt logici solum duas partes orationis, scilicet: nomen et verbum, quia ad orationem veram vel falsam non sunt necessariae nisi duae partes orationis, scilicet nomen et verbum; quia solum ex istis potest constitui oratio vel enunciatio vera vel falsa, dicendo: 'Socrates currit.' . . . Deinde advertendum quod logicus non curat distinguere pronomen contra nomen, quia ipse non distinguit partes orationis per modos significandi sicut facit grammaticus, sed tali modo quia ipse considerat orationem inquantum vera vel falsa. . . . Partes principales orationis sunt subiectum et praedicatum et copula . . . modo copula semper est verbum, et aliquando in verbo implicatur simul copula et praedicatum, sicut dicendo: 'Socrates currit.' Postea ponitur alia pars, scilicet nomen; et quia per conversionem potest fieri de subiecto praedicatum, et e converso, igitur logicus reputat consimiles partes orationis subiectum et praedicatum. Et sic patet quare logicus non reputat principales partes orationis nisi nomen verbum." *Log.*, t. 1, c. 5, f. 3r.

proposition without using any of the accessory terms. Following Albert, we shall discuss in the next paragraphs his notions about the parts of the proposition and their different classifications.

TERMS AS LANGUAGE-SIGNS
NATURAL AND CONVENTIONAL SIGNS

A sign in the broad sense is any thing which when apprehended makes something else come into the cognition of someone. In other words, a sign in this broad sense is anything which if understood, reminds us of something else already known. In this sense anything can be a sign; for instance, the hoop of the barrel before the tavern is the sign of wine. A sign in the strict sense is a language-sign; that is, something that besides being a sign in the broad sense, can stand for something in a proposition, or be added to other signs in a proposition, or is a composition of many of these signs. These language-signs are called terms and propositions; and in this strict sense things like hoop or smoke are not signs, because they are not fitted *(non sunt aptae natae)* to enter into a proposition or to supposit in a proposition.[6]

Terms are either natural signs, or conventional signs, and the last are also called arbitrary signs. A term which is a natural sign is referred to as a mental term, concept, or intention of the soul; and it is fitted to stand in a mental proposition for that which it signifies. A term which is an arbitrary sign, devised at the will of the authors *(institutum ad placitum instituentium)*, signifies its significate or significates by convention or voluntary imposition. Conventional signs are oral or written terms, and they are subordinated in their signification to the natural signs, not because the conventional terms signify the concepts, but because the arbitrary signs signify by imposition the same thing that the natural signs signify by nature.

This distinction of natural and conventional signs indicates that we have to take for granted the existence of the psychic facts of understanding, of concepts and propositions. These realities are natural human reactions to the world; they are called natural signs because we are not their authors in the willful and arbitrary manner by which we devise the oral

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[6] "Hoc nomen signum capitur dupliciter. Uno modo prout se extendit ad omne illud quod apprehensum facit aliquid venire in cognitionem alicuius, et isto modo dicimus circulum pendentem ante tabernam esse signum vini. ... Secundo modo accipitur hoc nomen signum pro illo quod apprehensum facit venire aliquid in cognitionem alicuius, et cum hoc aptum natum est pro illo supponere in propositione, vel aptum natum est illi addi in propositione, vel pro illo quod est compositum ex talibus." *Log.*, t. 1, c. 1, f. 2r.

or written terms. Under certain circumstances humans have similar psychic reactions; the hearing of a sound, the perception of a color, the understanding of the notion of a triangle, the formation of such mental propositions as: 'This is white,' 'I am hearing a sound,' and so on. And it does not matter whether the persons are Greek or Latin, French or German, the psychic reactions are similar; but the oral or written signs are different. Thus, the signification or meaning of the natural signs does not depend on our will, but the opposite is true in regard to the oral or written signs, be they terms or propositions.

Some of the natural signs signify their significate or significates without reference to time and are called nouns; some have such a temporal import, and they are called verbs. Some of the arbitrary signs are nouns and some are verbs, and they are that by convention, because it was at the will of the one who devised an oral or written sign to subordinate it to mental terms which are nouns, or to mental terms which are verbs. Furthermore, the grammatical construction of the conventional signs or of a statement is correct or congruent, or incorrect and incongruent, according to whether or not it is subordinated to a congruent or incongruent mental construction. Thus, we see that a conventional term is subordinated to a natural term, and a conventional proposition to a mental proposition. This subordination has to be understood in the sense already explained.[7]

SUPPOSITION

Supposition is the acceptance or use of a term in a proposition to stand for one or several things. There are three types of supposition:

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[7] "Unde sciendum est quod quidam est terminus qui est signum naturale illius cuius est signum, alius est terminus qui est signum alicuius ad placitum instituentium. Terminus qui est signum naturale vocatur terminus mentalis, seu terminus qui est in anima, qui est aptus natus ingredi propositionem mentalem sicut similitudo naturalis ipsius hominis quae est in anima, vel ipsius lapidis. Et tales termini sunt consimiles apud omnes, unde similitudo quae est naturaliter repraesentativa ipsius hominis vel ipsius lapidis in mente unius graeci, est consimilis similitudini naturali ipsius hominis vel ipsius lapidis quae est in mente unius latini: ex quo sequitur quod talis terminus non est aequivocus. Terminus autem qui est signum ad placitum institutum est talis terminus qui hoc significat ex impositione voluntaria, quod aliquis terminus qui est mentalis seu qui est signum naturale significat naturaliter, sicut est terminus vocalis vel scriptus; ut hic terminus vocalis 'homo,' vel hic terminus scriptus 'homo.' Et hic terminus qui significat hoc ad placitum quod unus alter terminus mentalis significat naturaliter, dicitur illi termino mentali esse subordinatus in significando; non quia significet illum terminum mentalem, sed quia significat hoc ex impositione, quod iste terminus mentalis significat naturaliter." Nec illi termini qui sunt ad placitum instituti sunt idem apud omnes." *Log.*, t. I, c. I, f. 2r.

personal, material, and simple. Personal supposition is the use of a mental, oral, or written term in a mental, oral, or written proposition, to stand for the thing or things which it signifies naturally and properly, or by convention. For instance, in the proposition: 'Man is an animal,' the term 'man' is taken significatively, that is, it is used to stand in a proposition for its natural and proper, or conventional significates. In the proposition: 'Quality is a predicament,' the term 'quality' is taken significatively to stand for itself, for which purpose the term was devised.

Material supposition is the use of a mental, oral, or written term, in a mental, oral, or written proposition, to stand for itself or for something similar to itself; and the term employed is neither a natural and proper sign of the signified thing, nor a conventional sign of the signified thing. For instance, in the proposition: "'Man' is a term," the term 'man' has material supposition. Personal and material supposition are the types of supposition that particularly pertain to logic. In modern times they are called formal and material supposition, or the use of a term and the mention of a term. When a term is mentioned or taken in material supposition, the customary procedure is to include it in quotation marks or single quotation marks. Medieval authors frequently use the term 'ly' before a term taken in material supposition.

The third type of supposition is called simple supposition and it is proper only to oral or written terms. It consists in the use of an oral or written term in a proposition to stand for a concept, which it was not instituted to designate. In the proposition: "'Man' is a species," the term 'man' has simple supposition. Simple supposition can be dispensed with in favor of material supposition. This seems to be also the opinion of some medieval logicians who acknowledge only two types of supposition: personal and material. Buridan, Paul of Venice, and Paul of Pergula maintained this doctrine. By this reduction, material supposition would be the use of a mental term in a mental proposition to stand for itself, when it does not signify itself naturally and properly; or the use of an oral or written term in a proposition to stand for itself or for a concept of the mind, and such a term was not instituted to signify itself or the concept of the mind. The notion of simple supposition was mainly due to the medieval discussions between realists *(reales)* and nominalists *(nominales)*, about the reality of the universals outside the mind. In the proposition: "'Man' is a species," the term 'man' signifies or supposits for the universal nature according to the realists; for the nominalists or conceptualists the term 'man' stands for the universal concept. But the problem of the reality of the universals outside the mind, important

as it is, does not pertain to logic, which leaves it to be solved in some other discipline. We shall come back to this point later when speaking about universals and individuals.[8]

IMPROPER, PROPER, AND STRICT TERMS

The name 'term,' as applied to natural or conventional language-signs, is taken in three distinct senses: in a broad or improper, in a proper and in a strict sense. In a broad or improper sense, 'term' means any linguistic sign that can be an extreme of a proposition, and it does not matter whether it is a complex or incomplex term. By extremes of the proposition are meant the subject and the predicate. Complex terms are those such as: 'white man,' 'humble man,' 'Socrates is running;' incomplex terms are such as: 'white,' 'man,' 'Socrates,' and so on. In this broad sense, a proposition can be called a term. For instance, if we say: "'Every man is an animal,' is a true proposition;" the proposition 'Every man is an animal,' is the subject, 'is' is the copula, and 'true proposition' is the predicate. Thus a proposition is a complex term of which the terms 'true' or 'false' can be predicated; and it is different from such complex terms as: 'white man,' 'at home,' which are neither true nor false.

In a second and proper sense, 'term' is called any language-sign which is not a proposition, and which can be a subject or predicate in a proposition when taken in material or personal supposition. In this sense, the syncategoremata as well as the categoremata are called terms. For instance: "'Every' is a sign of universality." In this proposition the syncategorema 'every' has material supposition and is the subject of the proposition. In the proposition: 'Some man is white,' the categoremata 'man' and 'white' are incomplex terms and the extremes of the proposition.

In a third or strict sense, 'term' means any language-sign that, when taken significatively or in personal supposition, can be a subject or predicate of a proposition. In this strict sense, only the categoremata are called terms; and no syncategorema, and no proposition is a term in this strict sense. Briefly, the language-sign 'term' is taken in a broad, in a proper, and in a strict sense. In the broad sense, it applies to categorematic and syncategorematic terms and to propositions. In the

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[8] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 2, c. 1—4, f. 11rv; John Buridan, *Perutile compendium totius logicae* (Venice, 1499), t. 4, f. Blr; Paul of Venice, *Logica* (Venice, 1506), t. 2, c. 1, f. 7r; Paul of Pergula *Logica* (Venice, 1501), t. 2, f. Clv; I. M. Bocheński, *Précis de logique mathématique* (Collection Synthèse; Bussum: G. G. Kroonder, 1949), p. 12; W. V. O. Quine, *Mathematical Logic* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 23—26.

second or proper sense, 'term' does not apply to propositions, but only to syncategorematic and categorematic terms. In the third or strict sense, 'term' applies only to categorematic terms. Further discussion of these categoremata and syncategoremata is the object of the next section.[9]

CATEGOREMATA AND SYNCATEGOREMATA

Terms in the proper sense, natural or conventional, are divided into two classes: categorematic terms and syncategorematic terms. Categorematic terms or categoremata are those terms which, when taken significatively or in personal supposition, can be subject or predicate, or part of the subject or a part of a distributed predicate in a categoric proposition; for example, these terms: 'man,' 'animal,' 'stone.' A categoric proposition is a complex term which has for its principal parts the subject, the predicate, and the copula.

A categorematic term is such in a broad or in a strict sense. A strictly categorematic term has signification in the strict sense, that is, the term has an independent meaning, or is a sign of an independent significate. Such a term is a proper sign; it is meaningful and significative; as for example: 'Peter,' 'man,' 'animal.' These terms, when taken in their significative function, can stand alone in a proposition as subjects or predicates. They, too, are called 'nouns' in a strict sense; for instance, in the proposition: 'Peter is white,' the term 'Peter' and the term 'white' can stand alone as subject and predicate of the proposition.

In a broad sense, categorematic terms are called those terms which, when taken significatively, cannot stand alone as subjects or predicates of a proposition; but can be parts of the subject or parts of the predicate. For instance, the term 'to Socrates,' cannot be the subject of the verb 'reads,' we cannot form the proposition: 'To Socrates reads.'[10]

The syncategorematic terms or syncategoremata include the copula and the accessory parts of the proposition. They can be described as terms that, if taken significatively or in personal supposition, cannot stand as subjects or predicates or parts of the subject or parts of a distributed predicate in a categoric proposition. The syncategoremata,

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[9] Cfr. *Log.*, t. I, c. 4, f. 3r.

[10] "Terminus categorematicus dicitur qui significative acceptus potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum, vel pars subiecti vel pars praedicati distributi propositionis categoricae." *Log.*, t. I, c. 3, f. 2 v. "Logicus accipit nomen stricte pro illo solo quod potest esse pars principalis orationis, vel quod potest subiici respectu cuiuscumque verbi . . . Notandum tamen est quod nomina obliqua sunt nomina non accipiendo nomen ita stricte, sed largius pro illo quod potest esse pars subiecti vel pars praedicati." *Ibid.*, c. 5, f. 3 v.

if taken in material supposition, can be subjects or predicates of a proposition. For instance: "'Or' is a disjunctive conjunction," "'Not' is an adverb," "'And' is a copulative conjunction." In these examples, the syncategorematic terms 'or,' 'not,' 'and,' are taken in material supposition and as subjects of the propositions. The *syncategoremata* have no independent meaning or signification, they do not signify an independent thing, they have no independent significate. They are not strict signs, we might say that they are co-signs, they con-signify or co-mean, they are co-meaningful or consignificative; in one word, they are *syncategoremata*, the terms that accompany the categorematic terms. Thus, when we refer to the meaning or signification of the *syncategoremata*, we understand it in the sense just explained.

The significative function of the syncategorematic terms is manifold; sometimes these terms signify the affirmative or negative composition of the categorematic terms, for example: the copula 'is,' or the denial 'not;' or the mode of personal supposition, e. g., the signs of universality, as 'every,' 'none,' or the signs of particularity as 'some.' The propositional connections are *syncategoremata* also, they link simple or categoric propositions to form compound or hypothetical propositions; for instance: the copulative conjunction 'and,' and the disjunctive conjunction 'or,' and the conditional conjunction 'if . . . then,' and the signs of exceptive and exclusive propositions, as 'exclusively,' 'except.' The modal terms are *syncategoremata* as well; for example: 'possible,' 'impossible,' 'necessary,' 'contingent.' The enumeration, of course, is not exhaustive,[11]

FIRST AND SECOND INTENTIONS

Terms of first intention or simply first intentions are mental terms which signify things that are not language-signs, or if the significates

[11] "Terminus autem syncategorematicus dicitur qui significative acceptus non potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum, nec pars subiecti nec pars praedicati distributi propositionis categoricae. . . . Et notantur dico significative acceptus, quia isti termini . . . si accipiantur materialiter, bene possunt esse subiecta vel praedicata propositionum, sicut dicendo: "'omnis' est signum universale," "'vel' est coniunctio," "'non' est adverbium," "'et' est coniunctio copulativa." . . . Prout autem categorematicum est idem quod significativum, et syncategorematicum est idem quod consignificativum, dico quod omnis terminus dicitur categorematicus, quod significat aliquam rem per se conceptam; sicut hic terminus 'homo,' vel hic terminus 'animal.' Terminus vero syncategorematicus est qui nullam rem per se conceptam significat, sed significat vel affirmationem vel compositionem terminorum significantium res, vel eorum divisionem ab invicem per operationem intellectus, vel modus supponendi terminorum pro suis suppositis, vel aliquod huiusmodi effectum exercet circa dictiones categorematicas." *Log.*, t. 1, c. 3, f. 2v—3r. Cfr. *Ibid.*, t. 4, c. 1, f. 24r.

are language-signs, they are not signified in their aspect of language-signs, but as psychic states (mental terms), or as physical realities (oral or written terms). The mental term 'man' taken significatively, signifies, for instance, Socrates and Plato who are not language-signs. The mental term 'vocal sound' has among its significates 'oral terms', which are in fact language-signs; but the mental term 'vocal sound' signifies them, not as signs, but as physical objects. Terms of second intention or simply second intentions are mental terms which are natural signs of things which are language-signs and in their aspect of signs, so that if they would not be signs the second intentions would not signify them. To this class belong mental terms such as 'term,' 'proposition,' 'universal,' 'genus,' 'species,' 'difference,' 'property,' noun,' 'verb,' 'grammatical case,' and so on.

Terms of first imposition are oral or written terms which are arbitrary signs of things which are not signs, or if they are signs, they are not considered in their aspect of signs; as for instance: 'Socrates,' 'man,' 'white,' 'substance,' 'quality.' Terms of second imposition are oral or written terms which are arbitrary signs of language-signs in their aspect of signs; as, 'genus,' 'species,' 'noun,' 'verb,' and so on. The preceding four divisions can without difficulty be reduced to two: terms of first and second intention, described as mental, oral, or written terms plus the respective characteristics of each class just mentioned above.[12]

UNIVERSALS, INDIVIDUALS, AND THE CATEGORIES

Ockham always denied any kind of extramental universal nature. Outside the mind there are only individuals. Universals are concepts, common or confused cognitions of individuals. Regarding the psychological reality of the universals, Ockham admitted two theories. In his early works he held the *fictum theory*, the universals are some product of the mind in contact with reality; they are diverse from the act of cognition, but they have no psychological reality; they are not real accidents of the mind, neither are they substances. In his last non-polemical works, the *Venerabilis Inceptor* rejected this obscure theory and embraced the *quality theory*, according to which the universals are concepts and real qualities of the mind; their psychological reality is identified with that of the cognitive act.

The aristotelian categories are not classifications of things, but of terms that signify things which are not signs. Ockham engages in lengthy

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[12] Cfr. *Log.*, t. I, c. 9, f. 4 v.

discussions about the correspondence of the categories and reality, and holds that outside the mind only substantive and qualitative terms have significates really distinct; that is, outside the mind there are only two types of real being: individual substances and qualities that modify such substances. The rest of the categories signify the same individual in different ways.[13]

The *Venerabilis Inceptor* is fully aware that such questions as the relation of the categories to reality and the problem of the universals and reality, important as they may be, are extraneous to logic. He himself asserts that such problems belong to metaphysics, but he is forced to treat them because ignorance of their true solution has led many *moderni* to manifold errors in logic.[14]

Albert of Saxony follows Ockham closely on these problems. Universals are not things outside the mind, they are not substances or common natures; universals are common terms, mental, oral, or written, which signify or are predicated, or supposit for several individuals in common. The individuals treated of in logic are not substances outside the mind, but singular terms which signify them. The categories are not classification of extramental objects, but some arrangements of categorematic terms of first intention. There are ten categories or most general groups: substance or substantive terms, which are divided into two groups: singular terms which signify individual objects distinctly, and common terms which signify individual objects indistinctly; quantity or quantitative terms; relation or relative terms; quality or qualitative

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[13] For Ockham's doctrine on the universals, cfr. Ph. Boehner, "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham," *Traditio*, vol. 4 (1946), 313—317; *The History of the Franciscan School*, Part 4: William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Ph. Boehner, 1946) pp. 17—19; "The Relative Date of Ockham's Commentary on the Sentences," *Franciscan Studies*, vol. 11 (September-December, 1951), 307—313; P. Vignaux, "Nominalisme," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, vol. 11, part 1 (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1931), col. 713—754. For Ockham's doctrine on the universals and the categories, cfr. E. Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham* (New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1935), pp. 66—175.

[14] "Sed in proposito accipitur passio animae pro aliquo praedicabili de aliquo, quod non est vox nec scriptura, et vocatur ab aliquibus intentio animae et ab aliquibus vocatur conceptus. Qualis autem sit ista passio, an scilicet sit aliqua res extra animam, vel aliquid realiter existens in anima, vel aliquod ens fictum existens tantum in anima obiective, non pertinet ad logicum sed ad metaphysicum." *Expositio aurea, Super primum librum de interpretatione*, prooemium, f. 87r. "Quamvis praedicatae quaestiones (the three questions raised by Porphyry in the beginning of the *Isagoge*), et consimiles non ad logicum sed ad metaphysicum sint pertinentes, quia tamen ex earum ignorantia multi moderni in multiplices errores in logica sunt elapsi, ideo de ipsis breviter quid sit secundum sententiam Aristotelis et secundum veritatem dicendum, est docendum." *Ibid., Super librum praedicabilium*, prooemium, f. 8v.

terms; and so on. Distinct real things correspond solely to substantive terms and qualitative terms; all the other categories are different concepts of the same reality. Albert, as Ockham, warns explicitly time and again, that the problem of the universals, and the problem of the relation of the categories to reality are extraneous to logic; but Albert is not prolix where it concerns these problems for he expressed himself in a very concise and succinct manner. He believes that these questions belong to metaphysics.[15]

THE MATTER AND FORM OF PROPOSITIONS AND THEIR FORMAL DIVISION

After discussing the different classifications of terms, we are able to determine what constitutes the matter and form of propositions. The material elements of propositions are the purely categorematic terms, that is, the subjects and predicates, leaving aside the syncategoremata by which the former are joined or disjoined, distributed or modified in various ways. The form of propositions is constituted by the syncategoremata and the order of arrangement of both categorematic and syncategorematic terms. These propositions have different form because of the quantification signs: 'Every man is an animal,' and 'Some man is an animal.' The form of these propositions is different due to the arrangement of the terms: 'Every man is an animal,' and 'An animal is every man;' the first proposition is true, the second is false.[16]

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[15] Cfr. *Log.*, t. I, c. 10—25, f. 4v—10v. "Non est igitur ponendum quod termini de praedicamento quando, nec de praedicamento ubi, nec etiam de praedicamento situs, nec de praedicamento actionis, nec de praedicamento passionis, nec de praedicamento ad aliquid, nec de praedicamento quantitatis, significent res distinctas a substantia et qualitate. De hoc tamen considerare non pertinet ad logicum, sed pertinet ad scientiam altiorem. Nec valet consequentia: termini de praedicamentis enumeratis non significant res distinctas a substantia et qualitate, igitur praedicti termini sunt de praedicamento substantiae vel qualitatis. Unde quamvis omnes significent substantiam vel qualitatem, non tamen eodem modo." *Log.*, t. I, c. 25, f. 10v.

[16] "Per materiam propositionis aut consequentiae intelliguntur termini pure categorematici sicut sunt subiecta et praedicata, circumscriptis syncategorematibus sibi appositis per quae ipsa coniunguntur, aut distinguuntur, aut ad certum modum suppositionis trahuntur. Sed ad formam dicitur pertinere totum residuum. Unde copulae tam categoricarum quam hypoteticarum dicuntur pertinere ad formam propositionis, similiter negationes et signa, et ordo praedictorum ad invicem, et modi significandi pertinentes ad quantitatem propositionis sicut est discretio, communitas et similia. Verbi gratia de praedictis: propter diversas copulas modalium et de inesse propositiones modales dicuntur esse alterius formae a propositionibus de inesse; propter negationes aut etiam signa propositiones affirmativae dicuntur esse alterius formae a propositionibus negativis; et similiter propositiones universales dicuntur esse alterius formae propositionibus particularibus; et propter discretionem et communitatem terminorum propositiones singulares

From the discussion of categorematic and syncategorematic terms of matter and form of propositions, we think that should a comparison be made of these notions with the modern logical doctrine of variables and logical constants or operators, the Scholastic counterpart of the variables are the categoremata or matter of the propositions, while the syncategoremata correspond to the logical constants.

Propositions are divided acoording to their form into two main groups: categorical propositions and hypothetical or compound propositions. The categoric propositions are subdivided into assertoric and modal. The compound propositions are subdivided into expressly hypothetical propositions, propositions equipollent to hypotheticals, and modal compound propositions. Any proposition, no matter to which group it belongs, is either affirmative or negative; affirmative when the formal constituent is posited, negative when it is denied.[17]

Categoric propositions are those which are not composed of several propositions, but which have as principal parts a subject, a predicate, and the copula; for instance: 'A man is running.' Categoric propositions are either assertoric or modal. Assertoric propositions *(categoricae de inesse)*, are those propositions which have no modal syncategorema among their parts; for instance: 'Man is an animal,' is an assertoric proposition. A modal proposition is, for instance, the following: "It is necessary that 'man is an animal'." An assertoric proposition is affirmative when the copula is affirmed, and it is negative when the copula is denied. For instance: 'Socrates is running' is an affirmative proposition; 'Socrates is not running' is a negative proposition.

Assertoric propositions may have amplified subjects, or not-amplified subjects. Propositions with not-amplified subjects are always of the present time and their predicates are not ampliative terms; for instance:

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dicuntur esse alterius formae a propositionibus indefinitis; et propter diversum ordinem istae sunt alterius et alterius formae ut: 'omnis homo est animal,' et 'animal est omnis homo;' et similiter istae consequentiae: 'omne B est A, ergo quoddam B est A,' et 'omne B est A, ergo quoddam A est B;' item, propter relationem ut: 'homo currit, et homo non currit' est alterius formae ab ista: 'homo currit, et ipse non currit,' propter quod secunda ex sua forma est impossibilis prima vero non." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 1, f. 24r; cfr. *Ibid.*, t. 3, c. 10, f. 23r.

[17] "Propositio alia affirmativa alia negativa. Propositio affirmativa dicitur illa in qua formale ipsius propositionis manet affirmativum, propositio vero negativa dicitur illa in qua formale ipsius propositionis negatur. Et per formale propositionis categoricae intelligo copulam verbalem, per formale autem propositionis hypotheticae intelligo notam hypotheticae. Ideo illae propositiones dicuntur affirmativae scilicet: 'Socrates non currit, et Plato non disputat,' 'si Socrates non currit, Socrates non movetur;' istae vero dicuntur negativae: 'non: Socrates currit, et Plato disputat,' 'non: si Socrates movetur, Socrates currit.'" *Log.*, t. 3, c. 1, f. 17v.

'Some man is an animal.' Amplified propositions are either of the present, past, or future time, or have a modal term affecting the proposition. An instance of a proposition with the copula of the present time and amplified subject by reason of the predicate is the following: 'A man is dead,' the subject of the proposition stands for present or past significates; thus the proposition means: 'Something which is now a man or was a man, is dead.' Assertoric propositions of the present time without ampliative terms, have the copula either as *secundo adiacens*, as for instance: 'A man exists' *(homo est);* or they have the copula as *tertio adiacens*, as in: 'Man is an animal.'

Assertoric propositions have either complex or incomplex extremes. When the subject and the predicate are incomplex terms, the proposition possesses incomplex extremes. Those propositions which have as subject or predicate a complex term are called propositions with complex extremes. Some propositions with complex extremes are such without any interposed conjunction or adverb, and the complex term or terms are composed of a substantive term and an adjective, as: 'A white man is running;' or of a term in the nominative case and a term in an oblique case, as: "Socrates' son is running." Some propositions with complex extremes are of the sort that have an interposed adverb or conjunction, and these are subdivided into six types: propositions with disjunctive extremes: 'Socrates or an ass is running;' propositions with copulative extremes: 'Socrates and a donkey are running;' propositions with conditional extremes: 'Any proposition, if it is impossible, is not to be accepted;' propositions with extremes expressing place: 'Where Socrates is running, Plato is disputing;' propositions with temporal extremes: 'No animal is awake while sleeping;' propositions with casual extremes: 'Man, inasmuch as he is sensible, is an animal.'

Assertoric propositions are universal, particular, indefinite, or singular. A universal proposition is one in which the subject is a common term determined by a sign of universality; for example: 'Every man is an animal,' 'No man is an animal.' A particular proposition is one in which the subject is a common term determined by a sign of particularity; for example: 'Some man is running.' An indefinite proposition is one in which the subject is a common term not determined by a universal or particular sign: 'A man is running' *(homo currit)*. A singular proposition is one in which the subject is a common term determined by a demonstrative adjective, or the subject is a singular term; such as: 'This man is an animal,' 'Socrates is running.'[18]

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[18] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 3, c. 1, f. 17rv.

Modal propositions are those in which a modal term is used. Modal terms, modes or modalities commonly accepted as such, are: 'possible,' 'impossible,' 'contingent,' necessary,' true', and 'false.' Modal terms not accepted by everybody are: 'known,' 'believed,' 'opinioned.' This classification of modal terms accepted by Albert, reminds one of Ockham's divisions. The *Venerabilis Inceptor* holds that there are more than the usually admitted four modalities; since a proposition can be necessary, impossible, possible or contingent; but it can be also, true, false, known, unknown, oral, written, mental, believed, opinioned, doubted, and of almost innumerable other modes. Similar discussions about the different kinds of modalities continue in our times, when logicians are becoming interested in modal logic.[19]

Modal proposition, Albert continues, are of two types: modals *in sensu diviso*, and modals *in sensu composito*. Modal propositions *in sensu composito* are those in which the *dictum* is the subject and the modal term *(modus)* is the predicate, or vice versa. By the *dictum* is meant all the terms of the proposition except the modality, the copula, and the terms affecting the modal term or the copula. For instance, in the proposition: "It is possible that 'Socrates is running'," 'Socrates is running' is the *dictum*, 'is' is the copula, and 'possible' is the mode. The modal propositions *in sensu composito*, Albert holds, sharing opinion with Burleigh, are not properly modal, because the copula is not affected by the modality; but Albert treats such type of propositions with the modal propositions following the common opinion of the medieval logicians.

Modal propositions *in sensu diviso* are those in which a part of the *dictum* is the subject, and the other part of the *dictum* is the predicate, and the modality determines the copula; as in: 'A man is possibly white,' 'A man is white' is the *dictum*, 'A man' is the subject of the modal proposition and a part of the *dictum*, 'white' is the predicate of the modal proposition and a part of the *dictum*, and the copula 'is' of the *dictum* is qualified by the modal term 'possibly.' Albert remarks that modal terms are sometimes nouns, sometimes verbs, and sometimes adverbs. For instance: "'Socrates is white' is a possible proposition," 'A man can be white,' 'A man is possibly white.'

Modal propositions *in sensu composito* are affirmative, if the copula is affirmed; negative, if the copula is denied. An instance of the first type of propositions: "It is possible that 'Socrates is white';" an instance

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[19] Cfr. William Ockham, *Summa logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, (Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series No. 2; St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1951—1954), II, c. 1, p. 218; *Ibid.*, c. 29, pp. 309—310; A. N. Prior, *Formal Logic* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1955), pp. 215—220.

of the second type: "It is not possible that 'Socrates is white'." Modal propositions *in sensu diviso* are simply affirmative or equivalent to affirmative propositions. Simply affirmative modal propositions *in sensu diviso* are those in which there is no negation at all, as in: 'A man is possibly white.' Modal propositions *in sensu diviso* equipollent to affirmatives are those in which there is a double denial, one that precedes the modal term, and one that follows it and affects the predicate. For instance: 'For A it is not possible not to be B' is equivalent to: 'A is necessarily B.' 'For A it is not necessary not to be B' is equipollent to: 'A is possibly B.' Modal propositions *in sensu diviso* are negative in a twofold manner; some are negative in such a way that the denial affects the modality, because it precedes the modal term; and others are negative in such a manner that the denial follows the modal term, and does not affect it. An instance of the first is: 'No man is possibly a donkey': an example of the second is: 'For a man it is possible not to be a donkey.'[20]

Hypothetical or compound propositions are those which have as principal parts several categoric propositions, and one or more propositional connectives *(nota vel notae hypotheticae)*. There are, according to Albert, six types of hypothetical propositions: copulative, disjunctive, conditional, causal, temporal, and propositions expressing location. Other Scholastics offer different divisions; some admit more classes, others less. Ockham records five classes, but remarks that many others could be found; although they can be reduced to the five types that he expressly acknowledges. Buridan, whom Albert seems to follow, admits the same six classes distinguished by Albert. Paul of Venice in his *Logica magna* speaks about logicians who admit five, six, seven, ten, fourteen types of hypotheticals. He himself holds that there are three classes: copulative, disjunctive, and conditional. The division of Paul of Venice is adopted by his pupil Paul of Pergula. Le Fèvre d'Etable and his pupil Clichtove, divide hypothetical propositions into three classes: conditionals, copulatives, and disjunctives; all other types can be reduced to the mentioned classes. Clichtove shows how such a reduction can be accomplished. Modern logicians establish that in a two-valued logic there are sixteen different truth-functional compound propositions in all possible combinations with two propositions as principal parts. The movement that received its main impulse from *Principia mathematica* uses in its development of the logic of propositions, four of these combinations, which are named: conjunction, disjunction, conditional or material implication, and biconditional or material equivalence. These four

[20] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 3, c. 4, f. 18v—19r.

combinations are used only for practical purposes, since they can be reduced to a single one, which may be the joint denial 'neither ... nor,' symbolized by a dagger with its point down '↓'; or the alternative denial, 'either ... or,' symbolized by the stroke '|'.[21]

Continuing with Albert's classification of compound propositions, we find first the copulative proposition which is composed of several categoricals linked by means of the conjunction 'and,' as: 'Socrates is running, and Plato is disputing.' Disjunctive propositions are those composed of several categoric propositions linked by means of this conjunction 'or,' as: 'Socrates is running, or Plato is disputing.' Conditional propositions are those composed of serveral categoric propositions linked by means of the conjunction 'if ... then,' as: 'If Socrates is running, then Socrates is moving.' Causal propositions are those composed of several categoric propositions linked by means of the adverb 'because,' as: 'The students improve, because the professor lectures to them.' Temporal propositions are those hypotheticals compounded of several simple propositions linked by means of the adverb 'when,' as: 'Adam lived, when Noah lived.' Propositions expressing location are those composed of several simple propositions joined by the adverb 'where,' as: 'Socrates is running, where Plato is disputing.'

A hypothetical proposition can be composed of more than two categoric propositions, and even all the propositions written in a huge volume can be a single compound proposition. The categoric propositions can be combined into compound statements by means of the same type of propositional connectives, or by different types of connectives. When simple propositions are joined by different connectives, difficulty arises as to what type of compound proposition is given, and different sophisms arise. For instance: 'All men are donkeys or men and donkeys are donkeys' *(Omnes homines sunt asini vel homines et asini sunt asini);* it can be proven in sophistical fashion that this proposition is true and false. Albert studies in detail this proposition in his work entitled *Sophismata,* and resolves that the sophism originates in the fact that such a proposition can be understood as a copulative proposition or as a disjunction,

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[21] Cfr. *Log.,* t. 3, c. 5, f. 19r; Ockham, *Summa logicae,* II, c. 30, p. 314; Buridan, *Compendium logicae,* t. 1, f. c 41r; Paul of Venice, *Logica,* t. 1, c. 12, f. A41r; *Logica magna* (Venice, 1499), f. 124v, as quoted by C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande,* vol. 4, (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1955), p. 131; Paul of Pergula, *Logica,* t. 1, f. B2r; J. Le Fèvre and J. Clichtove, *Introductiones artificiales in logicam* (Lyons, 1538), intr. 7, f. 125v—128v; I. M. Bocheński, *Nove lezione di logica simbolica* (Rome: Angelicum, 1938), pp. 33—41; Quine, *Mathematical Logic,* pp. 42—49; I. M. Copi, *Symbolic Logic* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), pp. 255—256.

and it is not specified which are the main parts of the proposition. Hence, if it is taken as a copulative, the proposition is true; but if it is taken as a disjunction, it is false. The sophism disappears when the grouping of the elements is clearly stated; in other words, when the main parts of the proposition are determined, or in modern terms, when the main break is indicated. Modern logic avoids or solves easily these sophisms arising from ambiguity of grouping, by explicit indication of the grouping of the elements by means of parentheses, dots, or similar devices, of which the most rigorous seems to be the Polish notation.

A compound proposition is affirmative when the main propositional connective is affirmed; and it is negative when the main connective is denied. For instance, these propositions are affirmative: 'Socrates is not running, and Plato is not disputing,' 'If Socrates is not running, then Socrates is not moving;' but these propositions are negative: 'It is not the case that: Socrates is running, and Plato is disputing,' 'It is not the case that: if Socrates is moving, then Socrates is running.'[22]

Propositions equipollent to hypotheticals are those which are categoric in their appearance as oral or written expressions, but they are compound propositions in their meaning. The principal propositions belonging to this type are the following four. Exclusive propositions, in which such terms as 'exclusively,' only,' and similar ones are used. For example: 'Only men are running' *(Tantum homo currit)*. This proposition is equivalent to this other: 'Men are running, and nothing distinct from man is running.' Exceptive propositions in which such terms as 'except' and similar ones are employed. For instance: 'Every man, except Socrates, is running,' is equivalent to this proposition: 'Socrates is not running, and every man distinct from Socrates is running.' Reduplicative propositions in which the terms 'as such', 'inasmuch as,' and similar ones are used. For instance: 'Every man is sensible inasmuch as he is an animal,' is equivalent to: 'Every man is an animal, and every man is sensible, and: if there is an animal, then it is sensible.'

Propositions equipollent to hypotheticals are also those in which the verbs *incipit* and *desinit* are used. For instance: 'Socrates is beginning to exist,' is equivalent to: 'Socrates exists now, and immediately before now Socrates did not exist.' 'Socrates just ceased to be white,' is equipollent to: 'Socrates is not white now, and immediately before now he was white.'

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[22] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 3, c. 5, f. 19r; *Sophismata, Ms.* Paris, BN, 16134, f. 5v— 6r; *Log.*, t. 3, c. 1, f. 12v.

Modal hypothetical propositions are those in which the main propositional connective is qualified by a modal term; as for instance, this is a necessary conditional: "It is necessary that 'if there is a man, then he is an animal'."[23]

We now conclude our discussion of propositions, their material and formal elements, and their formal classification. From it we gather that for Albert, as for Ockham and his medieval followers, pragmatical and semantical relations, that is: relations of the language-signs to their authors and users, and relations of the same signs to their significates, are not the concern of logic; those relations are presupposed to some extent, but they do not belong to the subject-matter of logic. The categorematic terms are the variables, the operands of the syncategorematic terms or logical operators; but logic abstracts from the contents of the categorematic terms. Logic is formal, it is interested in the formal elements of language, in the meaning and usage of the syncategorematic terms, in syntactical relations of signs among themselves, in developing a rigorously consistent and conscious usage of logical constants.

CHAPTER II

PROPOSITIONAL CONSEQUENCES

The main purpose of the present chapter is to study Albert's theory of consequences among assertoric unanalyzed propositions. First, we shall examine Albert's notions of denial, conjunction, disjunction, conditional or consequence, equivalence, and the notion of conditional and consequence in some authors of Antiquity, of the Middle Ages, and of Modern times. Second, we shall study the rules for consequences among assertoric unanalyzed propositions. We shall introduce also some of Albert's notions of modalities for reasons that will become apparent in the course of the chapter.

By unanalyzed propositions is to be understood propositions taken as a whole, that is, propositions considered as complex terms, abstracting from their inner structure. For example, if we were to consider the proposition: 'Some man is running,' as unanalyzed, we would abstract from consideration as to whether it is universal, particular, or singular; and we would fix our attention on the proposition as a complex term of which the terms 'true' or 'false,' or some modality can be predicated. Propositions considered as a whole, or as unanalyzed, are represented

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[23] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 3, c. 6—9, f. 20r—23r; *Ibid.*, c. 5, f. 19rv.

in modern logic by the propositional variables or place-holders for propositions, and are usually symbolized by the letters 'p,' 'q,' 'r,' 's.' Moreover, we refer to unanalyzed assertoric propositions, as excluding from our present study the modal unanalyzed propositions. For instance: "It is possible that 'some man is running,'" is an example of a modal unanalyzed proposition. Nevertheless, we shall consider some modal propositions, as they are required by Albert's theory of consequences among assertoric propositions.

The qualification "formal consequences among unanalyzed assertoric propositions," indicates that we find in Albert logical rules which involve propositions taken as a whole, while other rules take into account the components of the proposition, viz., the terms. To clarify our point, let us give some examples. The following is a law of assertoric unanalyzed propositions: 'If p and q, then q;' or as a rule: a conjunction implies any of its constituents. Instead of 'p' and 'q,' we may substitute any statement, and so far as the form of the proposition is preserved, it remains true. If we now analyze a logically valid statement of the form *Barbara:* 'If every A is a B, and every C is an A, then every C is a B;' we find that 'A' and 'B' may be substituted not by propositions, but by terms, and no matter which terms we might choose to substitute for the term-variables, the proposition will remain true as far as its logical structure remains intact. However, we cannot express this law in terms of unanalyzed propositions, since if we state it as: 'If p and q, then r,' we have not a logical law, but a conditional statement which can be true or false. Hence, the validity of *Barbara* does not depend only on the relations of propositions considered as a whole, but rather it depends on the parts or elements of the proposition.

Another type of logical law found in Albert's tract on consequences is that in which the validity of the consequence is based mainly on a modal term. These modal laws can be, as the assertoric laws, concerned with unanalyzed or quantified propositions. In this chapter, as we have already indicated, we are going to treat mainly the formal consequences among assertoric unanalyzed propositions. The logic of such propositions is the most fundamental and elementary part of logic. Albert recognizes this fact when he places his logical rules for formal consequences among assertoric unanalyzed propositions right at the beginning of his tract on consequences, and when he uses these rules in the development of his logic of terms.

The logic of assertoric unanalyzed propositions is called in modern times the logic of propositions or the propositional calculus; during the

Middle Ages it was known as the tract on consequences or simply *Consequentiae*. The historical sources and development of this theory in the medieval times is not yet fully known. The work of authors such as Lukasiewicz, Salamucha, Bocheński, Mates, Moody, Dürr, Boehner, Clark has thrown light on the problem.[24] The *Topics* of Aristotle seem to have had an important role, and it is very likely that the propositional logic of the Stoic-Megaric School, through the *De syllogismo hypothetico* of Boëthius, influenced the work of Abelard as well as the work of other logicians of the first half of the thirteenth century. The accomplishments of this century paved the way for the powerful synthesis of the *Venerabilis Inceptor*. The doctrine of consequences became so important in the late medieval logic, that this may be characterized as a consequential logic. In it the theory of the syllogism becomes a part of the theory of consequences, and syllogisms are thought of as formal consequences. An outstanding witness of this mature consequential logic of the fourteenth century is Albert of Saxony.

The logic of Albert, and most medieval logic, is two-valued. We find the principles of excluded middle and of contradiction clearly stated by Albert. Every proposition is either affirmative or negative, there is no middle. It is impossible that the same proposition is true and false at the same time. It is impossible that two contradictory propositions are true and false together; however, it is necessary that one of two contradictories is true and the other false. Buridan in his *Consequentiae* stresses the importance of this fact and enunciates the principles of excluded middle and of contradiction just prior to the beginning of his

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[24] J. Lukasiewicz, "Zur Geschichte der Aussagenlogik," *Erkenntnis*, vol. 5 (1935), 111—131; *Aristotle's Syllogistic*, From the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1957); J. Salamucha, "Die Aussagenlogik bei Wilhelm Ockham," *Franziskanische Studien*, vol. 32 (1950), 97—134; Bocheński, "De consequentiis scholasticorum earumque origine," *Angelicum*, vol. 15 (January, 1938), 92—109; *Ancient Formal Logic*, (Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics; Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1951); B. Mates, "Diodorean Implication," *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 58 (1949), 234—242; "Stoic Logic and the Text of Sextus Empiricus," *American Journal of Philology*, vol. 70 (July, 1949), 290—298; *Stoic Logic* (University of California, Publications in Philosophy; Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1953); E. A. Moody, *Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic* (Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics; Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1953); K. Dürr, *The Propositional Logic of Boëthius* (Studies in Logic and Foundations of Mathematics; Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1951); Ph. Boehner, *Medieval Logic*, An Outline of its Development from 1250 to c. 1400 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952); J. T. Clark, *Conventional Logic and Modern Logic*, A Prelude to Transition (Philosophical Studies of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. 3; Woodstock, Md.: Woodstock College Press, 1952).

development of the consequences. We do not find a similar situation at the opening of Albert's tract on consequences in the *Perutilis logica*, but we note the same principles clearly indicated in other places in this work.[25]

DENIAL

Albert dinstinguishes three types of denial: negative negation *(negatio negans)*, as is the case in the proposition: 'Man is not an animal;' infinite negation *(negatio infinitans)*, as the denial 'not' in: 'Brunellus is a not-man;' and privative negation *(negatio privans)*, as the particle 'un' in: 'Socrates is unjust.' The rule for negative negation or simple denial, that is, the truth-functional relationship between any proposition and its denial, is expressed by Albert in the following manner: The law and nature of contradictory propositions is that if one is true, the other is false; and if one is false, the other is true; and they cannot be simultaneously true or false. This description of the law of denial can be represented by the modern truth-table.[26]

p	$\bar{p}$
T	F
F	T

COPULATION

A copulative proposition is one that has as its principal parts two propositions linked by the conjunction 'and.' For the truth of a copulative proposition it is required that both of its component parts be true;

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[25] "[Omnis propositio est affirmativa vel negativa] nam omni propositioni contingit contradicere, sed hoc non est nisi omnis propositio esset affirmativa vel negativa, ex eo quod contradictio est affirmatio vel negatio eiusdem de eodem cuius secundum se non est medium." Albert of Saxony, *Quaestiones super artem veterem*, Super primum librum de interpretatione, De enunciatione, q. 3, r. 100v. "Omnis propositio vel est affirmativa vel est negativa." *Log.*, t. 1, c. 6, f. 4r; "Semper cuiuslibet contradictionis altera pars est vera." *Ibid.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 24v; "Commune principium: impossibile est duo contradictoria simul stare." *Ibid.* "His suppositionibus appono haec esse supponenda praesentia: omnis contradictionis unam contradictoriam esse veram et aliam falsam, et impossibile esse ambas simul veras aut simul falsas. Item, omnem propositionem esse veram aut falsam, [et] (est *ed.*) impossibile esse eamdem simul veram et falsam." Buridan, *Consequentiae* (Paris, c. 1493), I. 1, c. 6, f. A6r.

[26] "De contradictoriis est regula quod si una est vera, reliqua est falsa, et e converso; unde non possunt simul esse verae neque falsae in aliqua materia: et hoc est unum commune principium in omni scientia." *Log.*, t. 3, c. 10, f. 23v; *Ibid.*, t. 6, c. 1, f. 43v. "Triplex dicitur negatio: quaedam dicitur negatio negans, quaedam infinitans, et quaedam negatio privans." *Quaestiones super artem veterem*, Super primum librum de interpretatione, De enunciatione, q. 3, f. 100v.

and for its falsity it is sufficient that one of its parts be false. For instance, this copulative proposition is false: 'God exists, and man is a donkey.' This definition of the copulative corresponds perfectly to the modern truth-functional definition of the same compound proposition. It can be represented by the usual truth-table.[27]

p	q	p · q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	F

DISJUNCTION

A disjunctive proposition is one composed of two propositions as its principal parts linked by the conjunction 'or.' For the truth of an affirmative disjunction it is sufficient that one of its parts be true. Albert refers here to an affirmative disjunction to distinguish it from the negative disjunction, that is the denial of a disjunction, which is equivalent to a copulative proposition, and hence has the same truth conditions of a copulative. This description of the disjunction is represented by the following truth-table.[28]

p	q	p ∨ q
T	T	T
T	F	T
F	T	T
F	F	F

CONDITIONAL AND CONSEQUENCE

The notion of the conditional involves a difficult problem. The conditional has been closely related with the core and crux of logic, viz.,

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[27] "Ad veritatem copulativae requiritur quod utraque pars sit vera. Unde haec copulativa: 'Deus est, et homo est asinus.' est falsa, quia significat aliter quam suae categoricae significant, quia significat quod sic sit copulative sicut suae categoricae significant; unde sibi correspondet distincta intellectio et conceptus ab intellectione suarum categoricarum. Et ideo est quod quicumque dicit istam: 'Deus est, et homo est asinus,' dicit simpliciter falsum, quia mentalis sibi correspondens est simpliciter falsa. Ad falsitatem copulativae sufficit alteram partem esse falsam." *Log.*, t. 3, c. 5, f. 19r.

[28] "Ad veritatem disiunctivae affirmativae sufficit unam partem esse veram. . . . Et notanter dico "ad veritatem disiunctivae affirmativae," nam ad veritatem disiunctivae negativae non sufficit unam partem esse veram, . . . nam disiunctiva negativa aequivalet uni copulativae, ad veritatem cuius requiritur utramque partem eius esse veram." *Log.*, t. 3, c. 5, f. 19r.

the notion of implication, inference consequence, or deduction. It has been controversial matter since the time of the Stoics, and it reached high points in the propositional logic of the Stoic-Megaric School, in the consequential logic of the late Middle Ages, and in the symbolic logic of modern times. In order to understand Albert's notion of the conditional and consequence, we shall examine the notions of conditional and argument in the Stoic logic; the notions of conditional or material implication, of logical implication and inference in modern logic; finally, the notions of the conditional and consequence in some medieval authors and especially in Albert.

First, we shall examine the notions under consideration in ancient times. A text of Sextus Empiricus provides us with four definitions of the truth value of the conditional in the Stoic-Megaric School. According to Philo of Megara, "a true conditional is one which does not have a true antecedent and a false consequent." This definition and the examples given make clear that the type of implication maintained by Philo corresponds to what is presently called material implication. Philo admits as true conditionals the following propositions: 'If it is day, then I am conversing,' assuming that it is day and I am conversing; 'If it is night, then I am conversing,' is a true conditional when it is day and I am silent; 'If it is night, then it is day,' is a true conditional when it is day.[29]

According to Diodorus Cronus, all the conditionals just given as examples of true conditionals are false. For him a true conditional is "one which neither is nor was capable of having a true antecedent and a false consequent." The following is an example of a true conditional according to Diodorus: 'If atomic elements of things do not exist, then atomic elements of things do exist,' this is a true conditional since it will always have a false antecedent and a true consequent.

A third opinion, that seems to be the tenet of no less a logician than Chrysippus of Soloi, introduces "connection" or "coherence" into the notion of conditional. All the above mentioned conditionals are false, since a true conditional "holds whenever the denial of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent." The denial of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent when the former cannot be true together with the latter. An example of a true conditional according to this view is the following: 'If it is day, then it is day.' This description of the conditional corresponds to the notion of strict implication given by the modern logician C. I. Lewis.

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[29] Our notes on these notions of the Stoic logic are based on the three works of B. Mates already cited in the first footnote of this chapter.

The fourth opinion maintains that a conditional is true "if its consequent is, in effect, included in its antecedent." The conditional: 'If it is day, then it is day,' is false, because it is impossible for a thing to be included in itself.

For the Stoic logicians, an argument is different from a conditional. An argument is a system of propositions composed of premises and conclusion. A valid argument was defined as a true conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the premises, and whose consequent is the conclusion of the argument; furthermore, the denial of the consequent is incompatible with the conjunction of the premises. An argument is invalid if the negation of the conclusion is compatible with the conjunction of the premises when the argument is transformed into a conditional. The valid arguments are subdivided into indemonstrable and derived. The former are the famed five Stoic indemonstrables from which all other arguments were proven. The Stoics further subdivided arguments into true arguments and false arguments. Those that are true, are also valid and have true premises; those that are false, are either invalid or have a false premise.

Now we turn our attention to modern times, which have witnessed a stupendous revival of logic, for today this discipline has made an outstanding progress such as has never been paralleled. Regarding the notions of conditional and logical implication, we find that the authors of *Principia mathematica* and the school or movement to which they gave an impetus, maintain the Philonean notion of the conditional. The authors of *Principia mathematica* and several other authors call the conditional proposition "material implication." Thus, proposition 'p' implies proposition 'q,' is defined to mean: either 'p' is false or 'q' is true. This notion is aptly described by the customary truth-table.[30]

p	q	$p \supset q$
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	T

The following conditionals are true: 'If France is in Europe, then the sea is salt,' 'If France is in Australia, then the sea is salt,' 'If France is in Australia, then the sea is sweet;' but this conditional is false: 'If France is in Europe, then the sea is sweet.' It is clear that no "connec-

[30] A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, *Principia mathematica*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925), p. 94.

tion" is required between the antecedent and the consequent for the truth or falsity of these conditionals, but only the relation of truth-values; hence, this type of conditionals is purely truth-functional and parallels the Diodorean conditional.

The truth-functional conditional has been sharply distinguished from logical implication, argument, inference, or inferential implication; but the latter is defined as validity of the conditional, that is, as a conditional which is logically true. A statement is logically true if it is true and remains true when all but its logical particles, ('not,' 'or,' 'and,' 'if . . . then,' 'every,' 'some,' and the like), are varied at will. In other words, statement s_1 logically implies statement s_2, when the conditional whose antecedent is s_1 and whose consequent is s_2, is valid or logically true.[31]

Inference, deductive argument, or simply an argument, is described as any group of propositions of which one is claimed to follow from the others. The proposition that follows is called the conclusion; the proposition or propositions from which the conclusion is said to follow, are called the premises. A valid argument or inference is one for which a formal proof or demonstration can be given. A formal proof is a sequence of statements each of which is either a postulate or an axiom of the system, or a premise of the argument, or a definition, or a statement that follows from preceding statements by the rules of the system; and whose last statement is the conclusion of the argument being proven valid. To every argument corresponds a conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument's premises and whose consequent is the argument's conclusion. Hence, an alternative method of proving the validity of an argument is by showing that the conditional corresponding to the argument is logically true, or that it is a tautology.[32]

The "coherence" or "connection" view of implication held by some of the Stoics, seems to have been embraced in modern times by the logician Lewis in his theory of strict implication. For him a conditional or implication is true when it is impossible that the antecedent is true and consequent false.

$$(p \multimap q) = - \lozenge (p \cdot \bar{q})$$

Material implication, Lewis remarks, is not in accord with the usual meaning of 'implies'; it leads to paradoxes, such as, a false proposition

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[31] Cfr. Quine, *Mathematical Logic*, pp. 1—5, 28, 31—33; *Methods of Logic* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955), pp. XV, 33—34, 37—38; Bocheński, *Précis de logique mathématique*, pp. 28—29.

[32] Cfr. Copi, *Symbolic Logic*, pp. 2—5, 30, 38, 40—46, 106—107, 204—210, 273.

implies any proposition, and a true proposition is implied by any other. If it is not the case that 'p' is true and 'q' is false, then: 'p' implies 'q,' is valid in material implication but not in strict implication. In ordinary speech: 'If roses are red, then sugar is sweet,' is a true conditional or material implication, because it is not the case that the antecedent is true and the consequent false, since the consequent is true. But the preceding conditional does not hold as strict implication, since as far as can be seen, the conjunction of the antecedent with the denial of the consequent is not inconsistent or impossible.

Inference for Lewis is a logical operation by which a new theorem may be taken as established, by showing that it is strictly implied by a postulate, definition or a previous theorem, according to the rules of substitution of adjunction. For instance, if 'p' has been asserted, and by the rules of substitution or adjunction we derive an expression of the form "'p' strictly implies 'q',", then 'q' may be asserted also.[33]

Strict or necessary implication leads to paradoxes similar to those of material implication, such as, an impossible proposition implies any other, and a necessary proposition is implied by any other. We think that Prior is right when he holds that "whatever be its relation to logical deducibility, the main relation of strict implication to material implication is a simple one . . . Lewis's strict implication is equivalent to (though it is not quite defined as) necessary material implication, LCpq — 'It is necessarily the case that p materially implies q.'" Carnap identifies Lewis' strict implication with necessary implication, and the last is defined as necessary material implication or necessary conditional. Hence, the following definition: "Abbreviation. Let '. . .' and '_ _' be sentences in S_2; '. . . $\supset$ _ _' for 'N (. . . $\supset$ _ _).'" For Lukasiewicz also, Lewis' strict implication is a necesary material implication; LCpq, that is: it is necessary that if p, then q.[34]

We now proceed to examine the notions of conditional and consequence in some Scholastic logicians in order to have a better understanding of Albert's doctrine. The *Venerabilis Inceptor* in his *Summa logicae* defines a conditional as a hypothetical proposition compounded of two categoricals linked by means of the conjunction 'if . . . then' or an equivalent expression. A conditional is equivalent to a consequence,

[33] Cfr. C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, *Symbolic Logic* (New York: Dover Publications, 1951), pp. 122—127, 134, 154.
[34] Cfr. Prior, *Formal Logic*, p. 197; R. Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity*, A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 3, 176—177; Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic*, pp. 146—147.

hence it is true if the antecedent infers the consequent. In the *Tractatus medius*, Ockham reiterates that a conditional is equivalent to a consequence, but he states very clearly in this tract the truth-conditions of the conditional. A conditional can be true even if none of its parts is true, and if the first is false and the second true; but it is false, if the first is true and the second is false. This description of the conditional is remarkably similar to the Philonian conditional and to material implication, all the possible cases of the truth-table for the conditional are given.[35]

In the *Summa logicae*, Ockham distinguishes eight classes of consequences, and hence of conditional propositions, but they are not mutually exclusive, for the contrary, they overlap. Ockham's main divisions are to be found in the first three classifications. The first division concerns "as of now" consequences *(ut nunc)*, and "simple" consequences. An "as of now" consequence is one that has an antecedent that sometime can be true without the consequent, but not at the present time; for instance: 'Every man is running, therefore Socrates is running.' A "simple" consequence is the one that has an antecedent that cannot be true without the consequent being true, and that at any time; for instance: 'No animal is running, therefore no man is running.' Thus, such a consequence parallels the necessary conditional or strict implication.

The second main division is into consequences that hold by an extrinsic *(per medium extrinsecum)*, and consequences that hold by an intrinsic means *(per medium intrinsecum)*. A consequence holds by an intrinsic means when it is validated by a proposition composed of a term of its antecedent and a term of its consequent; for instance: 'Socrates is not running, therefore a man is not running,' this consequence holds by virtue of the proposition: 'Socrates is a man,' which is composed of the term 'Socrates' found in the antecedent, and the term 'man' found in the consequent. A consequence is valid by an extrinsic means because of a general rule which does not regard the categorematic terms of the consequence more than any other categorematic terms, and which does not deal with truth or falsity, necessity

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[35] Our notes on Ockham's notions of the conditional and consequence are based on Boehner's article: "Does Ockham Know of Material Implication?", *Franciscan Studies*, vol. 11 (September-December, 1951), 203—230. The main passages of Ockham's works dealing with these notions are: *Summa totius logicae* (Venice, 1508), II, c. 31, f. 43r; *Ibid.*, III, III, c. 1, f. 74r; *Ibid.*, c. 37, f. 92r; *Tractatus medius logicae Ockham*, *Ms.* Munich, Staatsbibliothek, 1060, f. 157r—158r, 242v; *Tractatus minor logicae Ockham*, *Ms.* Assisi, 690, f. 231v, 236v, 237v. Cfr. Salamucha, "Die Aussagenlogik bei Wilhelm Ockham."

or impossibility of propositions. For instance: 'Only man is a donkey, therefore every donkey is a man,' this consequence is good not in virtue of a proposition composed of a term of the antecedent and a term of the consequent, but by the rule that an exclusive proposition is equivalent to a universal proposition in which the terms of the exclusive are interchanged.

The third main class of consequences comprehends formal and material consequences. A formal consequence is twofold. One class of formal consequences holds by virtue of extrinsic means, that is by rules regarding the form of the propositions involved. This has been exemplified in the paragraph, by the consequence holding by a rule concerning exclusive and universal propositions. The second class of formal consequences is that which holds immediately by virtue of intrinsic means and mediately by extrinsic means which regard the general conditions of propositions; for instance: 'Socrates is running, therefore a man is running,' this consequence holds immediately by the proposition: 'Socrates is a man,' and mediately by the rule that it is valid to infer an indefinite affirmative proposition from a singular affirmative. The second division of the third main class of consequences consists of material consequences which hold precisely by virtue of the categorematic terms, and not by any rule regarding the general conditions of propositions; for instance: 'If a man is running, then God exists,' 'Man is a donkey, therefore God does not exist.'

From the three main classifications of consequence, we gather that Ockham acknowledges a formal consequence which may be either complete or enthymematic, and a material consequence. A consequence valid by extrinsic means, which is always a complete formal consequence; and a consequence valid by intrinsic means, which is a formal enthymematic consequence. A "simple" consequence which is a necessary conditional, and an "as of now" consequence which is similar to material implication.

We find further information about the consequences in the consequential rules stated by Ockham in his *Summa logicae*, in the *Tractatus medius* and in the *Tractatus minor*. Let us first examine the two tracts. They have substantially the same doctrine as the *Summa logicae*, as Boehner has proven, but they provide further information in some points. The *Tractatus medius* informs that syllogisms, conversions, inductions and many other types of arguments are simple consequences, if one so desires to call them consequences *(si vocantur consequentiae)*. The consequences valid by intrinsic means can be "simple" or "as of now;"

and the ones that hold in virtue of extrinsic means are "simple" consequences, because the rules by which they are valid, are necessary. In this last part, we have a confirmation that simple consequences are necessary conditionals.

A formal consequence, according to Ockham in the same *Tractatus medius*, can be an "as of now" consequence. Hence, not every formal consequence is a "simple" consequence. But since in this same tract we find that syllogisms, conversions and inductions are "simple" consequences; and the example given of an "as of now" formal consequence is an enthymeme, we may conclude that the type of formal consequences here mentioned, is the formal incomplete or enthymematic consequence of the *Summa logicae*. A material consequence, Ockham remarks in the same *Tractatus medius*, can be a "simple" consequence; hence, we may conclude that it can be an "as of now" consequence also. The *Tractatus minor* adds that an "as of now" consequence holds by a contingent intrinsic means, thus, it stresses that such a consequence is not a necessary conditional; but a simple consequence holds by a necessary extrinsic means.

We may summarize Ockham's classification of consequences in the three mentioned logical treatises in the following manner. Consequences are either material or formal. A material consequence holds by virtue of the categorematic terms, and not by a general rule or extrinsic means; it can be a "simple" consequence or an "as of now" consequence. A formal consequence is twofold. One holds by extrinsic means, and it is always a "simple" consequence. Another holds by intrinsic means immediately, and mediately by extrinsic means; it can be a "simple" and formal consequence, or an "as of now" formal consequence.

There are four rules of consequences in Ockham's *Summa logicae*, which define the characteristic properties of material and strict implication. A true proposition never implies a false one, and from a false proposition a true one may follow, rules which aptly describe the truth-functional conditional; while the next pair of rules express the paradoxes of strict implication: from an impossible proposition any other follows, and a necessary proposition follows to any other.

From our discussion about Ockham's doctrine on consequences, we may conclude that the as of now material consequence, and the conditional described in the *Tractatus medius*, correspond to the Philonian conditional and to modern material implication. The material simple consequence parallels the "connection" view of the conditional in the Stoic logic and the strict implication of modern logic. The formal con-

sequence holding by extrinsic means is Ockham's counterpart of logical implication, argument, inference or inferential implication.

According to Peter of Spain in his *Summulae logicales*, it is required for the truth of the conditional that the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent; for instance: 'If a man exists, then an animal exists.' Hence, every true conditional is necessary, and every false conditional is impossible. It is sufficient for the falsity of the conditional that the antecedent can be true without the consequent; as for instance: 'If a man exists, then something white exists.'[36]

Buridan in his *Compendium logicae* or *Summulae de dialectica*, closely follows Peter of Spain in defining the conditional. It is required for the truth of the conditional that the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent; while for the falsity of a conditional it is required that the antecedent can be true without the consequent, as for instance in the following conditional: 'If Socrates exists, then Socrates is white.' Consequently, every conditional is necessary and a necessary consequence, and any false conditional is impossible.[37]

We do not find further information on the consequences in the *Compendium logicae*, but we do discover it in the *Sophismata*. We shall examine first the notion of truth and falsity in this work because it plays a major in the definition of consequence. Buridan asserts that some hold and he himself once held, that a proposition is true if whatever the proposition signifies, it is so; and a proposition is false if it is not the case whatever the proposition signifies, it is so. In other words, a proposition is true if it is thus as the proposition signifies, and a proposition is false if it is not thus as the proposition signifies. Buridan finds these definitions to be defective, since they do not determine exactly the truth-conditions for every type of proposition, and besides they do not provide a good solution to the insolubles. Nevertheless, Buridan concedes these definitions and affirms that he even will use them, as he does, but warning time and again that they have to be understood in the proper sense which he intends them to have. They are general, although faulty, definitions of truth and falsity, which have to be clarified and explained when they are applied to the different types of propositions, as for instance: assertoric affirmative or assertoric negative propositions, propositions of the present, past, or future time, quantified propositions and modal sentences. Each type of propositions

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[36] *Summulae logicales*, t. 1, p. 8.
[37] *Compendium logicae*, t. 1, f. C5rv.

has its own truth-conditions which cannot be covered by a general definition.[38]

Buridan quotes several opinions on the truth-conditions of a consequence. He refers, for instance, to the sentence that a good consequence is the one in which it is impossible that the antecedent is true without the consequent being also true. He himself first admits that a consequence is good if the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent being true, if they are both stated. But then Buridan faces this objection: these consequences are true: 'No proposition is affirmative, therefore a stick is in the corner,' 'No proposition is negative, therefore no proposition is affirmative;' these consequences are valid since it is impossible that the antecedent is true, and if the antecedent is thus, and both antecedent and consequent are stated, then, it cannot be that the antecedent is true without the consequent. Buridan does not wish to concede the validity of these consequences because from the contradictory opposite of the consequent does not follow the contradictory opposite of the antecedent. But he wants to admit that this sophism is a valid consequence: 'Every proposition is affirmative, therefore no proposition is negative,' because from the contradictory opposite of the consequent follows the contradictory opposite of the antecedent. Buridan confesses that this admission leads to great difficulties in determining why a consequence is true or false. Thus, for instance, he is forced to admit that in a good consequence the antecedent can be true and the consequent cannot be true, as in the sophism already mentioned: 'Every proposition is affirmative, therefore no proposition is negative.' But since it is an assumption or axiom that a possible antecedent never implies an impossible consequent, Buridan is forced to admit that some proposition is possible and nevertheless it cannot be true. In the aforesaid consequence, the antecedent is possible, and the consequent is possible, although the consequent cannot be true. A proposition is called possible not because it can be true, but because as the proposition signifies, thus it can be; and a proposition is called impossible not because it cannot be true, but because it cannot be thus as the proposition signifies.[39]

In the solution of the insoluble propositions which reflect on themselves, such as: 'Every proposition is false,' Buridan finally decides that when such propositions exist, they are false and impossible. And this is precisely the case with the proposition: 'No proposition is negative,'

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[38] Buridan, *Sophismata* (Paris, 1496/1500), c. 2, f. A8r—B3v.
[39] *Sophismata*, c. 8, f. E7rv.

which reflects on itself. Buridan affirms that the proposition: 'Every proposition is false,' is possible, although it cannot be true, because it would be so as the proposition signifies, in case God would destroy every proposition except these two: 'God is a donkey,' and 'Every horse is a goat.' In this case every proposition would be false. But the copulation of the proposition and the "case," is impossible because it would follow an impossibility, viz., that such a proposition is true and false. The "case" is composed of circumstances described above when there is no true proposition.[40]

Besides, every proposition with the addition 'that it exists,' implies that it is true. For instance, let B be the name of the proposition: 'Some horse is running,' then it follows: 'Some horse is running, and B exists, therefore B is true.' In similar manner, if it is assumed that the proposition: 'Every proposition is false' be existent, then it follows that it is true; but if it is true, then it follows that not every proposition is false, which is the contradictory opposite of the proposition under consideration, and any proposition that implies its contradictory is false and impossible, therefore when the proposition 'Every proposition is false' and similar ones are stated, or exist, they are false and impossible. From this it would seem that Buridan's distinction between possible and possibly true is eliminated, since a proposition to be qualified as possible or possibly true, has to exist or be stated, and whenever a proposition that reflects on itself is stated, it becomes impossible and impossibly true, which is also the case with the proposition 'No proposition is negative.' Consequently, it would seem that the consequence: 'Every proposition is affirmative, therefore no proposition is negative,' breaks the rule that a possible antecedent never implies an impossible consequent, since the consequent whenever stated is false and impossible according to Buridan's doctrine.[41]

Buridan continues establishing the conditions under which a consequence is valid. He admits that in a good consequence it is impossible that the antecedent is true and the consequent is false, if both are stated. Nevertheless, since he has conceded the truth of the consequence: 'Every proposition is affirmative, therefore no proposition is negative,' he is compelled to make a difficult compromise. He admits that it can be that a true proposition implies a false one, as for instance in the aforesaid consequence. But then he weakens this assertion when he immediately adds that when the consequent 'no proposition is negative,'

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[40] *Sophismata*, c. 8, f. F2v, F3v, F4v.
[41] *Sophismata*, c. 8, f. F4r.

is stated, then the antecedent 'every proposition is affirmative,' becomes false. We see that if the antecedent is false when the consequent is stated, and for the existence of a consequence it is required that both antecedent and consequent be stated, then it is not so that from truth can follow falsity.[42]

Although, in every good consequence the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent, it is not sufficient, Buridan continues, for a good consequence, that it is impossible that the antecedent be true without the consequent, as the already mentioned consequences have proved, viz.: 'No proposition is affirmative, therefore a stick is in the corner,' 'No proposition is negative, therefore no proposition is affirmative.' These consequences are invalid because from the contradictory opposite of the consequent does not follow the contradictory opposite of the antecedent, and nevertheless it is impossible that the antecedent is true without the consequent. Therefore it is required for the truth of a consequence that it cannot be that it is so as the antecedent signifies, without being so as the consequent signifies.[43]

We do not quite see what would be the difference between the accepted definition of consequence and the other just rejected as insufficient. It seems that Buridan himself felt these difficulties for in his *Consequentiae* he admits the three definitions we met in the *Sophismata*, although he remarks that they are not completely satisfactory. Albert of Saxony, as we shall see, embraces a similar position to the one held by Buridan in his *Sophismata* regarding the general definition of consequence.

Finally, Buridan provides us with important information about the term 'impossible' used in the definition of consequence. He says that in order that a consequence be valid, it is necessary that the antecedent and the consequent be stated. Assuming this, the following rule is formulated. A consequence is good if it is impossible that it is so as the antecedent signifies without being so as the consequent signifies. This rule can be understood in a twofold sense. First, the modal term of impossibility affects the conjunction of the antecedent and the denial of the consequent, and in this sense the rule is commonly understood. Thus we have a modal proposition *in sensu composito*, which is clearly strict implication.

$$(p \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} q) = \text{def. } Y (p \cdot \bar{q})$$

Buridan does not admit this common interpretation, because it would validate the sophistic consequence: 'No proposition is negative, there-

[42] *Sophismata*, c. 8, f. E7v.   [43] *Sophismata*, c. 8, f. E8r.

fore some proposition is negative,' since the antecedent is impossibly true, then it follows that it is not possible that the antecedent is true without the consequent. Hence, Buridan understands the rule as determining a modal proposition *in sensu diviso*. The rule means that a consequence is valid, if whatever the antecedent signifies is impossible to be so, without whatever the consequent signifies being so. In other words, if the antecedent is impossible, then the consequence is valid. This may be symbolized as follows:

$$\text{Yp} \sqsupset (\text{p} \sqsupset \text{q})$$

The rule thus interpreted, Buridan remarks, does not validate the sophistic consequence: 'No proposition is negative, therefore some proposition is negative,' because the antecedent is not impossible, but is a possible proposition, although it is not possibly true.[44]

We realize that the problem of the notion of truth and the insolubles obscure and complicate the notion of consequence in the *Sophismata* of Buridan. But one thing is clear, the term 'impossible' appearing in the definition of consequence, has to be taken in the modal sense; moreover, according to Buridan it was commonly understood as determining a modal proposition *in sensu composito*, modifying the copulative proposition composed of the antecedent and the denial of the consequent. We shall find a similar stand in Clichtove, a logician of the early sixteenth century. We do not find in the *Sophismata* further information on the consequences, as for instance the divisions, but to avoid many repetitions we shall refrain here from discussing the notion and division of consequences as found in Buridan's *Consequentiae*, which Albert very closely follows; but we shall indicate the principal differences between Albert and Buridan's *Consequentiae* when analyzing Albert's doctrine.

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[44] "Consequentia nunquam est vera vel etiam falsa nisi ipsa sit; et ad hoc quod consequentia sit bona aut vera, oportet quod antecedens et consequens [sint] (sit *ed*.). Et tunc datur regula his suppositis, quod consequentia est bona si impossibile est esse sicut per antecedens significatur, quin ita sit sicut per consequens significatur, Et haec regula potest dupliciter intelligi: uno modo quod sit una propositio de impossibili in sensu composito, eo modo quo communiter solet dici, et est sensus quod consequentia est bona si haec est impossibilis ipsa formata: est ita sicut per antecedens significatur, et non ita est sicut per consequens significatur; et ista regula non valet, quia secundum istam regulam sequeretur quod sophisma esset verum: ['Nulla propositio est negativa, ergo quaedam propositio est negativa']. Alio modo intelligitur quod sit una propositio de impossibili in sensu diviso ita quod sit sensus: consequentia est bona, si qualitercumque per antecedens significatur impossibile est ita esse, quin qualitercumque per consequens significatur sit ita. Et sic apparet quod ista regula non argueret sophisma esse verum." *Sophismata*, c. 8, f. E8v.

We shall now consider Albert's definition and division of the consequences, but first we shall analyze his position in regard to the notions of truth and falsity and some modal terms, since they are very important for the definition of consequence. We find in Albert's works two definitions of a true proposition, which nevertheless are equivalent. In the *Perutilis logica*, Albert defines a true proposition as one that in whatsoever manner signifies, it is so. In the *Quaestiones super libros posteriorum* he states that for the truth of any proposition it is sufficient and required that it is so as the proposition signifies. These definitions, Albert points out, are equivalent because the term 'as' that appears in the second definition has a universal distributive meaning; thus, it could be well interpreted to mean 'in any way.' Hence, if it is thus as the proposition signifies, then it is thus whatsoever the proposition signifies, or it is so in any way the proposition signifies. As a matter of fact, Albert frequently interchanges the two definitions. A false proposition is one in which it is not the case that whatsoever the proposition signifies, it is so; or if it is not so as the proposition signifies, then the proposition is false.[45]

The notion of possibility is clearly a primitive notion in Albert's doctrine as in the medieval logical tradition, since the word 'possible,' or some of its grammatical equivalents, appears in its definition. Perhaps it could be said that a proposition is possible when it is not a formal contradiction, that is, it is not a conjunction of its affirmation and denial, and besides it does not imply any contradiction. Albert simply says that a proposition is possible when whatsoever it signifies, so it can be. The modal term 'impossible' is defined with the aid of denial and possibility, an impossible proposition is one which is not-possible; in other words, a proposition is impossible when it is a contradiction or implies a contradiction, or as Albert puts it, an impossible proposition is one that whatsoever it signifies, it cannot be so. The modal term 'necessary' is for the most defined with the help of denial and possibility, a proposition is necessary when it is true and cannot be false; in other words, when it is true and its denial is impossible; or as Albert states, a necessary proposition is one that whatsoever it signifies, it is necessarily so, or cannot be otherwise. If we symbolize 'possible' by 'P,' 'impossible' by 'Y,'

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[45] "Propositio vera est illa quae qualitercumque significat ita est, propositio autem falsa est illa quae non qualitercumque significat ita est." *Log.*, t. 3, c. 3, f. 18r; *Ibid.*, t. 6, c. 1, f. 43r. "Ad veritatem cuiuslibet propositionis sufficit et requiritur quod sic sit sicut per eam significatur. Pro declaratione istius conclusionis oportet notare quod ly 'sicut' confundit terminum sequentem confuse mobiliter; ergo si sic est sicut per aliquam propositionem significatur, tunc sic est qualitercumque per illam significatur." *Quaestiones super libros posteriorum* (Venice, 1497), q. 11, f. 10r.

'necessary' by 'L,' and the denial by '-,' then we have a primitive notion and two definitions.[46]

$$Pp$$
$$Yp = def - Pp$$
$$Lp = def - P\bar{p}$$

Buridan in his *Consequentiae* examines the notions of truth and possibility in the same manner as Albert, but Buridan finds invalid *de virtute sermonis* the definition of truth as a proposition which whatsoever it signifies, it is so; such a definition is invalid since it covers only the truth of assertoric propositions of the present time, but not for instance propositions of the past or future, nor modal statements. Nevertheless, Buridan explains a sense in which the definition holds, and decides to use it to define the truth of any type of proposition. For instance, an assertoric proposition of the past time is true, if whatsoever it signifies, it was so; a possible proposition is true, if whatsoever it signifies, it is possible to be so.[47]

Information on the notion of the conditional and consequence is provided in three places of the *Perutilis logica:* in the tract on propositions, in the tract on consequences, and in the tract on the insolubles. We are going to analyze the corresponding passages and afterwards draw our conclusions. In the tract on propositions we find that a conditional is an hypothetical proposition compounded of several categoricals linked by means of the conjunction 'if . . . then.' The first opinion that Albert examines, maintains that for the truth of the conditional, it is required that the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent being true also. Albert rejects such an opinion on the grounds that the antecedent can be true without the consequent being stated, and hence, the antecedent can be true without the consequent being true.

The second opinion tries to strengthen the first by requiring for the truth of the conditional, that the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent being true, provided that both are stated. Albert again rejects this definition, because otherwise this conditional would be true: 'If no proposition is negative, then no donkey is running,' and this conditional is not true because the contradictory opposite of the consequent does not imply the contradictory opposite of the antecedent.

The third opinion is Albert's own, and according to it, it is required for the truth of the conditional, that it is impossible that whatsoever

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[46] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 5, f. 27r; *Ibid.*, c. 6, f. 28v; *Ibid.*, t. 6, c. 1, f. 43r; *Quaestiones super libros posteriorum*, q. 16, f. 13v—14r.
[47] Buridan, *Consequentiae*, l. 1, c. 1, f. A2rv.

the antecedent signifies is so without whatsoever the consequent signifies being so, if both antecedent and consequent are stated. We fail to see any difference between the preceding opinions and Albert's, other than to use instead of the term 'true' its definition, but we shall examine this point in a later place. For the falsity of the conditional, Albert requires that it can be that it is so as the antecedent signifies, and nevertheless it is not as the consequent signifies. Albert's definitions of the truth and falsity of the conditional clearly resemble strict implication and the Stoic conditional that requires "connection." It is further confirmed by Albert's definitions of a necessary and of an impossible conditional. For the necessity of the conditional are required the same conditions that are demanded for its truth, and for the impossibility of a conditional it is sufficient that the conditions required for its falsity be present; because every true conditional is necessary, and every false conditional is impossible.[48]

In the tract on consequences, a consequence is defined as a hypothetical or compound proposition composed of the antecedent, the consequent, and the note of consequence which denotes that the antecedent is the antecedent and the consequent is the consequent. Hence, every consequence is good or valid, and no consequence is bad or invalid, because if there is a conditional proposition in which it is denoted that

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[48] "Ad veritatem autem conditionalis dicunt aliqui quod requiritur quod antecedens non possit esse verum, nisi consequens sit verum. Hoc non valet, nam antecedens potest esse verum consequente non existente, ergo antecedens conditionalis vere potest esse verum consequente non existente vero. Alii ergo volentes hoc corrigere dicunt quod ad veritatem conditionalis requiritur quod antecedens non possit esse verum nisi consequens sit verum, si utrumque formetur. Breviter hoc adhuc non valet, nam tunc sequeretur quod ista conditionalis esset vera: 'Si nulla propositio est negativa, nullus asinus est,' et hoc est falsum. Falsitas patet, quia oppositum consequentis non interimit antecedens. Consequentia patet, quia impossibile est antecedens esse verum, ergo impossibile est antecedens esse verum consequente existente falso. Consequentia tenet, antecedens probatur, quia si antecedens posset esse verum, vel hoc esset quando esset, vel quando non esset. Non secundum, nam quando non est, tunc non est verum; nec primum, nam quandocumque ipsum est, tunc aliqua propositio est negativa, ex quo ipsummet est propositio negativa; sed ipsum significat quod nulla propositio est negativa, igitur quandocumque ipsum est, ipsum est falsum. Aliter ergo dicendum est, quod ad veritatem conditionalis requiritur quod impossibile est qualitercumque significat antecedens, quin qualitercumque significat consequens esse, si formetur. Ad falsitatem autem eius requiritur oppositum illius quod requiritur ad eius veritatem, scilicet quod possit esse ita sicut significat antecedens, et tamen non sit ita sicut significat consequens. Ad necessitatem autem conditionalis idem requiritur quod requiritur ad eius veritatem, et ad eius impossibilitatem sufficit idem quod requiritur ad eius falsitatem; ex eo quod omnis conditionalis vera est necessaria, et omnis falsa est impossibilis." *Log.*, t. 3, c. 5, f. 19v.

the antecedent is antecedent, and the consequent is consequent; then, if it is so, the consequence is valid; but if such a conditional signifies that the antecedent is antecedent, and the consequent is consequent, and it is not so; then, there is no consequence, since such a proposition is not composed of antecedent and consequent, as the definition of consequence or conditional requires. But Albert confesses that it is common to say: This or that consequence is not good, but this manner of speech expresses incorrectly the idea that such a proposition and similar ones are not consequences; nevertheless he states that he intends to use such expressions as: 'such a consequence is not good,' or 'the consequence is invalid or false.' We see from the preceding that Albert identifies a good or valid consequence with a true conditional, and this will be confirmed when we analyze Albert's treatment of the logical import of the antecedent and consequent.[49]

The note of consequence is a conjunction that links the antecedent and the consequent, and denotes that the antecedent is the antecedent and the consequent is the consequent. Notes of consequence are the conjunctions 'if ... then,' 'therefore,' and similar ones. There is a difference between these two notes of consequence, 'if' means that the proposition immediately following it, is the antecedent; and 'therefore,' that the proposition immediately following is the consequent. For instance: 'Man is a substance, if man is an animal,' 'Man is an animal' is the antecedent, even if it comes in the second place, after the consequent. In the consequence: 'A man exists, therefore a substance exists,' the consequent is the proposition that comes in the second place, viz., 'a substance exists.'[50]

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[49] "Consequentia autem est propositio hypothetica composita ex antecedente et consequente, et nota consequentiae denotans antecedens esse antecedens et consequens esse consequens. Ex quo infertur quod omnis consequentia est bona, et nulla consequentia est mala. Patet, nam si est aliqua propositio conditionalis per quam denotatur antecedens esse antecedens et consequens esse consequens, et si est ita, tunc est consequentia bona; si autem significatur per eam antecedens esse antecedens, et consequens esse consequens, et non est ita, tunc non est consequentia, ex eo quod non est composita ex antecedente et consequente. ... Sed diceres, tamen communiter dicimus quod illa consequentia est mala, ad quam sequitur quod illa est consequentia, et tamen non est bona. Respondetur quod propter hoc quando sic dicimus, intelligimus hoc: non esse consequentia, quamvis hoc tamen improprie exponamus per illam orationem: 'Illa consequentia est mala.' Et ad illum intellectum amplius intendo istis orationibus uti: 'Talis consequentia non valet,' 'Talis consequentia est mala,' 'Talis consequentia est falsa'," *Log.*, t. 4, c. 1, f. 24r.

[50] "Nota autem consequentiae dicitur conjunctio copulativa copulans antecedens cum consequente, per quam designatur antecedens esse antecedens et consequens esse consequens; sicut est illa coniunctio 'si,' vel 'ergo,'

The first opinion on the notion of antecedent and consequent is similar to the first opinion we met when we studied the conditional in Albert. According to this position, a proposition is antecedent to another, if it is impossible that such a proposition is true, and the other is not true; and a proposition is consequent to another, if it is impossible that such a proposition is not true, when the other is true. Albert rejects this position because the proposition 'Every man is an animal,' is antecedent to this: 'Some man is an animal,' and nevertheless the first can be true without the second, since the first can be stated without the second, and hence the first can be true without the second.[51]

The second opinion holds that a proposition is antecedent to another, if it is impossible that such a proposition is true without the other being true, if both are stated. And a proposition is consequent to another, if it is impossible that such proposition is not true, while the other is true, if both are stated. Albert does not accept this second opinion, because this proposition: 'No proposition is negative,' is not antecedent to this other: 'No man is a donkey.' But if the second opinion would be accepted then the first proposition would be antecedent to the second, because it is impossible that the first proposition is true, therefore it is impossible that it is true without the second being true, provided they are stated. It is impossible that the first proposition is true because it cannot be true when stated, and it cannot be true when it is not stated. It cannot be true if it is stated, because such a proposition: 'No proposition is negative', is a negative proposition; hence, if it is stated, some proposition is negative; but it signifies that there is not negative proposition, hence, when the proposition is stated, things are otherwise as the proposition signifies, and consequently the proposition is not true. And it cannot be true when it is not stated, because it is required that a proposition be stated in order to be qualified as true. But the proposition: 'No proposition is negative,' is not antecedent to this other: 'No man is a donkey,' or to this: 'No man is running,' because from the contra-

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vel istarum aequivalens. Et differunt istae coniunctiones 'si', et 'ergo,' quia ly 'ergo' significat quod propositio immediate sequens eam est consequens; sed ly 'si' significat quod propositio immediate sequens eam est antecedens, et alia consequens." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 1, f. 24r.

[51] "Dicunt aliqui quod illa propositio dicitur antecedens ad aliam quam impossibile est esse veram alia non existente vera, et illa est consequens ad reliquam quam impossibile est non esse veram alia existente vera. Sed illud non valet, quia ista: 'Omnis homo est animal,' est antecedens ad illam: 'Aliquis homo est animal,' et tamen prima potest esse vera secunda non existente vera: quia prima potest esse secunda non existente, et per consequens secunda non existente vera, prima potest esse vera." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 1, f. 23v.

dictory opposite of the consequent does not follow the contradictory opposite of the antecedent. Thus it does not follow: 'Some man is a donkey, therefore some proposition is negative,' or 'Some man is running, therefore some proposition is negative.'[52]

We do not think that Albert succeeds in proving his point within his own system. If he means that the proposition in question is not antecedent to the mentioned propositions when they are considered as analyzed, or in the logic of terms, then Albert is correct. But it is not so in the logic of propositions. Albert himself admits that the proposition: 'No proposition is negative,' is false when stated; moreover, he states that from a false proposition any other follows; hence, the proposition is antecedent to any other. Furthermore, according to Albert's principles the proposition: 'No man is a donkey,' is necessary, and the contradictory of a necessary proposition is impossible, therefore, 'Some man is a donkey,' is impossible; and since Albert admits that an impossible proposition is antecedent to any other, or implies any other, then, the proposition: 'Some man is a donkey,' is antecedent to any other.

Once Albert has rejected the two mentioned opinions, he formulates his own. A proposition is antecedent to another when it has such a relationship to the other, that it is impossible that it is so whatsoever the first proposition signifies, without being so whatsoever the second proposition signifies. Albert promises in the beginning of the tract on consequences to give a definition of consequent along with the definition of antecedent, but the edition of the *Perutilis logica* does not have the definition of consequent, neither the manuscripts that we examined

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[52] "Alii dicunt illam propositionem esse antecedens ad aliam quam impossibile est esse veram, alia non existente vera, si formetur; et illam esse consequens ad aliam quam impossibile est non esse veram, si formetur, alia existente vera, si formetur. Illud etiam non sufficit, quia ista propositio: 'Nulla propositio est negativa,' non est antecedens ad istam: 'Nullus homo est asinus,' et tamen impossibile est eam veram esse, alia non existente vera si formetur; unde impossibile est istam esse veram: 'Nulla propositio est negativa,' et per consequens impossibile est eam esse veram, alia non existente vera, si formetur, sed quod propositio praedicta non sit antecedens ad illam: 'Nullus homo est asinus,' patet, quia ex opposito contradictorio istius: 'Nullus homo est asinus,' vel saltem istius: 'Nullus homo currit,' non infertur oppositum istius: 'Nulla propositio est negativa.' Non enim sequitur: 'Aliquis homo est asinus, ergo aliqua propositio est negativa,' nec similiter sequitur: 'Aliquis homo currit, ergo aliqua propositio est negativa.' . . . Quod autem impossibile sit ipsam esse veram: 'Nulla propositio est negativa,' patet, quia nec potest esse vera quando est, nec potest esse vera quando ipsa non est. Non enim quando est, quia quando ipsa est, aliqua propositio negativa est, ex eo quod ipsamet est negativa; sed ipsa significat nullam propositionem negativam esse, ergo quando ipsa est, aliter est quam per ipsam significatur, et per consequens quando est, non est vera. Nec potest dici quod sit vera quando ipsa non est, nam ad hoc quod propositio sit vera requiritur quod ipsa sit." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 1, f. 23v—24r.

have it, except B (Bologna, Comm. dell'Arch., A. 887), but the definition given by B is contrary to Albert's principles. But since antecedent and consequent are correlative terms, it is not difficult it reconstruct the notion of consequent. A proposition is consequent to another, if the first has such a relationship to the other, that it is impossible that it is not so whatsoever the one signifies, when it is so whatsoever the other signifies.[53]

We fail to see any difference between Albert's definition of antecedent and the definition of antecedent given by the first opinion, except that Albert, instead of using the terms 'true' or 'false,' uses the definitions of these terms provided by himself. Buridan in his *Consequentiae* examines the three definitions of antecedent and consequent which we met in Albert. The first two are found to be defective for the same reasons that Albert rejects them. The third opinion, which Albert retains, is considered by Buridan as not true *de virtute sermonis*, since it supposes that a proposition is true because whatsoever it signifies, it is so; and as we have seen, this definition is not accepted by Buridan in his *Consequentiae* without restriction, although when interpreted in a certain sense, it is accepted by the same author. Thus, Buridan concludes that the three definitions of antecedent and consequent are acceptable, and that he himself is often going to use the first description, but that he will use also any one of the three, and he does so in the course of the *Consequentiae*.[54]

Albert draws several conclusions from his definition of antecedent. The first is that this proposition: 'Every proposition is affirmative,' is antecedent to this other: 'No proposition is negative,' because from the contradictory opposite of the consequent, the contradictory opposite of the antecedent follows. The opposite of the consequent is: 'Some proposition is negative,' and from it follows this other proposition: 'Not every proposition is affirmative,' which is the contradictory of the antecedent.

It is argued against such a consequence that if the consequent, viz. 'No proposition is negative,' is impossible to be true, then, it is impossible; and since the antecedent, viz., 'Every proposition is affirmative,' is possible, then, a possible proposition implies an impossible one, which is false. Albert answers that it is not the same to qualify a proposition as impossible and as impossibly true. A proposition is possible if it can

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[53] "Aliter ergo dicendum est, quod propositio illa dicitur antecedens ad aliam quae sic se habet ad eam, quod impossibile est qualitercumque est significabile per eam stante impositione terminorum sic esse, quin qualitercumque alia significat ita sit." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 1, f. 24r.

[54] *Consequentiae*, 1. 1, c. 3, f. A3rv.

be so as the proposition signifies, and the proposition: 'No proposition is negative,' is possible, since it can be that no proposition exists, and hence it can be that no proposition is negative. A proposition is possibly true if it is possible to be so as it signifies, and when it is thus, the proposition can be stated without contradiction *(ipsam non repugnat esse);* this is not the case with the proposition: 'No proposition is negative;' but the proposition: 'Every proposition is affirmative,' is possible and possibly true. This, Albert remarks, is what is commonly expressed in these words: Those propositions, whose actual existence or statement *(actus exercitus)* is repugnant to its signification *(actus significatus),* are impossibly true, although it is possible that it is so as they signify. Thus, when it is possible that the proposition exists, and at the same time it is possible that it is so as the proposition signifies, then, the actual existence of the proposition is not repugnant to its signification, and the proposition is possibly true. But if it is possible that it is so as the proposition signifies, and at the same time it is not possible that the proposition exists, then, the actual existence of the proposition is repugnant to its signification, and the proposition is not possibly true. In the consequence: 'Every proposition is affirmative, therefore no proposition is negative,' the actual existence of the consequent is repugnant to the signification of the antecedent; but the signification of the consequent is not repugnant to the signification of the antecedent; and the actual existence of the consequent is repugnant to its signification.[55]

It is again objected, Albert continues, that the same consequence: 'Every proposition is affirmative, therefore no proposition is negative,' is not valid; because it is possible that the antecedent is true, and it is

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[55] "Ex isto sequitur quod ista: 'Omnis propositio est affirmativa,' est antecedens ad istam: 'Nulla propositio est negativa,' quamvis antecedens sit possibile esse verum, non obstante quod consequens impossibile sit esse verum. Sed contra, si consequens impossibile est esse verum, tunc consequens est impossibile; et sic ex possibili sequitur impossibile, quod est falsum. Respondetur negando consequentiam istam: 'Consequens impossibile est esse verum, ergo consequens est impossibile,' unde multa sunt possibilia quae tamen impossibile est esse vera. Unde propositio dicitur possibilis per quam significatur sicut possibile est esse, modo sic est de illa: 'Nulla propositio est negativa;' sicut enim potest esse quod nulla propositio sit, ergo etiam potest esse quod nulla propositio est negativa. Sed propositio quam possibile est veram est illa quae significat sicut possibile est esse, et quando sic est ipsam non repugnat esse; modo sic non est de illa: 'Nulla propositio est negativa,' unde quando sic est vel sic erit sicut per eam significatur, tunc repugnat ipsam esse. Et hoc est quod consuetum erat dici sub his verbis: Quod propositiones quarum actus exercitus repugnat actui significato, impossibile est esse veras, quamvis possibile sit sic esse sicut per eas significatur." *Log.,* t. 4, c. 1, f. 24r; Cfr. *Ibid.,* t. 6, c. 1, f. 44v.

impossible that the consequent is true, as we have seen. Albert answers that some consequences are valid in which the antecedent can be true and the consequent cannot be true, although the consequent is possible. This solution implies that for the validity of a consequence, it is not required that the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent being true; but is is sufficient and required that it is impossible that it is so as the antecedent signifies, and at the same time it is not so as the consequent signifies. Furthermore, some consequence is good in which the antecedent is true and the consequent is false.[56]

We think that Albert's preoccupation with the insolubles, and his eagerness to secure a definition of truth that would avoid the paradoxes of the insolubles, carries him too far. He forgets that in defining the truth-conditions of a conditional and the validity of a consequence he is using his definition of truth, and leads us to believe that his definition of conditional or consequence is different from the other two opinions that he rejects. Besides, Albert's distinctions between possible and possibly true, impossible and impossibly true, seem to be inconsistent within his own system, since he states that if a proposition cannot be true, then it is impossible. Albert uses the expression: *non potest stare*, which we translate 'cannot be true,' since for Albert *stare* means that it is so as the proposition signifies, and this last sentence defines a true proposition. This inconsistency is even more apparent in Buridan's *Consequentiae* in which he also distinguishes between possible and possibly true, impossible and impossibly true; but then he defines that a proposition "stands," when it is true or when it is thus whatsoever the proposition signifies; and that if a proposition cannot be true, then it is impossible, and from it any other follows. The most unhappy conclusion of Albert's due to his definition of antecedent, together with the distinction between possible and possibly true, is that there is some valid consequence in which the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. This is contrary to Albert's explicit position, that it is impossible that from a true proposition a false proposition follows.[57]

Consequences are classified by Albert into formal and material. A formal consequence is one that is valid by its form, hence, any proposition of similar form is a valid consequence; for instance: 'Some B is an A,

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[56] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 6, c. 1, f. 44 v. "Aliqua consequentia est bona ubi tamen si antecedens est verum, consequens est falsum; ut patet in praedicta consequentia, scilicet: 'Omnis propositio est affirmativa, igitur nulla propositio est negativa." *Ibid.*

[57] *Consequentiae*, I. 1, c. 6, f. A6v, A7r. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 24v.

therefore some A is a B.' A material consequence holds by its matter, thus, not every proposition of similar form or structure is a valid consequence; or as it is commonly expressed, a material consequence is one that does not hold for all categorematic terms, when the same form is retained. For instance, this is a material consequence: 'A man is running, therefore an animal is running,' because the consequence does not hold using other categorematic terms and retaining the same form, as in the following consequence: 'A man is running, therefore a piece of wood is running.' What the form and matter of propositions are, has been explained in the first chapter. Briefly, the matter of propositions or consequences consists of the categorematic terms, the form is made up of the syncategorematic terms and the order or relative position in the proposition of both syncategorematic and categorematic terms.[58]

Material consequences are further subdivided into "simple" consequences *(consequentiae simplices)*, and "as of now" consequences *(consequentiae ut nunc)*. A material "simple" consequence is one that is good in an unrestricted sense *(simpliciter loquendo)*, because it is such that it is impossible that it is so as the antecedent signifies, without being so as the consequent signifies. A material "as of now" consequence is one which is not good in an unrestricted sense, because it is possible that it is so as the antecedent signifies, without being so as the consequent signifies. But this type of consequence is good at the present moment *(ut nunc)*, because it is impossible, the state of things being so as at the present time, that it is so as the antecedent signifies, without being so as the consequent signifies. We, Albert remarks, often use these consequences in a popular way; for instance, when we say: 'Socrates is running, therefore a master of arts is running.' Material "as of now" consequences are reduced to formal consequences by the addition of one or more true, but necessary, propositions; as in the following: 'Socrates is running, Socrates is a master of arts, therefore a master of arts is running.' Some logicians, Albert continues, deny the validity of the material "as of now" consequences, but he rejects this opinion.[59]

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[58] "Consequentiarum alia formalis, alia materialis. Consequentia formalis dicitur illa cui omnis propositio similis in forma, quae si formaretur, esset bona consequentia; sicut hic: 'Quod est B est A, ergo quod est A est B.' Sed consequentia materialis est cui non omnis similis in forma esset bona consequentia, si formaretur; vel sicut communiter dicitur, quae non tenet in omnibus terminis forma consimili retenta; sicut hic: 'Homo currit, ergo animal currit,' quia in his terminis non valet consequentia: 'Homo currit, ergo lignum currit.'" *Log.*, t. 4, c. 1, f. 24r.

[59] "Alia est divisio consequentiarum materialium, quaedam enim sunt quae vocantur consequentiae simpliciter, aliae quae vocantur consequentiae ut nunc. Consequentiae simpliciter vocantur quae simpliciter loquendo sunt

From the preceding discussions, we gather that Albert follows Peter of Spain and Buridan's *Compendium logicae* in his notion of the conditional and his general characterization of the logical import of a consequence; but he follows Ockham, although simplifying him, in his division of consequences and the notions of formal and material consequences. And, of course, Albert follows almost literally Buridan's *Consequentiae*, as is true for the whole tract on consequences found in the *Perutilis logica*, as we have already mentioned. We are convinced that the formal consequence of Albert corresponds to the notion of logical or inferential implication of modern symbolic logic. The "simple" consequence finds its counterpart in the connective implication of the Stoics, and in strict implication of modern logic. The "as of now" consequence would correspond to the Philonian conditional, and to the truth-functional conditional or material implication of modern logic.

We feel some problem in the interpretation of Albert's "as of now" consequence as a truth-functional conditional, for the following reasons. Albert rejects as a good consequence this proposition: 'A man is running, therefore a man is disputing,' which would be a true material implication provided that the antecedent is false or the consequent true. Albert even remarks that such a consequence is no more a consequence than this proposition: 'Adam or a dead man is a man.' But since Albert makes this remark when he is treating the general definition of consequence, which he conceives in modal terms, we cannot say beyond doubt that he would deny validity of such a consequence as an as of now consequence. We find further difficulty in another passage when Albert discusses the notions of pertinent and impertinent. Something is pertinent to another if it follows from or is repugnant to the other, for instance: 'An animal is running', is a pertinent proposition regarding this other: 'A man is running,' because the first follows from the second; the proposition: 'No animal is running,' is pertinent to this other: 'A man is running,' because the second is repugnant to the first. Something is

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bonae, et sic se habent quod non est possibile sic esse sicut significat antecedens, quin sic sit sicut significat consequens. Consequentiae autem ut nunc vocantur quae non sunt simpliciter loquendo bonae, quia possibile est sic esse sicut significat antecedens, sine hoc quod sit sic sicut significat consequens; sed bonae sunt ut nunc, quia impossibile est rebus omnino se habentibus ut nunc se habent, sic esse sicut significat antecedens, quin sit sic sicut significat consequens. Et istis consequentiis vulgariter saepe utimur, verbi gratia, ut si dicamus: 'Sortes currit, ergo magister in artibus currit,' supposito quod Sortes sit magister in artibus. Et illa consequentia reducitur ad consequentiam formalem per additionem alicuius propositionis verae, non tamen necessariae, vel aliquarum verarum, non tamen necessariarum; verbi gratia: 'Sortes currit, Sortes est magister in artibus, ergo magister in artibus currit'." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 1, f. 24r.

impertinent to another when it does not follow nor is repugnant to the other, for instance, the proposition: 'You are sitting,' is impertinent to this other: 'Socrates is writing,' because the first does not follow from, nor is repugnant to the second. Hence, we have that the consequence: 'Socrates is running, therefore you are sitting,' does not hold; but it would hold truth-functionally provided that the antecedent is true or the consequent false; but since Albert does not deny that it would hold as an as of now consequence, we prefer to interpret this passage as denying that such a consequence holds as a formal or as a simple consequence.[60]

Albert maintains also, as we saw, that the as of now consequence can be reduced to a formal consequence by the addition of a true but not necessary proposition, which is composed of two of the terms of the antecedent and consequent. Buridan in his *Consequentiae* holds this also and, besides, he expressly states a similar reduction for the "simple" consequence, viz., by the addition of a necessary proposition. But we think that if these consequences are to be kept as material, then they are not to be reduced, because the reduction makes them formal consequences, valid by their syntactical form alone.[61]

We may therefore, interpret Albert's "as of now" consequence as a truth-functional conditional. Thus, if we represent the note of an as of now consequence by '⊃,' we have the following definition:

$$(p \supset q) = \text{def.} - (p \cdot \overline{q})$$

We interpret "simple" consequence as strict or necessary implication, and if we symbolize the note of "simple" consequence by '⊃̄,' then we have the following definition:

$$(p \overline{\supset} q) = \text{def. } L (p \supset q)$$
$$\text{or}$$
$$(p \overline{\supset} q) = \text{def. } Y (p \cdot \overline{q})$$

We shall now consider the notion of consequence in two authors, whose writings pertinent to this subject are dated around the beginning of the sixteenth century. They are Le Fèvre d'Etaples and his pupil Clichtove.

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[60] "Illa non est magis consequentia: 'Homo currit, ergo homo disputat,' quam ista: 'Adam vel homo mortuus est homo'." *Log.*, t. 1, c. 1, f. 24r. "Pertinens alicui dicitur quod ad ipsum sequitur vel sibi repugnat; verbi gratia, sicut illa: 'Animal currit,' est pertinens isti: 'Homo currit,' quia sequitur ad ipsam; similiter ista: 'Nullum animal currit,' est pertinens isti: 'Homo currit,' quia repugnat sibi. ... Impertinens alicui dicitur quod nec sibi repugnat, nec ad ipsum sequitur; sicut: 'Tu sedes,' est impertinens isti: 'Sortes scribit,' quia nec sequitur ad eam, nec sibi repugnat," *Ibid.*, t. 6, c. 1, f. 46v.
[61] Cfr. Buridan, *Consequentiae*, 1. 1, c. 4, f. A3v—A4r.

We think it important to examine their doctrines because we find in them a clear confirmation of our interpretation of Albert's simple consequence as necessary implication, and because in Clichtove there is to be found a plain denial of material implication. According to Le Fèvre, a conditional is an hypothetical or compound proposition whose principal link is the note of inference 'if . . . then,' or an equivalent. A conditional is true, if it is impossible that its antecedent is true and its consequent is false. A false conditional is one in which it is possible that the antecedent is true and the consequent false. A consequence is an hypothetical proposition whose principal connective is the note of inference. Notes of inference are: 'therefore,' 'consequently,' 'if . . . then,' 'since,' 'hence,' and similar ones. A bad consequence is one in which it is possible that its antecedent is true and its consequent false. A good consequence is one in which it is impossible that its antecedent is true and its consequent false.[62]

Commenting on these notions, Clichtove points out that the definition of conditional and consequence clearly show that every good consequence is a true conditional, and vice versa; and that every bad consequence is a false conditional, and vice versa. Moreover, in the definitions of true and false conditional, or of good or bad consequence, the modal terms possible and impossible make the modified propositions modals *in sensu composito*.[63]

Clichtove defines a good and bad consequence in a slightly different manner from Le Fèvre, but he remarks that both definitions are equivalent. A good consequence, for Clichtove, is one in which it is necessary that when the antecedent is true, the consequent is at the same time true. This definition describes a modal proposition *in sensu composito*: It is necessary that if the antecedent of a good consequence is true, then

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[62] "Propositio conditionalis est propositio hypothetica cuius principalis copula est nota illationis 'si' aut illi aequivalens. Conditionalis vera est conditionalis cuius antecedens esse verum consequente existente falso, est impossibile. . . . Conditionalis falsa est conditionalis cuius possibile est antecedens esse verum consequente existente falso." *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. 7, f. 125v—126r. "Consequentia est propositio hypothetica cuius principalis copula est nota illationis. Notae illationis sunt: 'ergo,' 'ideo,' 'igitur,' 'itaque,' si,' 'siquidem,' 'utique,' et similes. . . . Consequentia mala est cuius antecedens esse verum consequente existente falso, est possibile. Consequentia bona est consequentia cuius antecedens esse verum consequente existente falso, est impossibile." *Ibid.*, f. 117v—118r.

[63] "Et summatim, omnis bona consequentia est conditionalis vera, et a diverso; ut ex definitionibus utriusque constat. Similiter omnis mala consequentia est conditionalis falsa, et e contra; ut utriusque definitiones clare ostendunt." *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. 7, f. 126v. "In his autem definitionibus modi possibile et impossibile modales faciunt compositas, quomodo in disciplinis accipiuntur." *Ibid.*, f. 118v.

its consequent is true at the same time; or in other words: it is impossible that in a good consequence the antecedent is true, and the consequent false at the same time. The terms 'necessary' and 'impossible' have to be taken as forming modal propositions *in sensu composito*. Here we have a clear case of strict implication.

$$(p \dashv 3\ q) = \text{def. Y } (p \cdot \overline{q})$$

A bad consequence is the one in which, although the antecedent is true, it is not necessary that the consequent be true at the same time; in other words, a bad consequence is one in which the antecedent can be true and the consequent false at the same time. The modal terms used in these definitions are to be understood as forming modal propositions *in sensu composito*. Hence, we have:[64]

$$- (p \dashv 3\ q) = \text{def. P } (p \cdot \overline{q})$$

From the definitions of a good and bad consequence, it can be concluded, Clichtove continues, that the validity of a consequence does not depend on the truth of the antecedent or of the consequent, but on the necessary relationship of truth that the consequent has towards the antecedent. Thus, in a good consequence, it is possible that the antecedent is true and the consequent is true, as in this consequence: 'A man is an animal, therefore man is a substance.' It is possible, too, that in a good consequence the antecedent is false and the consequent is true, for instance: 'Man is a horse, therefore man is an animal.' It is possible that in a good consequence the antecedent is false and the consequent is false, for instance: 'Man is a horse, therefore man is irrational.' But never is it possible that the antecedent is true and the consequent false.[65]

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[64] "Bona consequentia est cuius si antecedens sit verum, et consequens simul verum esse, est necesse. . . . Mala consequentia est cuius etsi antecedens sit verum, non oportet eius consequens simul esse verum." *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. 1, f. 12rv. "Praeterea definitiones consequentiae bonae et malae intelliguntur in sensu composito, hoc pacto: Necesse est, si bonae consequentiae antecedens sit verum, et eius consequens simul esse verum; sive quod in idem reddit: Impossibile est antecedens bonae consequentiae esse verum, et simul eius consequens esse falsum; capiendo necesse et impossibile ut faciunt modales compositas. . . . Mala autem consequentia est cuius antecedens potest esse verum et consequens simul falsum; quae definitio eiusdem est sententia cum definitione posita in littera." *Ibid.*, f. 13v.

[65] "Unde bonitas consequentiae non pendet ex eo quod antecedens est verum, aut consequens verum, sed ex necessaria habitudine antecedentis ad consequens penes veritatem. Potest enim bonae consequentiae antecedens esse verum et consequens verum, ut: 'Homo est animal, ergo homo est substantia.' Potest et antecedens esse falsum, consequente existente vero, ut: 'Homo est equus, ergo homo est animal.' Denique potest antecedens esse falsum et consequens falsum, ut: 'Homo est equus, ergo homo est

The invalidity of a consequence does not depend on the falsity of the antecedent or of the consequent, but on the lack of necessary relationship of truth of the consequent towards the antecedent. Thus, it can be that in a bad consequence the antecedent is true and the consequent is true, for instance: 'Some man exists, therefore some horse exists.' It is possible that in a bad consequence the antecedent is true and the consequent false, for instance: 'Man is an animal, therefore man is brute.' It is possible that in a bad consequence the antecedent is false and the consequent is true, for instance: 'No man exists, therefore some horse exists.' Finally, it can be that in a bad consequence the antecedent is false and the consequent is false, for instance: 'No man exists, therefore no horse exists.' This description of an invalid consequence is a plain denial of material implication. Le Fèvre and Clichtove distinguish in a manner closely akin to Ockham and Albert of Saxony, a formal and material consequence, the latter taken as material simple consequence; but we abstain from further discussion of these notions. We now proceed to examine Albert's notion of equivalence.[66]

EQUIVALENCE

A notion closely related to implication, is that of equivalence or equipollence. It is described by Albert in several places of the *Perutilis logica* as mutual consequence; and since there are two types of consequence, formal and material, we may distinguish also two types of equivalence, formal and material. Material equivalence has subdivisions similar to those of material consequence, viz.; "as of now" material equivalence and "simple" material equivalence. Hence, if we symbolize "as of now" equivalence by '$\equiv$,' and "simple" equivalence by '$\cdot$,' then, we have the following definitions:[67]

$$(p \equiv q) = \text{def.} \ [(p \supset q) \cdot (q \supset p)]$$
$$(p \equiv q) = \text{def.} \ [(p \overline{\supset} q) \ (q \overline{\supset} p)]$$

We proceed now to study the rules for propositional formal consequences.

irrationalis.' Sed nunquam potest antecedens esse verum et consequens falsum." *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. I, f. 13v—14r.

[66] "Invaliditas consequentiae non evenit ex falsitate antecedentis et consequentis, sed ex eo quod non est necessaria antecedentis ad consequens in veritate habitudo. Potest enim malae consequentiae antecedens esse verum, et consequens verum, ut: 'Homo est, ergo equus est;' potest et antecedens esse verum, consequente existente falso, ut: 'Homo est animal, ergo homo est brutum;' praeterea potest antecedens esse falsum, et consequens verum, ut: 'Nullus homo est, ergo equus est;' denique potest antecedens esse falsum, et consequens falsum, ut: 'Nullus homo est, ergo nullus equus est'." *Introductiones in logicam*, intr. I, f. 14r.

[67] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 2, c. 10, f. 15v—16r; *Ibid.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25r; *Ibid.*, c. 5, f. 27rv; *Ibid.*, t. 6, c. 1, f. 43v.

RULES FOR FORMAL PROPOSITIONAL CONSEQUENCES

First rule. It is a valid consequence to argue from a proposition to its contradictory opposite when the latter is preceded by the denial 'not.' For instance: 'Socrates is running, therefore it is not the case that Socrates is not running;' another example: 'Socrates is not running, therefore it is not the case that Socrates is running.' The first instance exemplifies the law of double denial. Albert enunciates this rule in the tract on topical consequences, but he remarks that it should be listed with the formal and not among the dialectical consequences. We shall give after each rule a symbolic interpretation of the thesis described by the rule.[68]

$$p \; \overline{\supset} \; - \; (\overline{p})$$
$$\overline{p} \; \supset \; - \; (p)$$

Second rule. It is a formal consequence to argue from a copulative proposition to either one of its constituents. This rule describes the laws of simplification of modern logic.[69]

$$(p \cdot q) \; \overline{\supset} \; p$$
$$(p \cdot q) \; \overline{\supset} \; q$$

Third rule. It is sufficient for the falsity of a copulative proposition that one of its constituents be false.[70]

$$\overline{p} \; \overline{\supset} \; - \; (p \cdot q)$$
$$\overline{q} \; \supset \; - \; (p \cdot q)$$

Fourth rule. Any proposition formally infers a disjunction in which the first proposition is a part. This rule refers to the laws of addition.[71]

$$p \; \supset \; (p \lor q)$$
$$q \; \overline{\supset} \; (p \lor q)$$

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[68] "Iuxta locum a contradictoriis complexis sit ista regula: ab uno contradictoriorum ad reliquum, praeposita ista negatione 'non,' est bona consequentia. Propter hoc bene sequitur: 'Sortes currit, igitur non: Sortes non currit;' similiter sequitur: 'Sortes non currit, igitur non: Sortes currit.' Et potest dici quod tales consequentiae non debent computari inter consequentias dialecticas, postquam sunt consequentiae formales tenentes in quibuscumque terminis." *Log.* t. 4, c. 24, f. 36v—37r.

[69] "Sequitur ex consequentia formali . . . a tota copulativa ad alteram eius partem." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 24v.

[70] "Ad falsitatem copulativae sufficit alteram partem esse falsam." *Log.*, t. 3, c. 5, f. 19r.

[71] "Quaelibet propositio infert formaliter unam disiunctivam cuius ipsa est pars." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 24v.

Fifth rule. It is a formal consequence to argue from a disjunction and the denial of one of its parts, to the other constituent part. This rule speaks about the laws of the disjunctive syllogism.[72]

$$[(p \lor q) \cdot \bar{p}] \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} q$$
$$[(p \lor q) \quad \bar{q}] \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} p$$

Sixth rule. Every consequence that is similar in form to the following is a formal consequence: 'Socrates exists, and Socrates does not exist, therefore a stick is in the corner.' This rule is commonly stated as: Every copulative proposition composed of two contradictory propositions formally implies any other proposition.

$$(p \cdot \bar{p}) \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} q$$

Albert proves this rule in the following manner. This is a formal consequence: 'Socrates exists, and Socrates does not exist, therefore Socrates exists.' It is a formal consequence because from a copulative proposition is inferred one of its parts. Moreover, it follows: 'Socrates exists, therefore Socrates exists, or a stick is in the corner;' this consequence is valid, because any proposition formally infers a disjunction of which the same proposition is a part. Thus, we have the proposition: 'Socrates exists, or a stick is in the corner,' and we also have: 'Socrates does not exist,' as found in the second part of the copulation; therefore we may form the valid consequence: 'Socrates exists, or a stick is in the corner; and Socrates does not exist: therefore a stick is in the corner.' The consequence is valid, since it is a formal consequence to infer one part of a disjunction from the disjunctive proposition and the denial of one of its parts.[73]

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[72] "A tota disiunctiva cum destructione unius eius partis ad alteram partem est bona consequentia." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v.

[73] "Quaelibet talis consequentia est formalis: 'Sortes est, et Sortes non est, ergo baculus stat in angulo.' Probatur, nam sequitur ex consequentia formali: 'Sortes est, et Sortes non est, ergo Sortes est,' a tota copulativa ad alteram eius partem; similiter sequitur: 'Sortes est, et Sortes non est, ergo Sortes non est,' per eandem regulam. Et sequitur ultra: 'Sortes est, ergo Sortes est, vel baculus stat in angulo,' tenet consequentia, nam quaelibet propositio infert formaliter unam disiunctivam cuius ipsa est pars; et tunc ultra: 'Sortes est, vel baculus stat in angulo; sed, per secundam partem praedictae copulativae, Sortes non est; ergo baculus stat in angulo,' consequentia tenet, nam a disiunctiva cum destructione unius eius partis ad aliam est consequentia formalis: quia omnis propositio sibi similis in forma, si formaretur, esset bona consequentia. Ista regula solet poni sub his verbis: ad omnem copulativam ex duabus contradictoriis compositam sequitur quaelibet alia, consequentia formali." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 25r.

Seventh rule. If a proposition is assumed as true, then, it is necessary that when 'p' is true, 'q' or 'not-q' are true together with 'p.' This rule describes one of the laws of expansion.[74]

$$p \supset [\bar{p} \cdot (q \vee \bar{q})]$$

Eighth rule. The contradictory of a copulative proposition is a disjunction composed of parts which are the contradictories of the constituents of the copulative. For instance, the contradictory of this proposition: 'Socrates is running, and Plato is disputing,' is the following: 'Socrates is not running, or Plato is not disputing,' The contradictory of a disjunction is a copulative composed of the parts which are the contradictories of the parts of the disjunction. For instance, the contradictory of this disjunction: 'It is not the case that Socrates is running, and Plato is disputing,' is this copulative proposition: 'Socrates is not running, and Plato is not disputing.' This eighth rule is concerned with the so-called De Morgan laws.

$$-\ (p \cdot q) \equiv (\bar{p} \vee \bar{q})$$
$$-\ (p \vee q) \equiv (\bar{p} \cdot \bar{q})$$

Albert proves the first part of the rule by the following reasoning. The cause of the falsity of a copulative is either that both constituent parts are false, or that one of them is false; since for the falsity of a copulative it is sufficient that one of its parts be false. And if both parts or at least one of the parts of the copulative is false, it follows that both parts or at least one part of the disjunction is true, since the disjunction is composed of parts which are the contradictories of the constituents of the copulative; and since for the truth of a disjunction it is sufficient that one of its parts be true, it follows that the whole disjunction is true. Albert does not offer any proof of the second part of the rule, but it is not too difficult to see that the proof would follow along similar lines of the proof of the first part of the rule.[75]

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[74] "Necesse est stante A, stare B vel non-B." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 24 v.

[75] "Propositioni copulativae contradicit propositio disiunctiva composita ex partibus contradicentibus copulativae, unde contradictoria istius: 'Sortes currit, et Plato disputat,' est 'Sortes non currit, vel Plato non disputat.' . . . Contradictoria disiunctivae affirmativae est una copulativa ex partibus contradictoriis partium disiunctivae composita, ergo propositio contradicens disiunctivae affirmativae aequivalet uni copulativae; ergo ista: 'Non tu curris, vel tu non curris,' valet istam: 'Tu non curris, et tu curris.'" *Log.*, t. 3, c. 5, f. 19 r; Cfr. *Ibid.*, t. 6, c. 1, f. 43 v. For the history of these so-called De Morgan's laws, Cfr. Boehner, "Bemerkungen zur Geschichte der De Morganschen Gesetze in der Scholastik," *Archiv für Philosophie* (September, 1951), 113—146.

Ninth rule. An impossible proposition implies any other.

$$Yp \supset (p \supset q)$$

The proof of this rule is based on the definition of antecedent and consequent. If any proposition is impossible, then it is impossible that such an impossible proposition is true without any other proposition being true also. Therefore, an impossible proposition is antecedent to any other, or it implies any other. This rule, Albert adds, is commonly stated in these terms: From an impossibility any thing follows; for instance: 'Every man is a donkey, therefore a man is running.'[76]

Tenth rule. Any proposition implies a necessary proposition.

$$Nq \supset (p \supset q)$$

This rule is proven from the definition of antecedent and consequent. It is impossible that a necessary proposition is not true; therefore, it is impossible that a necessary proposition is not true, if things are as any other proposition signifies, or in other words, if any other proposition is true. Hence, a necessary proposition is consequent to any other; for instance: 'A man is running, therefore every donkey is an animal,' 'A man is running, therefore God exists.' In the first instance, Albert warns, we have to suppose with Aristotle that the proposition: 'Every donkey is an animal,' is a necessary proposition.[77]

Eleventh rule. Any proposition implies any other whose contradictory opposite cannot stand together with the first; and no proposition implies any other whose contradictory opposite can stand together with the former. A proposition stands together with another in case that, when it is so as one signifies, it is consistent that it is so as the other signifies.

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[76] "Ad propositionem impossibilem sequitur quaelibet alia. Probatur per quid nominis antecedentis et consequentis positi in primo capitulo, nam aliqua propositione existente impossibili, impossibile est sic esse sicut ipsa significat, non existente sic sicut quaelibet alia significat; ergo propositio impossibilis est antecedens ad quamcumque aliam propositionem, et per consequens ad propositionem impossibilem sequitur quamcumque aliam. Et hoc est quod communiter solet dici quod ad impossibile sequitur quodlibet. Ex quo sequitur: 'Homo est asinus, ergo homo currit,' nam ex quo antecedens est impossibile, ergo existente sic sicut significat antecedens, impossibile est sic non esse sicut significat consequens." *Log.* t. 4., c. 2, f. 24 r.

[77] "Ad quamlibet propositionem sequitur propositio necessaria. Probatur iterum per quid nominis antecedentis et consequentis positi in primo capitulo; nam impossibile est non esse sic sicut significat propositio necessaria, ergo impossibile est non esse sic sicut significat propositio necessaria, existente sic sicut significat quaelibet alia; et per consequens propositio necessaria est consequens ad quamlibet propositionem. Ex quo sequitur quod ista consequentia est bona: 'Homo currit, ergo asinus est animal,' vel 'Homo currit, ergo Deus est;' supponendo cum Aristotele quod haec sit necessaria: 'Asinus est animal'." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 24 rv.

The phrase 'it is so as a proposition signifies,' defines a true proposition according to Albert as we have seen; hence, we may interpret the expression 'to stand together with,' as meaning: 'to be true together with.'[78]

$$Y \ (p \ . \ \bar{q}) \ \sqsupset \ (p \ \sqsupset \ q)$$
$$P \ (p \ . \ \bar{q}) \ \sqsupset \ - \ (p \ \sqsupset \ q)$$

The first part of the rule, viz., any proposition implies any other whose contradictory opposite cannot be true together with the first, is proven thus: let us assume that it is impossible that proposition 'p' is true together with 'q,' that is, the copulation of 'p' and 'q' is impossible; then 'p' implies the contradictory of 'q', that is 'not-q.' We can consider two cases: either 'p' can be true or it cannot be true. If 'p' cannot be true, then, it implies any other proposition, by the rule that from an impossible proposition any other follows. In case that 'p' can be true, then, it is necessary that when 'p' is true, it is true together with 'q' or 'not-q,' since one of two contradictory propositions is always true; but it is impossible that when 'p' is true, 'q' would be true together with 'p,' according to what was assumed in the beginning of the proof; therefore, it is necessary that when 'p' is true, it is true together with 'not-q.' Hence, it is impossible that 'p' is true and 'not-q' is not true, and consequently, 'p' implies 'not-q.'

The second part of the rule, viz., no proposition implies any other whose contradictory opposite can be true together with the first, is proven thus: If 'p' and 'not-q' are true together, then, when 'p' is true, 'q' is not true, because 'q' and 'not-q' are not true together; therefore, it is possible that when 'p' is true, 'not-q' is true together with 'p,' and consequently, 'p' does not imply 'q.'[79]

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[78] "Ad quamlibet propositionem sequitur quaelibet alia cuius contradictoria non potest simul stare cum ipsa, et ad nullam propositionem sequitur alia cuius contradictoria potest simul stare cum ea. Et intelligo per propositionem simul stare cum alia, sic esse sicut significatur per unam stare cum sic esse sicut significatur per aliam; et per oppositum, per propositionem non stare cum alia, intelligo sic esse sicut significatur per unam non stare cum sic esse sicut significatur per aliam." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 24 v.

[79] "Prima pars regulae patet nam ponamus quod impossibile est cum propositione A stare propositione B, tunc dico quod ad A sequitur contradictorium istius B, scilicet non-B; patet quia vel A non potest stare, et sic est impossibilis, ergo ad eam sequitur quodlibet per primam regulam [The order of the rules in our work does not correspond to Albert's ordering]; vel A potest stare, et tunc necesse est stante A, stare B vel non-B, quia semper cuiuslibet contradictionis altera pars est vera; sed impossibile est stante A stare B, quod est positum; ergo necesse est stante A stare non-B, et per consequens impossibile est stante A non stare non-B: ergo ad A sequitur non-B. Secunda pars regulae probatur, quia si simul stant A et non-B,

Twelfth rule. If there is any valid consequence, then the contradictory opposite of the consequent implies the contradictory of the antecedent. This rule speaks about the law of transposition for implication or simple contraposition.

$$p \supset q) \supset (\bar{q} \supset \bar{p})$$

Albert proves this rule as follows: let us assume that 'p' implies 'q', then 'not-q' implies 'not-p;' because it is true, or it is possible that it is true that 'not-q' is true together with 'p;' but it is necessary that if 'p' is true, then 'p' and 'q' are true, since we assumed that 'p' implies 'q;' therefore, if 'not-q' and 'p' are true together, and 'p' and 'q' are true together, then, 'q' and 'not-q' would be true together, which is impossible. Consequently, 'not-q' implies 'not-p.' The proof here offered by Albert is a reduction to the impossible. By the same method, Albert continues, it might be proven that any proposition stated as a consequence is a valid consequence, if the contradictory opposite of the designated consequent implies the contradictory of the designated antecedent.[80]

$$(\bar{q} \supset \bar{p}) \supset (p \supset q)$$

Thirteenth rule. If 'p' implies 'q', and 'q' implies 'r,' then 'p' implies 'r;' and any proposition that implies 'p' implies 'q' also; and any proposition that is not implied by 'p,' is not implied by 'q' either; and any proposition that does not imply 'q' does not imply 'p' either. This rule Albert remarks, is commonly stated in the following manner: For every good consequence, whatever follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent; and everything that implies the antecedent implies the consequent; and everything that does not follow from the antecedent does not follow from the consequent; and whatever does not infer the consequent does not infer the antecedent.[81]

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constat quia tunc A stante, non stat B, cum ergo et B et non-B non stant simul; ergo possibile est stante A, non stare B; ergo ad A non sequitur B." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 24 v.

[80] "Omnis consequentiae bonae ad contradictorium consequentis sequitur contradictorium antecedentis. Patet, nam ponatur quod ad A sequitur B, dico quod ad non-B sequitur non-A. Probatur, quia vel sic est, vel sic non est; si sic est, habetur propositum; sic non est, ergo est possibile simul cum non-B stare A, per praecedentem regulam; sed necesse est stante A, stare B per casum; ergo simul stabunt B et non-B, quod est impossibile per commune principium: impossibile est duo contradictoria simul stare. Eodem modo probaretur quod omnis propositio per modum consequentiae formata est bona consequentia, si ad contradictorium istius quod denotatur esse consequens, sequitur contradictorium istius quod denotatur esse antecedens. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, c. 24 v.

[81] "Si ad A sequitur B, et ad B sequitur C, then C sequitur ad A; et ad quodcumque sequitur B, ad illud sequitur C; et quidquid non sequitur ad A, non sequitur ad B; et ad quodcumque non sequitur C, ad illud non sequitur B. Et hoc est quod communiter solet dici: omnis consequentiae bonae,

$$[(p \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} q) \cdot (q \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} r)] \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} (p \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} r)$$
$$[(p \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} q) \cdot (r \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} p)] \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} (r \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} q)$$
$$[(p \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} q) \cdot {-} (p \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} r)] \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} {-} (q \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} r)$$
$$[(p \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} q) \cdot {-} (r \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} q)] \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} {-} (r \mathbin{\bar{\supset}} p)$$

This thirteenth rule has four parts which have to be proven. The first part, viz., everything that follows from the consequent follows from the antecedent, is proven in the following manner. If 'p' implies 'q,' and 'q' implies 'r;' then, 'p' implies 'r': Because if 'p' implies 'q,' then, if 'p' is true, 'q' is true also, by the definition of antecedent and consequent; and since 'q' implies 'r,' then, if 'q' is true, 'r' is true also; consequently, 'p' implies 'r.' The second part of the rule, viz., everything that implies the antecedent implies the consequent, is proven as follows. If 'p' implies 'q,' then, any proposition that implies 'p' implies 'q' also. Let 'r' be any proposition that implies 'p,' then, 'r' cannot be true without 'p' being true, by the definition of antecedent and consequent; and since 'p' cannot be true without 'q' being true; consequently, 'r' implies 'q.' The third part of the rule, viz., everything that does not follow from the antecedent does not follow from the consequent, is proven in the following manner. If 'p' implies 'q,' and 'p' does not imply 'r,' then 'q' does not imply 'r;' because, if 'p' does not imply 'r', then, 'p' can be true when 'r' is not true; and since if 'p' is true, then 'q' is true also; therefore, 'q' can be true without 'r' being true; consequently, 'q' does not imply 'r'. The fourth part of the rule, viz., everything that does not infer the consequent does not infer the antecedent, is proved by the subsequent reasoning. If 'p' implies 'q,' and 'r' does not imply 'q,' then, 'r' does not imply 'p;' because if 'r' does not imply 'q,' it follows that if 'r' is true, 'not-q' can be true, by the rule that no proposition implies any other whose contradictory opposite can stand together with the former; but, since 'p' implies 'q,' it is necessary that 'not-q' is true also, by the rule that the contradictory of the consequent implies the contradictory of the antecedent; hence, when 'r' is true, 'not-p' can be true also; consequently, 'r' does not imply 'p.'[82]

quidquid sequitur ad consequens sequitur ad antecedens; et ad quodcumque sequitur antecedens ad illud sequitur consequens istius antecedentis; et quidquid non sequitur ad antecedens non sequitur ad consequens; et ad quodcumque non sequitur consequens ad illud non sequitur antecedens.'' *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 24 v.

[82] ''Ista regula habet quattuor partes. Prima est, si ad A sequitur B, et ad B sequitur C, tunc ad A sequitur C. Nam si ad A sequitur B; tunc si ita est sicut significat A, ita etiam est sicut significat B, per quid nominis antecedentis et consequentis; et cum ad B sequitur C, tunc si ita est sicut significat B, ita etiam est sicut significat C; ergo si ita est sicut significat A, etiam ita est sicut significat C, et per consequens ad A sequitur C. Secunda pars

Fourteenth rule. Whatever follows from the consequent together with something else, the same thing follows from the antecedent with the new assumption.[83]

$$\{(p \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} q) \cdot [(q \cdot r) \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} s]\} \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} [(p \cdot r) \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} s]$$

Fifteenth Rule. Albert formulates two important propositional rules in the treatise on syllogistic consequences, rules which are used in the indirect reduction of syllogisms. We shall analyze Albert's text in chapter five. The theses described by the rules are the following two.[84]

$$[(p \cdot q) \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} r] \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} [(\bar{r} \cdot q) \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} \bar{p}]$$
$$[(p \cdot q) \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} r] \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} [(p \cdot \bar{r}) \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} \bar{q}]$$

Two other rules that are formulated in the same passage describe the following theses:

$$[(p \cdot q) \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} r] \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} [\bar{r} \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} - (p \cdot q)]$$
$$[(p \cdot q) \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} r] \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} [\bar{r} \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} (\bar{p} \lor \bar{q})]$$

Sixteenth rule. It is impossible that a true proposition implies a false proposition, but a true proposition implies only true propositions; if the antecedent of a consequence is true, the consequent is also true; and if there is a consequence, and its consequent is false, its antecedent is false also; and a false proposition can imply a true proposition.[85]

$$(p \cdot q) \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} - (p \supset \bar{q})$$
$$[(p \supset q) \cdot p] \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} q$$
$$[(p \supset q) \cdot \bar{q}] \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} \bar{p}$$
$$\bar{p} \mathbin{\overline{\supset}} (p \supset q)$$

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patet, nam ad quodcumque sequitur B, non potest stare nisi stet B; et cum B non potest stare nisi stet C; ideo sequitur quod ad quodcumque sequitur B ad illud sequitur C. Et per B stare intelligitur sic esse sicut B significat. Tertia pars patet, nam ponatur quod D non sequitur ad A, et B sequitur ad A; probo quod D non sequitur ad B: nam ex eo quod D non sequitur ad A, A potest stare non stante D; et quando A stat, B stat; sequitur quod B potest stare non stante D, et per consequens D non sequitur ad B, quod erat probandum. Quarta pars patet, nam si C sequitur ad B, et non sequitur ad D, tunc etiam B non sequitur ad D. Probatur, nam ex quo C non sequitur ad D, tunc stante D potest stare non-C, per tertiam regulam; sed et necesse est stante non-C, stare non-B, eo quod C est consequens ad B, et ex opposito consequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis; igitur stante D potest stare non-B, et per consequens B non sequitur ad D, quod fuit probandum." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 24v.

[83] "Quidquid sequitur ad consequens cum aliquo assumpto, sequitur ad antecedens istius consequentis eodem modo sumpto." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 18, f. 32v.

[84] Cfr. *Log.*, t. 4, c. 8, f. 29v.

[85] "Impossibile est ex vero sequi falso. . . . Si antecedens est verum, consequens est verum et non falsum. . . . Si consequens alicuius consequentiae est falsum, tunc etiam antecedens istius est falsum. . . . Ex falsis potest sequi verum." *Log.*, t. 4, c. 2, f. 24v.

This rule of Albert's describes some of the characteristic properties of material implication, or as of now consequence. Buridan in his *Consequentiae* enunciates the rule more forcefully: Any false proposition implies any other in a consequence as of now, and any true proposition is implied by any other in an as of now consequence. Hence, we may construct a truth-table for this material as of now consequence, which parallels the truth-matrix of material implication.[86]

All the thorems of simple consequences hold also for factual or "as of now" consequences, in such a manner that if each "simple" consequence were replaced by a factual consequence, all the theses would be valid; but the asserted consequence would be either a "simple" or a factual consequence, and either way the asserted consequence would be a formal consequence, valid by the syncategorematic terms alone. Albert does not explicitly hold this position, but Lewis and Langford in their similar system maintain and formally prove, that whenever a strict implication holds, the corresponding material implication can also be asserted, but not vice versa.[87]

(To be continued)

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[86] "Et est notandum quod de consequentia ut nunc modo proportionali ponenda est conclusio, secundum quod ad omnem propositionem falsam omnis alia sequitur consequentia ut nunc, et omnis vera ad omnem aliam sequitur etiam consequentia ut nunc." *Consequentiae*, I. I, c. 6, f. A6r.

[87] Cfr. Lewis and Langford, *Symbolic Logic*, pp. 136—137; Cfr. also Moody, *Truth and Consequence*, pp. 96—98.

THREE FRIARS, A QUEEN AND A CARDINAL
AND NEW SPAIN

CHAPTER VI
ZUMÁRRAGA, THE ADMINISTRATOR

In 1527, when appointed first bishop of Mexico, Fray Juan de Zumárraga was the guardian of the monastery of Abrojo, near Valladolid, the then capital of the kingdom of Castile. The young Emperor, Charles V, only twenty-seven years of age, had come that Spring to the city in connection with the administrative affairs of the realm. He was still there when the sacred ceremonies of Holy Week, the most august of the Christian year, were carried out in full at the monastery. The Emperor attended them, stayed at the monastery for the week, and was deeply impressed by the simple austerity of the religious life of the Franciscan community, and especially by that of its guardian, Zumárraga. Before the end of that year, on December 12, the youthful Emperor named the sixty-year old Friar guardian, the Bishop-elect of Mexico City. The ruddy, barrel-chested, bow-legged Emperor proved a keen judge of men throughout his life. As for the selection of the first bishop of Mexico City, he had made a splendid choice in Zumárraga, a man of rugged honesty, thorough kindliness and unswerving devotion to the highest spiritual ideals.

Fray Juan lived poorly. As a friar, he had been accustomed to poverty. When the Emperor, at the end of Holy Week, provided a generous alms for the monastery, the guardian refused it at first, and when pressed to accept it, did so only to turn it all over to the poor, reserving none of it for himself or the other friars.

Y como por mandado se S. M. se hiciese muy larga limosna al monasterio de comida y de todo lo demas necesario al sustento de los religiosos, de ninguna cosa de cuantas le dieron se quiso el buen prelado aprovechar para sí ni para sus frailes, más todo lo mandó repartir entre pobres, y él y sus frailes se pasaron con su acostumbrada pobreza.[1]

This incident aptly characterizes Zumárraga. Without a passing acquainntance with his life, one might suspect him of trying to impress

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[1] Fray Gerónimo de Mendieta, ed., Joaquín García Icazbalceta, *Historia Eclesiástica Indiana* (Mexico, 1870), 629; Carlos E. Castañeda, *Fray Juan de Zumárraga and the Indian Policy* (Austin, Texas, 1949), 298.

the Emperor. He died, not penniless, but in debt. It is told that once, not having anything else to give to a begging Indian, he forthwith gave him a cloth with which he was wiping his face.[2]

He was not one to choose an easy life or the path of least resistance. His life among the Observantine Franciscans was hard enough. But he desired an even stricter rule. Consequently, he joined the Recollects in the province of Concepción. Further, he must have been a man of sound judgment and capable in administration of community life and its problems, for among the Recollects he became, at various times, guardian and definitor and once the provincial.

> . . . pero deseando mayor aspereza y soledad se pasó á la recoleta de la concepción, en la qué fue muchas veces guardian y definidor, y una provincial . . .[3]

He went to Mexico, therefore, with what might be normally termed a lifetime of experience, and inured to austerity. At an age when others might be thinking of retiring, he was undertaking, as an act of obedience, a new task in a New World, in the newly discovered Aztec Empire. The last twenty years of his life were consecrated to the cause of the Indians in the land that is now Mexico. He died there on June 3, 1548. He arrived in the land in 1528. His policy towards the Indians during those years is our present concern.

Unfortunately, Zumárraga left Spain and went to the New World without actually being consecrated. He became, therefore, upon his arrival, the Bishop-elect of Mexico City. More than once, those opposed to his defense of the Indians reminded him of this. The Emperor had done all he could in presenting him for appointment as bishop. There the imperial power ceased. Charles could not wait to have him consecrated and ordered him to leave without delay. Meanwhile, in the New World, a hostile Audiencia harped on the fact that he was not consecrated, in order to lessen his influence as he strove to better the lot of the Indians. In verbally dangling this distinction before his eyes at opportune moments, the Audiencia had a vantage point over Zumárraga at a time when he needed every ounce of respect, authority and prestige he could command. His failure to be consecrated before setting out from Spain on his journey across the sea proved costly under the circumstances. Had he met with sympathetic understanding and a cooperative spirit, the fact that he was not consecrated would not have in the least impaired

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[2] *Ibid.*, 633.
[3] D. Moreno Dávila, "Zumárraga" in *Apendice al Diccionario universal de historia y de geografía*, 3 vols. (Mexico, 1856), III, 1130.

his work among the natives. He had all the jurisdiction he needed for the time being. He could administer the Sacrament of Confirmation and that sufficed.

A word of explanation as to why Zumárraga left Spain without being consecrated is indispensable at this point. It was not any fault of his. Experienced as he was, undue haste could hardly be expected of him. It can be validly deduced that it was not his wish to go without having been consecrated. Why, some have asked, was he not consecrated by Bishop Julian Garcés of Tlaxcala,[4] upon his arrival in New Spain, when he passed through that diocese on his way to take possession of his own in Mexico City. The truth of the matter is that Zumárraga was urged to go by the Emperor without waiting for the bulls for his consecration. This is evident from the Cédula of January 13, 1528.

> Sépades que nos, acatando la buena vida y ejemplo, meríctos y buena conciencia del devoto padre Fray Juan de Zumárraga, de la Orden de San Francisco le habemos presenctado al Obispado de México con los límites y términos que le habemos señalado; el cual por servicio de Dios Nuestro Señor; y el aprovechar desde luego en la instrucción de las ánimas de los naturales habitantes en esa tierra se va allá sin esperar sus bulas y consagración . . .[5]

It was the Emperor who thus exposed Zumárraga as Bishop-elect to unnecessary indignities and situations. The reason for this is simple. History records that the imperial troops sacked Rome in May of 1527 and that Pope Clement VII was made a prisoner. Although Cardinal Quinoñes, a Franciscan, distantly related to the Emperor, had gone to him three different times to effect the release of the Pope,[6] there was no telling when the appropriate bulls could be obtained under the circumstances.

As it turned out, harmony and concord were established between the Pope and the Emperor in June of 1529 by the Treaty of Barcelona. On September 2, 1530, Pope Clement issued the first of six bulls and later a seventh in connection with the consecration of Mexico City's first bishop. In the first bull, authorization was given for the erection of the diocese of Mexico City; the second bull named Zumárraga as its first bishop; the third was directed to the Archbishop of Seville, notifying him of the creation of the new diocese that was to be a suffragan diocese

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[4] Joaquín García Icazbalceta, *Don Fray Juan de Zumárraga*, ed., Rafael Aguayo Spencer y Antonio Castro Leal, 4 vols. (Mexico, 1947), I, 103—104.
[5] Alberto Maria Carreño, *Don Fray Juan de Zumárraga. Documentos Inéditos* (Mexico, 1941), 53.
[6] *Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, 1912), XII, 613.

of his metropolitan see; the fourth, fifth and sixth bulls gave becoming notice to the ecclesiastical cabildo of Mexico, to the city and to the clergy in general. The seventh bull was necessitated by an error in Zumárraga's name. His first name had been given as Francisco instead of Juan.

In the interim, two years passed and Zumárraga had been obliged to face strange and embarrassing situations in Mexico. The first Audiencia was removed and a second one was appointed. The upshot had been that finally, on August 2, 1530, a cédula had been despatched that carried an implicit reprimand for the Bishop-elect, although he was in no wise at fault.[7] Another cédula, handed to Zumárraga by Sebastian Ramírez de Fuenleal, the temporary president of the second Audiencia, dated January 25, 1531, ordered Zumárraga to return to Castile.[8] Icazbalceta explains that the supposed reason for the recall was to get firsthand information concerning the new land and to make possible his consecration. However, says Icazbalceta, a then recently published document showed that the command to return was not so favorable as it appeared on the surface.

Hase dicho que la Emperatriz le llamó para que informara acerca delo estado de la tierra y se consagrase alla; pero un documento recientemente publicado hace ver que los terminos del mandamiento no eran tan favorables como se supone.[9]

At any rate, Zumárraga had to go back to Spain in compliance with the royal instructions, sometime in the month of May of 1532. There he answered fully for his adamant stand against the notorious first Audiencia and was completely vindicated, being then consecrated by the Bishop of Segovia in the chapel of the convent of St. Francis in Villadolid, on Sunday, April 27, 1533. In June of 1534, he was on his way back to his beloved Indians, a consecrated bishop and still the officially appointed protector and defender of the Indians.

Judging from the Emperor's letter of January 10, 1528, in which he named Zumárraga the Protector and Defender of the Indians, the Emperor was in deadly earnestness about this office. It was not a mere fanciful name, designed as window-dressing in order to give the im-

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[7] ... Cédula de S. M. fecha en Madrid a 2 Agosto de 1530, en que se ordena al ILLmo. Sr. Obispo acate y obedezca al Presidente é Oidores de esta Real Audiencia como a personas que representan la Real suya, pues de lo contrario se dará por deservido. Icazbalceta, *op. cit.*, IV, 69.

[8] ... Real cédula de S. M. fecha en 25 de Enero de 1531, en que se ordena al ILLmo. Sr. Zumárraga pase de éstos a los reinos de Castilla. *Ibid.*, IV, 69.

[9] *Ibid.*, I, 103,

pression that at least a vague attempt was being made to succour the Indians. A reading of the letter demonstrates clearly that the Emperor was well-informed by this time of the abuses against the natives, that he knew of specific cases in which the Indians had been maltreated and that he was authorizing Zumárraga to correct all abuses. The letter reads much like an ordinary account that might have been written today, detailing specific charges of corruption in government. In this instance, however, it is the Emperor himself who outlines the existent abuses and names the man who is to correct them.

A general summary seems in order, since here we find the Crown's attitude towards the Indians. It is to be borne in mind that Zumárraga was still in Spain at the time the letter, pointing out his duties and obligations was written. First of all, the Emperor put his finger on the Spaniards who had Indians under their administration as encomenderos. He declared that these Spaniards were not treating the natives as vassals of the Crown, as they should; that they were not treating them as free persons; that the Spaniards overburdened the Indians with work, and demanded of them more than they could render. The Emperor further stated that the Indians were being compelled to give up their wives and offspring. He explained that the Indians were being enslaved so that the Spaniards might use them in barter. Moreover, that free Indians were being taken and branded and many other cruelties were being committed against them. All this, the Emperor explained, was a disservice to Our Lord and damaged the cause of conversion among the Indians. This ill-treatment was responsible also for a diminution of the Indian population.

Consequently, the Emperor, advised by the Council of the Indies, was seeking to remedy this intolerable situation. He wanted the natives freed, and governed as free men and vassals of the Crown; he wanted them to come to a knowledge of the Catholic Faith. He admitted that the natives were still numerous and the land rich. As a step toward remedying the situation an agreement between himself and the Council of the Indies had been reached to select a zealous person, one devoted to the service of Our Lord, to be the protector and defender of the Indians. The duty of that person was to look after the good treatment of the natives and their conversion. He was in no wise to consent to any harm being done to the natives; he was to enforce the laws and ordinances already drawn up and passed for the good treatment of the natives.

Because of his zeal and integrity, Zumárraga was assigned this task. The Emperor stated that he was to be the protector and defender of the

Indians and charged him to take the utmost care in the discharge of his office. Zumárraga was to visit the Indians and make sure that they were properly treated, trained and taught by the persons under whose care they lived; that all laws, ordinances, instructions and provisions for their good treatment were fulfilled or complied with and that any future instructions for the humane treatment and conversion of the Indians were strictly observed. He was to exercise the greatest diligence in respect to the observance of these orders. If anyone violated the legal provisions set up to guard against injustice to the Indians, Zumárraga was fully empowered to proceed against such an individual in accordance with the provisions of the laws regarding such violation. The Emperor also commanded that the Audiencia should give Zumárraga all the aid and support he needed to carry out his mission. The penalty for failure to comply the Emperor laid down in the form of a fine of ten thousand maravedis.[10]

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[10] The complete text of the Emperor's letter to Zumárraga reads as follows:

Don Cárlos, por la divina clemencia, Emperador de Romanos semper augusto, doña Juana su madre. Por quanto nos mandamos dar una nuestra provision firmada de mi el Rey y sellado con nuestro cello su tenor de lo qual es este que se signe. Don Cárlos por la gracia de Dios Rey de Romanos, Emperador semper augusto, doña Juana su madre & c. A vos el venerable y devoto padre Fray Juan de Cumarraga obispo de Tenuxtitlan México salud y gracia. Sepade que nos sómos informados que los indios naturales de la nueva España son tratados de los christianos españoles que en ella residen que los tienen en administracion y encomienda é de otras personas no como devian y como vasallos nuestros é personas libres como lo son lo qual no mirando el servicio de Dios ni lo que son obligados les han dado y dan demasiados trabajos pidiendoles mas servicios y cosas de las que buenamente pueden cumplir y son obligados é ansi mesmo tomandoles sus mugeres é hijos é otras cosas que ellos tienen por fuerca é contra su voluntad e haziendo assi mesmo esclavos por rescatar é por otroas formas a los que son libres é les hierran contra su voluntad é assi mesmo sirviendose dellos como de tales y haziendoles otras crueldades ynormes á lo qual de mas de ser en mucho deservicio de nuestro Señor y estorvo para la conversion de los dichos yndios á nuestra santa fee catholica ha sido y es en mucha diminucion de los dichos indios é causa de despoblarse la dicha tierra la qual visto por los del nuestro consejo de las yndias é comigo el Rey consultado queriendo proveer y remediar cerca de lo suso dicho como los dichos indios é naturales de aquellas partes sean libertados é administrados como libres y vasallos nuestros é vengan en conocimiento de nuestra sancta fee catholica por amor que es nuestro prencipal deseo é intincion siendo tan poblada e rica fue acordado que deviamos de proveer de una persona zelosa del servicio de Dios nuestro Señor é nuestro para que sea protector e defensor de los dichos yndios é mire por su buen tratamiento é conversion dellos é nuestra sancta fee catholica y no consientan que les hagan agravio ni sin razon é se guarden con ellos las leyes é ordenancas para su buen tratamiento é nos tuvimoslo por bien por ende confiando de vuestra fidelidad é conciencia buena vida é exemple que en esto guardareys el servicio de Dios nuestro Señor é nuestro é con toda retitud é buen zelo entendereys en ello es nuestra merced é voluntad que quanto nuestra merced é voluntad fuere seays protector é defensor

This letter of the Emperor Charles to Zumárraga, making him the defender and protector of the Indians sounds like a page from the Indian policy documents of his grandmother, the great Queen Isabella. Both the Queen and the Emperor, as their writings demonstrate, insisted on the humane treatment of the Indians and their civilization and christianization, before Las Casas undertook his apostolate. Besides these instructions of the Emperor to Zumárraga, given before the latter set sail for the New World, other instructions were issued to him while he was in New Spain laboring in behalf of the Indians, before his recall in 1531.

The opposition of the first Audiencia to Zumárraga's execution of the Indian policy as laid down by the Emperor had given rise to conflicting reports and counter charges. The Audiencia had forwarded letters and information, denouncing the bishop but Zumárraga had succeeded at last in smuggling out a long letter, with the aid of a sailor, that finally reached Spain. One conclusion was obvious and inevitable to the officials in Spain and that was that differences of opinion existed between the protector and defender of the Indians, who was the Bishop-elect of Mexico City, and the Audiencia, whose president was Nuño de Guzmán. Charles, the King of Spain and Emperor of Germany, had been absent for a time. His wife, Isabella of Portugal, born in 1503, Queen of Spain and Empress of Germany by virtue of her marriage to Charles in 1526, had been left in Spain as the supreme authority. It was over her signature that the new instructions on Indian policy were issued to Zumárraga in a letter dated August 2, 1530.

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de los dichos indios de la dicha tierra por la presente vos mandamos cometemos é encargamos e mandamos que tengays mucho cuydado de mirar é visitar los dichos indios é hazer que sean bien tratados y é endustriadose enseñados en las cosas de nuestra sancta fee catholica por las personas que los tienen y tuvieren á cargo y veays las leyes é ordenancas é instruciones é provisiones que se han echo ó hizieren cerca del buen tratamiento y conversion de los dichos indios los quales hagays cuydado como en ella se contiene é si alguna ó algunas personas las dexan de guardar é cumplir o fueren ó pasaren contra ellos executeys en sus personas e bienes las penas en ellas contenidas para lo qual y para todo lo demas que dicho es por esta carta vos damos poder cumplido con todas sus incidencias é dependencias anexidades é conexidades é mandamos al nuestro presidente é oydores de la nuestra audiencia é Chancilleria real de la nueva España é á los nuestros oficiales é otros juezes é justicias della que usen con vos en el dicho cargo é para ello vos den y hagan dar todo el favor e ayuda que les pidierdes y menester vuieredes é los unos ni los otros non fagades ende al por alguna manera so pena de la nuestra merced y de diez mill maravedis para la cámara á cada uno que lo contrario hiziere. Dada en Burgos á diez dieas del mes de Henero año del nacimiento de nuestro salvador Jesu Christo de mill é quinientos é veinte é ocho años. — Yo el Rey — *Cedulario*, Vasco de Puga, 2 vols. (Mexico, 1878—79), I, 227—229.

It is enlightening to follow the general contents of this letter, as given by Puga in his famous *Cedulario*. The Empress stated that she had been informed that differences of opinion had arisen concerning the office of protector of the Indians and the manner in which the office was to be exercised. She stated very clearly that her source of information concerning these differences was certain testimony that had reached Spain from the royally appointed Audiencia. Her desire, she stated, was to rectify matters so that the differences might cease. The office of protector of the Indians was to remain intact. However, her letter required the observance of the new orders within certain limitations. Her desire was to smooth out differences of opinion, hence the reason for the new instructions, which were concretely directed to the elimination of friction between the bishop and the Audiencia.

In the first place, the protector of the Indians might send individuals to visit any part of the territory within the limits of his jurisdiction, when he himself was unable to undertake the journey of inspection. The limitation imposed concerning this power was that the persons sent were to be approved by the president and his oidores.

Secondly, the persons sent by the Protector of the Indians or the Protector himself had authority to make official inspections and gather information relative to the ill-treatment of the Indians. If the inspection revealed that the persons to whom the Indians were entrusted deserved corporal punishment or deprivation of their Indians, this information was to be sent to the Audiencia for review and final determination. It was suggested that the person making the inspection report his findings personally to the Audiencia. In the event that the punishment was to be pecuniary, the Protector of the Indians or his delegates could execute the sentence if it involved up to fifty pesos of gold, subject to appeal to the Audiencia. Moreover, they could sentence offending individuals to a maximum imprisonment of ten days, in conformity with the tenor of the law but the execution of the sentence was reserved to the Audiencia.

Thirdly, the Protector of the Indians and his substitutes were empowered to make official inspections within the limits of their territory and even permitted to go to any part of the province and into the jurisdiction of corregidors to obtain information on how the Indians were being treated. They could report corregidors, constables and other offending persons to the Audiencia, so that the Audiencia might punish them accordingly. However, it was to be understood that the Crown had no intention or desire to give authority to the Protector of the Indians that superseded that of the Audiencia or lesser officials.

Fourthly, the Protector of the Indians, or persons named by him as his assistants, were to have no part in criminal cases.[11]

Differences between Zumárraga and the civil government of New Spain were inevitable. It is well to recall that Cortés, who had conquered New Spain, was absent from the land between 1524 and 1526. He had appointed others who ruled in his stead while he went on the ill-fated Hibueras expedition (Honduras). Following his departure, disorder and strife ensued because of the inexperience of those left to rule and because of their selfishness. In the futile attempt to entrench themselves in

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[11] The Spanish text reads:

E agora somos informados que cerca del dicho oficio de protector y exercicio del é de la manera como se ha de usar á avido algunas diferencias entre el dicho presidente é obispo de México protector y el presidente é oydores de la nuestra audiencia de la dicha nueva España segun paresció por ciertos testimonios que por los dichos nuestro presidente é oydores al dicho nuestro consejo fueron embiados y queriendo proveer y remediar cerca desto como cessen las dichas diferencias visto por los del nuestro consejo de las yndias fué acordado que deviamos de mandar dar esta nuestra carta en la dicha razon é nos tuvimoslo por bien por la qual declaramos y mandamos que la dicha provision que de suso va incorporada se guarde y compla y execute con tanto que cerca del uso y exercicio del dicho oficio de protector se guarden las órdenes y limitaciones siguientes.

Primeramente que el dicho protector pueda embiar personas á visitar á qualesquier partes de los términos de su protection donde el no pudiere yr con que las tales personas sean vistas y aprovadas por nuestro presidente é oydores de la dicha audiencia y de otra manera ninguna persona pueda yr a visitar.

Otrosí que el dicho protector ó las tales personas que en su lugar embiare puedan hazer y hagan pesquisas é informaciones de los malos tratamientos que hizieren á los indios y si por la dicha pesquisa merecieren pena corporal ó privacion de los dichos indios las personas que los tuvieron encomendados fecha la tal informacion pesquisa la embien al dicho presidente é oydores para que ellos la vean y determinen y en tal caso el protector pueda prender a la tal persona é embiar la pesquisa juntamente con la informacion al dicho presidente é oydores en caso que la condemnacion aya de ser pecuniaria pueda el dicho protector ó sus lugar tenientes executar qualquier condemnacion hasta en cincuenta pesos de oro y dende abaxo sin embargo de qualquier apelacion que sobre esto se interpusieren y ansi mesmo hasta diez dias de carcel y no mas y en lo demas que conosciere y sentenciare en los casos que puedo conforme á esta nuestra carta sean obligados á otorgar el apelacion para la dicha audiencia y que no pueden executar por ninguna manera la tal condemnacion.

Yten que el dicho protector y las personas que vuieren de yr á visitar en su lugar como dicho es puedan yr á todas las partes provincias é lugares de corregidores como de las otras partes y aver informacion sobre el tratamiento de los dichos yndios ansi contra otras qualesquier personas y si hallaren culpa contra los dichos corregidores y usticias embien la informacion con su parecer al dicho presidente é oydores para que lo castigue y por esto no es nuestra intencion y voluntad que los protectores tengan superioridad alguna sobre las dichas justicias.

Yten que el dicho protector y las otras personas en su nombre no puedan conocer y conozcan en ninguna causa criminal que entre un dia y otro passare salvo los dichos presidente e oydores y corregidores y justicias nuestras. Dado en Madrid á dos dias del mes de Agosto de M. d. XXX años. — Yo la Reyna — *Cedulario* de Puga, I, 229—231.

power, they had maliciously declared Cortés dead and his property confiscated. The Crown, anxious also to replace Cortés by rulers of its own choice, had eventually named a governing body called the Audiencia, which consisted of a president and four oidores. It seemed necessary to name a plural ruling body in order to cope with the strong personality of Cortés, who had returned to Mexico City.[12] It was with this Audiencia, the very first to be set up in Mexico City, that Zumárraga had to contend. Icazbalceta says that an evil genius seemed to have suggested the names of the members of this Audiencia, especially its president, Nuño de Guzmán.[13] The other four members were: Alonso de Parada, Francisco Maldonado, Juan Ortiz de Matienzo and Diego Delgadillo, who arrived in Mexico on December 6, 1528. Guzmán, the deadly enemy of Cortés, was already in the New World. Two of the older and more competent of the four oidores died within thirteen days of their arrival, which left the two oidores Matienzo and Delgadillo. There arose two factions: one devoted to Cortés and ardent supporters of the missionaries, and the other, led by Guzmán, inimical to Zumárraga and the missionaries.

Upon his arrival in Mexico City, Zumárraga had the Indian leaders informed that he was sent to be their bishop and in conjunction with that office, their protector. Through Fray Pedro de Gante, as interpreter, he told them that it was the command of the King himself that all Indians should be justly treated; that anyone inflicting harm on them would be duly punished. Further still, that if the Indians misbehaved, they too would be punished accordingly. The Indians were grateful to God and king for the presence of Zumárraga.

No time was lost by the natives in placing their complaints before Zumárraga. The accusations were many and wellfounded. Thereupon, the Protector of the Indians laid the charges before the president and oidores of the Audiencia, who listened to what he had to say. It seemed they would be amenable. However, in their own good time, they notified Zumárraga that the administration of Indian affairs was to be none of his concern; that it was the business of the Audiencia alone. They reminded him that he was not a true bishop and warned him that he had better not intervene in favor of the Indians.

To this Zumárraga replied with calmness and moderation that the Audiencia should examine his prerogatives as Bishop-elect and as Pro-

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[12] Mas no se tomó determinación de confiar el mando a una sola persona, porque no se juzgó posible encontrarla capaz de contrarestar la influencia de Cortés, y se vino a elegir el mal camino de nombrar Audiencia gobernadora. Icazbalceta, *op. cit.*, I, 30.

[13] *Ibid.*, I, 30.

tector of the Indians, that an agreement on procedure should be reached. The curt reply of the civil authorities was simply that he should desist from exercising the office of Protector of the Indians. Otherwise, the consequence would be that he would find himself removed to an isolated place, his income cut off, and, if necessary, his very person would suffer violence.[14]

There was no legal court to which Zumárraga could appeal, for the Audiencia itself was the supreme authority in New Spain. He tried in vain to get the Audiencia to come to some understanding. The retort was a warning to the Spaniards that if they consorted with Zumárraga, they would lose the Indians committed to them. As for the Indians themselves, they were threatened with hanging if they went near the Bishop-elect. Again, Zumárraga appealed to the Audiencia, in a private manner, attempting to make them see the folly of their course of conduct. He found everyone, Indians and Spaniards alike, avoiding him like the plague, as if he had been excommunicated, as he himself put it. It was impossible to do the work he had been sent to do. He entreated the civil authorities to desist from impeding his work, commanded by the Emperor. He proposed means of reaching a conciliation of some kind but it was all to no avail. Zumárraga finally decided to air the matter publicly, from the pulpit. It was an open conflict now between the Bishop-elect, who would not be silenced, and an obstinate Audiencia bent upon a ruthless exploitation of the natives.

On August 27, 1529, Zumárraga wrote an important letter to the Emperor, some seventy pages long.[15] It revealed the general tenor of the Bishop-elect's policy toward the Indians, basically reflecting that of the Crown. After making a courageous and forthright indictment of the Audiencia, Zumárraga presented his recommendations to the Crown. Although the Emperor had, on July 31, 1529, expressly forbidden the Audiencia to retain or withhold letters being sent to Spain from Mexico, to censor them or to intercept any mail,[16] the bishop was obliged to have the letter smuggled out.[17] Of course, the Audiencia thought it best that the Crown obtain its information only from itself and therefore had repeatedly disregarded the imperial order. Zumárraga outwitted the spies of the Audiencia by slipping the letter in a cleric's jacket, as he and the cleric journeyed to the port of Vera Cruz from Mexico City.

[14] *Ibid.*, I, 56—57.
[15] *Ibid.*, II, 169, the letter is quoted in full, pp. 169—245, as Document Number 4.
[16] *Ibid.*, I, 72.
[17] *Ibid.*, II, 274.

There it was given to a Biscayan sailor who also risked his life in smuggling it to Spain.

The letter contained specific charges. It did not indulge in mere generalizations. It stated that Garcia del Pilar pried gold and other gifts from Indians, after inviting them to the home of the president of the Audiencia on the pretense of friendship. Of him, Zumárraga says:

> . . . y aun el presidente me dijo que Pilar es servidor de V. M., y que ha de hacer por el mucho, como lo hace; pues yo afirmo y ofrezco prueba que este Pilar lo es del infierno y deservidor de Dios y de V. M., que merece gran castigo, el cual no espero que habrá en la era presente.[18]

The letter continued to explain how the Indians were taken from the encomiendas of the first conquerors and placed in the custody of friends of the Audiencia. It explained how Casulzin, an important Indian chief, was kept a prisoner for months as a means of extorting wealth from his people in payment for the promise of his liberation. It divulged the shameful request for eight beautiful maidens for the pleasure of Guzmán. As for the remonstrating Bishop-elect, Guzmán would hurl him from the pulpit, only he did not attend services. Zumárraga had something akin to a convent for Indian women. The enclosure was violated and two Indian girls kidnapped by order of the lustful oidores. Cortés had built San Lazaro, a hermitage where the Indians repaired to hear Mass and for devotional exercises. Guzmán razed it to the ground and built his personal mansion on the same site, making the Indians do the greater part of the work. He sent twenty-one shiploads of Indians to the islands to be sold as slaves, estimated by Zumárraga to be more than eleven thousand. The same Guzmán, as Governor of Panuco, had devastated that land. It was from that post that he had been elevated to the presidency of the Audiencia. One Indian was literally crucified, and others hanged and killed.

> Ha habido español de diabólico espíritu, que de uno tengo relación, que puso a un señor en la cruz con tres clavos como a Cristo, porque no le daban tanto oro como le pedía, y desta manera otras crueldades dioclecianas: hay otro que mató y ahorcó indios porque no le daban la que pedía para sí: sobre ello fuí a hablar al presidente y no hizo caso ni se entendió en cosa alguna que toque a indios, aunque vea que los matan.[19]

Indians were required to transport heavy loads of maize, wood and coal for long, fatiguing distances. Pregnant women and children were pressed into the same service. One hundred and thirteen died as a result.[20]

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[18] *Ibid.*, II, 197.   [19] *Ibid.*, II, 227.
[20] *Ibid.*, II, 228.

The Audiencia not only mistreated the Indians, but also the Bishop-elect and the missionaries as well, because they defended the natives. The president threatened to exile Zumárraga to the Azores, along with other clerics. He vilified the old Franciscan and had read to him such abominable charges against the missionaries that the saintly and sturdy administrator would not commit them to writing in the letter to the Emperor. Guzmán's abominations were unprintable. He had said he would hang Zumárraga, if he did not cease defending the Indians. To all of this, the old Franciscan reacted with the determination of one ready to lay down his life for the Indians.

> . . . que aunque me costase la vida, no pensaba desistirme dello, ni dejar amparar y defender y desagraviar los indios, pues tanto convenía al servicio de Dios y de V. M.[21]

Zumárraga rightly urged, therefore, that the Emperor remove Guzmán, together with the diabolical oidores, Matienzo and Delgadillo, and that all of them be fittingly punished. He called for a new Audiencia. Unless this were done, the finest laws in the world would be useless. The axe had to fall on the root of the evil, the Audiencia itself.

He insisted unhesitatingly that a stop be put to the ruin of the province of Panuco, which Guzmán mercilessly governed as an absentee landlord, maltreating Indians and causing their deaths.

He laid stress on the necessity of punishing those who mistreated the Indians, specifying what he had in mind as mistreatment. He mentioned as examples the taking of an Indian's wife or the appropriation of an Indian's daughter or sister by Spaniards and keeping them indefinitely. There was the practice of inciting dogs to attack Indians, beating and cuffing them, not to say killing them. Some Spaniards seemed to think this was no crime. Zumárraga branded all these things as criminal, and indicated that they happened too often. These complaints were made to the Emperor years before the *Breve Relación* was written by Las Casas, who repeated them along with other extreme cases in his detailed indictment of Spanish atrocities.

If there ever was a down-to-earth approach to the just and humane treatment of the Indians, from the point of view of concreteness and detail, it is to be found in the lengthy letter of Zumárraga of August 27, 1529, directed to the Emperor. For his pains and those of the missionaries, the civil authorities meted out to them a systematic persecution worthy of Herod and Diocletian.[22]

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[21] *Ibid.*, II, 224—225.
[22] *Ibid.*, II, 239.

In addition, Zumárraga had to journey to Spain against his will to clear himself. In the end, he triumphed; his enemies failed miserably and were brought to book. A handful of wilful men damaged the good work of the missionaries and Spaniards interested in the betterment of New Spain and in the civilization and christianization of the Indians. Fortunately, their government was short-lived, lasting less than two years.

The new or second Audiencia was a magnificent contrast to the first. The four new oidores, selected by the Bishop of Badajoz, president of the Audiencia of Valladolid in Spain were: Ceynos, Salmerón, Maldonado and Quiroga. Spain had reason to be proud of every one of them. Shortly afterwards, the Emperor-King Charles selected a viceroy for New Spain in the person of Antonio de Mendoza, who arrived in November of 1535. He was an experienced diplomat, a statesman, a man of vision and integrity. He has left his mark in history as one of Spain's best viceroys, a ruler of high caliber, who "advocated by word and deed a more tranquil and kindly policy towards the natives."[23] Until his actual arrival, the temporary president of the Audiencia was Bishop Sebastian Ramírez de Fuenleal, a Dominican, experienced in the Audiencia of Santo Domingo. He did not reach Mexico until September 23, 1531. The four oidores had all arrived by January 9, 1531. Icazbalceta says that once the first Audiencia had disappeared from the scene there was never even the slightest discord between Zumárraga and the government.

Desde que desaparece la primera Audiencia no se vuelve a oir de la menor disordia entre el obispo y el gobierno.[24]

He attributes the rise of disputes in the preceding administration to the failure of the Crown to define more precisely the jurisdiction and faculties of the protectors of the Indians.[25] Be that as it may, precise laws alone do not ensure peaceful government. The ingredients of good will, fairness, sympathy and understanding frequently accomplish more than flawless laws. Zumárraga and the second Audiencia show this to be true, even prior to the arrival of Fuenleal and of Mendoza, the Viceroy.

In suggesting Fr. Martín de Valencia, the Franciscan, and Fr. Domingo de Betanzos, the Dominican, in his letter of August 27, 1529, as the most suitable candidates for the office of Protector, Zumárraga at the same time recommended that more power and authority be attached

[23] Carlos E. Castañeda, *Our Catholic Heritage in Texas*, 7 vols. (Austin, Texas, 1936—   ), I, 84.
[24] *Ibid.*, I, 107.
[25] *Ibid.*, I, 50.

to the office. The protector should have ample power; the authority to make, alter and abrogate ordinances, and to choose reliable persons as justices of the peace for Indians, with the authority to try criminal and civil cases.

... se les de muy complido poder ...; y que puedan hacer, añadir y quitar ordenanzas como les pareciere, ...; elija personas ..., que sean alcaldes de los indios y puedan determinar sus causas civiles y criminales ...

The recommendations were not put into effect. By a royal cédula, dated September 28, 1534, Zumárraga was directed to transfer his obligations as protector of the Indians to the president of the Audiencia, who at that time was Fuenleal.[26]

The duties as protector of the Indians had weighed heavily on Zumárraga and he was happy to be relieved of them. To his fellow-friars, who — but for two exceptions — had stood solidly with him to a man in the battle for the Indians, he was grateful. He was grateful, too, to his closest friend, Fray Domingo de Betanzos, who laid the foundation of the Dominican province in New Spain, and who supported Zumárraga wholeheartedly. All of them had constituted a unison of voices pleading for the natives. Above that chorus, there had been a voice louder than all the rest. It had been that of his own conscience, which had given no respite until the appearance of the second Audiencia.

On March 28, 1531, months before repairing to Spain, Zumárraga had written two letters, one to the Empress-Queen, "A la C. C. Mag. de la Emperatriz e Reina, Ntra. Sra.,"[27] and the other to the president of the Council of the Indies. To the Queen, he frankly said that whatever the future held in store for him, he was certain of one thing; no pain could come to him from either the Crown or private citizens that could equal his joy at the dismissal of the old Audiencia and the arrival of the new. This change in administration he hailed as the redemption of the land. To the Council of the Indies he expressed himself as ready to answer for his words and deeds. If he was guilty he was humbly prepared to accept any punishment inflicted upon him. He would be glad to make an open confession, for his conscience was clear. He had nothing to hide, nothing of which to be ashamed. This was language that could come only from a man of integrity.[28]

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[26] Otra Real Cédula de S. M. fecha en Valencia en 28 de Septiembre de 1534, para que el ILLMo. Sr. Obispo de Mexico entregue todas las provisiones que tiene de Protector de los indios al Presidente de esta Nueva España, y que no use de ellas. *Ibid.*, IV, 72.

[27] *Ibid.*, II, 277.

[28] *Ibid.*, II, 277—280.

Another event brought Zumárraga great joy. The Blessed Virgin had appeared to Juan Diego in December of 1531 and she left the impress of her image on his Indian mantle. A procession had formed in Mexico City on December 26, 1531, for the transfer of the original image to its first hermitage at Tepeyac.[29] This was but a few months before he left for Spain. Since that time, revolutions have wrought their destruction in the land of the Aztecs but the mantle with its image remains, and the shrine on Tepeyac hill continues to draw hundred of thousands each year.

Immediately prior to his sailing for Spain a significant meeting took place, on May 1, 1532, attended by Fuenleal, Zumárraga, the four oidores and eight missionaries — four of them Franciscans and four Dominicans. This is probably the first meeting of a mixed group of religious and Spanish officials on the mainland held to discuss Indian problems and recommend an adequate Indian policy. Their recommendations have generally been ignored, as well as the influence they must have exercised in working out the Indian policy in general. Zumárraga carried the proposals of the meeting to the Crown when he went to Spain to defend himself against the notorious Delgadillo, at which time he defended also a more humane and Christian policy towards the Indians.

A portion of the minutes of the meeting, most significant as affecting Indian policy, should be considered. The junta declared that the Indians were able and capable human beings, who loved the Catholic Faith, had borne supernatural fruit and would continue to do so. They were suited for mechanical and agricultural acitivities. The junta added that the women were industrious and devoted to the principles of the Catholic Faith.

In a concise manner these men pointed out the crux in the social and economic administration. They recommended that the Crown make grants of land and Indians only to those who had conquered the land and the settlers who came to found homes in New Spain, with a special eye to the merits of the individuals concerned. Those absenting themselves without permission from the lands granted them should lose their rights.[30]

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[29] Mariano Cuevas, S. J., in *Estudio sobre Fray Juan de Zumárraga* (Mexico, 1950), No. 2, Year 7, July-September (Numero extraordinario de los Anales de la Provincia del Santo Evangelio), 36; Jesus Garcia Gutierrez, *Ibid.*, 75, mentions the existence of 48 unimpeachable documents between 1531 and 1648 to substantiate this event.

[30] Mariano Cuevas, S. J., *Historia de la Iglesia en Mexico*, 4 vols. (Mexico, 1921), I, 428.

While in Spain, during which time he was vindicated and finally consecrated, Zumárraga busied himself assembling materials and helpers for his Indians, to whom he would shortly return. It required three ships to transport what he had gathered. He managed to win six women to the cause of instructing the Indian maidens. "A number of Sisters of the Third Order Regular accompanied the Poor Clares from Salamanca under the personal care of the wife of Cortés in 1530."[31] The six women brought by Bishop Zumárraga constituted an important addition to the growing band of Spanish nuns devoted to the development of the talents and abilities of Indians maidens. The Bishop induced thirty artisans and their families to come to New Spain to labor among the natives and teach them their trades by example.

Important as supplies were, the old Franciscan Bishop stressed the value of personnel in advancing the conversion and civilizing of the Indians. A letter he wrote to the Viceroy Mendoza in 1536 shows how seriously concerned he was about getting more missionaries. He was exploring means to pay for the passage of those willing to come. He begged the Viceroy for financial aid. If he were unable to meet the expense entirely, then he proposed that the Bishops contribute proportionately to the cause. If this sum of money raised were insufficient, as a last resort, he suggested that the tribute paid by one village of Indians be set asside, each year, and that it be used for this purpose alone.

. . . y suplico a V. Sría. que sobre esto de enviar acá religiosos cargue la mano para con S. M. los señores del Consejo Real de las Indias, que *sine ipsis factum est nihil*, y si las necesidades de S. M. son tan grandes como a todos consta, y sería gran razon que todos le sirvamos con cuanto tenemos, soy de parecer, o que obispos hagamos lo que pudíeremos para pagar el pasaje de los religiosos que vienen a cada diócesi; o que por ser nuestra posibilidad poca, sería buen corregimiento, que cada año con los tributos de un pueblo de indios se pagasen los fletes dellos, y estos tributos estuviesen para esto diputados, y no se empleasen en otra cosa . . .[32]

It is to be noted that Zumárraga did not suggest levying a tribute but only that the tribute already exacted be used for passage money for missionaries, without whom he said he could do nothing. In respect to Indian tribute, he had succeeded previously in getting it lowered. ". . . obtuvo el señor Zumárraga en España la moderación de los tributos . . ."[33]

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[31] Rt. Rev. Juan Zumárraga, *The Doctrina Breve*, ed. Rev. Zephyr Englehardt, O.F.M., and Stephen H. Horgan (New York, 1928), 14.

[32] Icazbalceta, *op. cit.*, III, 93—94.

[33] *Ibid.*, I, 121. Cf. *Apéndice al Diccionario universal de historia y de geografía*, ed., Manuel Orozco y Berra, 3 vols. (Mexico, 1856), III, 1131.

There has been much discussion about the exaction of tribute from the Indians, their being made to work in the mines and in the cultivation of the fields and other burdens imposed on them by the encomenderos. The first Bishop deserves high commendation for his success in bettering the lot of the Indians on all these points.

> ... al V. Zumárraga se debió la primera reduccion estos onerosísimos tributos, que en los dos siglos siguientes llegaron a una cantidad insignificante por cabeza; así como se le debio también la exencion del trabajo de las minas, de la siembra de caña y de otros penosísimos con que los neófitos eran oprimidos por los encomenderos.[34]

Long before the Spaniards arrived, the custom of using Indians as beasts of burden, to carry heavy loads upon their backs, was well established. Those used were known as *tamemes* or carriers. There were no beasts of burden in New Spain prior to the conquest. Had there been, they still would have availed but little, for the Indians knew nothing about the wheel. In order to better the lot of the carriers, Zumárraga urged the introduction of beasts of burden, asses in particular, ... in large numbers, so that the natives might acquire them.[35]

After the conquest, there were two general classes of Indian slaves; those taken in war and those that were obtained through bartering or were bought outright, "los de guerra y los de rescate."[36] A prisoner of war was not enslaved merely because he was captured. If, after capture, Indians revolted, or if they broke the peace agreed upon, they could be enslaved. As for those who were bought, they were part of the ancient slave system obtaining among the Indians themselves. They had slavery before the advent of the Spaniards. The conquistadores bought them from their Indian masters. On August 2, 1530, the Crown struck for the unconditional abolition of both types of slavery. There was to be no slavery of any kind or for any reason. The power to make slaves was to cease without exception. Anyone violating this surprise order of the Crown was to suffer the loss of all his temporal goods. This radical order, like the New Laws of 1542, was the result of the inability to curb abuses effectively by milder means. This law, which antedates Las Casas, Icazbalceta quotes from the *Cedulario* de Puga as follows:

> ninguna persona seosada de tomar en guerra ni fuera de ella ningun indio por esclavo, ni tenerle por tal con título de que le hubo en guerra justa,

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[34] *Apéndice al Diccionario universal de historia y de geografia*, III, 1131.
[35] Carlos E. Castañeda, *Fray Juan de Zumárraga and Indian Policy in New Spain* Reprinted from The Americas, Volume V, January, 1949, Number 3 (Washington, D. C.).
[36] Icazbalceta, *op. cit.*, I, 218.

ni por rescate, ni por compra, ni trueque, ni por otro título ni causa alguna aunque sea de los indios que los mismos naturales de las dichas Indias, Islas y Tierra Firme tenían o tienen o tuvieren entre sí por esclavos, so pena que el que lo contrario hiciere, por primera vez incurra en perdimiento de todos sus bienes.[37]

This order of the Crown, which was thenceforth to be the law, was, like many others, not enforced. The question of Indian slavery, which could have ended definitely then and there, was allowed to go un-checked. Zumárraga spoke his mind on both types of slavery to Viceroy Mendoza, who sought his advice. He fearlessly told the Viceroy what had been his consistent viewpoint on the matter, explaining he knew no reason, human or divine, why he should change it.

Two questions were put to Zumárraga on the issue of slavery. Was it just to indulge in the Indian slave system as practiced under the native regime, that is, the purchase, sale, barter and exchange of Indian slaves? To this, Zumárraga replied that he knew of no law, divine or natural, positive or human, civil or ecclesiastical, whereby the natives were justly reduced to slavery.

Acerca de las dudas propuestas, e que V Sría. manda que diga mi parecer, yo no tengo otro del siempre he tenido, y ni sé autoridad, ni razón ni ejemplo en contrario, y si la oviere, estaré sujeto a la correción y mejor parecer.

Y cuanto a la primer dubda, si es justo que se hagan esclavos de rescate en esta tierra, digo que hasta agora yo no sé ley divina, natural, ni postiva, ni humana, eclesiastica ni cevil [sic], por donde estos naturales desta tierra, segun su condicion, sean al presente así hechos esclavos y pierdan la libertad, *rebus stantibus ut nunc*, &c.; . . .[38]

To the second question: Should there be enslavement by war, Zumárraga replied that if he were in authority, there would be none. He would exonerate the war slaves. He would prohibit war from being made against the Indians who did not first make war against the Spaniards. He said the only good war was that of the conquest of souls, through missionaries sent out as Christ sent the Apostles and disciples. Slowly the missionaries would penetrate among the Indians, build churches and win them bit by bit. He was against a sudden intrusion.

A la segunda dubda, si se harán esclavos de guerra, digo que si tuviese poder haría que no se pudiesen hacer, y esto sería excusando y aun vedando hacer guerra a los indios que no nos la hacen, y nunca han entendido ni aun quizá oído de la fe, y creyendo que la buena guerra o conquista sería la de las almas, enviando religiosos a ellos, como Cristo envió sus apostoles y

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[37] Icazbalceta, *op. cit.*, I, 120.
[38] *Ibid.*, III, 90—91.

discípulos, de paz, que poco a poco penetrasen sus tierras y moradas yendo edificando iglesias, y no entrando de golpe entre ellos . . .[39]

The thorniest problem in the Spanish economic and social organization of New Spain in the days of Zumárraga was that of the encomienda. In this connection two terms are generally used: repartimiento and encomienda. The former referred to the Indians given in the first instance to the Spaniards after they had conquered a province; the latter, connoted the entrusting (encomendar) anew to another person of Indians that had previously been apportioned. In time the terms repartimiento and encomienda came to be synonymous.

Por *repartir* se entendía dar la primera vez los indios a los españoles cuando se conquistaba una provincia *encomendar* era conceder de nuevo a otra persona los que, habiendo sido antes repartidos, quedaban después vacos por cualquier motivo; mas con el tiempo vinieron a ser sinónimos ambos términos.[40]

"As early as 1509 the Crown had established that the encomienda might not be inherited, but was to escheat to the Crown upon the death of its holder."[41] This ruling was not consistently enforced. By a cédula of June 20, 1523, the Crown prohibited encomiendas in New Spain. It ordered Cortés to revoke any such rights that he may have granted or established for himself or anyone else in the land.

En España continuaba la aversión a los repartimientos y no tardó Cortés en hallarse aqui con una cédula real dada en Valladolid a 20 de junio de 1523, en que se le prohíbia repartir o encomendar indios y se le mandaba que si habia hecho algunas de esas mercedes, las revocase.[42]

On this point also, the best known authority on the subject in English says:

. . . the Crown itself, in the instructions issued to the *visitador* Ponce de Leon, had recognized the injustice and hardship of leaving the widows and children of deceased encomenderos destitute, and gave him permission to make such disposition of titles as seemed prudent. The practice of allowing widows and children to inherit was further legalized (in Cuba, at least) by cedulas of 1528, 1529 and 1532. The first Audiencia, on the other hand, had been instructed to incorporate in the Crown all encomiendas which should become vacant upon the death of their holders. The second Audiencia reversed this procedure . . . The Council of the Indies now legalized the matter generally. It was the royal will, stated the famous Ley de Sucesion

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[39] *Ibid.*, III, 91. In a note on page 90, the editor says that this letter to the Viceroy is undated but probably belongs to the year 1536.

[40] *Ibid.*, I, 213.

[41] Lesley Byrd Simpson, *The Encomienda in New Spain* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1950), 114.

[42] Icazbalceta, *op. cit.*, 212—213.

of 1536, that the encomenderos should settle permanently in their encomien-das — which they would do the more readily if they knew that upon their death their widows and children would be provided for . . .

The Law of 1536 was clearly encouragement to the encomenderos to look upon their titles as proved, at least for two "lives". There is certainly no hint that the Council was contemplating the drastic Article 35 of the New Laws of 1542 which incorporated all encomiendas in the Crown at the death of their holders. It is easy to see why the vacillation of the Crown in this and other matters was one of the most trying aspects of all government of the Indies.[43]

This brings us to the New Laws. They were the result of a meeting held at the home of Pedro Gutierrez de Leon, near San Pedro. Cardinal Loaysa, a Dominican friar and the President of he Council, was present. Present, too, were Fuenleal, who had been temporarily president of the Audiencia of Mexico, Las Casas, and a number of others. The object of the New Laws was the abolition of the encomienda system, and Indian slavery in all its forms. There was no new idea in the pseudo New Laws. What they attempted had been attempted before. They were rather a reiteration of previous laws on the question of general Indian policy, succinctly and forcefully presented. The Emperor signed his name to them at Barcelona on November 20, 1542, and emendations were made on June 4 of the following year. The result of the New Laws, had they been put into effect rigorously, would have been to deprive most Spaniards of their livelihood. "La ejecución completa de las Leyes quitaba los medios de subsistencia a la mayor parte de los españoles."[44]

Francisco Tello de Sandoval, the Archbishop of Toledo, was sent to Mexico to put the laws into effect. The Spaniards knew the purpose of his visit before his arrival. To show their profound opposition to the New Laws, it was even proposed to meet Sandoval dressed in mourning but the plan was abandoned through the prudent action of the Viceroy. Sandoval soon became aware of the strong feeling that prevailed and he admits he feared sedition. Zumárraga, always a prudent man, came to his aid by proposing to the Spaniards, who were in a rebellious mood, that Archbishop Sandoval would clarify the whole issue in a sermon, on the Feast of the Annunciation. He thus succeeded in restoring a measure of calm. Mendoza and Zumárraga, whose influence was great, proposed that a commission of the provincials of the three orders of Franciscans, Dominicans and Augustinians be sent to Spain to plead the cause of New Spain before the Emperor himself. Accordingly, Fray

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[43] Simpson, *op. cit.*, 114—115.
[44] Icazbalceta, *op. cit.*, I, 239.

Juan de San Roman, an Augustinian; Fray Francisco de Soto, a Franciscan, and Fray Domingo de la Cruz, a Dominican, each with a companion, set out from Mexico on June 17, 1544. They found the Emperor in Flanders. The Franciscan provincial took ill and had to remain in Seville.

The New Laws, which had been mainly the work of Las Casas "Obra habían sido de fray Bartolomé de Las Casas, si no en todo, a lo menos en su mayor parte,"[45] did not result in open rebellion in New Spain, due to the timely intervention of Zumárraga, who had diplomatically avoided the tragedy through his advize to Sandoval.

> Acudió en su ayuda el señor Zumárraga, que nunca dejaba de intervenir cuando se trataba de poner paz, y esforzó las razones del visitador.[46]

In Peru, where the laws were put into effect, the result was the death of many, including that of the viceroy. In Central America, where an Audiencia was set up to facilitate the execution of the laws, the president, a man of Las Casas' own choice, loudly remonstrated against the impractical nature of the laws to Las Casas himself, who, after an uprising, had to abandon his bishopric, which he later resigned.[47]

It is interesting to note that Simpson says of Las Casas:

> Long after most of the abuses which he attacked had been greatly modified by more humane laws and easier economic conditions, and after the encomienda had been reduced from a thin disguise for slavery into something like a social system, Las Casas was still attacking it as if nothing had changed since the dreadful days of Cuba and Española.[48]

In regard to the statement of Professor Hanke that Las Casas and his New Laws set in motion a revolutionary change in American Society comparable to that of Copernicus in the astronomical sphere,[49] Simpson adds that Professor Hanke is inclined to give more weight to Las Casas than the circumstances seem to guarantee and that as to Las Casas and Copernicus having created similar revolutions, this is a "somewhat unexpected asseveration."[50]

Zumárraga, who recommended that the Indians be placed in perpetual encomienda, has been severely and unjustly criticized because of the abuses of the encomenderos. He did not mean by it that the encomienda system itself was to be retained in perpetuity. What he recommended was something quite different. It had become customary to

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[45] *Ibid.*, I, 245.   [46] *Ibid.*, I, 241.   [47] *Ibid.*, I, 246.
[48] Simpson, *op. cit.*, 49.
[49] Lewis Hanke, *Bartolomé de Las Casas* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1951), 33.
[50] Simpson, *op. cit.*, 193, n. 6.

assign Indians to different encomiendas as needed. Zumárraga pointed out that if the same Indians remained under one and only one during the time they were put in trust and were required to work for him alone, the encomendero would be inclined to take better care of his Indians. If an encomendero had Indians for but a brief period only, he was inclined to work them to the limit during the time he had them, so as to get the most out of them. Whereas, if they were in perpetual encomienda, that is, under one encomendero only, the Indians would receive much better treatment.

> . . . viendo que cada día les mudan señores, no tienen sosiego ni amor, ni quieren servir a quien los tienen encomendados, por guardar lo que tienen para otro senor que les dan otro día . . .[51]

Zumárraga was also opposed to a double income for Spaniards at the expense of the Crown. If a person held an encomienda, then, according to Zumárraga, he should not be on the imperial payroll also, and vice versa.[52]

As time goes on, Zumárraga will grow in stature, for his many beneficient labors among the Indians. Though he has been misunderstood, his name bids fair to endure, increasing in favor. "It would be difficult to name a more important figure in the early history of New Spain than Bishop Zumárraga."[53] This is particularly true as regards Indian policy.

He has been accused of destroying idols, paintings and manuscripts. How many idols did he destroy? No one knows. Nor can any reasonable person have expected him to spend his time preserving them. That he destroyed paintings and manuscripts cannot be substantiated. Torquemada has been the only one of his contemporaries to have accused him of it.[54]

Consistent with his genuine desire to improve the condition of the Indians, Zumárraga's introduction of the printing press into Mexico and the New World should not be overlooked. Besides contracting for the first printers, he financially aided the first publications. Of the fourteen works printed between 1539 and 1548, ten were ordered by him.[55] The oldest complete book printed in America that is extant today is the *Doctrina Breve* compiled by Bishop Zumárraga and published at his expense in the City of Mexico, on June 14, 1544. From a printer's

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[51] Icazbalceta, *op. cit.*, II, 234.
[52] *Ibid.*, II, 235.
[53] *Simpson, op. cit.*, 214.
[54] Fr. Fidel de J. Chauvet, O.F.M., *Fray Juan de Zumárraga, O.F.M.* (Mexico, 1948), 297.
[55] Chauvet, *op. cit.*, 298.

viewpoint, the makeup of the book is marvelous. It illustrates the zeal of the Bishop in bringing Christianity and civilization to the natives of Mexico.[56]

Zumárraga strongly advocated the translation of the Sacred Scriptures into the native languages, an argument fully in accord with the position of the Catholic Church.[57]

He founded the first college of higher studies in America, that of Santa Cruz at Tlaltelolco, within walking distance of Mexico City, officially and solemnly opened on January 6, 1536,[58] a hundred years before Harvard opened its doors. He fostered education for both Indian boys and girls, and many schools had been built alongside the churches and monasteries, before the formal opening of this college. He helped to plan the University of Mexico, founded in 1551.

Zumárraga built hospitals, the most notable of which was that of Amor Dei, for the care of syphilitics. He attached enough importance to the development of the silk industry that he requested the coming of moriscos from Granada to undertake teaching the Indians how to go about the work.[59]

It would be unfair to close without giving an inkling of his tremendous energy in administering spiritually to the Indians. That, after all, was his prime purpose in being in the Indies. In a letter to the Emperor, dated May 30, 1548 (he died on June 3, 1548), he stated that he had confirmed for forty consecutive days and that over four hundred thousand had been confirmed. His friends had said that it would be the death of him.[60]

On May 24, he was taken quite ill. A short time previously he had spent four days confirming in a place called Tepelaoztoc. The number confirmed: 14,000! It is to be wondered whether any other bishop in the entire world, from apostolic times on down through the centuries of the Christian era, has equalled him in the number of his confirmations.

Zumárraga, made an archbishop prior to his death, had accomplished much in the eighteen years he had labored in the New World. He was now an octogenarian. In dying, he called for his bosom friend, the saintly Dominican friar, Fray Domingo de Betanzos, his confessor and counsellor, in whose arms he died. After almost twenty years of fruitful

[56] Zumárraga, *The Doctrina Breve*, 14—16.
[57] Robert Ricard, *La Conquista Espiritual de México* (Mexico, 1947), 150, n. 102.
[58] Francisco Borgia Steck, O.F.M., *El Primer Colegio de América, Santa Cruz de Tlaltelolco* (Mexico, 1944), 13.
[59] J. Ignacio Davila Garibi, *Zumárraga* (Mexico, 1948), 23.
[60] Icazbalceta, *op. cit.*, III, 274.

labor in distant Mexico, where he had been a true father to the Indians for whom he constantly pleaded, he died, as one author tells us:

> . . . primer arzobispo de nuestra metropolitana de México, fundador de su iglesia y padre amorosísimo de los indios . . .[61]

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The conquest of Granada by the Catholic Kings, Ferdinand and Isabella, dealt a hard blow to Mohammedanism, which was as powerful a foe of Christian civilization in that day as Communism is to the whole world in our times. It signalled the end of the power of the infidel in southwestern Europe. It was the climax of a relentless struggle between the Cross and the Crescent that dated back almost eight hundred years. The hordes of Mohammed had swept across Spain and beyond the Pyrenees into southern France. Its whirlwind advance had been checked by Charles Martel at the Battle of Poitiers in 732. From that date, the Islamic forces began to recede. The tug of war continued until Catholic Spain reconquered its last foot of soil from the invader whose ancestors had poured into the country from across the Strait of Gibraltar centuries before.

But Europe was not entirely free of Mohammedanism by the ultimate victory of Spain. The Turks had become followers of Mohammed and Constantinople had fallen to their prowess in 1453. Slowly, they edged into southeastern Europe, remaining a constant menace to European Christians. Mohammedan power still held in its possession all of northern Africa. Wittingly or otherwise, the progress of the Moslem, from its inception, took the form of a pincers movement. The left jaw of the pincers was turned back by Spain; the right jaw kept moving from the Bosporus Straits inward along the eastern reaches of the main continent of Europe. The area occupied by the Mohammedans was in the shape of their own symbol, the crescent, whose base was in northern Africa and whose two horns extended upwards at both ends of southern Europe. Spain's victory in Granada did not crush the power of Mohammedanism completely, but did shear the crescent of one of its horns. This achievement brought rejoicing as far away as Merrie England. Henry VII, the Catholic sovereign of Catholic England, ordered public thanksgiving to be offered in his realm, which was devoted to the Faith.

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[61] *Apéndice al Diccionario universal de historia y de geografía*, III, 1130.

Prior to the conquest of Granada, Spain was a divided country: part Moorish, and part Christian, with one part hostile to the other. It was the Korea of its day. Like a house divided, Spain could not endure in that sad predicament. With the fall of Granada the Catholic Kings had taken the first long step in safeguarding the unity of Christian Spain. The conquered Moors, a minority, were given honorable and generous terms under which they continued to live as Moors in that Christian land.

Hardly had the enervating, ten-year Moorish War been concluded when Isabella consented to aid Christopher Columbus in his daring adventure. Like the Queen, Columbus too was a person of deep Faith. Divine Providence used them both as instruments in bringing the Faith which they prized to a countless number of natives across the seas, where idolatry was rife and human sacrifice was taking a heavy toll of native human life.

Queen Isabella was faced with the necessity of making a tremendous decision. It was her Kingdom of Castile that had sponsored Columbus, the unforgettable mariner. She was the Queen of the new lands discovered. As sovereign she would have to decide on the policy to be pursued in respect to the natives of the New World. New territories were being discovered daily along the shores of western Africa and its inhabitants were being sold into slavery. Not only were the African Negroes committed to slavery without a qualm, but captives of war, regardless of color or creed, were likewise generally considered slaves to be bought and sold. Slavery was not an uncommon practice. Columbus himself did not think it amiss to sell the natives of the New World into slavery. His view was the prevailing one of those days. It was the trend of the times; no one was shocked by the action of Columbus. Normally, in accordance with the spirit of the times, it seemed that the Indians would be doomed to servitude.

Fortunately for the Indians, it was Queen Isabella who reigned in Castile. First and foremost, it is to her that the Indians are indebted for the humane policy adopted towards them. It was Isabella, the Catholic, who decreed that the lowly people of the New World were not to be enslaved. She forbade their enslavement. More than that, she ordered that they be civilized and Christianized. This Indian policy is contained in the codicil of her last will and testament, her final official act, which was dictated for she no longer had strength to write. The highest authority in the realm of Castile had acted officially and forcefully in behalf of the least in the kingdom, at any rate the most defenseless, the latest and newest addition to the kingdom. Although she could hardly have been

expected in a few brief years to have plotted a precise course of action, she did, however, set the general direction to be followed, much to the dismay of many. For in acting as she did, Queen Isabella broke an established tradition of enslavement.

Spanish policy toward the natives fell within her jurisdiction. The conversion of the natives was a spiritual matter on which she consulted Alexander VI, who had become Pope the same year of the New World's discovery. Isabella was willing to recognize his authority in matters pertaining to the soul of the natives. In May of 1493, Alexander VI, issued a number of bulls in rapid succession detailing aspects pertinent to the conversion of the natives, in all of which Queen Isabella readily acquiesced, as was her wont in matters strictly spiritual. The Pope reminded the Queen that in virtue of the sacrament of Baptism she had an obligation, as all Catholics, to exert energies toward the conversion of the natives. Since she was Queen her obligation was commensurate with her position of influence and authority. Here is a point too often lost sight of by many historians.

It was thus Spanish Indian policy in America began to be laid. Insofar as the policy was authorized in Spain and administered by Spaniards it was Spanish. But the underlying principles were in consonance with the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount. To the extent that these principles were Christian, and not given to purely administrative matters, the policy of the Crown transcended the confines of Spain and was universally applicable and wholesome. It was the Queen of Faith who knew her mind that established the basis of a kindly, humane and just Indian policy. She was strengthened and encouraged in her convictions by the fervent and learned Cardinal Ximénez, the Franciscan friar, whom the Queen brought out of the obscurity of monastic life into the council halls of Spain. He, too, was wholeheartedly interested in both the spiritual and the material welfare of the natives. That distance and the human frailties of Spanish officials and settlers alike too often failed to carry out this humane policy is no fault of the Queen or her successors.

It is unfair of Reginald Merton, it seems to the writer, for him to affirm that neither the Queen nor the Cardinal had any concern for the Indians except for their souls, that the corporal welfare of the natives meant little or nothing in their scale of Spanish values. The Queen's vital concern in the corporal welfare of the natives is forcefully evidenced in her adamant stand in defense of their freedom, in her declaration that as her free vassals they were to be treated as human beings. The Cardinal's

similar concern is obvious in the Jeronymite mission which he sent to better the lot of the natives. The mission dealt explicitly with the material improvement of the Indians.

The overall policy of Spain toward the Indians as found in laws, cédulas and ordinances demonstrates a ready willingness on the part of the Crown to be just and fair to its subjects overseas. That there were faults and failings, some of grave consequences, cannot be gainsaid. But no one can reasonably contend that Spain's laws were not generally good and sound. That they were not always put into execution does not constitute a devastating argument against Spanish Indian policy, so excellently conceived. It is a tribute to Spain that there is general agreement that her laws regulating the Indies were good. Solorzano, Ots Capdequí and Antonio Zinny are agreed, as many others, that Spain's Indian policy was reasonably and fairly grounded.

In the course of this study we have tried to show the absence of a sound basis for the many criticisms leveled against Spain and her rulers. The Crown, while exacting a sternly just policy of the encomenderos, made exceptions in its own favor and opened the door to abuses, some say. Others charge that the Indians ought to have been left free to roam at will, unmolested and unrestrained by the Crown. Had no restraint of any kind been applied there could have been no civilization nor any Christianization of the natives. These twin objectives, the basis of Spanish Indian policy made reasonable restraints inescapable to effect the ends desired. Restraints are justifiable for the preservation of any organized and ordered society. The Spanish Crown had no recourse but to subject the natives to the rule of law, if Spanish colonization was to take root, or if any kind of development was to be realized.

Still others would blame the Crown for having successfully Christianized the natives. They seem to evince a sense of regret that the Indians were brought within the fold of Christianity. This school of thought would have preferred that the natives linger in the darkness of idolatry and paganism. Their preference is paganism in the sacred but misunderstood sense of liberty and freedom. If the doctrine of Christ, the Light of the world, has no meaning, then such a stand is understandable.

Another school of thought has attempted to leave the impression that Christianity did violence to the consciences of the pagans. The pagans should have been allowed to follow their own bents and whims, whether morally right or wrong. What right had anyone to impose a new law upon them, or any law for that matter, they ask. On the surface,

this type of reasoning appears plausible. But the fact of birth, in which the newly born has absolutely no choice, imposes inescapable obligations.

The work of the missionaries was to uproot what was evil in the light of Christianity. It was much more than that, however, in a broader sense. The mission of these educated and saintly men was to propagate Christianity and reorganize native society to correspond to the higher Christian order. They were not destroyers; they were builders. They recognized that paganism had its values, that pagans were not thoroughly vicious. The approach of the missionaries was sound. They knew only too well that the supernatural work, which was their prime mission, was to be built upon the natural, which they could hardly destroy entirely, if they were to build upon it. We have tried to show that it was the missionaries who insisted that the Indians were human beings, made to the image and likeness of God, the same as every other mortal; that it was the missionaries who accepted the natives as their brothers, realizing that all men have a common Father in heaven; that it was the missionaries who defended the Indians, declaring that they had souls, minds, intellects; that they had feelings, emotions and sentiments and were as human as other men and were not to be maltreated; that it was the missionaries who sought to direct the Indians, with all their God-given gifts, into channels that would elevate them above their pagan level; that it was the missionaries who urged the building of schools and hospitals, who introduced the printing press and had the first books published; that it was the missionaries who educated the natives, and did it so well, that within a single generation of their coming, they were intellectually equipped to teach their own people and even the sons of Spaniards. We have shown that it was the missionaries who won the affection and regard of the Indians. An acquaintance with the apostolic labors of Motolinía, Sahagún and Zumárraga reveals that they, like so many other hundreds of missionaries, did not content themselves with drawing up regulations to be enforced by others on behalf of the Indians. They were missionaries who went down among the Indians and lived their simple life, teaching them by example as well as precept. They stayed with the Indians and did not abandon them when the going became difficult. There is ample proof that the missionaries were beloved by the Indians, and this alone speaks volumes in their favor. The missionaries attracted the natives freely to the Catholic Faith.

The civilizing influences of the Spaniards are inestimable. They brought the natives a knowledge of the arch and the wheel; they taught them the alphabet; they enriched their lives by bringing them domesticat-

ed animals and beasts of burden; they added a rich variety of foods to the fertile fields of the New World; and they instructed the peoples of the Americas in the arts and sciences.

Spanish Indian policy was an enlightened one, we have tried to show, despite all the bitter critism levelled against it. Revolutions in the independent period have overturned social and economic institutions time and again. But the Church, the work of the missionaries, still survives. The Christian Faith took a ferm hold in the domains once ruled by Spain. This is Spain's glory. Spain lost her colonies, but her one-time empire has retained the richest pearl of the Spanish crown, the Catholic Faith. The language of the conquistadores is spoken still in the lands they wrested from paganism. Evidences of Spanish culture and civilization endure to this day wherever Spaniards trod, reminders of the sincerity of the spiritual and cultural conquest. The Christian heritage of Spain lives on in spite of all the critics of Spain.

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11. *Living Stones. Meditations on the Meaning of the Franciscan Vocation* by Philotheus Boehner. At press.

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